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Introduction
How I conducted this China Study
As early as forty years ago, Chinese leader Mao Zedong said in his work “Ren
de zhenque sixiang shi cong nali laide?”(“Where do correct ideas come from?”):
“Where do correct ideas come from? Do they drop from the sky? No. Are they
innate in the mind? No. They come from social practices and from them alone.
They come from three kinds of social practices, the struggle for production, the
class struggle and scientific experiments. It is man’s social being that deter-
mines his thinking.” He also said: “Correct knowledge can be arrived at only
after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness and
then back to matter, that is, leading from practice to knowledge and then back
to practice. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge, the dialectical materialist
theory of knowledge.”1
Our correct understanding of China’s national conditions and their develop-
ment needs a repeated process of practice, understanding and reflection. The
practice of the Chinese people is the greatest social practice in human history.
More than one billion Chinese people are engaging in the greatest reform and
opening-up practice in an area of 9.6 million square kilometers of land and
three million square kilometers of territorial waters with a dozen countries as
its neighbors. The study of Chinese national conditions (or China Studies as it
is called outside China) takes this great practice as the subject of study. Such
study needs a repeated processing of knowledge, from perceptual to theoretical
and from theoretical back to practice, to see which theories or policies can
achieve the anticipated results, thus providing the correct guidance to China’s
practice of reform and opening up, and stimulating China’s development.
Over the past half-century, three generations of Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong,
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, and Chinese intellectuals and scholars, have
been ceaselessly probing into such problems as: Is socialist modernization neces-
sary to a developing country with a long history, large population and vast
territory with great regional disparities? What kind of socialist modernization
should be realized? Can China realize modernization? How should China realize
socialist modernization with distinct Chinese features? China’s socialist modern-
ization is a unique process based on China’s basic national conditions. The
more we know about the basic characteristics of China and its peculiarities
(especially factors restricting development), the fewer policy errors we shall
make and the fewer will be the economic and political prices to be paid. The
more thoroughly we master the law governing China’s economic development
and the more comprehensively we sum up our development experience and
lessons, the more capable we shall be in knowing and directing future devel-
opment. But it not easy to attain a true understanding of China, as China has
not only a time-honored history, but also a rich cultural tradition, and is in the
process of unrivaled social transformations and rapid economic development.
I regard studying China and understanding China and its development not
only as my life-long career and research direction but also as my biggest pursuit
and enjoyment in life. China is the most populous country in the world and its
reform and development constitute the greatest social practice in human history.
The study of its national conditions has the most extensive social bases and
social demands, and it can bring extensive social impacts. I have found the path
of my life in my academic career. Its real implications are to grow with China’s
development, to keep company with China’s opening up, to advance with China’s
reform and to live with the prosperity of the country.
For this purpose, I founded the Center for China Studies of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 1999. In the same year, CAS-Tsinghua Center
for China Studies was established with Tsinghua University. The center aimed
to become one of the most influential public policy study centers and think-
tanks for high-level policy and decision-making.
In February 1998, I published the first China Studies Report entitled “Wei
renmin chuangzao gongzuo: zhongguo de shiye wenti yu jiuye zhanlue”, which
discussed China’s unemployment and employment strategies. It caught the atten-
tion of then Premier Zhu Rongji and Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo, who attached
important commentaries on my report. I was greatly encouraged and was deter-
mined to make the China Studies Reports an information platform for collecting
and sorting out major information about China’s national conditions and estab-
lishing a national conditions policy-making databank to promote national
conditions studies and education and to train senior researchers in public poli-
cies. By June 2005, we had published over 750 issues of China Studies Reports,
which served as background material for central and local leaders in their reform
and management, and introduced the views and recommendations of foreign
experts on China’s economic development.
The country’s central leadership has paid close attention to the China Studies
Reports and some recommendations were adopted in their decision-making. 
As a result, the influence of the China Studies Reports has increased and greater
social benefits have been achieved. According to related statistics, fifty-seven
issues of China Studies Reports and decision-making information have been
submitted to the Party Central Committee and State Council and senior lead-
ership have made sixty-two commentaries, among which fifty commentaries
were made by Premiers of the State Council. China Studies Reports have played
a very important role in influencing policy decision-making, reflecting the
national economy and people’s livelihood, disseminating policy-making know-
ledge.
2 Economic and social transformation in China
Great changes have taken place in China’s political policy decision mecha-
nism concerning the economic and social transformation of the country. In the
Mao Zedong era, most of the major policy decisions were made by himself,
such as the launching of the Great Cultural Revolution, establishing of the third
defense line, and the restoration of Sino–US relations. That was a period of
personal decision-making. In the Deng Xiaoping era, apart from displaying the
core role of Deng Xiaoping, the Party’s collective leadership became increas-
ingly important. That may be regarded as a collective policy decision-making
era. Since the 1990s, the policy decision-makers are listening more and more
to the experts. This has provided us with a good opportunity for becoming
involved in policy and decision-making.
China is very special in its economy and society. In the process of modern-
ization, China has met such great difficulties, so many contradictions and such
complicated problems that they are not easy to understand or resolve. At present,
China is presented with many development opportunities, but also unavoidable
challenges. In a word, the uncertainty of risks and the incompleteness of know-
ledge about the development of China and the world have added to the difficulties
and complexity of policy decisions.
On June 24, 2002, at an economic experts conference on Chinese economic
polices chaired by Premier Zhu Rongji, I made a policy recommendation of
“liberating the peasants for the third time”, namely, to liberate the peasants,
invest in peasants, transfer peasants, reduce the number of peasants and make
peasants rich. Looking back at past events we would find that the leaders who
had a profound understanding of agriculture, peasants and rural issues usually
made better, more suitable policies as they were most closely based on the
national conditions. They have therefore given a big push to China’s develop-
ment, because only the reforms that benefit the overwhelming majority of the
population can be regarded as true reforms. Likewise, only those scholars who
have made a profound study of agriculture, peasants and rural issues have
achieved real academic attainment, because their knowledge has benefited the
people, especially peasants.
After studying China’s population, resources, environment, grain and eco-
nomic development as a whole for a long time, I have arrived at two major
understandings. First, the difficulties and crises China has met in its long-term
development are more serious and complicated than we have imagined, and
that has deepened our knowledge and understanding of the socio-economic
reasons and underlying contexts for China’s reform and development. Secondly,
solutions for overcoming the difficulties and crises are more difficult and more
arduous than we have imagined. It is hard to find a panacea.
It is, therefore, necessary to mobilize to the maximum and utilize more ratio-
nally all kinds of resources and forces of society to push forward the reform
and modernization process fruitfully, firmly and forcefully; there is no going
backwards. Meanwhile, it is necessary to tell the people what is really happening,
helping the people of the entire country, especially the intellectual stratum, to
understand how the sense of backwardness and the sense of crisis concomitant
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to the process of opening up to the outside world will clash with the national-
istic consciousness of self-confidence and the sense of self-improvement. This
will give rise to a common understanding of the long-term nature, arduousness
and painfulness of reform and development. It is necessary to prepare the people
for a long, hard struggle to get out of crises and difficulties so as to revitalize
the Chinese nation in the twenty-first century.
My basic understanding of China’s national conditions is that we should be
neither blindly optimistic nor pessimistic about the prospects of China’s future
development. Instead, we should take a cautiously upbeat attitude. In the future,
we should follow neither radical revolutionary means nor conservative reformist
ways. Rather, we should opt for incremental development. We should imitate
neither the ways of Western developed countries, nor the traditional modern-
ization models of the former Soviet Union and other socialist countries, nor
should we continue along the original models already traversed by China. Rather,
we should opt for a unique model of socialist modernization and development
best suited to China’s national conditions.
People ask me why my recommendations were adopted by the central author-
ities not long after they were put forward. Policy decision-making by the central
authorities is never economic policy decision-making pure and simple, but
economic and political policy decision-making. China’s economic problems
cannot be studied simply from economic perspectives. Instead, we must study
them from the social angle and – especially – from the political angle. I have
always held that the regional gap is not only an economic issue, but is or has
been a political issue. That is why I approach the issue not merely from the
economic perspective as a simple geographical issue, but deal with the issue
both from economic and political perspectives.
An economist is an “engineer” who brings benefits to mankind. As an intel-
lectual, his biggest contribution to mankind is knowledge. Compared with other
scientists and intellectuals, an economist has more opportunities and better condi-
tions for making such contributions. Economics itself is a way of “governing
and benefiting the people” by exploring ways of creating wealth. Economic
growth theories study why some countries grow faster than others. An econo-
mist does not study how to create wealth for individuals, but how to do so for
the people and the country. What he provides is a kind of “public good”, namely
“knowledge,” which has a strong externality and benefits others and the society.
Many issues in China cannot be resolved without approaching them politi-
cally. Only when an issue provokes a response from big shots in the policy
decision-making process and is turned into public policies, is it possible to
finally arrive at a common understanding and resolution of problems. Over the
years, the central policy decision-makers have become more and more atten-
tive to the views of experts and common people alike. This is known as making
policy decision-making more scientific and more democratic. To make the
Chinese nation prosper and the motherland strong is both the goal of my life-
long struggle and the purpose of my academic studies. What I am concerned
about are the problems concerning the common people, such as layoff problems,
4 Economic and social transformation in China
social security problems, peasant income problems, poverty in areas inhabited
by minority people, and inflation.
Most scholars follow the principle of division of labor. When one studies
economic issues, he would never touch upon politics. When one studies macro-
economic problems, he would never touch upon microeconomic issues; when
one studies the economy of the United States, he would not care about the
economy of Japan. However, my stories are closely associated with China’s
reform and opening up because I study China’s national conditions and there-
fore I must start from the hot issues, the difficult and disputable issues that are
in need of urgent solution for economic and social development. What I focus
on are the most important issues concerning the development and progress 
of the entire society instead of limiting myself to any particular discipline or
theoretical problems.
I hold that an outstanding scholar must lead the social tide instead of just
flowing with it. Both scholars and leaders can lead the social tide and promote
social development. The difference lies in the fact that scholars lead society by
relying on correct ideas and correct views. When the public agrees and accepts
our ways, correct thinking and views will play their leading role. Leaders,
however, standardize the behavior of the people by taking advantage of state
authority, which may be persuasive and coercive. But how to lead the tide? 
I think this depends on whether or not we can obtain new knowledge. This
requires international exchange. It also depends on knowing, absorbing, under-
standing and accumulating the best knowledge already known to mankind. Here,
the personal knowledge-holding capacity plays a crucial role. Thirdly, it depends
on the localization of international knowledge.
I often quote the latest research achievements in the world. After the World
Bank published its World Development Report: Knowledge for Development
in 1998, I came out with China’s knowledge development strategy for the
twenty-first century, which is regarded as the third generation of the catching-
up strategy. Mao Zedong’s heavy industrialization can be regarded as the first
generation of the catching-up strategy, which was not very successful. Deng
Xiaoping’s reform and opening up may be regarded as the second generation
of the catching-up strategy, which was relatively successful. The knowledge
development strategy should become a new catching-up strategy to answer the
challenges of economic globalization and the development of information tech-
nology. I have not only put forward the general strategy for China, but also
analyzed the regional gaps in knowledge development, thus evolving the new
catching-up strategy for various regions, that is, the knowledge development
strategy.
The study of national conditions often touches upon the most sensitive issues
and those at the forefront of political and economic reform, and the recom-
mendations raised are often forceful and forward-looking. The sharp mastery
of the political and economic situation has made my study strikingly synchro-
nized with policy adjustments. It is exactly these acute innovations that have
influenced the policy decision-making process and the society as a whole, thus
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realizing my academic purpose of “being eager to meet the urgent needs of the
state and thinking as the state thinks” established at the outset of my entry into
the field of national conditions study.
In April 1996, the US Newsweek magazine called my economic policy recom-
mendations a Chinese New Deal. The Japanese World Affairs Weekly carried
my “Report on Regional Gaps in China” in its April 9, April 16 and April 23
issues, and called it the boldest and the most clear-cut exposition in recent years
to provide Japanese readers with a comprehensive picture of the regional gaps
in China. On September 15, 1997, the US Time magazine (Asian edition) said
that “Hu openly demands policies to close the gaps between rich and poor
regions.” The American China Economic Studies described the “Report on
China’s State Capabilities” coauthored by myself and Wang Shaoguang of the
Political Department of Yale University as “one of the most influential and also
the most disputed literatures concerning China’s economy in recent years.”
Each era has its unique economic environment and also its unavoidable
economic crises. Economists are “the wise ones” who understand and solve
these economic issues. Although there have been no fundamental changes in
the basic principles of economics, economists are able to use these principles
flexibly and creatively to know and analyze crises and actively cope with chal-
lenges. Economists play an indispensable social role in different countries or
during different periods of time in a country. They are probably the first to
witness economic and social crises and they are the experts in handling these
crises.
My policy recommendations proved influential for state policy decision-
making. It is not because I have any particular political background or personal
connections, but because my policy and what I have studied, political or
economic, and even the most sensitive political issues, are all closely associ-
ated with the fundamental, long-term and maximum interests of 1.3 billion
people. I am not only very clear about where their interests lie but also very
clear about how to enable policy decision-makers to understand this through
my China Studies Reports. At the same time, I have the idea of “telling the
people and the whole society what is right.” I believe that policy decision-
makers are rational and wise enough; and I believe ever more that the people
and society are capable enough to tell what is right and what is wrong.
Take the government unemployment and employment policies and strategies
for example. As early as 1997 I made it very clear that the first and foremost
tasks for economic development after the first successful soft landing of the
macro economy were to expand employment and reduce the unemployment
rate. Since then, I have constantly alerted the policy decision-makers and the
whole society to the biggest challenge China would face in the twenty-first
century – that it had entered the high unemployment stage, as in one of my
research reports entitled “Kuaru xinshiji de zuida tiaozhan: woguo jinru gaoshiye
jieduan” (The Greatest Challenge Entering the Twenty-First Century: China
Enters the High Unemployment Stage) (1999). The central economic confer-
ences and government work reports later all arrived at the basic judgment that
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“China’s employment pressure is mounting,” until in September 2002, Jiang
Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji described China’s employment situation as “very
grave.” In November 2002, President Jiang Zemin in his report to the Sixteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party clearly pointed out that to increase
employment was a key and difficult task for us at present and in the long run.
The government will adopt long-term policies and strategies to increase employ-
ment.2 This is one example of how my policy researches and recommendations
directly influenced the formation of central government policies.
China’s reform and opening up have attracted worldwide attention. All the
new problems encountered in the course of reform and development need rational
analysis and solutions using the principles of economics. This has provided our
new generation of scholars with a vast stage for carrying out academic studies.
We are lucky to live in this era, in which we may make contributions to society
by obtaining, innovating, spreading and exchanging knowledge. I will continue
my studies, as there will always be new challenges and new issues to pursue
in the course of my studies. These challenges and new issues are so inex-
haustible that I cannot pull myself away from them. To grapple with these
challenges and new issues gives me pleasure.
I believe that the spread of knowledge is not competitive. I may enlighten
you and you may also enlighten others. The important tasks of the Center for
China Studies are to obtain, absorb, innovate and spread knowledge.
In recent years, I have published a series of books on China Studies. However,
most of my researches are published in Chinese. Only a few of my researches
have been translated into English and been formally introduced to overseas
readers. In the past several years, I have participated in international sympo-
siums and seminars on various occasions and have conducted joint studies with
foreign researchers. In October 2005, I started to collect all these papers together
and printed them in an informal brochure to share with my fellow foreign
researchers. In November 2005 in South Korea, when participating in a confer-
ence sponsored by POSCO, I gave Peter Nolan one copy as a personal present.
Peter encouraged me to have it edited and formally published in English to be
made available to English readers.
This resulting book is a collection of research papers that I have presented
at international symposiums and seminars, as well as joint researches. In these
papers, I have tried to explain the sources for China’s fast economic growth,
the challenges in Chinese economic development, the costs of China’s devel-
opment and its great transformations and the transition of the focus of the
Communist Party from economic development to institution building.
The book provides a large amount of information with numerous tables and
figures. All these data demonstrate that China is experiencing four transform-
ations simultaneously, unprecedented in human history in terms of scale and
complexity: economic system transformation, a transformation from a planned
economy to a socialist market economy; social transformation, a transformation
from a traditional agricultural and rural-based society to a modern industrial and
service-based urban society; political system transformation, a transformation
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from a traditional centralized political system to a socialist democratic political
system; and an opening-up transformation, a transformation from a closed econ-
omy and society to an open economy and society. China’s transformation is a
transformation of 1.3 billion people, a transformation of 800–900 million rural
people, a transformation of 5000 years of Chinese civilization. It is unprece-
dented in Chinese history, even in world history in terms of its large-scale
population, the fast speed of transformation, the profound impacts on China and
the world, the complexity of social conflicts. I feel very much honored to have
witnessed, experienced, observed, and more importantly promoted these trans-
formations using my knowledge in China Studies accumulated over twenty years.
Generally speaking, challenges are unavoidable in such multi-dimensional
transformations, and crisis is the norm. The key in this transformation is to
respond to the challenges proactively, to identify crises timely, to emphasize
social order, and to reduce transformation costs.
The chapters in this book record how China is transforming itself, the chal-
lenges it faces, and how it is responding to these challenges. It is a record of
the history of China’s transformation and an analysis of that history, as well
as a reflection of history itself. China’s transformation is far from complete, as
new challenges will appear in the future, but through our studies we are confi-
dent that we are more active in responding to the challenges than at any other
time. To some extent, China’s model is a typical learning model: learning by
doing, doing by learning. From this perspective, this book is my personal experi-
ence of learning. To have this book published in English is to introduce my
experiences to foreign readers.
8 Economic and social transformation in China
1 Why has China’s economy
grown so fast?1
A successful catch-up paradigm of modernization
In the world as a whole, modernization of all countries is a process of mutual
association, mutual competition and mutual development. Many countries,
though they started late, have caught up with or surpassed the countries that
have led the modernization process.
In terms of modernization, there are countries that lead and countries that
lag behind, countries that are advanced and countries that are backward, coun-
tries that are catching up and countries that are left behind. In terms of
technology, countries may also be divided into innovators and pursuers as well
as leaders and imitators. By backwardness, I mean a kind of relative state of
being behind others. Countries that are left behind are the countries that are in
a state of relative backwardness. A country that is left behind is a country that
starts relatively late in launching and entering industrialization rather than a
country that is relatively backward in economic development at a certain point
of time, as Alexander Gerschenkron puts it.2
The history of modern economic development shows that there have been
four successful catch-up paradigms. One is the United States, which spent forty-
three years catching up with Britain at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. According to data from Angus Maddison, the per capita GDP of the
United States in 1820 was only 73.3 percent that of Britain, and reached 75.3
percent in 1870. Starting from 1870, the United States initiated an economic
takeoff, registering an average annual per capita GDP growth of 3.9 percent
from 1870 to 1913 as opposed to 1.9 percent in Britain over the same period.
By 1900, the US average per capita GDP rose to 89.2 percent that of Britain
and up to 105.5 percent, surpassing Britain by 1913.3
The second example is the former Soviet Union, which caught up with the
United States during the great economic depression. During 1928–1939, the
GDP growth rate of the former Soviet Union was 5.6 percent while that of the
United States was only 0.8 percent. The per capita GDP of the former Soviet
Union was 20.8 percent that of the United States in 1928 and it rose to 34.1
percent by 1939, demonstrating the catch-up effect.
The third example is Japan, which took forty years to catch up with the
United States. In 1950, the per capita GDP of Japan was 19.6 percent that of
the United States. In 1953, Japan’s GDP growth surpassed the highest level
during World War II, starting a takeoff. From 1953 to 1992, Japan’s annual
GDP growth averaged 6.5 percent while that of the United States was only 3.0
percent. By 1992, Japan’s per capita GDP amounted to 90.1 percent that of the
United States. Japan was regarded as the most successful country in the catch-
up game and it set a world record (an annual growth rate of 1.95 percent) in
increasing the per capita income in 1982–1992 by twenty-eight-fold.
The fourth example is what is known as the “four little dragons” in Asia,
which took thirty years to catch up with the developed Western countries. From
1965 to 1992, the GDP of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Taiwan Region
grew at an average annual rate of 8.8 percent. The per capita GDP of ROK
and Taiwan was only 24.3 percent and 31.4 percent that of the Western European
countries (twelve countries) respectively. But it reached 57.5 percent and 66.6
percent, respectively, by 1992 (see Table 1.1).
Why can latecomers catch up with forerunners? What are the objectives and
strategies for the catch-up game? According to Alexander Gerschenkron, back-
wardness has an advantage in so far as latecomers to industrialization enjoy
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Table 1.1 Less advanced countries catch up with advanced ones
Period GDP % in per capita GDP 




Britain 1871–1913 1.9 100.0 100.0
United States 3.9 75.3 105.5
Second catch-up
United States 1928–1939 0.8 100.0 100.0
Soviet Union 5.6 20.8 31.4
Third catch-up
United States 1953–1992 3.0 100.0 100.0
Japan 6.5 19.6 90.1
Fourth catch-up 
Western Europe (12 countries) 1965–1992 . 100.0 100.0
ROK 8.8 24.3 57.5
Taiwan Province 8.8 31.4 66.6
Fifth catch-up
Western Europe (12 countries) 1978–1995 1.74 100.0 100.0
China 7.49 9.1 19.0
Source: A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992, Paris: OECD, 1995. 
Notes: Calculation based on 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollar.
special benefits and advantages, including the introduction of technologies and
equipment from advanced countries. This is the first and foremost factor that
can ensure that countries lagging behind in industrialization gain a high-speed
growth. The substitution of R&D by technology imports can accelerate the pace
of industrialization and avoid risks. In addition, latecomers can learn from the
successful experiences of the advanced countries and draw lessons from their
setbacks. Latecomers can optimize and diversify the design of their industrial-
ization models innovatively. There is no need for them to repeat the errors
experienced by forerunners, such as “pollute first and control later.” They can
also choose a faster development path and more open development policies.
For instance, economic globalization has provided external conditions for tran-
sitional countries in the process of reform to accelerate the development of
market mechanisms. An efficient reformer learns faster than others. But how
to learn and how to ensure not being left behind depend not only on the initial
conditions, but also on the ways of learning.4 Last but not the least is the strong
sense of “catch-up.” The more backward the latecomer is, the stronger the desire
for catching up and the greater success it will achieve. The tremendous and
sudden spurt of a backward country is a “new deal” spiritually.5
According to the new economic growth theories, there are three decisive
factors that determine whether or not a poor country can catch up with a rich
country. One is the level of savings. The higher the savings rate, the faster the
per capita GDP growth rate. The second factor is the opening of the economy.
International capital inflow helps accelerate the catch-up process. The third is
the speed of technology diffusion. As the cost of imitating and using the tech-
nologies and inventions of the forerunners is much lower than the cost of
self-innovation, latecomers may overtake technically advanced countries in terms
of growth.6 The bigger the gaps in technology between the technology fore-
runners and technology importers, the greater gains the imported and imitated
products will have, thus revealing the catch-up effect. If a technology importing
country has a big economy, the gains or overflowing effect of imported tech-
nology products will demonstrate the efficiency of a big economy.
China’s economy in retrospective: from decline to rise
China is a typical latecomer in industrialization. It started late in launching
industrialization and the time for full industrialization has lagged greatly. If we
say that Europe and North America began industrialization from 1750, then
China started the process 100 to 200 years later. In other words, the official
start of industrialization in China was 1950.
China was not only late in starting industrialization, but it also started at a
very low point. The per capita income of Europe and the United States at the
time of starting industrialization was much higher than that of China. According
to the world economic history expert Angus Maddison (see Table 1.1), the per
capita GDP (1990 PPP international dollar) was US $1024 and it rose to US
$1232 in 1820. The per capita GDP of the United States was US $600 in 1700
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and US $1260 in 1820. But in China, the per capita GDP was only US $439
in 1950, much lower than the level of the United States when it started indus-
trialization in 1820.
At the beginning of the 1950s, the per capita income level of China was
much lower than that of industrialized countries in Europe and North America,
showing a tremendous development gap. In 1950, the per capita GDP in Western
Europe was 10.5 times that of China; the per capita GDP of the United States
was 21.8 times that of China; and the per capita GDP of Russia was 6.5 times
that of China. Even the per capita GDP of Japan was 4.4 times that of China
(see Table 1.2). China’s per capita GDP was also lower than that of India (US
$619). China was one of the poorest countries in the world.
Over the past half century, China’s economy has experienced rapid growth
and began to take wing in 1978. The gap between China and the developed
countries in terms of average per capita GDP has been greatly narrowed. In
1998, China’s per capita GDP was US $3117. The gap with Western European
countries narrowed to 5.8 times, the gap with the United States narrowed to
8.8 times, the gap with Japan narrowed to 6.6 times, and the gap with the world
average narrowed to 1.83 times (see Table 1.2). China demonstrates a catch-
up model in narrowing the gap with developed countries in modernization (see
Figure 1.1).
China is one of the countries with the most ancient civilization. Its devel-
opment history is unique. It has enjoyed long-term prosperity. For a considerably
long period of time, China was one of the biggest and the most economically
advanced countries in the world. Its position dropped drastically in 1820 and
reached its nadir by 1950, but it rose again from 1978.
According to the calculation by Maddison, China’s GDP was one-third 
(32.9 percent) of the world total in 1820 when it reached its peak.7 It was an 
12 Economic and social transformation in China
Table 1.2 Per capita GDP comparisons among selected economies (1820–1998)
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1978 1998
Per capita GDP (1990 Geary-Khamis Dollar, PPP)
China 600 530 552 439 839 979 3117
Japan 669 737 1387 1926 11439 12581 20413
US 1257 2445 5301 9561 16689 18373 27331
Western Europe 1232 1974 3473 4594 11,534 12674 17921
World 667 867 1510 2114 4104 4382 5709
Per capita GDP comparison (China is 1.0)
China 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Japan 1.12 1.39 2.51 4.38 13.63 12.58 6.55
US 2.10 4.61 9.60 21.8 19.89 18.77 8.77
Western Europe 2.05 3.72 6.29 10.46 13.74 12.95 5.75
World 1.11 1.64 2.74 4.82 4.89 4.48 1.83
Sources: A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; A. Maddison, The World Economy:
A Millennial Perspective, OECD: Paris, 2001, Table B–21.
Notes: Calculation based on 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars.
economically strong power in the world, followed by India, whose GDP
accounted for 16 percent of the world total. France was ranked third, Britain
fourth, Germany fifth. But in 1950, the United States ranked first, with its GDP
accounting for 27.3 percent, followed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and Germany.
China was pushed back to fifth, with its share of GDP in the world total drop-
ping to 4.5 percent. In 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union remained
the first two, with Japan ranking third and Germany fourth. China remained fifth.
In 1998, the United States stayed in first place while China rose to second, with
the share of its GDP in the world total rising to 11.5 percent. Japan was in third
place, India fourth, and Germany fifth (see Table 1.3).
China was ready for an economic takeoff period at the beginning of the
1980s. From 1978 to 2003, its GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.3
percent, far higher than the world average. China was one of the fastest growing
economies in the world during this period (see Table 1.4). In the 1980s, the
world GDP aggregate increased at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent. From
1990 to 2002, it was 2.7 percent. In the same period, China recorded the fastest
growth among the world’s major five economies (see Table 1.5). If calculated
by PPP, China’s GDP in 2002 was 12 percent of the world total, placing it
second, just behind the United States (see Table 1.6).
China’s industrialization process has accelerated to the extent that it has
become the biggest country in the world in terms of the output of manufac-
tured goods and added values. The growth of economic aggregate in China is,
to a large extent, the result of the rapid growth of industry, particularly the
manufacturing industry. From 1978 to 2003, the industrial added value grew at
an average annual rate of 11.5 percent, much higher than the world average















Figure 1.1 Per capita GDP comparisons of major countries (1870–1998)
Source: A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy; A. Maddison, The World Economy: A
Millennial Perspective, Paris: OECD, 2001, Table B–21.
growth. The world average industrial growth was 3.1 percent in the 1980s and
2.1 percent in 1990–2002. China recorded the fastest industrial growth among
the five major powers in terms of production size and added value. Calculated
by PPP, China’s industrial added value made up only 3.4 percent of the world
total in 1975, but doubled (to 6.8 percent) in 1990 and doubled again in 1995
(to 13.6 percent). By 2002, it already exceeded 20 percent (21.5 percent
precisely), when it overtook the United States and ranked first in the world (see
Table 1.7).
In a word, the past twenty-five years was a period of tremendous changes
in China. It witnessed the fastest economic growth, the accelerated speed of
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Table 1.3 Percentage of GDP of major countries in the world total (1820–1998) (%)
Countries 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998
Western Europe 23.6 33.6 33.5 26.3 25.7 20.6
Britain 5.2 9.1 8.3 6.5 4.2 3.3
France 5.5 6.5 5.3 4.1 4.3 3.4
Germany 3.8 6.5 8.8 5.0 5.9 4.3
US 1.8 8.9 19.1 27.3 22.0 21.9
Former Soviet Union 5.4 7.6 8.6 9.6 9.4 3.4
Japan 3.0 2.3 2.6 3.0 7.7 7.7
China 32.9 17.2 8.9 4.5 4.6 11.5
India 16.0 12.2 7.6 4.2 3.1 5.0
Asia 56.2 36.0 21.9 15.5 16.4 29.5
Latin America 2.0 2.5 4.5 7.9 8.7 8.8
Africa 4.5 3.6 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.1 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Table B–20.
Notes: 
1. Data for Asia do not include Japan. 
2. Calculation based on 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollar.
Table 1.4 Four fastest developing economies during different periods of time in the world
Period Country
1870s (a) Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria
1880s (a) Germany, Finland, Austria, and Denmark
1970s (a) Botswana, Malta, Singapore, and ROK
1980s (a) ROK, China, Botswana, and Thailand
1990s (b) China (10.3), Vietnam (7.9), Singapore (7.8), and Ireland (7.8)
Sources: 
(a) Data for the nineteenth century are based on the estimates by Maddison, Monitoring the World
Economy 1820–1992; data for the twentieth century are based on the estimates by the World
Bank; see M. Olson, “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Others
Poor,” Bijiao (Comparative Studies), 2003, Issue No. 7, pp. 21–38.
(b) World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 236–237.
industrialization and urbanization, and the acceleration of world economic
globalization. Unprecedented changes also took place in methods of produc-
tion, ways of living and ways of thinking, a situation that has never been seen
for thousands of years.
Sources of China’s economic growth
China entered the economic takeoff stage around 1980 and maintained high-
speed growth for a generation. What are the sources of China’s economic
growth? What determines and affects China’s economic growth? What are the
changes in its growth pattern?
Domestic and foreign studies show that since reform and opening up to the
outside world, the key to higher economic growth compared to economic growth
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Table 1.5 Economic growth comparisons of five major countries (1980–2002) (%)
Country GDP (annual) Agriculture value Industry value Service value 
Added (annual) Added (annual) Added (annual)
1980– 1990– 1980– 1990– 1980– 1990– 1980– 1990–
1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002
China 10.3 9.7 5.9 3.9 11.1 12.6 13.5 8.8
India 5.7 5.8 3.1 2.7 6.9 6.0 6.9 7.9
Japan 4.1 1.3 1.3 –2.9 4.2 0.0 4.2 2.2
Russia –2.7 –1.9 –4.5 –0.6
US 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.8 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.7
World 3.3 2.7 2.6 1.8 3.1 2.1 3.5 3.1
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Calculated using current international dollars, PPP.
Table 1.6 Comparisons of economic indicators of five major countries (2002)
Country Per capita GDP PPP % of GDP % of Industry % in 
GDPPPP (Current in world industry added world’s 
(Current inter- GDP in GDP value total 
inter- national (US $ industry 
national $) $ billion) billion) value added
China 4580 5860.9 12 51.1 2954 21.5
India 2670 2799.6 5.7 26.6 722 5.34
Japan 26940 3425 7.2 30.6 1114 7.51
Russia 8230 1185.6 2.4 33.8 431 2.87
US 35750 10308 21.5 23.1 2604 17.1
World 7867.9 48771 100 28.6 14539 100
Source: Ibid.
Notes: Calculated in current international dollars, PPP.
prior to reform lies in the surge of total factor productivity (TFP).8 An analysis
by the author shows that there were four major sources of economic growth
from 1978 to 1995: (1) high-speed growth of labor (2.6 percent); (2) high-speed
growth of capital stock (9.3 percent, though a bit lower than the growth rate
of 11.5 percent from 1952 to 1978); (3) human capital calculated by the average
years of education for employment populations above the age of 15 grew at an
average annual rate of 2.2 percent; and (4) TFP rose from –1.9 percent before
reform (1952–1978) to 3.3–4.5 percent (calculated by different weights of capital
or labor), with contribution to economic growth being 33–47 percent. The results
of these calculations are fairly close to the major conclusions of international
studies, such as that by the World Bank9 and Maddison.10
This demonstrates that the high-speed economic growth during reform was
not the aftermath of capital growth but because the growth of TFP rose from
negative to positive, rising by 5.2–6.5 percent compared with that before reform.
In analyzing the sources of economic growth, we have used another method
to construct a growth model. This is a comprehensive growth framework
covering capital, labor, institutional change, and knowledge. The per capita GDP
is used as the variant of output. Capital is the indicator of per capita capital
stock, labor is the employment participation indicator to reflect the impact of
population change on labor supply, institution is the institutional accumulation
indictors (ten indicators), and knowledge is the knowledge accumulation indi-
cators (ten indicators). For the calculation results, please refer to Table 1.8.
First, about half of the per capita output growth came from per capita capital
growth. The per capita growth was 8.5 percent during this period, assuming a
fairly high capital deepening process. This reflects the fact that China’s economic
growth was capital driven.
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Table 1.7 Percentage of industry value added, export trade of five major countries in the
world total (1975–2002) (%)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
Industry value added
China 3.39 4.05 5.47 6.76 13.6 18.5 21.5
India 2.11 2.19 2.83 3.54 4.44 4.93 5.34
Japan 8.59 8.61 9.00 9.97 8.94 7.97 7.51
Russia 6.54 3.00 3.02 2.87
US 19.5 19.2 18.9 17.6 17.9 17.8 17.1
Export trade 
China 0.66 0.62 1.34 1.44 2.63 3.54 4.56
India 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.52 0.61 0.80 0.97
Japan 6.22 6.31 8.53 7.34 7.52 6.50 5.56
Russia 2.17 1.81 1.45 1.50
US 13.50 12.20 13.35 12.91 12.80 13.95 12.68
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Calculated in current international dollars, PPP.
Secondly, one-third of the per capita output growth came from institutional
changes. This reflects the fact that reform has been the engine or driving force
of economic growth. The growth of the institutional accumulation indicator
during this period was 5.2 percent. This indicates a fairly high speed of
institutional changes.
Thirdly, one-fifth of the per capita output growth came from knowledge devel-
opment. This shows that knowledge development has become a major source of
economic growth, though it may not be the major driving force behind China’s
economic growth. The knowledge accumulation indicator growth was 3.7 per-
cent during this period. This was a fairly high speed of knowledge innovation,
import, absorption, dissemination, and application. It evidently demonstrates the
big country effect.
This method of calculation better interprets the sources for China’s economic
growth. It implies that institutional changes can be stimulated through reforms,
and knowledge development can be promoted through opening up and technical
innovation. Thus, policies can be made accordingly to achieve sustainable growth
in the future. This means that China should make technology and knowledge,
rather than capital and natural resources, the driving forces for economic growth.
However, such high and rapid economic growth and growth of TFP did not
last. In 1995–2001, the economic growth rate (8.2 percent) was lower than the
long-term potential growth rate (9.3–9.5 percent). And since 1995, the sources
for China’s economic growth changed substantially.
First, employment growth dropped significantly (only 1.2 percent). This indi-
cates that the ability of the economy to absorb labor has weakened, leaving
China in the state of high economic growth but low employment growth.
Secondly, the capital stock growth rate was 2.5 percentage points higher than
that in 1978–1995 and also higher than the growth of 11.5 percent in 1952–1978.
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Table 1.8 Sources of China per capita output growth (1978–1998)
Regression Contribution to % of 
parameter growth (%) contribution
Per capita capital stock 0.5 4.136 50.5
Institutional changes 0.578 2.765 33.8
Knowledge development indicators 0.375 1.469 18.0
Total – 8.370 102.3
Source: Xiong, Yi zhishi wei jichu de fazhan zhanlue yanjiu.
Notes: Knowledge development index (KDI) consists of three categories of index, capacity for
acquiring knowledge, capacity for absorbing knowledge, and capacity for communicating know-
ledge. Capacity for acquiring knowledge consists of science and technology papers (per million
population), patent application by residents (per million population), percentage of net FDI in GDP.
Capacity for absorbing knowledge consists of years of education per capita (years), primary educa-
tion enrollment rate (%), secondary education enrollment rate (%), and higher education enrollment
rate (%).Capacity for communicating knowledge consists of popularization rate of television (‰),
popularization rate of telephone (including mobile telephone) (‰), and popularization rate of the
internet (‰).
Capital productivity (economic growth minus capital growth) turned from posi-
tive (0.5 percent) to negative (–3.6 percent). In terms of capital deepening, the
per labor capital growth was as high as 10.6 percent, which is the fastest in
the world and also the fastest capital deepening process, nearly 4 percentage
points higher than in 1978–1995.
Thirdly, the human capital growth rate was as high as 2.8 percent. During
this period, more students were enrolled in senior middle schools and institu-
tions of higher learning in China. China has become the country with the largest
number of tertiary school students.
Fourthly, TFP dropped significantly to 0.3–2.3 percent (calculated by different
weights assigned to capital and labor), dropping by 2–3 percentage points. This
shows that the main source for economic growth in 1995–2001 was high capital
input, low labor input, and low productivity.
What merits attention is the economic situation in 2003, when GDP growth
was 9.1 percent, which is close to the long-term potential growth rate. The
investment growth rate was 26.7 percent, much higher than the average growth
(10.9 percent) in 1979–2001. Investment was apparently heating up. According
to the author’s estimates, the capital stock growth in 2003 was 15.8 percent
(after accounting for depreciation) and its contribution to economic growth was
about 6.3–9.5 percent (calculated by the weights assigned to capital and labor).
TFP dropped to 1.1 to –1.1 percent. It was estimated that the contribution of
TFP to economic growth in 2003 was likely to be negative, similar to the time
when the planned economy prevailed. This shows that although economic growth
in 2003 reached the potential growth rate, overheated investment appeared. The
investment growth rate was far higher than the economic growth rate. This
probably will have a positive investment effect, but more importantly it lowers
capital productivity, probably to –6.7 percent. Economic growth was far lower
than capital stock growth, thus greatly reducing the growth of TFP.
I am concerned about a possible reverse in the process of the transition of
economic growth model – reversing to the growth pattern from high-quality,
high-efficiency, low-energy consumption and low-pollution emission to low-
quality, low-efficiency, high-energy consumption and high-pollution emission.
Five major effects that drive China’s rapid economic growth
Factors determining economic growth have two different effects. The first is
what we call the “horizontal effect,” which refers to a short-term growth effect
of capital input under conditions in which technological progress and industrial
structures remain unchanged. As long as capital input is increasing, the economic
growth level will rise. The second is the “speed effect,” which means that
technological progress, industrial restructuring, and changes in economic organ-
izations will generate long-term growth. The horizontal effect has a role to play
only in the short term. The speed effect, however, plays a role in long-term
growth. The speed effect plays the fundamental role in the economic growth
of a country. Since reform, China’s economy has grown in a sustained manner,
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exhibiting the speed effect. In fact, five major effects which are interrelated and
interact have contributed to the high-speed economic growth for the past quarter
of a century.
The first effect is the speed effect, i.e., in a given period of time, the indus-
trialization latecomers achieve a higher economic growth than the forerunners.
China has been experiencing the fifth catching-up in modern history at a higher
growth rate than the prior four catching-ups (see Table 1.1). If we say that the
“four little dragons” in East Asia experienced thirty years of high-speed growth
after World War II, the highest and the longest lasting growth among less-
advanced countries since industrial revolution, and achieved the “East Asian
miracle,” China, once again, broke the record. More significantly, this time the
“the miracle” has happened in a country that has one-fifth of the world total
population.11
Mankul Orsen discovered from the economic growth data of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries that a poor country may achieve the highest economic
growth and the growth rate would increase with the passing of time. In the
1980s and 1990s, China’s economic growth ranked the second and the first
among 174 economies in the world. If we compare the 1870s and 1880s with
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the four fastest growing economies in the earlier
period often showed faster growth than the four fastest growing economies
during the late period (see Table 1.4).
The structure effect shows that, in a given period of time, the structural indi-
cator of latecomers changes faster than advanced countries. For example, it took
Japan eighty years to reduce the percentage of its agricultural labor in the total
employment from 70 percent to 50 percent. It took the United States fifty years
(in 1820–1870), the former Soviet Union/Russia thirty-three years (from 1917
to 1950) and China only seventeen years (from 1978 to 1995) to achieve the
same. The period of 1978–2003 witnessed major changes in the structures of
population, employment, production, demand, consumption and trade, with
eleven of the sixteen indicators exceeding the changes in 1952–1978 (see Table
1.9). Accelerated growth may stimulate labor to move to the high-level produc-
tion sectors, and structural changes constitute an important source of economic
growth, as the movement of labor from low productivity sectors to the high
productivity sectors is always accompanied by the growth of material capital
stock, the improvement in the skills of workers, the development of education,
organizational improvements, and more openness in international trade.
The opening up effect, that is, the participation of industrially less developed
economies in globalization, is faster than in advanced countries. According to
calculations by Maddison, exports made up only 1 percent of the world total
output in 1820 and rose to 8.7 percent by 1913 and further up to 13.5 percent
by 1992. The economic takeoff of a country is inevitably accompanied with
the rapid rise in total and unit international trade. The share of exports in total
GDP of all countries that have achieved economic catch-up rose significantly.
This has been proven by Japan, the ROK, Thailand and Taiwan. China began
to open up toward the end of the 1970s, transiting from an isolated model that
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was completely cut off from the world economically to a social development
model that partially opened up to the rest of the world. The total import and
export value in 1978 was US $20.6 billion, accounting for 13 percent of GDP.
But by 2003, it topped US $850 billion, 41 times that of 1978, accounting for
60.3 percent of GDP.12 It was only 0.66 percent in 1975, but it quadrupled to
1.44 percent and reached 4.56 percent by 2002 and was likely to top 5 percent
by 2003. China has become the fourth largest exporter in the world. This marks
the transition from a partially open society to a fully open society.
China has caught up with the level of the world great powers from being a
country of autarchy. But about half of China’s exports are goods processed with
imported materials. If such processing trade is deducted, the opening up of a
country like China is still far lower than the global level.13 Since reform, not
20 Economic and social transformation in China
Table 1.9 China’s economic structural changes (1952–2003) (%)





Urban population 12.5 17.9 40.5 0.21 0.90
Rural population 87.5 82.1 59.5 –0.21 –0.90
Employment structure (total employed population)
Primary industry 83.5 70.5 49.1 –0.5 –0.86
Secondary industry 7.4 17.3 21.6 0.38 0.17
Tertiary industry 9.1 12.2 29.3 0.12 0.68
Production structure (GDP by production approach)
Primary industry 50.5 28.1 14.6 –0.86 –0.54
Secondary industry 20.9 48.2 52.3 1.05 0.16
Tertiary industry 28.6 23.7 33.1 –0.19 0.38
Domestic demand structure (GDP by expenditure approach)
Household consumption 65.4 48.8 43.2 –0.64 –0.22
Government consumption 13.5 13.3 12.2 –0.008 –0.04
Capital formation 22.2 38.2 42.9 0.62 0.19
Net export –1.1 –0.3 1.8 0.03 0.08
Household consumption structure (Engel coefficient)
Cities and towns 57.5 37.1 –0.82
Rural areas 67.7 45.6 –0.88
Trade ratio (% of GDP)
Export 4.0 4.6 31.1 0.02 1.06
Import 5.5 5.2 29.3 –0.01 0.96
Sources: Guojia tongjiju (National Statistical Bureau of China), Xinzhongguo wushinian tongji ziliao
huibian (Collection of Statistical Data of the 50 years of New China), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 1999, pp. 1–3, p.60; Guojia tongjiju (National Statistical Bureau
of China), Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2004 (China Statistical Abstract 2004), Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 2004, pp. 16, 37, 41, 98, 158.
only have China’s exports grown rapidly, but the export product mix has also
undergone tremendous changes. In 1980, China’s primary product exports made
up 50.2 percent of the total exports, but by 1985, the percentage dropped to 35.0
percent and further went down to 14.6 percent by 1990. By 2000, it plummeted
to 4.7 percent. In the meantime, exports of manufactured goods rose, reaching
87.1 percent of total exports by 2000. The proportion of high-technology exports
of total exports rose from 2.6 percent to 22.4 percent. The export volume of 
all products in world total exports also rose steadily. The proportion of low 
technological products rose from 4.5 percent in 1985 to 18.7 percent by 2000.
The proportion of high-technology products rose from 0.4 percent to 6.0 per-
cent by 2000. This shows that China has exploited its advantages in both labor-
intensive products export and in the export of high-technology products (see
Table 1.10).
The institutional effect, that is, the degree of liberalization, has improved
significantly and the economic operation has been based on the market mech-
anism. Where is China in terms of orienting its national economy toward a
market economy after twenty-four years of efforts, from 1978 to 2002? How
far has China gone in its market-oriented reform during that same period? The
experience of China’s reform and opening up shows that the reform is a process
in which market mechanisms have played an increasingly large role in the allo-
cation of resources, and the dependency on market mechanisms has been
deepened and enhanced. This includes the establishment and improvement of
the market infrastructure, the establishment and implementation of institutional
market rules and the standardization of the behaviors of market players. Based
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Table 1.10 Export competitiveness of China in world trade (1985–2000) (%)
Item 1985 1990 1995 2000
Share of world market 1.6 1.8 4.8 6.1
Primary products 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.3
Resources products 1.1 1.3 2.1 2.7
Non-resources manufactured products 1.5 3.4 6.1 7.8
Low technology 4.5 9.1 15.5 18.7
Middle grade technology 0.4 1.4 2.6 3.6
High technology 0.4 1.4 3.6 6.0
Other 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.8
% in total exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Primary products 35.0 14.6 7.0 4.7
Resources products 13.6 8.2 7.4 6.9
Non-resources manufactured goods 50.0 76.2 84.6 87.1
Low technology 39.7 53.6 53.5 47.6
Middle grade technology 7.7 15.4 16.9 17.3
High technology 2.6 7.3 14.2 22.4
Other 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.1
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export
Competitiveness, New York: United Nations, 2002.
on this understanding, we have selected nine areas and designed twenty-four
indicators to measure the degree of market evolution and liberalization in all
aspects.14 These indicators reflect from different angles the features of the market
(see Table 1.11 and Figure 1.2):
• Study of the adaptability of government behaviors to the market (including
the behavior, the scale and ways of participation of the government, how
far the government has withdrawn from the microeconomic area and how
far it has realized the transition from direct to indirect macroeconomic
control and the methods and changes in the abilities of the government to
accumulate revenue);
• Manifestation of the market in the economic structure including income
distribution, industrial output and distribution of consumer goods;
• Competitiveness of price and market (changes in the commodity consump-
tion by peasants and the deepening of the role of market demand and supply
in price formation);
• Market orientation of investment (non-state investment and changes in the
ownership of investment);
• Market orientation of banking and insurance (including changes in the
ownership of banks and the accommodation of negotiable securities);
• International level of the economy and openness (including dependency on
trade, dependency on production and tariff levels);
• Market orientation of production factors (including the structure of owner-
ship of the labor market in urban areas and towns and the shrinkage of the
rural natural economy);
• Adaptability of the environment for the operation of the economic system
to the market evolution (including the evolution of education and human
capital input mechanisms, public welfare and social relief);
• Rules and the legal system (including the accumulation of legal factors,
evolution of the legal system for the economy and the enhancement and
popularization or diffusion of the rule of law among economic players).
Technology catch-up effect refers to the rate of technology diffusion of tech-
nologically lagging countries (T2) evidently higher than the technological
innovation speed of technologically advanced countries (T1), that is, T2 > T1,
revealing the features of technology catch-up. This is because the cost of tech-
nology innovation is higher than the cost of technology imports and the time
required to achieve commercial application of technological innovation is longer
than that required by using technological imports. Although developing coun-
tries are less developed in technology, technological imports may lower the cost
of innovation, thus shortening the time for new products to enter the market.
Technological innovation is mainly manifested in new products and new markets.
When it refers to the technology innovation of less developed countries in tech-
nology (t), it may accelerate the pace of technological catch-up, that is, T2 + t
> T1. It is exactly these two conditions that have made it possible for less-
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advanced countries to realize technology catch-up, hence raising their labor
productivity, which in turn stimulates economic catch-up, narrowing the gap
with developed countries. The history of world economic development shows
that Japan and the Asian “four little dragons” are fairly successful examples.
China, India, and Southeast Asian countries are becoming successful paradigms
of the second generation of industrialized countries.
But where does China’s technology come from? There are three sources
according to the calculation by the value method.
One is direct imports or import of capital goods containing new technolo-
gies, such as import of high-technology products. But the technology imports
do not include spending on medium and high technology transfer, copyright,
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Table 1.11 Evolution of the marketization development indicators (MDI) of the entire and
local economic operational mechanism of China (1978–1999) (%)
Year Changes Market- Market- Market- Market- Market- Market- Market Rules MDI 
of ization ization ization ization ization ization opera- and (a)
govern- of outputof price of of of of labor tional legal 
ment and and invest- banking foreign and environ- system 
behavior distribu- trading ment and trade employ- ment (12.0)
(10.0) tion (10.6) (10.3) insur- (11.2) ment (12.4)
(11.7) ance (12.1)
(9.7)
1978 71.54 24.98 24.33 13.80 0.94 10.60 16.16 5.03 3.78 18.39
1979 71.08 25.12 28.76 19.03 0.99 13.14 16.85 5.51 5.15 19.96
1980 72.26 27.23 34.69 28.51 1.14 14.28 17.60 6.51 4.79 22.25
1981 74.13 31.33 38.98 30.57 1.49 15.90 17.98 7.53 5.21 24.02
1982 74.24 34.97 39.56 38.15 1.47 16.25 18.06 8.74 5.72 25.56
1983 75.70 39.08 41.82 48.72 1.63 16.64 19.14 10.03 3.91 27.64
1984 75.25 43.89 46.25 49.17 2.34 18.22 23.16 11.81 5.33 29.80
1985 73.24 55.74 62.17 49.11 1.91 22.22 24.28 12.91 7.44 33.60
1986 74.98 57.89 62.74 48.89 1.97 26.09 25.14 14.25 7.47 34.78
1987 74.48 59.49 65.90 49.71 2.14 28.21 25.77 15.44 9.07 36.00
1988 74.44 61.06 69.89 53.34 3.25 28.56 26.14 16.46 10.66 37.49
1989 73.15 61.79 64.41 50.37 2.98 26.66 25.63 17.98 11.35 36.53
1990 73.83 61.04 69.45 52.80 2.85 34.79 29.55 18.44 9.65 38.52
1991 73.18 60.01 67.65 51.66 2.95 39.37 29.29 19.14 10.51 38.71
1992 73.51 61.72 69.30 51.83 4.43 43.06 29.96 21.43 11.23 40.14
1993 79.86 65.61 75.59 56.09 8.84 41.15 31.82 22.77 13.65 43.23
1994 80.36 69.59 71.53 59.09 9.18 59.82 33.42 23.74 13.87 46.09
1995 81.82 71.77 72.10 61.03 8.27 58.13 35.11 25.87 15.69 47.16
1996 80.79 71.68 73.73 62.70 10.58 54.18 36.52 27.10 15.14 47.43
1997 82.64 74.85 74.83 62.76 19.97 56.09 37.91 28.96 19.48 50.15
1998 82.79 76.30 75.51 61.63 17.12 54.90 43.49 31.72 18.44 50.78
1999 82.98 77.23 76.86 60.43 18.97 44.26 45.04 33.43 17.92 50.25
Source: Wu Qungang, “Impact of Institutional Changes on Long-Term Economic Performance:
Theories, Models and Application,” doctoral dissertation at School of Economics and Management
of Tsinghua University under the supervision of Dr. Hu Angang, 2002.
Notes: (a) MDI is the weighted sum of nine indicators. Data in brackets are weights. All calcula-
tions are completed by SPSS10.0 software.
and patent fees. The second is direct acquisition of new technologies through
foreign direct investment (FDI), though FDI is not entirely used in R&D. The
third is direct financing of Chinese enterprises and institutional innovation by
spending on R&D, which is expressed in the proportion of national R&D in
GDP. Together, the total spending on R&D as a share of GDP rose from 4.10
percent in 1991 to 10.36 percent in 2001 (see Table 1.12).
China also obtains and disseminates knowledge, technology, and informa-
tion through telecom networks and the Internet, and obtains new knowledge
and new technologies through science and technological cooperation with
advanced countries, exchanges in science and technology and exchanges of
personnel. But these cannot be quantitatively measured.
The other method is the knowledge accumulation indicator, which is made
up of ten indicators.15 Since reform, China’s knowledge development indica-
tors have grown in a sustainable manner and China has become one of the
fastest growing countries in terms of knowledge development. The knowledge
accumulation indicator in China grew by 108 percent from 12.22 in 1980 to
25.70 in 2000. However, it is still short of the 185 percent growth in ROK and
greatly lagging behind the United States, Britain and Japan. China is still a
knowledge importer and consumer rather than a knowledge innovator (see Table
1.13).
The entire process of catching up with developed countries is a process of
economic and knowledge catching up, with the knowledge growth and economic
growth mutually reinforcing each other and mutually supplementing each other.
In the future, China should transit from a capital-driven economy to a technology-
driven economy.
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Figure 1.2 Changes of China’s labor participation, institution, and knowledge indicators
(1978–1998)
Source: Xiong, Yi zhishi wei jichu de fazhan zhanlue yanjiu.
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Table 1.12 China’s technology sources (1991–2001)
Year Import of FDI Total % Total % of Total in 
high (million technology technology spending GDP (f)
technology US $) sources sources in on R&D 
(million (b) (million GDP (d) in GDP 
US $) US $) (c) (e)
1991 94.39 43.66 138.05 3.40 0.70 4.10
1992 107.12 110.37 217.49 4.50 0.79 5.29
1993 159.09 275.15 434.24 7.22 0.74 7.96
1994 205.95 337.67 543.62 10.02 0.66 10.68
1995 218.27 357.21 575.48 9.84 0.60 10.44
1996 224.69 417.25 641.94 7.86 0.60 8.46
1997 238.93 452.57 691.50 7.70 0.64 8.34
1998 292.01 454.63 746.64 7.89 0.69 8.58
1999 375.98 403.19 779.17 7.86 0.83 8.69
2000 540 (a) 407.15 947.15 8.76 1.00 9.76
2001 621 (a) 468.78 1090 9.27 1.07 10.34
Sources: (a) Estimates by author; data for technology import from Ministry of Science and
Technology. See Zhongguo kexue jishu zhibiao 2000 (China Science and Technology Indicators
2000), Beijing: Science and Technology Literature Press, 2000, p. 198; FDI from Guojia tongjiju,
Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002 (China Statistical Yearbook 2002), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 2002, p. 629; R&D spending in GDP from Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1999 (China
Statistical Yearbook 1999), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999, p. 675 and Zhongguo tongji
nianjian 2002, p. 703.
Notes: 
1. Technology import includes high-technology import and FDI, not including imports that do 
not contain technology.
2. Total technology sources = Import of high technology + FDI; Total in GDP (f = %) total
technology sources in GDP + % of spending on R&D in GDP.
Table 1.13 International comparison of the knowledge development indicator (KDI) 
(1980–2000)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Growth 
indicator
(1980 = 1)
Brazil 12.61 13.85 14.49 16.73 26.27 2.08
China 12.22 13.79 16.25 22.56 25.70 2.10
Chinese Hong Kong 22.90 24.74 29.21 34.04 46.03 2.01
India 9.28 10.68 11.86 13.43 15.04 1.62
Japan 43.57 45.13 47.03 51.44 62.27 1.43
ROK 21.91 27.19 32.90 46.69 62.39 2.85
Britain 38.74 41.35 45.44 50.70 65.93 1.70
US 47.52 48.63 55.92 60.38 69.82 1.47
Source: Xiong, Yi zhishi wei jichu de fazhan zhanlue yanjiu.
Challenges China faces in economic development
China’s development has attracted worldwide attention. On the one hand, China’s
development speed startled the world, which called it “the China miracle” or
“the rise of modern China.” On the other hand, it has made people wonder
whether or not China’s development can be sustained. What are the challenges,
development bottlenecks or other factors constraining its potential development
in the next decade? Should these factors appear (individually or combined),
what impacts will they have on China’s economic performance?
Generally speaking, China is facing six major challenges:
Increasingly large gaps between urban and rural
One of the basic national conditions of China is “one country, two systems.”
This does not refer to the idea introduced when China recovered the sovereignty
of Hong Kong and Macao. It refers to the two different institutional arrange-
ments of cities and the countryside in the Chinese mainland. The basic conflict
in Chinese society is the contradiction between the dual economic and social
structures in the cities and the countryside. The urban/rural gap has become one
of the biggest challenges to China’s development. It is also the biggest institu-
tional obstacle to furthering productivity and social progress. The urban/rural
gap mainly manifests itself in the following ways: (1) income gap; (2) consumer
spending gap: If all the financial subsidies to urban residents are converted, the
real gap in consumption level between urban and rural residents is six times; (3)
public service gap: A large number of ill-educated people live in the rural areas,
especially in the rural areas of the western part of China. The inequality of edu-
cational resources between urban and rural areas is extremely large and there
are huge gaps between urban and rural areas in terms of the distribution of pub-
lic health resources, medical insurance coverage, telecom and postal services;
(4) labor productivity gap: The percentage of agricultural output value in GDP
has dropped, and the proportion of agricultural labor productivity to national
average labor productivity has also dropped. The proportion of per capita income
of peasants to per capita GDP and the proportion of peasants’ income from
farming to their total income has also declined.16
Enlarging regional gaps
China is a country with the biggest regional disparities in the world. It is known
as “one China, four worlds.” The first world covers high-income areas, which
include Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, with a total population accounting for
only 2.2 percent of the national total; the second world covers middle-income
areas, including Tianjin, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, with a population
accounting for 21.8 percent of the national total; the third world refers to lower
middle income areas, with a population accounting for 26 percent of the national
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total; and the fourth world refers to low income areas, mainly poor areas in the
middle and western parts of the country, with a population accounting for 50
percent of the national total. The gap is seen not only in per capita income or
per capita GDP but also in economic and social indicators. About half of the
population is still in the low income group. The per capita national income, a
key indicator of economic development, shows that China has already attained
the level of a well-off society, that is, the lower-middle income level in the
world. But it is extremely uneven.
Uneven economic and social development
Although China has realized the goal of quadrupling its GDP and per capita GDP
by 2000 ahead of schedule, it failed to achieve the important social development
goal of “primary health service to all” by 2000. China’s human development indi-
cator growth is lower than other populous developing countries.17
Incompatibility of investment in hardware and software
China’s domestic investment rate is fairly high compared with the level of the
world, about 40 percent. But government spending on public education, infra-
structure and poverty relief is gravely inadequate, with its proportion in GDP
lower than the world average.
In economic development, the government, especially local governments,
often over-involve themselves and become major interest groups. They not only
deeply involve themselves in economic activities, but also seek profits. Thus,
there are temptations to launching big projects, making investments blindly and
building similar projects again and again. However, in the social development
areas, the government is often absent. The supply of public goods is inade-
quate, public services are not in place, and services are beyond the reach of
most people and low in quality. Public service supply is biased toward cities.
There is neither efficiency nor equality.
Economic wealth has grown rapidly and social costs have risen drastically.
Even calculated according to constant price, GDP in 2002 was 8.5 times that
of 1978. The individual assets of urban residents (bank savings alone reached
8700 billion Yuan by the end of 2002) have also increased, but social costs
and deficits have become larger and larger and the society has become more
and more insecure. There are increasing tensions between labor and manage-
ment, between labor and enterprises. The number of recorded disputes and
conflicts is on an upward trend. The social order has become seriously damaged.
Crimes and security related incidents have become serious, aggravating social
problems. Traffic accidents, fires, work injuries and worksite accidents occur
frequently. Corruption cases have grown in number. The number of all kinds
of offenses has risen rapidly. The amount of money involved in these cases has
reached 7.2 percent of the total GDP.
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The imbalance between resources and environment on the one hand
and development on the other
The basic characteristics of the national condition of resources in China can be
described as large in territory and abundant in resources in aggregate, but on
a per capita basis, the amount of resources is very small, and the space for
subsistence is very narrow. In terms of resource supplies relative to develop-
ment demand, there are shortages in many resources and the situation is getting
worse. The environmental and ecological problems include worsening soil
erosion and water loss. The desertification of land is growing. China is one of
the countries with the worst desertification problem. The desertification areas
have reached 2.62 million square kilometers, which is 27 percent of the total
land area, and the land becomes desertified by an average of 2460 square kilo-
meters every year. The standing stock of forests has dropped drastically. China
is one of the countries that have the least forests, with a total forest area
accounting for 3.9 percent of the world total and the standing stock of forests
accounting for 2.5 percent of the world total. The forest coverage is only 14
percent as opposed to 55.4 percent in Russia. The per capita standing stock of
forests is less than 19 cubic meters, accounting for 13 percent of the world’s
per capita average. China’s ecological deficit is mainly manifested in the forest
deficit. Most of the state-owned forest enterprises have no mature forests to
log. Grassland degeneration, desertification and salination have been increasing
year by year. Air pollution is very serious and acid rain is affecting increas-
ingly large areas. China is both a large energy consumer and a large polluter.
If the energy consumption trend continues, China will become one of the coun-
tries with the biggest greenhouse gas emissions in the first half of the twenty-first
century.18 Water pollution is becoming more and more serious, thus worsening
an already serious shortage of water resources.
The deterioration of the ecological environment has exacerbated natural disas-
ters, which have shot up, with more and more areas becoming prone to natural
disasters. The economic costs caused by natural disasters in the 1990s accounted
for 3 to 5 percent of the GDP. Air and water pollution have also caused losses
in human capital and economy. Further, some costs of ecological damage are
hard to calculate, such as forest logging, grassland degeneration, water loss and
soil erosion, desertification, river runoff reduction, shrinkage of lake surfaces,
damages to all kinds of mineral sources and sharp reduction in cultivated land
– all of these can cause big losses and overwrite the GDP increment.
Imbalance between economic growth and employment growth
China is the most populous country in the world. Its population makes up 21.3
percent of the world total population. China also has the largest working popu-
lation. In 1999, the population aged 15–64 was 844 million, 22.4 percent of
the world total. The working population (referring to the employed population
and active servicemen) was 751 million, 25.9 percent of the world total.19 China
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is, therefore, a country with abundant labor, but also a country with the biggest
employment pressures. In the 1990s, China’s economic growth pattern began
to transit from high employment growth to low employment growth, with the
per capita capital output assuming a downward trend.
The new generation of Chinese leaders is well aware of these challenges and
their negative effects. In February 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out that
China has achieved rapid economic development but also accumulated a few
problems, which mainly include the urban/rural gap, regional disparity and
income gaps among residents. These gaps are continuing to enlarge; the pres-
sure of employment and social security is mounting; education, public health,
culture and other social undertakings are lagging behind; the conflict between
population growth and economic development on the one hand and the ecolog-
ical environment and natural resources on the other has been exacerbating; the
economic growth pattern is backwards; and the quality of the economy as a
whole is not high and lacks competitiveness. These problems demand our full
attention. They must be resolved step by step and under no circumstances should
they be allowed to run their own course. So Wen Jiabao put forth a develop-
ment approach of “putting people first” that advocates sustainable development.20
Take up all major challenges and foster a new approach to
development
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we have implemented
two generations of economic development strategies. The first generation was
the traditional economic development strategy during the period of planned
economy. In the mid-1950s, Mao Zedong put forward the strategic conception
of “catch-up with Britain and the United States.” In the mid-1960s, he put
forward the strategic conception of “Four Modernizations” by the end of the
century, introducing “high accumulation, low consumption” policies, giving
priorities to the development of heavy industries, including the military industry,
adopting capital-intensive guidelines and highly protective import substitution
policies. This resulted in a highly conflicted urban–rural dual system.
The second generation of development strategies occurred during the transi-
tion period. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping put forth the idea of a three-step
development. The goal of quadrupling the GDP was achieved ahead of schedule.
The country made the best use of its comparative advantages in labor resources
and pursued an opening-up policy. The policy stimulated export growth and
realized a liberalization of trade and investment. The country also introduced
market mechanisms and encouraged market competition. This strategy agreed
with the national condition of China and accelerated the economic and social
development and narrowed the gap with developed countries. But still, the
strategy was material-centered, with the pursuit of high-speed economic growth
as the primary goal. What Deng Xiaoping advocated was “high-speed devel-
opment” and “uneven development,” allowing some areas and part of the
population to get rich first. But high-speed economic growth was achieved at
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the price of high capital input, high energy consumption and heavy pollution.
Concomitant with development was an enlarged urban/rural income gap, a
regional development gap and the biggest inequality (Gini coefficient) in the
world in terms of the income distribution among residents.
Now, Chairman Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have put forth the third
generation of development strategies, which features harmonious, sustainable
development and common prosperity. In fact, the fifth plenary session of the
Fourteenth National Party Congress in 1995 already put forth the principle of
“coordinated regional development to narrow the regional gaps.” In June 1999,
Jiang Zemin put forth the “Western China Development” strategy and began
to officially implement the strategy in 2001. This also falls in line with coor-
dinated regional development. The Party’s Sixteenth National Congress officially
put forward the development goal of building a well-off society that will benefit
the entire population and defined it as “greater economic development, sounder
democracy, greater progress in science and education, more flourishing culture,
greater social harmony and much improved life of the people.” At an expert
forum on June 17, 2003, Wen Jiabao clearly put forward the approach of coor-
dinated development in four aspects, namely, coordinated development of both
urban and rural areas; coordinated development among different regions; coor-
dinated social and economic development; and coordinated development
between man and nature.21
What development strategies should China adopt to cope with the major
development challenges?
First of all, it is imperative to achieve urban/rural coordinated development
to narrow the enlarging gaps. The first and foremost problem in development
is always the problem of peasants. The first and foremost task of China’s devel-
opment is to transfer peasants by removing institutional barriers and accelerating
the pace of urbanization. China needs an institutional revolution of liberating
the peasants so as to eliminate at its roots the unequal and unfair situation of
isolation, opposition and separation of urban and rural areas. The aim is to free
the peasants, invest in the peasants, serve the peasants, transfer the peasants,
reduce the number of peasants and make the peasants rich. The state should
set up a standard transfer payments system in the rural areas and provide the
rural population with basic public services. The state should invest in the rural
infrastructure, improve the production and living conditions of rural areas and
create more employment opportunities for peasants.22
Secondly, it is imperative to launch western China’s development initiatives
and to revitalize the old industrial bases in northeast China so as to narrow the
gap between the east and the west and between the south and the north, that
is, the development gap between southeast coastal areas and the northeast China
area. It is essential to establish a unified and fair domestic market and to promote
the free movement of all production factors, especially the movement of labor.
It is also essential to accelerate the pace of urbanization to make the urban
population exceed that of the rural areas. Only then will it be possible for China
to narrow the urban/rural gap and the regional development gap.
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Thirdly, it is necessary to promote a “two-wheel drive” in order to solve the
imbalance in economic and social development. Economic development is the
base for social progress while social progress is the aim of economic develop-
ment. The two may be compared to “two wheels” that drive the development
of human society. The two must be mutually coordinated, and go together. This
includes both contemporary development and sustainable development of future
generations. It includes both the idea of allowing part of the regions and part
of the population to get rich first and the idea of the people in poor areas or
at a low level of living standards to enjoy the fruits of social development. It
includes both the narrowing of economic gaps and the social development gaps
to realize the equalization of basic public services for the people of the whole
country. Basic public services, such as education, health, family planning,
environmental protection and infrastructure, must meet the minimum demands
of all people. The goals of enabling most of the people to live a well-off life
and lifting most of the poor population out of poverty are equally important.
Only when there is equal service will it be possible to have the most efficient
service. It is, therefore, essential to display the leading role of the government
in social development. The government should increase its investment in “social
software” and reduce investment in hardware so as to make the two kinds of
investment well matched. It is essential to shift the emphasis of investment
from large-scale public investment (infrastructure) to providing public services,
and from materials to human resources.
Fourthly, we should improve the ecological environment and attain “green
development.” The environment is one of the three major assets for economic
development. “Green development” is an inevitable path of development. This
stresses unified and harmonized economic development and environmental pro-
tection, a path toward sustainable development that puts the people first. Large
cities must become “green cities” instead of “black cities;” agriculture must
become green agriculture instead of black agriculture; green GDP should be used.
The fundamental way out for solving the problem of the deterioration of the eco-
logical environment is to change the economic growth pattern, to follow a new
path toward sustainable economic development, the never-ending utilization of
resources, the steady improvement of the environment and a good ecological
environment. The core lies in a shift in the pattern of development: from tradi-
tional industrialization to new industrialization; from traditional industrial cities
to knowledge-intensive, technology-intensive and information-intensive cities;
and from high consumption that copies from the West to an appropriate and fair
consumption model.
Fifthly, we must give priority to employment and opt for a growth model
focused on employment. The number of laborers in China makes up more 
than one-quarter of the world total work force, equal to 1.6 times that of high-
income developed countries, while the capital resources of China are less than
4 percent of the world total. This means that China should opt for an economic
growth model that is centered on employment. Creating more jobs should
become the first objective of the central and local governments. Employment
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should be the top priority of economic and social policies. The key to changes
in the employment growth model, from formal employment to informal, flex-
ible and diversified employment and to build an open society lies in the
promotion of the free movement of personnel, labor and the population.
For China, the major challenges in the twenty-first century are not to accel-
erate growth, but to insure sustainable growth and equity, reduce poverty and
promote human development. China should pay attention not only to economic
growth, but also to the goal of such growth, namely to meet the increasing
material and cultural demand of the over one billion population, including the
basic demand for subsistence, especially the population still in poverty, such
as food and clothing, employment, education, health and housing, so as to raise
the level of human development and enjoy higher standards of living and public
services.
The idea of “putting people first” means to invest in the people, serve the
people, develop the economy for the people. For human development, the goal
is to enhance the development capabilities of the people and increase their
development opportunities. The future development model for China should be
to lift human development indicators and the standard of living to a fairly high
level, and gradually realize common prosperity; to eliminate poverty and prevent
polarization; to follow a sustainable development road; to build a resources-
saving national economic system and a living system with an appropriate
consumption level. Only then will China’s modernization benefit all the people
and lead the Chinese people onto the road to common prosperity.
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2 Comprehensive national
power (1980–2000)
A comparative study of the US,
Russia, Japan, India and China1
The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death,
a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on
no account be neglected. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant
factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to deter-
mine the conditions obtained in the field. These are: (1) The Moral Law; 
(2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
(Sun Tze, The Art of War)
Entering into the twenty-first century, economic globalization has been accel-
erating not only the process of integration of the world economy, but also
competition among/between countries, especially among the big powers.
International competition manifests itself mainly in dynamic changes in the
strategic resources of different countries and open competition between national
powers (Zonghe Guoli). They often come into conflict with one another and
are locked in contention while being complexly interdependent and intercon-
nected. In the development process, which is quite out of balance, some countries
have grown in national power while others are losing. These changes have
brought about significant changes to the pattern of the world.
The status (or position) of a country in the international community is in
essence associated with the rise and fall of its national power, and the increase
and decrease of its strategic resources. This has brought us to such issues as:
what is the comprehensive national power (CNP) of a country? What strategic
resources make up CNP? What kinds of strategic resources are more important
in the twenty-first century? What are the advantages and disadvantages of China
in strategic resources vis-à-vis other great powers? Where does China stand in
the world with regard to CNP? Has it gained or lost in strength over the past
twenty years? How is China’s CNP changing compared with the United States,
Japan, India and Russia, which are closely associated with China’s national
interests and geopolitical strategy? How should China raise its CNP, and how
should it make full use of its advantageous strategic resources while constantly
improving its disadvantageous strategic resources? What are the objectives of
China’s grand strategies, and how can they be achieved?
CNP and national strategic resources
The concept of CNP
CNP generally means the sum total of the power or strengths of a country’s
economy, military affairs, science and technology, education, resources and its
influence.2 More abstractly, it refers to the combination of all the powers
possessed by a country for the subsistence and development of a sovereign
state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as
well.3 Foreign scholars usually use national power in its specific sense, that is,
the strategic capabilities by which a sovereign state uses its overall resources
to influence others.4 It is the most important indicator in measuring the basic
national conditions and resources of a country, and a comprehensive indicator
for the economic, political, military and technological powers of a country.
Comparing the analysis of CNP by Chinese and foreign scholars, we can draw
the following conclusion: CNP has a wider coverage, emphasizing compre-
hensiveness and all aspects, including material strength, ideational ethos and
international influence. “National Strategic Resources” stresses material strength
or command power, though it does not ignore completely the importance of
ideational ethos or soft power. The Klein equation, for instance, puts the
ideational factor in an important place in implementing the will to pursue national
strategy. In sum, both CNP and national strategic resources focus on the study
of grand strategy; the two concepts have no fundamental differences and may
be interchangeable.
But there is not yet a unified definition or method for calculating CNP or
national power of a country. Ashley Tellis defines national power as a product
of the interaction of two components, namely, the capability of a country to
command its economic innovation cycle at a given time and to use such
command power to form effective military capabilities and, in turn, to create a
stable political environment, to intensify existing economic advantages and to
provide basic conditions for maintaining its strategic advantages and seeking
gains in the international system.5 In a word, CNP may be simply defined as
the comprehensive capabilities of a country to pursue its strategic objectives by
taking actions internationally, and the core factors of the concept are strategic
resources, strategic capabilities and strategic outcomes, with strategic resources
as the material base. This chapter focuses on national strategic resources with
an emphasis on tangible strategic resources or hard power. We will study intan-
gible strategic resources or soft power in another chapter.
We define national strategic resources as the real and potential key resources
available for realizing the strategic outcomes of a country. They reflect a
country’s abilities in utilizing all kinds of resources worldwide and also reflect
the country’s CNP. Kenneth Waltz defines powers as the distribution of all
kinds of capabilities. In fact, CNP is the distribution of the strategic resources
of a country, to mobilize and utilize strategic resources to achieve the strategic
objectives of a country. Generally speaking, CNP refers to the sum total of the
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strategic resources of a country while the strategic resources of country refer
to certain kinds of strategic resources.
National strategic resources
Michael Porter lists five major resources, namely, physical resources, human
resources, infrastructure resources, knowledge resources and capital resources.6
Accordingly, we divide national strategic resources into eight categories, with
twenty-three indictors. These indicators constitute CNP.
1) Economic resources
We measure economic resources by gross national product (GNP) or gross
domestic product (GDP). GNP, as usually used to measure the economic scale,
is the value of final goods and services produced by domestically owned factors
of production within a given period of time. It includes taxes excluded in total
output value minus any subsidies, and major income of non-residents (employ-
ment compensation and asset income). GNP also includes GDP and non-
residents’ major incomes. Usually, there are two ways of measuring GDP. One
is calculated by the official or nominal exchange rate. This method often under-
estimates the economic power of developing countries, but overestimates the
economic power of developed countries. The other method is calculated by the
purchasing power parity (PPP). Sometimes, the US dollar converted using PPP
is called the international dollar. The international comparison project (ICP) of
the World Bank and the IMF takes 1993 as the base and calculates the GNP 
of 118 countries and uses PPP to estimate per capita GNP and per capita GDP
in terms of the international dollar.
2) Human capital resources
Human capital, especially the opportunities and capabilities of acquiring educa-
tion, is regarded as the determining factor in the process of economic growth.
Generally, human capital is expressed in the number of years of education
received by the population. The more the number of years of education received,
the more skillful the workers and the higher the labor productivity. The rich
human resources of developing countries make it easier for them to absorb and
use new technologies imported and disseminated from the developed countries.7
The total human capital of a country is expressed in two categories of indica-
tors: one is the number of people and the number of working-aged people, such
as people aged 15–64; the other is human capital, which is expressed in the aver-
age number of years of education received by people over the age of 15.8 These
two categories of indicators constitute the total human capital of a country, which
is defined as the number of working-aged people multiplied by the average num-
ber of years of education received, or defined as the multiplication of labor forces
and the average number of years of education received by the population. Labor
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forces refer to people who are economically active as defined by the International
Labor Organization. This includes people who provide labor service to produc-
ers and services at a given stage. They include both people with jobs and people
without. The estimated figure for females does not have international compara-
bility, because in many developing countries most of the female laborers help
with farm work or engage in labor without pay in family businesses. In general,
labor forces include soldiers, unemployed people and people who are searching
for jobs for the fist time, but do not include family workers or other service
workers without pay and people working in non-regular working units.
3) Natural resources
Usually, natural resources refer to the abundance, quality, accessibility and costs
of major natural resources. Natural resources are the necessary conditions for
economic development, but they are limited, possibly becoming constraints on
the upper limit of economic growth. Meanwhile, natural resources are regres-
sive, having marginal gains with relatively high ecological costs and external
costs to their excavation and utilization. Different resources play quite different
roles during different stages of development, but generally assume a downward
trend, whereas the roles of knowledge resources assume an upward trend. There
are four major indicators for natural resources: (1) arable land, referring to tem-
porary and permanent arable land and permanent farm and pasture defined by
the FAO of the UN; (2) fresh water resources, including domestic river water
at current volume, underground water accumulated from precipitation and river
current volume from river flows in from other countries; (3) commercial energy
usage, referring to energy consumption which is equal to domestic production
plus imports and inventory changes, minus exports and fuel supplied to ships
and aircraft engaged in international transport; and (4) electricity production,
measured at the terminals of all alternator sets in a power station. In addition to
hydropower, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear power generation, this also includes geo-
thermal, solar, wind, and tide and wave energy, as well as that from combustible
renewable material and waste.
4) Capital resources
According to the definition given by Michael Porter, capital resources include
three major indicators: (1) gross domestic investment, that is, the net changes
to spending on fixed assets plus the inventory level in the economy of a country;
(2) foreign direct investment (FDI), that is, the net inflows of investment to
acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in an economy
other than that of the investor; this is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment
of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, as shown in the
balance of payments; and (3) market capitalization (also known as market value),
that is, the share price times the number of shares outstanding, which reflects
the size of the financial market.9 In this chapter, we have converted domestic
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investment into international dollars, but the other two indicators are calculated
in US dollars.
5) Knowledge and technology resources
We deem knowledge and technology resources the most important strategic
resources. In the twenty-first century, the world entered into a knowledge and
information era. Knowledge and technology resources are becoming more and
more important. Knowledge and technology resources include five major indi-
cators: (1) number of scientific thesis, including number of thesis published in
about 4,800 international academic publications, which reflect the knowledge
innovation capability of a country; (2) patent applications by domestic resi-
dents, which reflect the technology innovation capability of the country; (3)
number of personal computers (PCs), which shows the country’s capabilities
of applying new technologies; (4) Internet hosts, i.e., computers with active
Internet protocol (IP) addresses connected to the Internet, which reflect the capa-
bilities of a country in information dissemination; and (5) government spending
on R&D, that is, the potential knowledge and technology innovation capabili-
ties of a country in the long run. These five indicators present a full picture of
a country in promoting knowledge innovation and dissemination, technology
innovation and proliferation in the information era.
6) Government resources
Due to limitations by quantitative indicators, we use only one indicator here,
that is, the fiscal spending of the central government, which includes both current
and capital spending, both commercial and service spending and spending 
on both non-financial public undertakings and public organizations. This reflects
the ability of a national government to mobilize and utilize resources.
7) Military power
Military power is an important component of CNP. It reflects the abilities of a
country to maintain social stability and prevent separatism. It also reflects the
external power of a nation in seeking the maximization of interests abroad.
Military power is also a kind of “output” of national power.10 It is an extremely
important strategic asset, because military power is not only an explicit func-
tion of CNP, but also an expressive function of the will of a state. Military
resources have two categories of indicators: (1) military expenditures which
cover military-related expenditures of the Ministry of Defense and other
ministries (including recruiting, training, construction, and the purchase of mili-
tary supplies and equipment), excluding civil expenditures of the Ministry of
Defense; and (2) armed forces personnel which refers to military personnel on
duty and quasi military personnel. However, the two indicators cannot reflect
the quality of military resources of a country.
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8) International resources
International resources include four categories of indicators: (1) volume of
exports and services; (2) volume of imports and services; (3) royalty and license
fees receipts; and (4) royalty and license fees payments. The first two indica-
tors reflect the ability of a country to utilize and open up international markets;
the last two reflect the ability of a country to create and utilize international
technologies.
Methods of measuring CNP
To measure and evaluate CNP, it is necessary to develop a new method that
can be widely applied and has strong measurability and comparability. Here we
will introduce the traditional methodologies and equations and then introduce
a multiple-indicator dynamic equation and computation method developed by
the authors.
Traditional measurement
Klause Knorr defined national power as power that includes economic capa-
bilities, administrative competitiveness and the ability of war mobilization.11
This is the earliest equation for calculating national power, which shows that
people already knew that national power does not mean only economic strength,
although the latter provides the foundation for national power.
A complex nonlinear multivariable index that attempts to both identify discrete
variables and specify their interrelationships came in 1960 with the work of
Clifford German, who produced a world power index in the following form:
G = National Power = N (L + P + I + M),
where N stands for nuclear capability, L stands for territory, P stands for popu-
lation, I stands for the industrial base, and M stands for military size. This is
a national power equation centering upon nuclear capabilities. The national
power is positively correlated to nuclear capability. It reflects the special import-
ance of having nuclear weapons during the Cold War and the nuclear era. In
fact, all major countries have made all necessary efforts to develope nuclear
weapons after World War II to accumulate the most important strategic resources
and tactical means.
A semi-nonlinear multivariable index was subsequently proposed by Wilhelm
Fucks in 1965, who sought to derive national power from three variables –
population size (P), energy production (Z), and steel production (Z1) – arranged
in one of nine formulas for measuring the national power (M), all of which
were variants of one another and took the following form:
M = (P^ 2) × Z
M = (P^ (3/2)) × Z1
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The equation is based on the traditional resources in the era of industrializa-
tion. The strategic objectives are to obtain more energy in the world and to
raise industrial productivity.
In 1975, Ray Cline defined a national power equation as the following:
Pp = (C + E + M) × (S + W)
where C stands for population and territory, E stands for economic capacity,
M stands for military capacity (including the strategic balance plus combat capa-
bilities and a bonus for effort), S stands for the national strategy coefficient,
and W stands for national will (including the level of national integration, the
strength of leadership, and the relevance of strategy to the national interest).
This is a CNP formula. The first part of the equation reflects the objective
strength or hard factors and the second part reflects the subjective strength or
soft factors. CNP is the multiplication of the two, reflecting the importance
attached by researchers to soft factors. However, soft factors are difficult to
calculate. This method was once used by the US military to estimate the long-
term trends of the international system.
Ashley Tellis and other scholars of RAND are the first to propose a method
to evaluate the national power of a country in the post-industrialization era. They
hold that traditional indicators and methods are unable to reflect national power
in the information age. They have introduced many new concepts and ideas in
their research, but neither equations for calculation nor result of the calculation.
Traditional approaches just give simple rank-ordering of capabilities, but do
not identify the real gaps and relative changes of the indicators. It is, in fact,
only a semi-quantitative method. We hope to develop a comprehensive quan-
titative method that tracks the relative dynamic changes in CNP of great powers.
The CNP calculation methods proposed by Chinese scholars
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has developed an indicator system
and weighted average scheme that covers eight aspects and sixty-four indica-
tors.12 The basic method is to process the hard indicators in a standard way
and use Cline’s integrated scoring method to make indicators of different meas-
ures to transit to standard collectable data. Then, we can obtain the basic data
sheet after simple addition and collection level by level. On this basis, various
countries can be ranked according to their national capacity. Qualitative and
quantitative analysis will allocate a certain weighted average according to
different levels to make corrections and adjustments of the basic data to obtain
the weighted average data sheet, with which to make comparisons.
The method proposed by the Chinese Military Academy holds that CNP
should be the organic integration of capacities for subsistence, development and
coordination.13 Thus, a “CNP dynamic equation” was designed, which takes the
following form:
P = K × H × S
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where P is CNP of a given year; K is the coordination system, including factors
such as the capacities of national leaders to coordinate and unify; H is hard-
ware, including all physical factors; and S is software, including ideational
ethos, intelligence and other factors.
An analytic hierarchical process was developed by the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations. This, plus expert surveys, regression
analysis, nerves network and cluster analysis, led to the initial creation of a
CNP indicator system. Data were then collected according to the indicators and
processed in a standard and dimensionless manner, establishing the weighted
average for each indicator and, on this basis, computing the value of CNP.
According to the study of Chinese scholars, the ranking in CNP of five major
powers in 1998 was the United States, Japan, Russia, China and India.14 From
this, we may conclude that the Chinese scholars stress the integration of qual-
itative and quantitative analysis, with an emphasis on quantitative analysis. But
these models of analysis are mainly confined to traditional approaches.
A new method and its characteristics
This chapter introduces the following formula of CNP:
NP = S (ai × Ri)
where NP is CNP, Ri is the percentage of a certain resource in the world total,
and ai is the weighted average of a certain resource. When the time variable
is considered, the formula takes the following form:
NP (t) = S (ai × Ri(t))
The characteristics of the method are explained as follows:
First, we adopt the dimensionless specific gravity method to compute the
percentage of major strategic resources of countries in the world total. CNP
refers to relative national power. What we are more concerned about is whether
or not CNP or strategic resources of a country rise or fall relative to another
country. Since the units of the more than twenty indicators are different and
cannot be added up, we use the gravity method (to convert different units into
a unified unit – percentage) to add them up to constitute CNP. On this basis,
we make international and historical comparisons.
Secondly, we define eight kinds of strategic resources and twenty-three major
indicators to constitute a computable CNP equation, which reflects, in a compre-
hensive manner, the strategic resources and CNP of different countries.
Thirdly, we adopt different weighted averages for different indicators to repre-
sent their respective importance. For instance, the weighted average of the
strategic assets in the knowledge or information age is different from that in
the industrial age. The former includes mainly knowledge, technology, informa-
tion and other new strategic resources, whose roles are swiftly on the rise. The
latter includes territory, food, grain, energy, iron and steel and other traditional
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resources, whose roles are declining. In view of this, the chapter gives a consid-
erably high weighted average to knowledge and technology (see Table 2.1).
Fourthly, the equation is dynamic, changing with the times. It not only reflects
CNP or the strategic resources of a country relative to another country, but also
the dynamic changes among them.
Dynamic changes of the CNP of five great powers (1980–2000)
The economic, political and security patterns of the modern world have been
influenced by the rivalry of a few major powers. The world has not been in bal-
ance or in peace. Over the past two decades, the relative CNP of the five major
powers has changed, reflecting the imbalanced development among the super or
big powers. Some are rising, some are falling and some are not changing much.
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Table 2.1 Strategic resources and major indicators




1 Economic resources 0.2 GDP (PPP international dollar) 1.0
2 Human capital 0.1 a. Working age population (ages 15–65)
b. Human capital (Average years of school)
Total human capital =a × b 1.0




4 Capital resources 0.1 Gross capital formation 0.4
Market capitalization of listed companies 0.3
Net foreign direct investment 0.3
5 Knowledge and 0.2 Number of personal computers 0.2
technological Internet users 0.2
resources Patent applications filed by domestic 0.2
residents
Scientific and technical journal articles 0.2
R&D spending 0.2
6 Governmental 0.1 Expenditure of central government 1.0
resources
7 Military resources 0.1 Military personnel 0.4
Military expenditures 0.6
8 International 0.1 Export goods and services 0.3
resources Import goods and services 0.3
Royalty and license fees receipts 0.2
Royalty and license fees payments 0.2
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator 2002 CD-ROM.
Notes: The chapter uses the World Development Indicator Database 2004, which contains more
than 500 economic and social indicators of 206 countries and regions in 1960–2000. In calculating
human capital (average number of years of education received by people above the age of 15
years), the paper uses Barro and Lee’s International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling
Quality data set. Available online at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/aer96bl.htm>
(accessed August 8, 2003).
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Table 2.2 Strategic resources and CNP of five countries (1980–2000) (% in world total)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Change from 
1980–2000
Economic resources
China 3.16 4.57 5.63 8.87 11.16 8.00
India 3.36 3.80 4.35 5.02 5.46 2.10
Japan 8.04 8.27 8.73 8.38 7.54 –0.50
Russia – – 5.43 3.02 2.62 –
US 21.96 21.60 20.85 20.73 21.64 –0.32
Five in total – – 44.99 46.02 48.42 –
Human capital
China 17.6 18.7 20.2 21.9 24.0 6.40 
India 8.40 9.06 9.98 11.1 12.3 3.90 
Japan 4.36 4.01 3.73 3.55 3.27 –1.09 
Russia 5.69 5.30 5.05 4.26 4.06 –1.63 
US 1.16 1.02 9.30 9.01 8.60 7.44 
Five in total 47.7 47.2 48.2 49.8 52.2 4.50 
Natural resources
China 8.65 8.57 9.30 9.62 9.74 1.09 
India 6.68 6.75 6.97 6.59 6.88 0.20 
Japan 3.34 3.23 3.41 3.54 3.39 0.05 
Russia 7.57 6.97 –
US 18.29 16.81 16.42 15.95 15.82 –2.47 
Five in total 43.26 42.79 –
Capital resources
China 2.21 3.81 3.87 10 10.14 7.93
India 1.5 2.16 2.0 2.7 2.22 0.72 
Japan 5.25 5.52 14.4 10.5 7.12 1.87 
Russia 1.5 2.27 –
US 23.02 20.33 23.4 23.8 25.54 2.52 
Five in total 43.67 48.5 47.29 –
Knowledge and technological resources
China 0.79 0.94 1.01 1.34 2.82 2.03 
India 2.23 2.01 1.23 0.85 1.14 –1.09 
Japan 8.23 9.17 8.56 15.32 14.70 6.47 
Russia 0.08 1.76 1.64 –
US 32.69 32.8 34.26 34.59 35.19 2.50 
Five in total 45.14 53.86 55.49 –
Governmental resources
China 1.84 1.48 1.16 1.03 2.60 0.76
India 1.63 2.10 2.66 2.46 3.54 1.91 
Japan 5.83 5.18 5.24 7.60 7.06* 1.23 
Russia 2.60 2.33 –
US 19.1 19.0 18.7 15.9 16.13 –2.97 
Five in total 29.05 31.66 –
Military resources
China 8.57 7.91 7.31 9.04 0.47
India 3.97 4.14 5.01 6.69 2.72
Japan 1.50 1.84 2.38 2.19 0.69
Russia 6.40 4.39 –
US 21.07 21.24 21.55 19.83 20.99 –0.25
Five in total 42.65 43.30 –
The United States remains the world’s superpower. The CNP of the United
States in 1980 accounted for 22.485 percent of the world total and 22.518
percent in 2000. The US still ranks first in the world.
China has risen to become the second world power. In 1980, the CNP of
China accounted for 4.763 percent of the world total, lower than that of the
former Soviet Union and Japan, ranking fourth in the world. But by 2000,
China’s CNP as a share of the world total rose to 8.770 percent, rising by 4.034
percentage points. The relative gap between China and the United States has
also narrowed. The CNP of China was only one-fifth (21 percent) of the United
States in 1980, and one-quarter (25.5 percent) in 1990, but rose to more than
one-third (39 percent) by 2000. In other words, the gap between the United
States and China in terms of CNP has been narrowed from five times to three
times over the past two decades.
Japan’s CNP accounts for 4.763 percent of the world total, ranking it third in
the world. It rose first in 1980–1995 and then fell comparatively after the 1990s.
India ranks fourth in the world, with a CNP accounting for 4.543 percent of the
world total. The relative gap between China and India expanded from 1.4 times
to 1.9 times. Russia has fallen in CNP. It was 2.925 percent of the world total in
2000, the lowest of the five major powers. The gap between China and Russia
has been grown from 2.2 times in 1995 to 3.0 times in 2000.
The relative changes in CNP of the five major countries inevitably caused
major adjustments to national security and foreign policy strategies in these
countries. In the eyes of the United States, the rapid rise of China’s CNP will
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Table 2.2 continued
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Change from 
1980–2000
International resources
China 0.59 0.91 0.74 1.35 2.43 1.84 
India 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.60 0.20 
Japan 7.55 9.05 9.97 10.38 9.78 2.23 
Russia – – – 0.82 0.71 –
US 22.47 24.01 22.10 22.18 24.44 1.97 
Five in total – – – 35.21 37.96 –
CNP
China 4.736 5.306 5.646 7.163 8.770 4.034 
India 3.376 3.615 3.735 4.008 4.543 1.167 
Japan 6.037 6.337 7.317 8.535 7.729 1.692 
Russia – – 3.271 2.808 2.925 –
US 22.485 22.022 22.138 21.903 22.518 0.033 
Five in total – – 42.107 41.613 46.481 –
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes:
1. The weighted average of economic and technology resources are both 0.2 and that of other
resources is 0.1.
2. The lack of some data does not affect the accuracy in the judgment of the general trend.
inevitably make China its strategic rival. It is, therefore, necessary to adopt
precautionary and containment strategies against China. Paul Kennedy, a
Professor at Yale University, holds that China is perhaps the only country that
will constitute real challenges to the dominance of the United States.15 Japan,
however, has already seen China as a real strategic threat, so it has strength-
ened its strategic alliance with the United States against China. China has always
been a major strategic threat to India, and India has long maintained its mili-
tary spending at about 2.4–3.5 percent of its GDP. Russia, due to the rapid
decline in its CNP, has found its gap with China enlarging. At present, Russia’s
strategy is favorable to China, yet its future strategy is not clear. All the above
shows that over the past two decades, China’s CNP has been rising rapidly,
and with its strategic resources and environment improving, China is becoming
more powerful in terms of CNP than its neighboring great powers (see Figure
2.1). But the latent strategic conflict between China and the United States is
increasing.
Dynamic evaluation of China’s strategic resources
Our initial computation results show:
First, computed by PPP, the percentage of China’s economic resources in
the world’s aggregate has been rising swiftly, with the relative gap to the United
States narrowing significantly. China has not only become the largest emerging
economy and market, but also will become the world’s largest economic entity.








China India Japan Russia U.S.
Figure 2.1 Percentage of comprehensive national power in world total (1980–2000)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002.
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According to the statistics of Guojia tongjiju (China’s State Statistical Bureau),
China’s GDP in 2000 was 7.3 times that of 1978, averaging an annual growth
of 9.5 percent.16 China’s GDP increased by nearly eight times (7.9 times)
between 1978 and 2001.
Calculated by the PPP international dollar (current price), China’s GDP
accounted for 2.78 percent of the world total in 1975, lower than the Soviet
Union (no. 2 in the world) and Japan (no. 3 in the world). By 1990, however,
the percentage rose to 5.63 percent, outstripping Russia to rank after Japan. By
1995, the figure rose to 8.87 percent, replacing Japan as second in the world,
outranked only by the United States. By 2000, the figure rose to 11.16 percent
(see Table 2.3), 8.38 percentage points higher than in 1975 when China’s GDP
was only 12.3 percent of the GDP aggregate of the United States.
According to the 2000 Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic
Forum and the International Development Institute of Harvard University, the
top ten countries in terms of GDP in the world for 1999 (calculated by PPP
international dollars) were U.S.A. (100), China (51.2), Japan (34.7) Germany
(21.4), India (20.8), France (15.0), UK (14.5), Italy (14.4), Brazil (12.3) and
Russia (11.0).17
According to a study by Angus Maddison, based on 1990’s PPP international
dollar, the study showed that in 1978, China’s GDP accounted for 4.9 percent
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Table 2.3 Economic resources of China, US, India, Japan and Russia (1975–2000)
Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2000
GNI (PPP, $ billions)
China 212 414 821 1520 3080 3850 4966
India 266 441 683 1170 1740 2030 2432
Japan 598 1050 1490 2350 2910 2940 3354
Russia – – – 1460 1050 948 1168
US 1730 2880 3880 5620 7200 8000 9646
World total 7623 13115 17955 26967 34730 37595 44506
Percent of GNI in world total
China 2.78 3.16 4.57 5.63 8.87 10.23 11.16
India 3.49 3.36 3.80 4.35 5.02 5.41 5.46
Japan 7.85 8.04 8.27 8.73 8.38 7.82 7.54
Russia – – – 5.43 3.02 2.52 2.62
US 22.71 21.96 21.60 20.85 20.73 21.29 21.64
Five in total – – – 44.99 46.02 47.27 48.42
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Gross National Income (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any
product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary
income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current US
dollars converted using the World Bank Atlas method. PPP GNI is gross national income converted
to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same
purchasing power over GNI as a US dollar has in the United States. See World Bank, World
Development Indicators 2004, Washington DC: World Bank, 2004, p. 17. 
Data for 2000 are those of the Gross National Income (GNI).
of the world total, 11.5 percent higher than in 1998.18 The GDP of the United
States in the world total rose from 21.6 percent to 21.9 percent; that of Japan
rose from 7.6 percent to 7.7 percent; that of Russia dropped from 9.0 percent
to 3.4 percent; and that of India rose from 3.3 percent to 5.0 percent. The
percentage of China’s GDP in the total of the United States rose from 22.7
percent to 52.5 percent.19
The above evaluations show that, calculated by the PPP international dollar,
China’s current GDP is one-tenth of the world total, or one-half that of the
United States. This is the basic estimation of China’s economic strength (or
relative economic strength).
China is the country with the greatest potential for development in the world.
That is the basic reason why its CNP has been rising steadily. According to
the 2000 Global Competitiveness Report, of the fifty-nine major countries
surveyed from 1990 to 1999, China ranked first in per capita GDP growth, with
11.3 percent. India ranked the twelfth; U.S.A., the twenty-fourth; Japan, the
forty-fourth; and Russia fifty-sixth, with –6.43 percent and per capita GDP drop-
ping by 75.2 percent.20
According to World Bank statistics, China has a great potential in its long-
term growth. Take for instance the period from 1965to 1999 (including the
ten-year great cultural revolution). Given the world economic growth as the
average (1.00), China’s GDP growth potential index was 2.45, and its per capita
GDP growth potential was 4.00. The indices for India were 1.40 and 1.50; those
for Japan were 1.24 and 2.13; and those for the U.S.A. were 0.91 and 1.25 (see
Table 2.4). Based on the aforesaid growth potential, China will become the
biggest economic entity in the world by 2020, with its GDP making up 22.2
percent of the world total, higher than that of the United States at 19.96 percent
(see Table 2.5). According to estimates by Maddison, China’s GDP would
exceed that of the United States by 2015. China’s GDP would make up 17.4
percent of the world total and that of the United States, 17.3 percent.21 The
World Bank estimates show that China will outpace the United States in GDP
by 2020. All the estimates show that if China maintains relative social stability
and realizes a sustainable economic growth, it is possible for China to become
the largest economic power in the world in twenty years.
The steady rise in economic strategic resources is the most important basis
for rising CNP. For more than twenty years, the rising percentage of China’s
GDP in the world total has played the biggest role in boosting the newly added
CNP index, with a contribution of 46.4 percent.
Secondly, China has the richest human capital in the world, which is the
strongest of all national strategic resources. According to the national popula-
tion census, the percentage of the population aged 15–64 was 61.5 percent in
1982, but rose to 70.15 percent by 2000. The growth of the population aged
15–64 in the same period was 1.97 percent, higher than the natural growth of
the population (1.23 percent). The number of years of education received by
people at and above 15 years rose from 4.61 in 1982 to 7.11 in 2000, rising
by 54 percent. The total human capital rose from 2.88 billion/year in 1982 to
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6.314 billion/year by 2000, more than doubling. Of this, the contribution by
population change factor (growth of population aged 15–64) was 45.2 percent.
The contribution by the rise in educational level (growth in the number of years
of education received by the population) was 54.8 percent. China’s percentage
of total human capital in the world total rose from 17.6 percent in 1980 to 24.0
percent in 2000 (see Table 2.6), doubling that of India and 2.8 times that of
the United States. This shows that China has become a No. 1 big power in
terms of population and total human capital. This is the biggest advantage in
its national strategic resources. The contribution by human capital to rising CNP
over the past twenty years ranked third or about one-fifth (21.0 percent). The
full utilization of human capital will be an extremely important development
strategy in the future.
Thirdly, China is a big power in terms of natural resources, ranking second
in the world in the actual utilization of major natural resources. China’s power
consumption in the world total has risen significantly, rising from 3.15 percent
in 1980 to 8.83 percent in 2000, ranking it second in the world. The percentage
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Table 2.4 Five countries economic growth trend 
Country GDP growth Per capita Growth potential index
(1965–1999) GDP growth
(1965–1999) GDP Per capita GDP
China 8.1 6.4 2.45 4.00
India 4.6 2.4 1.40 1.50
Japan 4.1 3.4 1.24 2.13
Russia – – – –
US 3.0 2.0 0.91 1.25
World total 3.3 1.6 1.00 1.00
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, New York: Oxford University Press,
2001, Table 1.4.
Notes: Growth potential index refers to the ratio of growth of all countries to the average growth
in the world.
Table 2.5 Predicted long-term economic growth trend of the five countries (1998–2020)
Country GDP (billion US dollars, 1998) Percent in world total
1998 2010 2020 1998 2010 2020
China 3850 9803 17057 10.23 17.66 22.20
India 2030 3482 5460 5.41 6.27 7.11
Japan 2940 4762 7116 7.82 8.58 9.27
Russia 948 1202 1466 2.52 2.17 1.90
US 8000 11406 15329 21.29 20.55 19.96
World total 37595 55505 76796 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Author’s estimation based on World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 CD-ROM,
1965–1999 data.
of commercial energy in the world total also rose, from 8.18 percent in 1980
to 11.56 percent in 2000, ranking it second in the world. But the percentage
of sowing area of crops has been falling steadily, dropping from 17.01 percent
in 1980 to 12.76 percent in 2000, also ranking it second in the world, lower
than India. But its percentage of water sources remains unchanged. China’s
natural resources in the world rose from 8.54 percent in 1975 to 9.74 percent
in 2000, ranking it second in the world in terms of available natural resources,
only after the United States (see Table 2.7). China’s percentage of natural
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Table 2.6 Human capital of five countries (1975–2000) (% in world total)
Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Working age population (% of total) (a)
China 22.2 22.6 23.3 23.6 23.2 22.4
India 14.9 15.2 15.4 15.7 15.9 16.2
Japan 3.27 3.03 2.83 2.67 2.48 2.30
Russia 3.93 3.65 3.35 3.09 2.81 2.69
US 5.99 5.80 5.44 5.10 4.88 4.76
Five-country total 50.3 50.3 50.3 50.1 49.2 48.4
Average years of school (b)
China (c) 4.38 4.61 4.94 5.51 6.08 7.11
India 2.70 3.27 3.64 4.10 4.52 5.06
Japan 7.78 8.51 8.74 8.96 9.23 9.47
Russia 9.27 9.23 9.77 10.5 9.77 10.0
US 9.69 11.9 11.6 11.7 11.9 12.11
World average 5.54 5.92 6.17 6.43 6.44 6.66
Total human capital (billion/person/year)
China 2.25 2.70 3.35 4.17 4.95 6.00
India 0.934 1.29 1.62 2.06 2.52 3.08
Japan 0.59 0.67 0.72 0.77 0.804
0.819
Russia 0.844 0.874 0.951 1.04 0.964 1.02
US 1.35 1.79 1.83 1.92 2.04 2.16
World total 12.8 15.4 17.9 20.7 22.6 25.0
Share of total human capital in worlds total 
China 17.5 17.6 18.7 20.2 21.9 24.0
India 7.27 8.40 9.06 9.98 11.1 12.3
Japan 4.60 4.36 4.01 3.73 3.55 3.27
Russia 6.57 5.69 5.30 5.05 4.26 4.06
US 10.5 11.6 10.2 9.30 9.01 8.60
Five-country total 46.5 47.7 47.2 48.2 49.8 52.2
Source: (a) World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM; (b) R. Barro and J. Lee,
“International Data on Educational Attainment Updates and Implication,” NBER Working Paper,
2000; (c) data for China from Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo
tongji zhaiyao 2001 (China Statistical Abstract 2001), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China
Statistics Press), 2001, p. 36.
Notes: Working age populations refer to the population ages 15–64. Average years of school refer
to the average years of education for those over 15. Total human capital refers to the working age
population times the average years of school.
Table 2.7 Natural resources of five countries (1975–2000) (% in world total)
Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Electricity production (kwh)
China 3.15 3.82 4.43 5.54 7.86 8.83
India 1.33 1.46 1.89 2.47 3.17 3.53
Japan 7.35 6.99 6.87 7.25 7.45 7.05
Russia – 9.82 9.91 9.23 6.52 5.71
US 31.23 29.63 27.02 27.12 27.02 26.09
Five in total – 51.72 50.12 51.61 52.02 51.22
Commercial energy use
China 8.18 8.68 9.18 10.07 11.84 11.56
India 3.51 3.5 3.76 4.18 4.82 5.08
Japan 5.19 5.01 4.73 5.1 5.49 5.31
Russia 10.24 11.03 11.7 10.5 6.9 6.21
US 27.98 26.17 22.94 22.37 23.06 23.26
Five in total 55.1 54.39 52.31 52.22 52.11 51.41
Arable land
China 17.01 16.3 14.87 15.79 12.96 12.76 
India 17.58 17.85 17.44 17.31 14.45 14.98 
Japan 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.34 0.31 
Russia – – – – 7.65 6.75 
US 12.51 12.28 12.2 11.08 8.62 8.84 
Five in total – – – – 44.02 43.64 
Freshwater resources
China 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
India 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91 3.91
Japan 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Russia 9.22 9.22 9.22 9.22 9.22 9.22
US 5.09 5.09 5.09 5.09 5.09 5.09
Five in total 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9
Total natural resources
China 8.54 8.65 8.57 9.30 9.62 9.74 
India 6.58 6.68 6.75 6.97 6.59 6.88 
Japan 3.49 3.34 3.23 3.41 3.54 3.39 
Russia – – – – 7.57 6.97 
US 19.20 18.29 16.81 16.42 15.95 15.82 
Five in total – – – – 43.26 42.79 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Electricity production is measured at the terminals of all alternator sets in a station. 
Freshwater resources refer to total renewable resources, broken down between internal flows of
rivers and groundwater from rainfall in the country, and river flows from other countries. Freshwater
resources per capita are calculated using the World Bank’s population estimates. 
Commercial energy use refers to apparent consumption, which is equal to indigenous produc-
tion plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuel supplied to ships and aircraft engaged
in international transport. 
Arable land includes land defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(UNFAO) as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary
meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and temporarily fallow
land. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded. 
Total natural resources equal all natural resources plus weight average (in all the cases, weight
average is 25%).
resources in the world total rose by only 1.09 percentage points, with their
contribution to the newly added CNP being only 2.9 percent. This also reflects
the fact that the percentage of China’s population is higher than the percentage
of natural resources in the world total, but the per capita natural resources and
utilization are lower than the world’s average, without any comparative advan-
tages.
Fourth, the percentage of China’s capital resources in the world total has
risen rapidly, with greater potential to tap. At the beginning of reform, China
was relatively short of capital resources. In 1980, the total domestic investment
made up only 4.4 percent of the world total. There was no foreign direct invest-
ment and there was no capital market. Its capital resources accounted for only
2.21 percent of the world total. With opening up to the outside world and the
development of the financial market, this percentage rose to 3.87 percent in
1990 and up to 10.14 percent by 2000 (see Table 2.8). Compared with the
United States, the amount of domestic investment in the world total was slightly
higher than the United States. China’s foreign exchange reserves were more
than the United States. But the capital market (market value of the stock market)
was far lower than the United States. In 2000, the market value of the U.S.
stock market was twenty-six times that of China’s. Conversely, China has great
potential in the development of its capital market, depending on how to open
up, develop and standardize the capital market.
Fifth, China is poor in knowledge and technological resources, the weakest
of all its national strategic resources. In 1980, China’s knowledge and techno-
logical resources accounted for only 0.79 percent of the world total. In the
1990s, China’s knowledge and technological resources in the world total rose
to 2.82 percent due to the rapid increase in mobile phones. But in the same
period, the percentage of the United States was 35.19 percent and that of Japan,
14.7 percent. China’s knowledge innovation capabilities (number of scientific
papers) were very low, accounting for only 2.21 percent of the world total.
Technical innovation capabilities (number of patent applications filed by resi-
dents) accounted for only 2.82 percent of the world total (see Table 2.9). In
reality, only 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent of the patents filed by Chinese resi-
dents were approved by the United States and Europe, respectively. Over the
past dozen years, about 75 percent of the Nobel prize winners in the natural
sciences, economics and sciences of medicine did research or lived in the United
States. Most of the information on the Internet came from the United States.22
In 1999, the number of scientists and technical personnel in China reached 2.91
million, including 1.59 million scientists and engineers.23 According to the World
Bank statistics, there were 1.02 million scientists and engineers engaged in R&D
in the United States. The number in Japan was 620,000. China ranked third,
with 570,000; Russia, 520,000; and India, 150,000.24 No matter how it was
counted, China was lower than the other four major powers in terms of the
number of papers and patents. This shows that although China has relatively
abundant numbers of scientific and technical personnel (ranking third in the
world), the current scientific and technical system has not shaken off the shadows
50 Economic and social transformation in China
Table 2.8 Capital resources of five countries (1975–2000) (% in world total)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Gross capital formation
China 3.45 4.41 7.61 8.32 16.26 18.23 
India 2.92 2.73 3.96 4.56 5.77 4.66 
Japan 10.56 10.29 10.26 11.99 10.76 10.20 
Russia – – – 6.96 3.15 5.02 
US 16.19 17.43 19.16 14.99 16.07 16.22 
Five in total – – – 46.82 52.01 54.33
Market capitalization of listed companies
China 0 0 0 0 0.24 1.80 
India – – – 0.41 0.71 0.46 
Japan – – – 31.0 20.6 9.81 
Russia – – – – 0.09 0.12 
US – – – 32.6 38.6 46.92 
Five in total – – – 64.01 60.24 59.12 
Net FDI
China 0 0 5.12 5.46 40.27 10.39 
India 0.56 0.26 0.35 0.22 2.62 0.72 
Japan – 0.21 0.78 0.51 0.01 0.34 
Russia – – – 0 1.6 0.74 
US 6.83 28.6 21.5 18.1 15.6 16.59 
Five in total – – – 24.29 60.1 28.78 
Capital resources
China 1.73 2.21 3.81 3.87 10.0 10.14 
India 1.74 1.50 2.16 2.0 2.7 2.22 
Japan 5.28 5.25 5.52 14.4 10.5 7.12 
Russia – – – – 1.5 2.27 
US 11.51 23.02 20.33 23.4 23.8 25.54 
Five in total – – – 43.67 48.5 47.29 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy
plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches,
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, rail-
ways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial
and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unex-
pected fluctuations in production or sales, and “work in progress.” According to the 1993 SNA,
net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation.
Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest
(10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than of the
investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-
term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Gross capital formation (gross domestic investment
in previous editions) is the sum of gross fixed capital formation, changes in inventories, and acqui-
sitions less disposals of valuables.
Market capitalization of listed companies (also known as market value) is the share price times
the number of shares outstanding. 
The weighted average of the data for 1975–1985 is all calculated by 0.5; that of data for other
years is calculated by capital resources = 0.4 × domestic investment + 0.3 × capital market +0.3
× net FDI; capital market refers to the market value of stocks (US dollar).
Table 2.9 Knowledge and technology resources of five countries (1980–2000) 
(% in world total)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Personal computers installed in education 
China 0.37 1.14 4.24
India 0.2 0.5 0.97
Japan 5.56 6.28 8.44
Russia 0.38 1.08 1.32
US 40.67 35.91 34.76
Five in total 47.18 44.91 49.72
Patent applications residents
China 1.61 (1996) 2.82
India 0.23 (1996) 0.10
Japan 46.88 (1996) 42.83
Russia 2.49 (1996) 2.61
US 15.39 (1996) 19.34
Five in total 66.6 (1996) 67.69
Scientific and technical journal articles
China 0.33 0.54 1.02 (1989) 1.42 2.21 (1999)
India 3.49 2.69 2.28 (1989) 1.8 1.74 (1999)
Japan 7.47 8.31 8.87 (1989) 9.04 9.05 (1999)
Russia 3.93 2.96 (1999)
US 39.37 38.64 38.03 (1989) 32.68 30.93 (1999)
Five in total 48.87 46.89 (1999)
Internet users 
China 0.02 0.15 
India 0.01 0.08 
Japan 2.83 3.75 
Russia 0.23 0.22 
US 63.68 66.41 
Five in total 66.77 70.61 
R&D expenditure
China 1.25 1.34 1.67 2.53 4.69 
India 0.96 1.33 1.52 1.71 2.82
Japan 8.99 10.02 11.51 11.59 9.44 
Russia 1.07 1.10 
US 26.01 27.12 25.12 25.27 24.50 
Five in total 42.17 42.55 
Total technology resources in world total
China 0.79 0.94 1.01 1.34 2.82 
India 2.23 2.01 1.23 0.85 1.14 
Japan 8.23 9.17 8.56 15.32 14.70 
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.76 1.64 
US 32.69 32.80 34.26 34.59 35.19 
Five in total 44.88 53.86 55.49 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Scientific and technical journal articles refer to scientific and engineering articles published
in the following fields: physics; biology; chemistry; mathematics; clinical medicine; bio-medical
research; engineering and technology; and earth and space sciences.
Expenditures for R&D are current and capital expenditures on creative, systematic activity that
increases the stock of knowledge. Included are fundamental and applied research and experimental
development work leading to new devices, products, or processes. 
Patent applications filed are applications filed with a national patent office for exclusive rights
for an invention – a product or process that provides a new way of doing something or offers a
new technical solution to a problem. A patent provides protection for the invention to the owner
of the patent for a limited period, generally twenty years.
The weighted average of the data for 1980 and 1985 is 0.5 that of data for 1990 is 0.33; that
of data for 1995 and 1998 is 0.2.
of the planned economic model, thus greatly restricting innovation capabilities
and labor productivity. That is why China is not a big power in terms of scien-
tific innovation or in technological innovation.
Sixth, China is the lowest of the five major powers in terms of the percentage
of governmental resources, and the percentage is dropping steadily (see Table
2.10). In 1980, China’s expenditure on central finance made up only 1.84 percent
of the world total, less than one-tenth of the United States, or 1.03 percent 
less than in 1995, barely half of India and Russia. In 2000, it was only 2.60
percent of the world total. The fiscal capabilities of the central government of
China were barely one-sixth of the United States, far lower than the percent-
ages of other types of resources in the world total. As a big populous power,
China requires that the government should provide all kinds of public goods
and services. As the biggest developing country, China requires that the govern-
ment should invest in infrastructure and telecom facilities. As a country with
the biggest regional disparities, the government should coordinate the develop-
ment of different regions and promote the development of areas inhabited by
national minorities. As the third largest country in terms of territorial land and
seas and with a dozen neighbors that are still in a state of conflict, the govern-
ment should have the necessary defense spending. Low fiscal capability cannot
solve the above problems. This is the “fatal point” in China’s strategic resources.
Seventh, China ranks first in terms of military personnel but it has a down-
ward trend, dropping from 18.25 percent in 1985 to 11.32 percent in 2000 (see
Table 2.11). According to the World Bank, China’s military spending accounted
for 11.50 percent of the world total while that of the United States accounted
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Table 2.10 Governmental resources of five countries (1975–2000) (% in world total)
Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Central government expenditure (% of GDP)
China 13.66 14.74 8.87 5.42 3.41 6.01
India 10.95 12.25 15.18 15.96 14.48 16.70
Japan 14.72 18.38 17.23 15.70 – –
Russia – – – – 25.37 22.9
US 21.01 22.02 24.14 23.49 22.64 19.2
Five in total 23.04 25.34 27.51 26.17 29.58 6.01
Central government expenditure (% of world total)
China 1.65 1.84 1.48 1.16 1.03 2.60 
India 1.66 1.63 2.10 2.66 2.46 3.54 
Japan 5.01 5.83 5.18 5.24 7.06 7.06 (a) 
Russia 2.60 2.33 
US 20.7 19.1 19.0 18.7 15.9 16.13 
Five in total 29.05 31.66 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Central government expenditure includes both current and capital (development) expendi-
tures and excludes lending minus repayments. 
(a) Data of 1995.
for 30.29 percent. China’s military spending is only one-third that of the United
States, twice as much as that of India and four times that of Japan. But according
to Chinese official figures, China’s military spending was only one-quarter that
of the United States. What needs explaining is why China’s military spending
is relatively low and why the structure of the spending is extremely irrational,
with 60–70 percent devoted to personnel and only very little to military tech-
nical equipment and R&D. But the United States spends only 19 percent on
personnel and 18 percent on procurement of military technical equipment and
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Table 2.11 Military resources of five countries (1985–2000) (% in world total)
Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Military personnel
China 18.25 16.21 12.56 11.32 (1999)
India 5.61 5.24 5.40 6.13 (1999)
Japan 1.07 1.03 1.00 1.13 (1999)
Russia 6.00 4.25 (1999)
US 9.99 9.31 7.33 7.03 (1999)
Five in total 32.29 29.86 (1999)
Military expenditures 
China 4.84 5.31 7.69 11.50 (2001)
China (a) 2.11 2.38 3.81 7.52 (2001)
India 2.87 3.40 4.75 7.07 (2001)
Japan 1.79 2.38 3.30 2.89 (2001)
Russia 6.67 4.49 (2001)
US 28.45 29.20 31.03 30.29 (2001)
Five in total 53.44 52.26 (2001)
Military resources
China 10.20 9.67 9.64 11.43
China (a) 8.57 7.91 7.31 9.04
India 3.97 4.14 5.01 6.69 
Japan 1.50 1.84 2.38 2.19 
Russia – – 6.40 4.39 
US 21.07 21.24 21.55 20.99
Five in total – – 44.98 43.30
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Military expenditures for NATO countries are based on the NATO definition, which covers
military-related expenditures of the defense ministry (including recruiting, training, construction,
and the purchase of military supplies and equipment) and other ministries. Civilian-type expendi-
tures of the defense ministry are excluded. Military assistance is included in the expenditures of
the donor country, and purchases of military equipment on credit are included at the time the debt
is incurred, not at the time of payment. Data for other countries generally cover expenditures of
the ministry of defense (excluded are expenditures on public order and safety, which are classified
separately). Military personnel refer to active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces
if those forces resemble regular units in their organization, equipment, training, or mission.
Percentage of military resources in world total = 0.4 × % of military personnel in world total
+ 0.6 × % of military expenditure in world total.
(a) China’s official statistics. Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo
tongji nianjian 2004 (China Statistical Yearbook 2004), Beijing: Tongji chubanshe (China Statistics
Press), 2004. 
14.2 percent on R&D, and nearly 35 percent on maintaining combat readiness
and executing military actions.25
Eighth, China has limited capabilities in utilizing international resources. The
percentage of international resources used by China is quite small in the world
total, only 0.59 percent in 1980, although it rose to 2.43 percent in 2000 (see
Table 2.12). But that of the United States was 24.44 percent. Over the past
twenty years, China’s exports accounted for only 3.0–4.0 percent of the world
total, while the spending on copyright and patents was only 1.73 percent of the
world total. So, China is neither a software export power nor a software importer,
failing to make full use of opening up to absorb global software technologies.
The preceding analysis shows that China’s eight kinds of strategic resources
in the world total are distributed extremely unevenly. It has advantages only in
a single kind of strategic resources, but disadvantages in a number of other
resources relative to those of the U.S. China enjoys a global strategic advan-
tage in human capital and some advantages in natural resources and capital
resources, but it has apparent disadvantages in knowledge and technological
resources and in the utilization of international resources. The government has
poor abilities in drawing in and operating finances, and still has a very weak
“central government.” Militarily, its strength is still not enough to cope with
the military challenges of the forces advocating Taiwan’s independence and the
power politics of external hegemonies. Governmental resources and military
resources still follow a downward trend. This reflects the unevenness in the
development of different strategic resources and also the advantages and dis-
advantages of strategic resources. These have provided us with the basis for
establishing the “grand strategy for the twenty-first century.” The objectives of
China’s grand strategy should be to give full scope to the strategic advantages
and turn strategic disadvantages into strategic advantages.
Conclusions: aims of China’s grand strategy
Based on the preceding evaluation of strategic resources, we hold that the objec-
tives of China’s grand strategy should be to make the people rich and the
country strong, that is, to constantly raise the percentage of its CNP in the
world total so as to become a big world power by the middle of this century.
The basic objectives of China’s grand strategy in the future twenty years should
be to include six goals: “high growth, great national power, an affluent people,
national security, improvement of international competitiveness and sustainable
development.”
China will have quadrupled its gross economic volume by 2020, with the
average annual GDP growth rate topping 7 percent from 2001 to 2020. In the
meantime, China’s GDP will be sixteen times as much as that of 1978 in terms
of constant prices, one-fifth of the world total, while the per capita GDP will
by then reach or approach the international level, making the country the world’s
biggest economic entity. In addition, trade growth will surpass economic growth,
with China’s trade volume making up about 10 percent of the world total and
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Table 2.12 International resources of five countries (1980–2000) (% in world total)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Exports of goods and services
China 1.1 1.25 1.35 2.33 3.59
India 0.49 0.57 0.54 0.63 0.77
Japan 6.41 8.77 7.64 7.83 7.03
Russia 1.45 1.47
US 11.85 12.86 12.65 12.58 13.52
Five in total 24.77 26.38
Imports of goods and services
China 0.86 1.79 1.1 2.18 3.28 
India 0.75 0.85 0.74 0.82 0.88 
Japan 6.75 6.66 7.01 6.75 6.22 
Russia 1.27 0.79 
US 12.51 18.03 14.52 14.34 18.32 
Five in total – – – 25.37 29.49 
Royalty and license fees receipts 
China 0 0 0 0 0.11 
India 0 0 0 0 0.11 
Japan 3.24 0 9.12 11.25 14.17 
Russia 0 0 0 0.01 0.13 
US 65.55 62.33 56.7 56.74 52.68 
Five in total 68.00 67.20 
Royalty and license fees payment
China – – – – 1.73 
India 0.14 0.3 0.3 0.22 0.41 
Japan 14.77 22.08 18.75 18.78 14.86 
Russia – – – 0.01 0.04 
US 10.26 11.38 13.04 13.8 21.74 
Five in total 38.79
International resources in world total
China 0.59 0.91 0.74 1.35 2.43 
India 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.60 
Japan 7.55 9.05 9.97 10.38 9.78 
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.71 
US 22.47 24.01 22.10 22.18 24.44 
Five in total 31.01 34.45 33.25 35.22 37.96 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM.
Notes: Exports and imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market
services provided to, or received from, the rest of the world. They include the value of merchan-
dise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as
communications, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services.
They exclude labor and property income (factor services in the 1968 SNA) as well as transfer
payments. 
Royalty and license fees are payments and receipts between residents and nonresidents for the
authorized use of intangible, non-produced, non-financial assets and proprietary rights (such as
patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial processes, and franchises) and for the use, through
licensing agreements, of produced originals of prototypes (such as manuscripts and films).
International resources =0.3 × (exports + imports) + 0.2 × (copyright income + spending).
the country jumping to the second major trading country from the present sixth.
In the coming twenty years, the relative gap between China’s overall national
strength and that of the United States will be reduced to two-fold from three-
fold, making the country a world power with dominant ability.
The per capita income level will see a constant improvement, rising from
the current low-middle to the middle or above the middle level, while the life
quality of the people will become noticeably better. The per capita schooling
years and life expectancy will witness an overall enhancement. The human
development index will reach a fairly high level from today’s mediocre level.
Absolute poverty will be eliminated from the population, and China will be
built into a “Xiaokang” (“well-off ”) society of common prosperity.
National security and unification must be safeguarded. At the same time,
defense and combat capability in high-technology conditions should be
increased, and the mechanization and informationalization of the military should
be completed so as to achieve a leapfrog development of military moderniza-
tion.
By 2020 China’s international competitiveness will have climbed from the
present thirtieth to fourtieth placing to the world’s top ten. By 2010 the popu-
lation’s natural growth rate will have been kept within 5 percent, and zero
growth will be achieved by 2020. Forest coverage will reach 20 percent in 2010
and 23.4 percent in 2020. Construction of safety nets for the prevention of all
kinds of disaster will be intensified and the emergency management and aid
system will be established. China’s economic, social and science and techno-
logical development will enter its “prime time” in the next twenty years. By
grasping this opportunity to speed up development, all the aforesaid goals will
be realized.
China should intensify investment in various strategic resources, raise its
percentage in the world total, give full scope to strategic advantages and turn
strategic disadvantages into strategic advantages so as to become the strongest
economic power in the world instead of just a big economic power and the
world’s big national power instead of just a regional big power.
First, to maintain a sustainable and steady economic growth to narrow the
gap with the United States in terms of economic aggregate and outpace it in
the 2015–2020 period, China must constantly raise the per capita income level,
further improve the human development so that all the 1.5–1.6 billion people
enjoy a better life, better ensure human security and a more beautiful ecolog-
ical environment, and further eliminate the number of people in absolute poverty,
thus realizing the objective of common prosperity.26 Second, it must further
intensify investment in human capital to realize the objective of popularizing
elementary education, accelerating the development of secondary and tertiary
education, expanding vocational studies and training opportunities, energetically
developing network education and remote education programs so as to build
the world’s biggest “learning society” with a lifelong learning system; and must
establish a nationally unified labor market with more flexible and free choices,
free movement and open competition in the labor market, fully utilizing the
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strategic advantages of human capital and turning them into sources of economic
growth and economic wealth.
Third, it must develop new energy sources and renewable energy, to protect
the land resources, to economize the use of water sources and fully utilize inter-
nationally available strategic resources based on market mechanisms and an
environmentally friendly, sustainable development model.
Fourth, to accelerate the transition from investment-driven growth to know-
ledge and technology-driven growth, China should actively encourage and
provide sufficient financial support to domestic knowledge and technological
innovation, introduce low or zero tariffs on new technologies and equipment
imported from other countries, and scrap non-tariff barriers, allowing domestic
companies and citizens globally to make procurement of technologies and soft-
ware, foreign language materials and books, encouraging foreign residents to
apply for patents in China and streamlining patent application procedures.
Fifth, it must accelerate the reform of the financial system, standardize the
capital market, and open up banking, insurance and securities markets to improve
the direct financing and foreign financing sources of enterprises.
Sixth, to establish a public management and public finance system to improve
the drawing capacity of the state, it must standardize fiscal receipts and incor-
porate extra-budgetary receipts into the budget, intensify tax collection so as to
raise the fiscal receipts in the GDP from 15 percent to 20 percent in the near
term and up to 25 percent in the middle term, and raise the central fiscal receipts
(not including debt receipts) from 7.8 percent in the near term up to 12 percent
and up to 15 percent in the middle term; it must accelerate the reform of 
the government, re-define the roles of the government in the market economy,
introduce the information release system in fiscal receipts and expenditure, stan-
dardize the policy decision-making procedures on fiscal spending, introduce
competition and the open bidding mechanism into government and public depart-
ments and raise the efficiency of fiscal expenditure.
Seventh, it must raise sharply the percentage of defense spending in GDP to
enhance defense capabilities. The state should ensure that the armed forces are
fed by the government, and it should be strictly forbidden to allow the armed
forces to engage in business and profit making–taking activities, standardize
defense spending and statistics and increase transparency. The defense spending
in GDP should be raised to 2.0 percent in the near term and up to 2.5 percent
in the middle term. It is necessary to cut non-military spending, improve combat
capabilities and the abilities to cope with state crises; to accelerate the reforms
of the military system, ending the drawbacks featuring “autarchy” in its external
relations and “small but complete” in its internal relations; to introduce a new
model of “open army building,” expand social resources (technical, educational
and human resources and infrastructure), raise the national defense mobiliza-
tion capabilities and the capabilities of utilizing social resources, intensify and
raise the military R&D and expand its overflow to the society and build part-
nership relationship with civil research organizations for mutual complement;
to further improve the wages and benefits of military personnel, open social
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security funds and personal retirement accounts for military personnel, intro-
duce “training” of demobilized servicemen to prepared them for taking up civil
jobs, establish an education and training fund for demobilized servicemen for
re-education and special training to help them improve their competitiveness.
Eighth, China must intensify development and the use of soft forces while
stressing the development of hard factors and raising the capabilities of oper-
ating strategic resources. CNP includes not only the hard factors but also the
soft factors. It is of great importance to stress international institutions, inter-
national prestige, cultural influence and other soft factors in safeguarding state
interests and in developing CNP. It is essential to come to grips with both hard
and soft factors at the international level and grasp both of them firmly. That
should be the key to China’s grand strategy of the twenty-first century.
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3 Why has China’s TFP
dropped in 1995–2001?1
China began to enter the economic takeoff stage around 1980 and has since
maintained high economic growth for a good generation of people. The economic
growth rate reached as high as 9.1 percent in 2003. Is China’s economy over-
heated? Are China’s investments overheated? There are two diametrically
opposed views that have aroused extensive concerns and disputes at home and
abroad. So we need to concentrate on the following problems: Can China sustain
its high growth in the future? Can China realize high-quality and high-effi-
ciency high growth? What are the sources of China’s economic growth? What
determines and affects China’s economic growth? How will its economic growth
pattern change? How should China transit from low-quality high-growth to high-
quality high-growth?
Historical experience: TFP is the key to economic growth
Studies at home and abroad show that China’s economic growth has been higher
following reform and opening up in that the Total Facts Productivity (TFP) has
been rising sharply.2 After analysis, we have found that there are four sources
for China’s economic growth: (1) high growth of the labor force (2.6 percent);
(2) high growth of capital stock (9.3 percent), but lower than the 11.5 percent
from 1952 to 1978; (3) high growth of human capital, which is 2.2 percent 
if calculated by the number of years of education received by people above 
15 years of age; (4) high growth of TFP, which has risen from –1.9 percent
from 1952 to 1978 to 3.3–4.6 percent, calculated according to the weighted
average of different capital or labor, and contributed to 33–47 percent of
economic growth. The results of the calculation are fairly close to the conclu-
sions arrived at by major studies in the world, such as the World Bank3 and
Maddison.4
This has explained why high economic growth appeared at the beginning
period of China’s reform. Such growth is attributable mainly to TFP, which
turned from negative to positive, rising by 5.2–6.5 percentage points, rather
than capital growth, which dropped 2.2 percentage points.
Changes in the growth pattern in recent years: significant
drop in TFP
But such high growth and TFP growth did not continue. After 1995, major
changes took place in the sources of economic growth. Up to the present, no
Chinese or foreign scholars have given this problem any analysis and attention.
The main reason for this is that when analyzing economic growth sources, the
selection of either the 1978–1995 period or the 1978–1999 period all contain
one important presumption, that the economic growth pattern after reform and
opening up has basically remained unchanged, or did not change much to affect
the long-term growth equation. We hold that this presumption is applicable only
to the 1978–1995 period, but not to the period after 1995.
Economic growth (8.2 percent) from 1995 to 2001 was lower than the long-
term potential growth (9.3–9.5 percent). Since that time, major changes have
taken place in the sources of growth: (1) employment growth has dropped signif-
icantly, to only about 1.2 percent, giving rise to a situation characterized by
high economic growth but low employment growth, indicating a drop in the
ability to absorb labor; (2) high growth in capital stock (11.8 percent), 2.5
percentage points higher than in 1978–1995 or slightly higher than in 1952–1978
(11.5 percent). As a result, capital productivity (economic growth minus growth
of capital stock) has turned from positive (0.5 percent) to negative (–3.6 percent),
dropping by 4.1 percentage points, indicating a capital deepening process5 and
the per capita capital growth reached as high as 10.6 percent, the fastest capital
deepening process in the world, almost 4 percentage points higher than in the
1978–1995 period. This has given rise to substitution of capital for labor and
capital excluding labor. (3) Human capital has grown by 2.8 percent: enroll-
ment of senior secondary schools and tertiary schools has expanded, with the
total enrollment in tertiary education ranking first in the world in 2003. (4) TFP
dropped sharply by 2–3 percentage points to about 0.3–2.3 percent (calculated
according to different weights of capital and labor). These show that the main
sources of economic growth in the 1995–2001 period were capital input and
low labor input. Both capital productivity and TFP dropped significantly.
What merits attention is the economic situation in 2003. GDP growth was
9.1 percent, close to the long-term growth potential (9.3–9.5 percent). Investment
growth was 26.7 percent, far higher than the average growth (10.9 percent) in
the 1979–2001 period. This shows that investment was already overheated. The
authors estimate that the growth of capital stock over the year was 15.8 percent
(depreciation factor taken into account), with the contribution to economic
growth being about 6.3–9.5 percent (determined by weight of capital and labor).
TFP growth dropped to 1.1 to –1.1 percent (see Table 3.1). It is estimated that
the contribution by TFP for the whole year might be negative, similar to the
planned economy period. This shows that, although economic growth in 2003
reached its potential growth, the economy as a whole was not overheated, but
there was already overheated investment, with investment growth much higher
than economic growth. This cannot produce a good investment effect; it can
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only lower sharply the capital productivity growth, estimated at about –6.7
percent. Economic growth is much lower than capital stock growth, lowering
sharply the TFP growth. This is, obviously, a typical high-growth and high-
investment of low quality and low efficiency.
Of late, we have adopted the Malmquist indexing method to study the non-
parameter frontier production function model and used it to analyze TFP growth
during different periods since reform and found that TFP growth in 1979–1995
was 4.63 percent and it dropped to 0.60 percent in 1996–2001 (see Table 3.2).
The highest TFP appeared in 1978–1984 (7.65 percent) and the lowest was in
1996–2001 (see Figure 3.1). The results are identical with the calculation results.
Then, we dissected the TFP growth into contribution by technical progress and
contribution by technical efficiency and found that technical progress slowed and
technical efficiency dropped in 1996–2001.6
This shows that China’s economic growth in recent years is not realized by
relying on technical progress and technical efficiency and investment efficiency,
but by high growth of capital investment, a path characterized by low quality
and high growth, with productivity dropping significantly. This is not a sustain-
able growth pattern. It is rather the price paid for overheated investment and
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Table 3.1 Estimates of China’s economic growth sources (1952–2003) (%)
1952–1978 1978–1995 1995–2001 2003
Population 2.0 1.4 0.9 0.6
GDP 4.7 9.8 8.2 9.1
Per capita GDP 2.7 8.4 7.3 8.5
Employment 2.6 2.6 1.2 0.9
Labor productivity 2.1 7.2 7.0 8.2
Capital stock 11.5 9.3 11.8 15.8
Human capital 4.1 2.2 2.8 2.8
Capital productivity –6.8 0.5 –3.6 –6.7
Capital stock per labor 8.9 6.7 10.6 14.9
TFP a –1.9 4.64 (47.3) 2.28 (27.8) 1.11 (12.2)
TFP b 3.95 (40.3) 1.30 (15.9) 0.27 (3.0)
TFP c –3.24 3.26 (33.3) 0.32 (3.9) –1.12 (–12.3)
Sources: Capital stock calculated at 1987 price from A. Hu and T. Liu, “Zhong mei ri yin guofang
shili bijiao” (Comparison of Defense Capital Power among China, US, Japan, and India), Strategy
and Management, vol. 6, 2003; Human capital from Ch. Li, “Renli ziyuan yu jingji fazhan diqu
chaju yanjiu” (Study of Regional Gaps in Human Capital and Economic Development), Management
master’s degree paper at School of Public Policy and Management of Tsinghua University under
supervision of Prof. Angang Hu; GDP, population and employment from Guojia tongjiju (National
Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian (Chinese Labor Statistical
Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 2000 and Guojia tongjiju
(National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2004 (China Statistical Abstract
2004), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 2004, pp. 38 and 42.
Notes: In calculating TFP, (a) weight of capital input is 0.4, labor input is 0.3, human capital input
is 0.3, (b) weight of capital input is 0.5, labor input is 0.25, human capital input is 0.25, (c) weight
of capital input is 0.6, labor input is 0.2, human capital input is 0.2. Data in brackets are contri-
butions by TFP to GDP growth.
blind investment. If we continue along this path, the pressure on energy and
environment will grow and it will not pay off. The challenges facing China’s
new government are not only to prevent big rises or falls in economic devel-
opment, but to change the economic growth pattern and raise economic growth
quality and efficiency in order to maintain the stability of the macro economy.
Why has China’s TFP dropped in 1995–2001?
According to the assets accumulation, economic growth and welfare analytical
framework visualized by the World Bank in its “Growth Quality,”7 there are
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Table 3.2 TFP growth and its components during different periods of economic reform
in China (1979–2001)
Periods TFP growth Technical efficiency Technical progress
change
Mean Std Var. Mean Std Var. Mean Std Var.
1979–1990 1.0494 0.0139 1.3274 0.9902 0.0112 1.1286 1.0605 0.0065 0.6133
1991–2001 1.0185 0.0215 2.1092 0.9969 0.0131 1.3130 1.0216 0.0159 1.5527
1979–1995 1.0463 0.0128 1.2197 0.9932 0.0113 1.1402 1.0542 0.0059 0.5600
1996–2001 1.0060 0.0256 2.5414 0.9936 0.0138 1.3914 1.0124 0.0172 1.6992
1979–1984 1.0765 0.0191 1.7766 0.9847 0.0139 1.4108 1.0938 0.0100 0.9110
1985–1990 1.0222 0.0172 1.6801 0.9958 0.0162 1.6283 1.0272 0.0084 0.8200
1991–1995 1.0372 0.0234 2.2566 1.0020 0.0225 2.2450 1.0354 0.0166 1.6028
1996*–2001 1.0060 0.0256 2.5414 0.9936 0.0138 1.3914 1.0124 0.0172 1.6992
Source: J. Zheng and A. Hu, “Zhongguo gaige shiqi shengji shengchanlu zengzhang bianhua de
shizheng fenxi (1979–2001)” (Provincial Productivity Trend in China (1979–2001): Analysis and
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Figure 3.1 TFP growth in different periods (1979–2001)











three kinds of capital for stimulating development: tangible capital, human
capital, and natural capital. Tangible assets make contributions to welfare through
economic growth. Human capital makes contributions to growth and welfare
by raising its gains, because investment in human capital investment, such as
education, health and drinking water, increases the welfare of the people directly.
Similarly, investment in natural capital is an important factor for improving the
ecological environment and people’s health and also an important part of the
effort to improve the quality of life. However, excessive reliance on tangible
assets or long-term implementation of distorted policies or inadequate invest-
ment in human capital and natural capital can also lower the growth of TFP.8
First of all, tangible capital has been excessively deepened; marginal returns
of investment have dropped progressively; and the profit-taking of investment
has inevitably dropped. Secondly, the country granted too many tax concession
to foreign capital enterprises and provided disguised subsidies by leasing land,
infrastructure facilities and energy at low prices, thus distorting the allocation
of resources of tangible assets; thirdly, capital price (real interest rates on loans)
is far lower than labor price (real wage growth and other welfare), encouraging
firms to use more capital but less labor, to invest more tangible capital but less
human capital. Since 1995, there appeared a sharp rise in the capital stock of
state-owned enterprises. But it did not create new jobs. Instead, it created a
large number of lay-offs. By the end of 2002, the number of on-the-job workers
in state-owned and urban collective units was reduced by 60 million, more than
the total population of France and equivalent to the reduction (22 million) of
employment in the manufacturing of twenty major countries in the world from
1995 to 2002. Fourthly, enterprises and departments engaging in natural
resources development possess a large amount of resource rents, giving the
incentive to excessive development, thus reducing the efficiency of the utiliza-
tion of resources. The coal output in 1996 was reduced from 1.4 billion tons
to 1 billion tons by 2000 and rose a little to 1.5 billion tons by the first half
of 2003, thus damaging the ecological environment. Fifthly, the income gap
has been further enlarged, thus reducing the impact of economic growth on
people’s welfare. The World Bank report holds that China’s income inequality
is rapidly rising, from a level lower than that of India (Gini coefficient 0.20)
to close to the level of the United States (Gini coefficient 0.40 in 1998 and in
some cases 0.51, after taking into consideration non-regular incomes). The
poverty reduction brought about by a 1 percentage point increase in the total
income of Chinese residents has dropped.9 Some scholars have discovered that
the Gini coefficient of China increased by 1 percentage point every year from
1988 to 1995, indicating a rapid polarization process.10 Dr. Lin Boqiang with
the Asian Development Bank holds that this process has been accelerated by
the policy of “letting part of the people get rich first” at the beginning of the
reform, which marked the start of the rapid expansion of economic growth and
polarization. He has discovered that the index of impoverished people in
1995–2001 was reduced by only 10 percent, but it was reduced by 18 percent
in 1985–1990 (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). The degree of inequality in 1985
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was low (Gini coefficient 0.23), indicating that economic growth effectively
reduced poverty. By 1995, the inequality situation got worse (Gini coefficient
0.33) and the effect of economic growth in reducing poverty also lowered
markedly.11
Another World Bank study developed a pro-poor growth measuring method,
which is not based on the average economic growth of a country, but on the
income growth of poor people. The study found that China’s average economic
growth from 1990 to 1999 was quite different from the pro-poor growth. The
average income growth of Chinese families was 7 percent, but the income
growth of poor families was only 3 percent and the income growth of the
wealthiest families was 11 percent. Although China’s economic growth in the
1990s and the income growth of residents were the highest in the world, the
pro-poor growth was only about 4 percent.12 Further, high governance costs
and social trading costs have offset the efficiency and results of the utilization
of the three major capitals. It did not create new wealth, but transferred wealth,
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Table 3.3 Poverty indicators and Gini coefficient (1985–2001) (%)
1985 1990 1995 2001
Human Poverty Index (H) 57.85 40.08 25.48 15.44
Income gap (I) 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.26
Poverty gap (PG = H × I) 19.00 11.76 6.89 3.43
FGT 8.37 4.75 2.56 1.03
Gini coefficient 0.23 0.29 0.33 0.35
Source: B. Lin, “Zhongguo de jingji zengzhang, pinkun jianshao yu zhengce xuanze” (China’s
Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and Policy Options), Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research
Journal), 2003, Issue No. 12, 15–25.
Note: Poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having
zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of
poverty as well as its incidence.
Table 3.4 Indicators for gauging poverty and changes in Gini coefficient (1985–2001) 
(%)
1985–1990 1990–1995 1995–2001
Reduction ratio of poor 17.77 14.60 10.04
population indicator (H)
Reduction ratio of income 0.05 0.02 0.01
shortage rate (I)
Reduction of poverty shortage 7.24 4.87 3.46
(PG = H × I)
Reduction ratio of FGT 3.62 2.19 1.53
Increase in Gini coefficient 0.06 0.04 0.02
GDP growth 7.9 12.0 8.2
Source: Same as for Table 3.3.
thus reducing economic growth. For instance, the rents of the financial market
reached 9 percent, thus increasing the actual cost of borrowing by enterprises
and individual persons.13 The authors of this chapter have made an initial esti-
mate of the four major types of corruption (rent-seeking, underground economic
activities, tax drain, public investment and public spending) during the transi-
tional period. In the latter half of the 1990s, the economic costs caused by the
above four types of corruption averaged 13.3–16.9 percent of GDP.14 In the
1998–2002 period, the courts of the country cleared 41.88 million cases, aver-
aging 326 per 10,000 people, 36 percent more than five years earlier. The
number of civil and commercial cases cleared by courts at all levels reached
23.62 million, 20 percent more than five years earlier, with the total amount of
money involved reaching 3197.1 billion Yuan, increasing by 2.4 times.15 The
estimate by the authors of this chapter is equal to 7.2 percent of the total GDP
of the period.
Conclusions: China needs to adjust its approach to
development and change its economic growth pattern
Chinese leaders began to become aware of the problems of its economic growth
pattern in the mid-1990s and clearly put forward objectives and a strategy for
change. But in the latter half of the 1990s, China’s economic growth was lower
than the long-term growth potential, with TFP growth dropping markedly. When
China was still in the lower-middle income stage, it was too early for the country
to enter the capital deepening process, and it failed to make full use of its rich
labor resources to more effectively develop labor-intensive industries. As a
result, fewer and fewer jobs were created, leading to a peak in lay-offs and
unemployment, and increasing inequality in income distribution, active rent-
seeking activities, and sharp rises in social cost. These not only affected
economic growth, but also directly or indirectly affected the welfare of the
people. This has also made economic growth that relies on capital input, energy
consumption and pollution discharge unsustainable. It seems very important for
the government to give up the traditional strategy of pursuing high economic
growth and investment-driven growth and instead adopt a new strategy of
pursuing the quality and efficiency of economic growth and productivity-driven
growth. At the same time, China also needs to shift from low-employment
growth to high-employment growth, from unfair growth to fair growth, and
from unsustainable growth to sustainable growth and to further improve the
quality of policies and the quality of the government in managing society.16
This is exactly the economic and social background for the new Chinese lead-
ership to put forward the new “putting people first” approach to development.
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4 From unevenness to 




China is now undergoing an in-depth economic development and social transi-
tion. Historically, except for China, no other country has ever achieved such a
quick economic growth and such an extensive social transition with regard to
such a huge population and within such a short period of time. In particular, since
the beginning of the reform and opening up, China has already experienced three
historic transitions: the first was from a traditional agricultural society to a mod-
ern industrial society (namely, industrialization); the second was from a centrally
planned economy into a market-oriented one (namely, marketization); and the
third is from a closed economy into an open one (namely, economic globaliza-
tion). Many distortions and deficiencies existing under the previous planned econ-
omy have been gradually eliminated. Market force is now playing an increasingly
important role in economic operations and decision-making.
Obviously, China has achieved unprecedented economic growth and enhanced
its comprehensive national power. As statistical data show, the annual average
growth rate of China’s GDP reached 9.4 percent from 1979 to 2002, while
during all of the 1980s and the first five years of the 1990s, this rate has even
exceeded 10 percent. In 1996, China’s GDP even equated to two-thirds of the
economic aggregate of the rest of East Asia (exclusive of Japan), while in 2002,
the comparable weight has grown to 1.2 times. In 2003, despite the negative
influence of the SARS crisis and the slackening of world trade growth, China’s
GDP still kept climbing at a speed as high as 9.1 percent.
China is unique in the world as a large-sized developing country, featuring
a huge population and broad territory. It is now also listed among those coun-
tries in the world that witness the biggest disparities in terms of physical
geography, population resources, economic development and social develop-
ment. We find that the relative variation coefficients of per capita GDP (in US
dollars) and human development indicators among the 31 provinces, munici-
palities and autonomous regions have all turned out higher than those of all the
other countries in the world. Nevertheless, one basic feature of contemporary
China is significant regional disparities and remarkably uneven development.
We summarize the real China as “One China, four worlds or groups.”2
The first world or group mainly comprises developed cities such as Beijing,
Shanghai, and Shenzhen. The per capita income (PPP) of Shanghai and Beijing
are US $15,516 and US $9,996 respectively, far higher than that of high/middle-
income countries (US $8,320), approximately 63.5 percent and 40.9 percent of
that of high-income countries (US $24,430), and ranking in forty-fifth and sixty-
fourth places respectively among the 206 countries and regions in the world.
The total population of Shanghai and Beijing occupies about 2.2 percent of the
whole country. The second world or group is composed of large/middle sized
cities and those high/middle-income regions in coastal areas, such as Tianjin,
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian and Liaoning. The per capita GDPs of
the above six provinces are all higher than the average level (US $3,960) of
middle/low-income countries, but lower than the average level of high/middle-
income countries. The total population in the second group amounts to 274.04
million, making up approximately 21.8 percent of the country’s total. The third
world or group is low/middle-income regions, including Shandong, Hebei,
Heilongjiang, and Jilin provinces. The per capita GDP of this group is lower
than the average level of low/middle-income countries, ranking between 100th
and 139th in the world. The total population in the third group is estimated to
reach 337.83 million, taking up about 26.0 percent of the country’s total. The
fourth group comprises the poverty-stricken regions in central and western
China, minority areas, rural areas, remote areas and other low-income areas.
Specifically, the per capita GDP of Guizhou province is US $1247, lower than
the average level (US $1790) of low-income countries, ranking the 177th place
in the world. In addition, Gansu, Shanxi and Tibet rank the 157th, 155th and
152nd places respectively. About half of China’s regions rank after 140th. The
total population in the fourth group accounts for about 630 million, occupying
half of the country’s total.
In 2000, China reported a Gross National Income (GNI) of US $3920 (PPP)
which was classified as a low-middle income level in the world. But the GNI
was still lower than the average level of low-middle income countries, and
approximately 53 percent of the world average level of US $7410. China features
a coexistence of four development worlds or groups in terms of per capita
income, but the underdeveloped worlds or groups (i.e. the third and fourth
worlds or groups) are absolutely dominant, hosting about three-quarters of the
country’s population. Therefore, as a whole, China’s economy in terms of per
capita income still remains at a relatively low level in the world.
To gain a clearer insight into China’s situation, it is necessary to pay more
attention to the remarkable disparities of economic growth and social develop-
ment among different provinces, rural and urban areas, and even different regions
within the same province. Since the 1990s, unbalanced economic development
across regions has become unprecedented, and regional disparities have already
been viewed as one of the most serious barriers that hinder economic devel-
opment, political reform and social stability in China.3 Therefore, how China
realizes coordinated regional development has become a major issue in both
academic researches and policy practices.
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The historical trend of regional development disparities
Many researches have conducted in-depth studies on the regional disparities of
development in China.4 However, most of them focus only on the disparity of
economic development, more specifically on a single indicator: per capita GDP.
In fact, the imbalance and inequality of China’s development is typically multi-
dimensional.5 Accordingly, the disparity should also be reflected in multiple
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Table 4.1 Per capita incomes and distribution in China (1999) (in US dollars, PPP)
Region Per capita Per capita Per capita Global 
GDP GDP GDP ranking 
(RMB Yuan) (US $) (US $, PPP) (US $ in PPP)
National level 6534 780 3291 128 
Beijing 19846 2369 9996 64 
Tianjin 15976 1907 8047 72 
Hebei 6932 828 3491 127 
Shanxi 4727 564 2381 144 
Inner Mongolia 5350 639 2695 141 
Liaoning 10086 1204 5080 98 
Jilin 6341 757 3194 131 
Heilongjiang 7660 914 3858 118 
Shanghai 30805 3677 15516 45 
Jiangsu 10665 1273 5372 92 
Zhejiang 12037 1437 6062 84 
Anhui 4707 562 2371 144 
Fujian 10797 1289 5438 92 
Jiangxi 4661 556 2348 146 
Shandong 8673 1035 4369 108 
Henan 4894 584 2465 143 
Hubei 6514 778 3281 129 
Hunan 5105 609 2571 142 
Guangdong 11728 1400 5907 87 
Guangxi 4148 495 2089 155 
Hainan 6383 762 3215 131 
Chongqing 4826 576 2431 144 
Sichuan 4452 531 2242 149 
Guizhou 2475 295 1247 177 
Yunnan 4452 531 2242 149 
Tibet 4262 509 2147 154 
Shaanxi 4101 490 2066 155 
Gansu 3668 438 1847 157 
Qinghai 4662 557 2348 146 
Ningxia 4473 534 2253 149 
Xinjiang 6470 772 3259 131 
Sources: Per capita GDP is from Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo
tongji nianjian 2000 (China Statistical Yearbook 2000), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China
Statistics Press), 2000; Data in US $ and PPP are author’s calculation in reference to World Bank,
World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, New York: Oxford University Press,
2000.
Notes: The global rank refers to the place of that province among 206 countries in the world.
dimensions. This chapter intends to analyze the historical trend of regional
disparities in terms of economic development, human development, social devel-
opment, and knowledge development, so as to gain a clear and comprehensive
insight into China’s regional disparities.6
Regional disparities of economic development
This study has calculated the coefficients of relative variations across different
regions in terms of per capita national income from 1952 to 1992, and has used
the data of per capita GDP from 1978 to 1999 to get other coefficients like
minimax coefficient, coefficient of relative variations, weighted coefficient of
relative variations, convergence coefficient, and Theil index. Based on all of the
analyzed results, we find that since the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China, the historical evolution of regional disparities of economic development
can be classified into three phases:
Phase I (1952–1978): regional economic disparities were expanding
in a fluctuant way
In fact, at the very beginning of the founding of China, China was already a coun-
try with a huge population, broad territory, and remarkable regional disparities
in physical geography and economic development. All of these are the historical
legacies that we inherited before launching industrialization, and also the initial
conditions for pursuing economic development. After 1952, the regional dis-
parities began to enlarge. For instance, the coefficient of relative variations in
terms of real per capita income reached 136.58 percent in 1978.
Phase II (1978–1991): regional economic disparities kept 
converging
In 1978, the coefficient of relative variations in terms of per capita GDP was 97.4
percent, and kept decreasing after the adoption of reform and opening up. The
same coefficient was 88.9 percent in 1985, and reached the minimum of 81.9 per-
cent in 1991. Other indicators, like weighted coefficient of relative variations, S
coefficient of per capita GDP, minimax coefficient, and Theil index, all followed
a similar evolving trend. These five indicators all reached their minimal values
in 1990 and 1991 respectively. In brief, the regional disparities reflected by dif-
ferent measures all showed similar evolving trends.
Phase III (1991–present): regional economic disparities began
enlarging again
The coefficient of relative variations in terms of per capita real GDP climbed
to 88.1 percent in 1995, and further to 94.5 percent in 1999, up by 12.6 percent
over that in 1991 and close to that recorded in 1978 when China initially adopted
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its policy of reform and opening up. The weighted coefficient of relative vari-
ations rose to 74.1 percent. The minimax coefficient also surged up to 17.7
times in 1999 from only 11.6 times in 1991, much higher than that (14.3 times)
posted in 1978. The Theil index kept climbing up in the 1990s, and reached
0.128 in 1999, far higher than that (0.105) in 1978. The S coefficient of per
capita GDP of all regions in 1999 was 0.599, far higher than that (0.553) in
1978. Among the five indicators concerning regional disparities, three reached
a higher level in 1999 than in 1978, which indicates that the increment of
regional disparities since the early 1990s has exceeded (or at least approached)
the decrement in the 1980s. Now, the economic disparities among regions have
expanded to the most serious level since the establishment of the PRC. In Figure
4.1, the decrease in 2000 is due to the necessary adjustment of the population
size by the National Census 2000, which increased the population base of several
coastal developed regions. In fact, the regional disparities in the successive two
years have kept expanding.
Regional disparities of human development
With respect to the Human Development Index (HDI), regional disparities still
exist in modern China. According to UNDP, China’s HDI was 0.726 in 2000,
already comparable to the high/middle level of human development in the
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Figure 4.1 Relative regional disparities (per capita real GDP) since reform and opening
up (1978–2002)
Notes: Calculation in 1978 fixed prices for all regions.
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world.7 In 1999, five western regions achieved HDIs between 0.650 and 0.500,
belonging to the middle/low level of human development. Twenty-three regions
recorded HDIs between 0.800 and 0.650, equating to the high/middle level of
human development. Each of the three municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing and
Tianjin) achieved an HDI of more than 0.800, reaching the high level of human
development. In addition, five regions in western China have not arrived at the
high/middle level of human development yet; and fifteen central and western
regions have all been ranked after the 100th place, in terms of HDI, among
174 countries and regions in the world. At the same time, we also find that
those regions with relatively lower HDI ranks in 1995 have achieved much
higher positions in 1999, which presents obvious “catch-up effects” (see Table
4.2). It must be pointed out that the ranking positions of China’s regions have
all turned out higher, to different degrees, on the global list of HDI than on
the global list of per capita GDP. Two reasons can explain such a phenom-
enon: first, the sample sizes are different, 174 for HDI and 206 for per capita
GDP respectively; secondly, the regional disparities in terms of human devel-
opment are narrower than those in terms of per capita income.
The “Human Development Report 1997” listed three countries in the world
which featured remarkable regional disparities in terms of the Human Poverty
Index (HPI) (see Table 4.3). Among the three countries, China ranked in the
first place, followed by Brazil and India. In China, the HPI of coastal regions
was 0.18, while that of Beijing turned out less than 0.10, equating to those
countries with extremely low HPI, like Chile and Singapore which ranked in
the fifth place among 78 developing countries. However, the HPI of those
western regions in China reached up to 0.44 and that of Guizhou province was
about 0.55, equating to those countries with rather high HPI, like Mali that
ranked the last but five among 78 developing countries.
In China, the poverty-stricken population in rural areas is not evenly distrib-
uted throughout its territory, but mainly congregates in the provinces and
autonomous regions in western China and those isolated regions with extremely
stagnant economic growth. Most of these regions are geographically remote, lack
human and natural resources, and have weak economic links with other regions.
A majority of the poverty-stricken population in rural areas of China lives in
mountainous regions. Some others are scattered in those counties with better
physical conditions, but which have been exposed to low education, poor health-
care and arid land resources (even degeneration in some places). According to
the latest analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (see
Table 4.4), the low-income population living in urban areas of China is 25.1
million people, while that living in rural areas totals 90.29 million people. Hence,
the total low-income population in China amounts to 115.39 million people.
Among them, 78 percent live in rural areas, while 85 percent live in central and
western China. Furthermore, the low-income population living in urban areas of
central China accounts for 51.3 percent of the country’s total, while that living
in western China reaches 54.4 percent of the country’s total.
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Table 4.3 Human risk indices of regions in eastern, western and central China (1999)
Human risk index Eastern China Central China Western China
Low human risk Shanghai (0.186)
(HRI<0.250) Beijing (0.231)
Jiangsu (0.241)
High/middle Fujian (0.263) Hunan (0.273) Xinjiang (0.264)
human risk Liaoning (0.266) Jilin (0.292) Inner Mongolia (0.282)
(0.500>HRI≥0.250) Guangdong (0.266) Anhui (0.297) Sichuan (0.312)
Hebei (0.269) Hubei (0.298) Shaanxi (0.334)
Tianjin (0.270) Heilongjiang (0.299) Qinghai (0.335)
Middle/low Hainan (0.278) Jiangxi (0.327) Guangxi (0.346)
human risk Shandong (0.290) Shanxi (0.340) Yunnan (0.415)
(0.750>HRI≥0.500) Zhejiang (0.367) Henan (0.466) Gansu (0.418)
Guizhou (0.519)
Ningxia (0.555)
High human risk Tibet (0.745)
(HRI≥0.750)
Source: UNDP, China Human Development Report 2002; authors’ calculation based on related
information.
Notes: The human risk index is a compound indicator worked out based on the malnutrition index,
air pollution index, water pollution index, etc. This index can manifest the quality of life and the
degree of execrableness of living environment in a certain region.
Table 4.4 Geographical distribution of low-income population living in rural and urban
areas in China
Low-income population Low-income population
in urban areas in rural areas
Population Proportion Proportion Population Proportion Proportion
size in the in the total size in the in the total 
(million) country’s population (million) country’s population 
total (%) living in total (%) living in 
urban areas rural areas 
of China of China 
(%) (%)
Whole Country 25.10 100.0 8.1 90.29 100.0 9.8
China’s east 4.97 19.8 3.8 12.55 13.9 3.3
China’s center 12.88 51.3 11.7 28.67 31.8 8.9
China’s west 7.25 28.9 10.2 49.08 54.4 21.8
Source: Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo fazhan baogao 2003
(China Development Report 2003), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press),
2003, pp. 189–190.
Notes: Low-income population refers to those residents whose per capita consumption expenditure
level falls below that of the lowest income group (20%). Residents below such a standard are able
to have nothing more than their basic needs of existence satisfied, while their per capita consump-
tion expenditure usually equates to one-third of the consumption expenditure level, and their
expenditure in food takes up more than 50% of their total consumption expenditure. 
Lately, UNDP’s “China Human Development Report 2002” studied the health-
care service accessibility indices of different regions in China (see Table 4.5).
Those western regions reported poor accessibility to healthcare services and
relatively low sanitary conditions. This report also put forward a human risk
index. In such a region as Tibet, despite little environmental pollution, other
indices turned out at a rather poor level.
Regional disparities of social development
Globally, China is a typical country with remarkable regional disparities in terms
of not only economic development, but also social development. By selecting and
employing multiple social development indicators, we are able to comprehensively
evaluate the degrees and possible regional disparities of social development, social
progress, social fairness, and the availability of public service. The selected social
development indicators include population development indicators, educational
development indicators, scientific and technological development indicators,
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Table 4.5 Healthcare service accessibility indices for different regions in eastern, central
and western China (1999)
Healthcare service Eastern China Central China Western China
accessibility index
Regions with a Beijing (0.06)
high accessibility Shanghai (0.12)
of healthcare Tianjin (0.22)
service (CSAI<0.25)
Regions with a Hebei (0.27) Jilin (0.36) Qinghai (0.37)
high/middle Liaoning (0.27) Heilongjiang (0.38) Xinjiang (0.39)
accessibility of Fujian (0.47) Shanxi (0.43) Inner Mongolia (0.43)
healthcare service Jiangsu (0.47) Ningxia (0.46)
(0.50>CSAI≥0.25) Yunnan (0.46)
Regions with a Shandong (0.50) Jiangxi (0.50) Guangxi (0.50)
middle/low Guangdong (0.50) Henan (0.51) Gansu (0.52)
accessibility of Hainan (0.56) Hubei (0.52) Shaanxi (0.53)
healthcare service Hunan (0.53) Sichuan (0.60)
(0.75>CSAI≥0.50) Anhui (0.54) Guizhou (0.72)
Regions with a Zhejiang (0.76) Tibet (0.91)
low accessibility of 
healthcare service
(CSAI≥0.75)
Source: UNDP, China Human Development Report 2002; authors’ calculation based on related
information.
Notes: The healthcare service accessibility index is a compound indicator worked out on the basis
of the number of sickbeds possessed by every 1,000 people, number of doctors and assistant doctors
possessed by every 1,000 people, number of senior nurses and nurses possessed by every 1,000
people, and the percentage (%) of those, in the total population, who have access to sickbeds, and
services provided by doctors and nurses in hospitals. This index can manifest the level of health-
care service skills in a certain region.
cultural development indicators, sanitary development indicators, and environ-
mental development indicators. In order to evaluate the development levels of
social service in different regions of China, we try to comprehensively explore
each of the preceding social indicators.
By investigating social development indicators (such as population, educa-
tion, sanitation, science and technology, culture, environmental pollution and
infrastructure), we find that regional disparities, either relatively or absolutely,
exist to different degrees in China. At either a national level or per capita level,
China has already reached the middle social development level in today’s world,
and a few coastal regions have even measured up to the high international level.
However, many inland regions still remain on rather low levels in comparison
to the world. The relative regional disparities in terms of the major social devel-
opment indicators have appeared quite large. The coefficients of relative varia-
tions of major development indicators in terms of population, education,
sanitation, and culture (except for books and magazines per capita) turn out much
lower than those of per capita GDP in the same periods. The coefficients of rel-
ative variations of scientific and technological indicators (except for the number
of approved patents per every 1,000 people) and environmental indicators are
lower than those of per capita GDP. The coefficients of relative variations of
major infrastructure indicators (except for per capita electricity) are higher, or
much higher, than those of per capita GDP. In brief, most regional disparities
of social development are smaller than those of economic development.
For different social development indicators, the relative regional disparities
have evolved inconsistently since the beginning of reform and opening up,
sometimes narrowing, remaining unchanged or enlarging slightly. Taking popu-
lation indicators as an example, the total fertility rate, birth rate, mortality rate,
and natural growth rate have all been lower than the world’s average levels,
thus ranking China at the top of developing countries. Since the beginning of
reform and opening up, the regional disparities in terms of total fertility rate
and mortality rate have been declining, but those in terms of birth rate and
natural growth rate have been rising in a fluctuant way. In those economically
underdeveloped regions, the total fertility rate, birth rate, mortality rate, and
natural growth rate have all remained on a relatively high level. What is more,
these regions also lag behind in terms of human development. In China, the
total fertility rate was 2.58 in 1981, and dropped down to 2.31 in 1990.
Remarkable gaps still exist between these regions and the developed regions.
The birth rate of the country was 33.43 per thousand in 1970, dropped down
to 18.21 per thousand in 1980, later climbed up slightly to 21.06 per thousand
in 1990, and kept descending throughout the 1990s. Finally in 1999, the birth
rate dropped to the lowest level of 15.23 per thousand since the beginning of
reform and opening up. This birth rate is lower than not only the world’s average
level, but also the national level of developing countries reporting high human
development indicators. Specifically, the birth rates of nine provinces (including
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong and
Hunan) have fallen below the average level of industrialized countries. As a
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matter of fact, China is a country with a relatively low birth rate. The birth
rate is low in developed regions, while it definitely remains high in underde-
veloped regions. The regional disparities in terms of birth rate have been
expanding in a fluctuant way. The coefficients of relative variations of birth
rate were 23.29 percent in 1980, 22.48 percent in 1985, and 20.27 percent in
1990. In the 1980s, this coefficient kept descending linearly. In 1995, the same
coefficient climbed up to 27.7 percent, and even reached 30.3 percent in 1999,
reaching a peak value during the past 25 years.
In brief, among the coefficients of relative variations of thirty-one social
development indicators in eight main categories, twenty-one indicators have
descended, seven have ascended, and the other three have only undergone slight
changes (see Table 4.6). This indicates that the coefficients of relative varia-
tions in terms of most social development indicators have been descending, and
also indicates that since the adoption of reform and opening up, the regional
disparities in terms of accessibility of public services have been narrowed to
different degrees.
Regional disparities of knowledge development
Knowledge is the most important factor in economic development and social
transition today. Knowledge creates wealth, promotes development and facili-
tates reform. Knowledge resources are the most important resources of a country
or region for driving its economic development. For underdeveloped countries
and regions, the low knowledge development level is the biggest bottleneck to
economic development.8
It is demonstrated by many researches that regional disparities are also
reflected in the dimension of knowledge development (see Table 4.7). In order
to conduct quantitative analysis on the regional disparities of knowledge capa-
bility, we set up an Evaluation Framework of Comprehensive Knowledge
Capability, and calculated the indices of comprehensive knowledge capability
for different regions. By investigating these indices, we can see that the distri-
bution of knowledge resources in China is extremely unbalanced, and the
resulting index for eastern China turns out much higher than that for central
and western China. All those regions whose knowledge capabilities are at a
high or high/middle level are nestled in eastern China. However, the know-
ledge capabilities in central and western China all remain at a low level, except
that Jilin, Hubei, Heilongjiang and Shaanxi provinces lie at a middle/low level.
In some regions and minority areas of western China, certain groups of people
are faced with the risk of knowledge division. In fact, the regions in western
China suffer the most insufficient knowledge resources and the largest know-
ledge developing disparities, which have already become a bottleneck hindering
their further development.
By analyzing and comparing the preceding indicators, we can see that China
has already reached the middle/low-income level and the high/middle human
development level, the consumption structure has undergone unprecedented
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Table 4.6 Coefficients of relative variations for different regions in terms of major
economic and social development indicators (1978–1999)
Indicators 1978 1980 1982 1985 1990 1995 1999
Economic indicators
Per capita GDP 97.2 96.8 96.2 87.5 83.0 88.2 94.5
(Yuan) (a)
Per capita government 186.3 200.0 200.0 170.0 102.8 91.5 98.8
revenue (Yuan)
Per capita government 68.8 59.5 70.3 55.8 52.2 65.9 74.5
expenditure (Yuan) (a)
Per capita Gross Domestic 74.7 88.8 94.4 103.0 112.3 121.5
Investment (Yuan) (a)
Population indicators
Birth rate (‰) 23.5 23.3 16.3 22.5 20.3 29.1 30.3
Death rate (‰) 14.9 14.8 17.0 20.4 11.4 13.3 10.4
Natural growth rate 33.4 34.9 22.4 31.1 28.0 46.3 54.0
of population (‰)
Total fertility rate 31.3 26.8
Educational indicators
Enrollment rate of 3.7 5.4 7.9 11.1 6.8 7.2
school-age children (%)
Percentage of graduates 9.9 15.9 21.1 20.2 14.9 8.9
of primary schools 
entering junior secondary
schools (%)
Percentage of graduates of 32.7 32.9 34.6 30.9 40.6 33.9
junior secondary schools 
entering senior secondary 
schools (%)
Health development indicators
Number of doctors per 51.1 52.5 52.2 52.8 49.3 47.3 37.3
1,000 people
Number of hospital beds 36.9 31.7 37.9 32.9 36.9 38.6 34.9
per 1,000 people
Incidence of diseases rate 65.0 36.8 36.4
from infectious disease to
be reported by laws (%)
Science and technological (S&T) indicators
Number of persons 84 77 54.6
engaged in scientific and
technological activities 
per 1,000 people
Number of workers and 20.9 19.0 17.1
staff members engaged 
in scientific and 
technological activities
Total patents granted to 164.5 154.7 149.9 122.8
residents per 1,000 people
Total patents granted per 57.1 71.0
10,000 S&T personnel
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Table 4.6 continued
Indicators 1978 1980 1982 1985 1990 1995 1999
Cultural development indicators
Per capita number of 65.8 61.7 62.1
newspapers
Per capita printed sheets 76.5 100.7 106.1 75.5
Radio coverage rate (%) 39.4 24.3 15.2
TV coverage rate (%) 44.9 16.0 11.0
Environmental indicators
Volume of solid industrial 66.8 59.0 63.1
waste (10,000 tons/
100 million Yuan) (a)
Volume of waste water 37.4 36.6 32.5
discharge (10,000 tons/
100 million Yuan) (a)
Volume of waste gas 51.3 46.6 51.8
emission (100 million 
cu. m meters/100 million
Yuan) (a)
Infrastructure indicators
Per capita electricity 105.8 92.8 89.5 82.8 67.8 55.9
production (kilowatt-
hour/person)
Length of highways per 120.4 144.1 141.8 132.3 124.2 114.3
million people
Length of railways per 74.0 81.6 76.3 104.6 107.6 110.1
million people
Mileage of navigable 71.9 84.8 85.4 82.3 88.3 84.2
inland waterways per 
million people
Number of telephone sets 83.7 80.9 81.6 87.7 96.1 89.7 77.3
owned per 100 people




Average years of school of 24.3 20.6 19.7 16.4
people aged 15 and 
above (years)
Adult literacy rate (%) 9.5 9.2 8.3 13.1
Life expectancy at birth 5.1 5.2
(years)
Human development index 9.0 10.2
Source: A. Hu and P. Zou, Shehui yu fazhan: woguo shehui fazhan diqu chaju de yanjiu (Society
and Development: Study of Gaps of Social Development among Different Regions of China),
Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe (Zhejiang People’s Press), 2000. Authors’ calculation based
on related information.
Note: (a) Calculated in 1978 fixed prices.
changes (urban areas are categorized in the well-off group, while rural areas
are categorized in the well-to-do group), and the percentage of the poverty-
stricken population has been cut down remarkably (far lower than the average
level of developing countries). However, China is not a homogeneous country,
but a heterogeneous one. We sum up the national situation in China as “one
China, two systems (urban and rural),” “one China, four worlds,” “one China,
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Table 4.7 Regional disparities in terms of comprehensive knowledge capabilities: ranking
by knowledge development indicator (KDI) (1998)
Eastern China Central China Western China
High knowledge Beijing (606.05)






knowledge level Liaoning (126.69)
(150% > KDI≥100%) Zhejiang (122.71)
Middle/low Shandong (82.05) Jilin (99.53) Shaanxi (88.05)
knowledge level Hebei (75.69) Hubei (92.18)
(100%>KDI≥75%) Heilongjiang (84.63)
Low knowledge Hunan (69.72) Xinjiang (65.85)
level (KDI < 75%) Shanxi (64.27) Chongqing (63.71)
Henan (63.74) Gansu (58.32)
Jiangxi (61.04) Inner Mongolia (56.59)







Source: A. Hu and Y. Xiong, “Woguo zhishi fazhan diqu chaju yanjiu: tedian, duice he chengyin”
(Analysis of Regional Disparities of China’s Knowledge Development: Characteristics, Causes and
Countermeasures), Guanli Shijie (Management World), 2000, Issue 3.
Notes: National KDI = 100%. 
Indicators used for measuring knowledge development in a certain region include three dimen-
sions: acquiring knowledge, absorbing knowledge and exchanging knowledge. The three dimensions
are measured respectively by the number of internationally employed treatises (including those
covered by three retrieval tools, SCI, EI and ISTP) per every one million people, the number of
approved patents per every one million people, per capita FDI; the per capita number of years on
average of exposure to education, the proportion of students entering the elementary schools, the
number of students on campus in middle schools per every 10,000 people, the number of students
on campus in colleges and universities per every 10,000 people, and the per capita number of
newspapers subscribed, telephone diffusion rate, and the number of computers possessed per every
10,000 people. The country’s average level is at 100%, then conduct indexation of these indica-
tors. The knowledge capability indicators of different regions can be worked out by means of
weighted averages.
four societies (agricultural, industrial, service and knowledge society),” which
is far more complicated than we can depict. This is a basic national situation
to which we must pay special attention when discussing how to construct an
all-round well-off society.
Insights into the real problems
Breakdown of income disparities
Since the beginning of reform and opening up, income disparities among
different regions, between rural and urban areas, and even within rural areas
and within urban areas, have kept enlarging. The 2004 World Bank Report
analyzed in detail various factors giving rise to income disparities, and also
broke down those factors using the data from 1990 to 1999 (see Figure 4.2).
They point out that the main factor is the increasing income disparities between
rural and urban areas in the middle and late 1990s, which reflects the institu-
tional costs of “one country, two systems” (i.e. different institutional systems
governing the urban and rural areas). The second factor is the income dispar-
ities among rural areas, which reflects the slow growth or even decline of
agricultural income in the inland agricultural provinces. This decline is due to
the descending prices of most agricultural products in the international and
domestic markets associated with the opening of China’s agricultural products
market in the first half of the 1990s. The third factor is the expanding income
disparities among urban areas, which is caused by the emergence of so-called
transitional poverty-stricken populations associated with enormous unemploy-
ment of former employees in the state-owned and collective enterprises in the
second half of the 1990s. The last factor is the expanding income disparities
among provinces.
It is noteworthy that the regional disparities, to a large extent, can be explained
by the regional gaps at the urbanization level. In other words, the development
disparities across regions are highly correlated to the development disparities
between rural and urban areas. Therefore, in the World Bank Report, the break-
down of income disparities using the Theil index consists of the income
disparities between rural and urban areas first, and then the income disparities
among provinces (inter-province disparities), and finally the income disparities
within the same provinces (inner-province differentials).9 In fact, such a break-
down has underestimated the influence of unbalanced regional development on
income disparities.
Income disparities due to regional features
In order to further explore the origins behind the variations of regional dispari-
ties in terms of per capita GDP, we may breakdown the Theil coefficient, which
represents the variations of per capita GDP, into regional components, and study
how these components and their discrepancies influence and contribute to the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































national coefficient of variations of per capita GDP. We find that the within-group
variation in each of the three major regions shows a trait of “convergence,” while
the between-group variation among them takes on an obvious “divergence.”
Since the early 1990s, the expansion of regional disparities has mainly orig-
inated from the enlargement of regional disparities among the three major areas
or regions. The within-region disparities, either absolutely or relatively, have
kept falling. For instance, the Theil coefficient with regard to within-region
disparities declined from 0.075 in 1978 to 0.043 in 2002, and the contribution
rate to regional disparities has dropped from 70.81 percent in 1978 to 31.29
percent in 2002. Specifically, the within-region disparities of eastern China have
reduced at the fastest speed, which is also the principal reason for the decreasing
regional disparities in 1980s. In contrast, the Theil coefficient with regard to
between-region disparities climbed from 0.031 in 1978 up to 0.096 in 2002,
and the contribution rate to regional disparities also surged from less than 30
percent in 1978 up to two-thirds in 2002.
Similar situations are observed in terms of human development disparity,
social development disparity and knowledge development disparity. The major
reason behind these phenomena is the disparities between coastal regions (in
eastern China) and inland regions (in central and western China).
In Table 4.9, aside from western regions, northeastern regions also dropped
down in the ranking list. This indicates that aside from the well-known “gaps
between the east and the west” (or east–west gaps), the “gaps between the south
and the north” (or south–north gaps) also exist in contemporary China. The



















Disparity within urban areas
Disparity within rural areas
Figure 4.2 Breakdown of income disparities (1990–1999)
Source: World Bank, China: Promoting Growth with Equity (Chinese edition), Beijing: Qinghua
daxue chubanshe (Tsinghua University Publishing House, 2004).
south–north gaps mainly refer to the disparities between coastal regions in 
southern and eastern China and those regions in northern and northeastern 
China. Compared to the east–west gaps, the south–north gaps are much smaller
and present different features. The development level of northeastern China is
higher than the national average, while that of western China is lower than the
national average. The south–north gaps are mainly due to the disparity of devel-
opment speed, while the east–west gaps can be attributed also to the disparity of
development level.
Statistically, the expanding gaps between the east and the west are the major
factors responsible for the enlarging regional disparities, while the south–north
gap of development speed has, to some degree, reduced the overall regional
disparities at the national level. However, if the south–north gap of develop-
ment speed keeps expanding, it will become an important source for the regional
disparities in China.
Evolutionary trend of regional disparities
China is a country with a broad territory and rapid socio-economic develop-
ment. It is very difficult to distribute the benefits of economic growth equally
among different groups and regions. The spontaneous market forces will give
rise to the continuous enlargement of development gaps, especially economic
disparities. Therefore, it is highly necessary to adopt measures to prevent such
trends.
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Table 4.9 Ranking of all provinces: the changing trend (by per capita income, 1980–2002)
Variations of Going up Going down
the ranking 
results
No.6–No.15 Fujian (15), Henan (9) Tibet (13), Ningxia (12), Gansu (12), 
Qinghai (11), Shanxi (9)
No.3–No.6 Shandong (8), Zhejiang (6), Heilongjiang (5), Liaoning (4), 
Hainan (6), Chongqing (6), Shaanxi (3)
Hebei (4), Inner Mongolia (4), 
Xinjiang (4), Anhui (4)
No.1–No.2 Hunan (2), Guangdong (2), Jilin (2), Sichuan (1)
Yunnan (2)
Unchanged Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hubei, Guangxi, 
Guangxi, Guizhou
Sources: Gaige kaifang shiqinian de zhongguo diqu jingji (China Regional Economy: A Profile of
17 Years of Reform and Opening-up), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press);
Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000 (China
Statistical Yearbook 2000), Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 2000, p. 62 and
p. 65.
The past two decades have seen the fastest expansion of income disparities.
Currently, China also records the greatest increasing amplitude of the Gini coef-
ficient in the world. In the future, China will be faced with a severe challenge
of enlarging income disparities. If China ignores the disparities and unbalanced
income growth between rural and urban areas, the income disparities are
expected to expand dramatically. The Gini coefficient for China is estimated to
reach 0.474 by 2020, from 0.437 in 1999. Instead, if we reverse the assump-
tion (e.g. by eliminating the gaps in economic growth among provinces, so 
the growth rates of income all reach 7.2 percent in every province), the Gini
coefficient will drop down to 0.395 by 2020.
At a certain future period, the relative disparities of human development indi-
cators and most social development indicators are likely to narrow, to different
degrees. However, the economic disparities and knowledge disparities will keep
enlarging for quite a long period. It will take a long time for currently disad-
vantageous regions to catch up with the modernization process. When consid-
ering eliminating regional disparities, it is suggested to give first priority to
narrowing the disparities of social development and human development. To
achieve the proposed goals is not only possible and feasible, but also helpful for
realizing the final target of eliminating economic disparities. Therefore, it is
necessary to take “narrow regional disparities of social development and realize
the equalization of public service access” as the prioritized policy in the State’s
long-term plan entitled “Accelerating the development of central and western
China by 2015.” Such a strategy will not only accelerate economic development,
but also facilitate social progress in these regions.
Offering public services to 1.3 billion people
In China, the fundamental political state is a “unitary system with 5.5 levels 
in governmental hierarchy.” China is a unitary state, not a federal one. The
Constitution of China has set down clear provisions regarding “4-levelled gov-
ernment.” However, governance operates at 5.5 levels: Central Level, Provincial
Level, Deputy Provincial Level, Regional/Municipal Level, County/City Level,
and Township/Village/District Level. There are too many administrative levels
of government in China. Even governments at the same level but in different
regions vary from one another markedly in terms of the size of population, public
affairs, public services and management capabilities. Undoubtedly, such a mech-
anism increases the difficulty of realizing coordinated regional development and
offering people basic and easily accessible public services.
Human orientation: a new philosophy of development
It is necessary to cultivate a new philosophy of development. In the twenty-
first century, major transitions in the issues of development have already taken
place in both philosophy and strategy. This round of transitions aims to improve
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the living conditions and to enhance the quality of life for humankind, while
maintaining the bearing capacity of the ecological system.
The traditional philosophy of development views increasing GDP as the only
purpose. As a materials-oriented philosophy, it is a strategy of “prioritizing
growth” which focuses solely on pursuing GPD growth. However, development
does not equal growth. It essentially refers to the transformation of the entire
society, a process that facilitates the modernization of traditional relationships,
traditional patterns of thinking, traditional ways of production, and traditional
life-styles.
The newly formulated strategy of development is a human-oriented one,
which focuses on improving living conditions and enhancing the quality of life.
It aims to increase employment opportunities and to improve people’s capa-
bilities to face new challenges. To reach these goals, many measures can be
adopted, such as developing human resources, protecting the diversity of ethical
cultures and achieving sustainable development. The new philosophy of devel-
opment is not a strategy with a single goal, but one with multiple objectives
at multiple levels. It is not a strategy pursuing only economic growth, but 
one seeking comprehensive socio-economic development. It is not a strategy
pursuing only the protection of the ecological environment, but one that intends
to protect and develop ethical cultures and to facilitate human development and
social transition. To be more precise, it is also a strategy that promotes the
coordinated development between economic growth and social progress.
Current policies
It is an important philosophy of China’s government to emphasize coordinated
development between rural and urban areas, coordinated regional development
and coordinated socio-economic development. On March 18, 2003, the newly
appointed Chinese premier Wen Jiabao announced a new policy direction 
with twenty-four words (in Chinese): “Coordination between rural and urban;
complementariness between east and west; communication between internal and
external parties; integration between super-ordinate and subordinate; harmo-
nization between short- and long-terms; and put into force effective and flexi-
ble policies.” The “Decision upon a Certain Number of Problems with Regard
to Consummation of the Socialist Market Economy System by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China” passed at the Third Plenary Session
of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC put forward the requirements of
“insisting on human orientation, establishing a philosophy of comprehensive,
coordinated and sustainable development, and facilitating the integration of
socio-economic and human developments.” It also clarifies the new direction for
development, featuring “five coordinations” of: 1) coordinating the development
between rural and urban areas; 2) coordinating economic development in
different regions, promoting the development of the western region and the
revitalization of northeast China and other old industrial bases; 3) coordinating
socio-economic development; 4) coordinating the development of human beings
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and the natural environment; 5) coordinating domestic development with open-
ing up.10 This policy was put forward by the Central Government after having
summed up its solid experience during reform and opening up over the past two
decades. It is set up at the request of meeting new situations and new tasks, and
dealing with those typical problems associated with socio-economic develop-
ment in China. Therefore, it is considered the starting point as well as the final
target of our reform.
We believe that the philosophy of “human-oriented development” brought
forward during the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee
of the CPC is a totally new, scientific one. The fundamental purposes of reform
are to invest in people, to facilitate the comprehensive development of all
Chinese people and to achieve a common prosperity. The five strategies of coor-
dinated development are suitable for the national conditions in China, and thus
can be termed the second generation of China’s development strategies.
During the thirty years from the founding of the People’s Republic of China
to the beginning of reform and opening up, in order to break through the
economic embargo of Western countries, the Chinese government implemented
a strategy of prioritizing heavy industry and a supplementary policy of coordi-
nated regional development. The main considerations behind the strategy were
national security and the previously established industrial base. During this
period, most construction funds were allocated to inland areas. For example,
more than 200 billion Yuan were invested in three-line regions, creating fixed
assets of over 140 billion Yuan, as well as establishing 29,000 state-owned
industrial enterprises. Throughout the three-line regions, the State erected an
industrial system that takes national defense science and technology industry
as the mainstream, bases itself on transport, coal, power, iron and steel and
non-ferrous metal industries, and considers the mechanical, electronics and
chemical industries as precursors. Such an industrial system that comprises a
complete array of industries has boosted the industrial development in the central
and western regions in China, ameliorated the industrial layout in China and
reinforced the economic strength and national defense capabilities of China.
The strategy and policies during this period ensured the extension of produc-
tion capacity from coastal areas to inlands, and to some extent has facilitated
resource exploitation of the inland regions. They helped coastal regions to find
places to acquire material resources from and to sell their products to, ensured
a roughly balanced development across different regions and lessened economic
frictions among different regions. However, the control mode of “mandatory
plans” adopted by the Chinese government reduced, to some extent, the effi-
ciency of resources deployment and impeded the improvement of the whole
national economy.
The first generation of development strategy was initially put forward by
Comrade Deng Xiaoping after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the CPC in 1978. Its theme was to speed up the development in
an unbalanced way, and it advocated “differentiated prosperity” that permitted
a portion of people in some regions to become rich first. The purpose of this
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reform was to release and develop productivity and to accelerate the develop-
ment of coastal regions.
The second generation of development strategy insists on development in a
coordinated, all-round and sustainable way. It also advocates that a “common
prosperity” be developed for all regions jointly and that they all share benefits.
The final target of this reform was to invest in human capital, to develop human
capabilities and to implement the five major strategies of coordinated develop-
ment. In fact, such strategic adjustments started in 1995 when the Fifth Plenary
Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the CPS was held. In this session,
Jiang Zemin put forward suggestions concerning how to properly deal with a
number of significant relationships (i.e. the twelve major relations) in the social-
ist modernization process. He also brought forward a notion of “insisting on
coordinated regional development, and narrowing regional disparities step by
step.” In June 1999, Comrade Jiang Zemin presented the strategy of “Western
Development” which was formally put into force in 2001. The strategy has
already embodied the thought of coordinated regional development. The Report
of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC officially put forward the devel-
opment objective of “building a well-off society in an all-round way” to bene-
fit the whole population of the country, and also began to conceive the second
generation of development strategy. Because of the outbreak of SARS and 
the painful lessons in handling the SARS crisis, the Chinese government has
accelerated the strategic transition from the first generation to the second one.
As for the regional development policies, it is well known that China features
two major regional disparities. One is the well-known “gap between the east and
the west,” while the other is the gap between the south and the north. To elim-
inate these two major regional gaps, it is necessary to employ strategic thought
in a comprehensive way. Since June 1999 when the central authorities decided
to implement the strategy of “Western Development,” considerations have been
given to how to reinvigorate the old industrial base in northeastern China. The
Report of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC in 2002 pointed out the
necessity of giving supports to the northeastern regions for speeding up their
structural adjustments. Since March 1994, the central government has begun to
consider how to reinvigorate the old industrial base in northeastern China. This
new consideration can be viewed as the second biggest strategic decision follow-
ing “Western Development” in the process of pursuing coordinated regional
development.
The Chinese government has already successfully brought forward a rela-
tively complete strategy for coordinated regional development. This strategy is
suitable for China’s conditions featuring great regional gaps, and also conforms
to the will of the Chinese people.
Policy suggestions (direction of development)
We believe that it is possible for China to narrow the disparities between rural and
urban areas and between different regions if it can insist on the second generation
China’s regional development (1978–2004) 89
90 Economic and social transformation in China
Table 4.10 Policies of regional development (1953–present)
1953–1978 (a) 1978–1995 (a) 1995–present (b)
Regional Balanced development Unbalanced development Balanced development
policy
Starting National security, Economic growth, Coordinated 
point establishment of enhancement of macro- development and 
industrial base economic benefits common prosperity
Principle Employment of Prioritize the efficiency, “Human orientation,” 
planning means, consider fairness, coordinated regional 
balanced deployment advocate “differentiated development; narrow 
of resources and prosperity,” boost regional disparities 
productivity economic development 
from coastal regions to 
inland areas step by step
Concrete Extension of production Establish special economic Initiate Western 
polices capacity from coastal zones and development Development, build 
regions into the inland zones, grant favorable a well-off society, 
areas; ensure roughly policies to coastal regions, reinvigorate the old 
balanced regional separate financial powers, industrial base in 
development; invest reduce the investment in northeastern China,
mainly in inland areas, central and western China etc.
and construct the three-
line regions.
Effects Facilitate resource Intensive market forces Require efforts over a 
exploitation and boost the optimization of period of time, 
economic development resources deployment maintain the 
in inland areas, but and the rationalization of continuous economic 
distort resource productivity layout; the growth, and create 
allocation to some economies at both material conditions for 
extent, impede the regional level and national coordinated regional 
enhancement of overall level all grow quickly. In development. Reform 
national economy. the 1990s, regional the economic 
Generally speaking, disparities of economic mechanism and 
regional disparities development expanded governmental 
expand in a fluctuant fast; China became one governance, so as to 
way of those countries with institutionally 
the largest regional guarantee coordinated 
disparities. regional development. 
Economic disparities 
keep increasing, but at 
a slower speed. 
Source: (a) A. Hu, Sh. Wang and X. Kang, Zhongguo diqu chaju baogao (Report on Gaps among
Different Regions of China), Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe (Liaoning People’s Press),
1995.
(b) Hu and Xiong, “Woguo zhishi fazhan diqu chaju yanjiu.”
of development strategy, further quicken the establishment of a unified and fair
domestic market, promote the free flow of various factors of production, especially
the labor force, and accelerate the process of urbanization.
Political support and commitments from the central government are
of top importance
In the transition of China from a traditional planned economy to a market-
oriented one, no proven experience or mature theories from international society
are available for reference. The transition process involves the redistribution of
benefits and powers. Therefore, the central government plays a non-replaceable
role in eliminating the regional disparities of development and boosting the
speedy development of underdeveloped regions.
Solid experience from many other countries has demonstrated that the influ-
ences of external environmental factors such as globalization on economic
growth, poverty and income distribution vary markedly from one country to
another. The degree of such influences depends, to a large extent, on the policies
adopted by the country concerned.
After rapid development over the past twenty-five years, China has already
equipped itself with the necessary conditions for solving the regional dispari-
ties of development, and the central government has also been able to provide
necessary support in terms of institutions, policies and funds to boost coordi-
nated regional development. As there are various kinds of conflicting interests
between central and local governments, and the process of structural and insti-
tutional reforms is rather complicated, some measures that are conformable to
the interests of most Chinese people and are also beneficial for China in
enhancing her competitiveness, will probably be resisted by some interest groups.
Furthermore, many dilemmas need to be evaluated carefully, making it difficult
for actual implementation.
Faced with heavy resistance, a very strong political determination is needed
to carry out the reform and ensure the development of the macro-economy in
a fast, stable and coordinated way. To implement the second generation of
development strategy and facilitate coordinated regional development, powerful
political supports and commitments are definitely required.
Establishment of a unified, open and fair domestic market is an
important measure for coordinated regional development
The National Congress decision put forward the concept of eliminating the
barriers between different regions, clarified the necessity of discarding unrea-
sonable regulations of regional protectionism, and broke industrial monopoly
and regional isolation. Only by opening markets inward and outward, speeding
up the construction of a unified domestic market and facilitating the flow and
development of various kinds of factors, can every region be able to gain more
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economy-of-scale effects from national and regional markets, just as the member
countries in the EU gain benefits from the greater EU market.11
By investigating the development of China’s labor force market, we find that
the flow of the labor force across enterprises, industries and regions has promoted
the adjustment of economic structures, and also facilitated decreasing gaps
between rural and urban areas and between different regions. As productivity
in the agricultural sector lags behind that of industry and the service sector, the
transfer of the agricultural labor force into non-agricultural sectors is extremely
vital to promoting economic growth and coordinated regional development in
the future. Currently, a majority of productive employment opportunities are
available in those regions with intensive economic activities, but not in remote
rural regions. Therefore, the transfer of the agricultural labor force into non-
agricultural sectors is now closely associated with the movement of the
agricultural population into urban areas.
It is necessary that we clarify the responsibilities of local government with
respect to local enterprises, financial institutions and courts, and make clear the
responsibilities of local governments in monitoring market activities and making
policies. In addition, it is necessary to take some innovative measures so as to
ensure the accountability of local governments for their market interventions.
Such measures may include a market survey to investigate the management
practices of local government. Moreover, China should complete its legal system
corresponding to its commitments to WTO.
It is advised that further systematic reform be implemented to facilitate the
movement of the labor force, and to further release the restrictions upon popu-
lation movement. In fact, such measures were already taken in 2001. If social
security funds and related services are concentrated at the provincial level, and
the coverage of the social security system is expanded to include non-state-
owned sectors in urban areas (i.e. inclusive of both local residents and migrant
workers), this will undoubtedly facilitate the free flow of the labor force across
and within urban regions. It is essential to continue reforming the regulations
on land use, so as to enable farmers to receive adequate compensation by
subleasing or transferring their lands through lawful ways. Such reforms will
be helpful for the movement of the population from rural areas into urban ones.
One more measure, which may be beneficial for increasing the overall liquidity
of the labor force market, is to develop the urban land market and to promote
housing development for the low-income population living in urban and suburban
areas.
Urbanization: a good remedy for narrowing the disparities between
urban and rural areas and between different regions
The concentration of population and resources will promote economies of scale
and will improve economic efficiency. Due to the economic advantages result-
ing from industry clustering, the newly added outputs and productive employ-
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ment opportunities in both service sectors and the manufacturing industry may
emerge principally in urban and suburban areas. Since the beginning of reform
and opening up, a majority of employment opportunities in non-agricultural sec-
tors have been created by small and medium sized cities. Specifically, the sub-
urban areas have witnessed the largest number of newly added employment
opportunities.
It is necessary to set up a complete market system for the development of
land used for industrial purposes, so as to facilitate the development of housing
for low-income populations. Such a measure will further demonstrate the advan-
tages of integrated development in China. If strict supervision and powerful
policy support from government are both available, commercial interests will
drive the development and utilization of land towards the expected mode.
The holistic effects of urbanization also depend on measures taken by the
government to boost the development of suburban regions and to improve the
quality of life in urban areas. When moving out from central urban areas, indus-
trial enterprises may prefer suburban regions, as these regions are advantageous
for both initiating business activities and housing development. In this respect,
local governments may have to play a more active role in the market of suburban
lands for housing purposes, so as to boost the development of housing for 
low-income populations. International experience has proven that the roles of
government should include providing basic social infrastructures and public
services in those regions close to economic activities, or in those regions suit-
able for low-income populations to live in. As a matter of fact, public services
are increasingly important in establishing a self-contained central area that not
only hosts economic activities, but also promotes a high quality of life. Such
public services may include an appropriate public transit network, basic educa-
tional facilities for local residents, sound environmental protection, and so on.
Allow equal access to basic public services at a national level
In order to eliminate the remarkable regional disparities of socio-economic
development, it is necessary to enable national citizens to equally obtain access
to basic public services. To reach this goal, it is necessary to formulate the
national minimum standards of basic public services.
It is necessary to set up a system for standardizing transfer payments from
the treasury. For central and western regions, the transfer payment should be
increased so as to balance the per capita financial capability across all regions.
In China, the current intra-government fiscal system cannot ensure the suffi-
ciency of public services. Despite a relatively big amount of inter-government
transfer payments (in 2001 and 2002, the amount of central government’s transfer
payments constituted 46 percent and 48 percent of the financial expenditure of
local governments respectively), the unreasonable transfer system makes local
government unable to provide funds for some important social services, such
as education and public health care in rural areas. The central government has
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shifted the responsibility of financial expenditure to local governments, but not
provided adequate financial supports at the same time. Such incompatibility will
worsen the imbalance of financial operations, and further expand the income
disparities among different regions. Obviously, this conflicts with what the
governments should be doing (such as alleviating the income disparities,
protecting the poverty-stricken population and the weak groups). To make things
worse, the governments in poverty-stricken regions are providing fewer public
services with lower quality, and shifting a relatively high proportion of the costs
to local people.
It is essential to clarify the expenditure purposes of transfer payments from
the exchequer. We find that, in 1998, among the eight provinces/autonomous
regions where minorities occupy a relatively higher proportion, seven provinces/
autonomous regions except Guizhou province all reported a per capita financial
expenditure level higher than the national average. However, their major social
development indicators and human development indicators have all turned out
lower than the national level. Among these regions, a majority of funds were
spent to support institutions and their employees, whereas only a small portion
was invested in public services. As a result, it is necessary to shift from uncon-
ditional transfer payments to conditional ones. The central government should
provide funds in such a way as to force local governments to effect reforms, so
as to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of financial transfer payments for
offering public services. In addition, the centralization of public service respon-
sibilities and fund management authorities will facilitate the provision of better
services. For example, the shift of some responsibilities concerning service pro-
vision and fund-raising from governments at village, town or county levels to
their super-ordinate governments can enhance efficiency, management abilities
and fairness. The reform of the financial revenue and expenditure system should
make the financial and institutional capabilities of governments compatible with
their corresponding responsibilities.
Coordinated regional development requires the clarification of responsibilities
between the central government and provincial governments, and the imple-
mentation of a combined mode of “centralization of central government and
decentralization of local governments.” Further, it is necessary to make clear the
respective responsibilities of the central government and the local governments
in respect to economic adjustment, market supervision, social management and
public services. Those affairs at national or intra-provincial levels should be
coordinated by the central authority, so as to guarantee a unified legal system,
governmental decrees and national markets. Those affairs within local adminis-
trative regions should then be managed by local governments, so as to improve
working efficiency, reduce managerial costs and enhance administrative capa-
bility. As to those affairs jointly managed by the central authority and local gov-
ernments, it is necessary to identify their respective roles, and to clarify the
primary and secondary responsibilities as well.
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Developing human resources: a prioritized strategy for narrowing
regional disparities of development
Human capital constitutes the most important component of national wealth. China
has the largest population in the world, and possesses the richest human resources.
However, China badly lacks physical resources, capital resources and technical
resources in comparative terms. The conflict between abundant labor resources
and relatively scarce natural resources and capital resources has become the pri-
mary contradiction in modern China. Therefore, developing human resources is
the basic national policy for China to pursue long-term development. The scarcer
natural resources are, the more important it is to develop human resources. The
more deficient capital is, the more necessary it is to invest in human capital. The
less developed the economy is, the more essential it is to develop education,
science and technology.
In China, the fundamental national policies should focus on education and
science. This is the only choice for China. The basic means of developing human
resources include investing more in human capital, speeding up the development
of various categories of education, promoting scientific and technological
advancement, ensuring the health of every citizen and eliminating absolute
poverty. The core is to develop, invest in and utilize the labor resources in under-
developed regions, so as to increase the national wealth, promote coordinated
socio-economic development, and narrow regional disparities of development.
Implementing the knowledge development strategy
The domestic and international experience have indicated that knowledge is the
most important factor in facilitating development. In the twenty-first century,
knowledge will be the most important resource in the economic development
of a country or a region. A low level of knowledge development will be the
biggest bottleneck that impedes the economic development of a country or a
region. Knowledge-facilitated development and knowledge-oriented society will
be the themes of human development in the twenty-first century. The level of
knowledge development in regions with relatively lower socio-economic devel-
opment falls far below that in the developed coastal regions. The disparities of
key knowledge capability will become much bigger. Thus, it is necessary to
prioritize the implementation of the knowledge development strategy in under-
developed western regions, to enhance the people’s abilities to acquire, absorb
and exchange knowledge, and to improve their abilities in gaining knowledge
assets and information knowledge.
Corresponding to the phenomena of “one China, four scenarios,” and “one
China, four societies,” the implementation of knowledge development strategy
in China should follow three steps:
1 To allow equal access to basic knowledge services. This is the foundation
for Chinese people to participate in knowledge creation and sharing.
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2 To accelerate the application of knowledge nationally. In contemporary
China, the scientific level and technological innovations still remain on a
rather low level from an international perspective, which means that acquir-
ing and absorbing foreign knowledge should be the primary consideration
for accumulating a knowledge base. Therefore, all regions in China should
improve their abilities in utilizing global knowledge as quickly as possible,
complete their networks for dissemination and application of knowledge,
and promote more intensive utilization of knowledge in socio-economic
development.
3 To strengthen the capabilities of knowledge innovation step by step. The
first two measures aim at improving “basic knowledge capabilities.” On
the basis of these basic knowledge capabilities, China should cultivate its
capabilities in knowledge innovation gradually, formulate an effective stim-
ulating mechanism, set up an interactive innovation system and utilize
limited resources to develop new knowledge. Among these, allowing equal
access to basic knowledge services nationwide serves as the foundation for
implementing the knowledge development strategy, and thus should be
treated as a high-priority strategy.
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5 China’s economic growth 
and poverty reduction
(1978–2002)1
The trend and evaluation of China’s poverty reduction
(1978–2002)
Great achievements in poverty reduction
Since China’s economy entered the takeoff stage in 1978, the average growth
rate of per capita GDP has been as high as 8.1 percent. As Amartya Sen has
analyzed, in the past two decades China’s economy has been developing very
rapidly. The growth of China’s income per capita is much faster than that of
any other region in the world. Nevertheless, people have always failed to realize
that this is rather astounding for such a large country as China. It’s totally
different from those well-known countries or regions with rapid economic growth
such as Hong Kong and Singapore. Unlike China, which has a very large rural
population, Hong Kong and Singapore are actually cities. It is an extraordinary
achievement for such a large country with dramatic regional differences to
achieve such a high average growth rate.2 Meanwhile, China’s rural impover-
ished population has decreased by a large margin. According to China’s national
poverty line, the rural impoverished population has dropped from 250 million
in 1978 to 28.2 million in 2002, decreasing by 88.7 percent. The impoverished
population has decreased by an average of 9.24 million per year (see Table
5.1). According to the international poverty line, at which the cost of living per
capita per day is below $1, the World Bank estimates that China’s rural impov-
erished population has dropped from 280 million in 1990 to 124 million in
1997, decreasing by 55.7 percent. The impoverished population has decreased
by an average of 22.29 million per year (see Table 5.2). These different esti-
mates demonstrate that while China is the country with the largest population
and the largest impoverished population, it has made unprecedented achieve-
ments in poverty reduction.
China’s achievements in poverty reduction constitute a huge contribution to
poverty reduction throughout the world. It is estimated by the World Bank that
according to the international poverty line (per capita cost of living below $1
per day), China’s impoverished population dropped from 542 million to 375
million in the 1980s (referring to the period from 1980 to 1990), decreasing by
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Table 5.1 Annual rural poverty reduction, the growth rate of per capita GDP and farmers’
consumption level (1978–2002)
Year Annual poverty The growth rate The growth rate The growth rate 
reduction of per capita of farmers’ of farmers’ net 
announced by GDP (%) (b) consumption income per capita 
the government level (%) (c) (%) (c)
(million) (a)
1978–1985 17.86 8.3 10.0 15.1
1985–1990 8.00 6.2 2.5 3.0
1990–1997 5.00 9.9 8.0 5.0
1997–2002 4.36 7.7 3.4 3.8
1978–2002 9.24 8.1 5.6 7.2
Sources: Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongtuo tongji zhaiyao 2002
(China Statistical Abstract 2002), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 
pp. 18, 32 and 91. Data for 2002 are from Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China),
“Zhongguo 2002 guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao” (The Communiqué of China’s
National Economy and Social Development 2002), Economy Daily, March 1, 2003.
Notes: (a) Calculated according to the data of Table 5.2; (b) and (c): all calculation in fixed prices. 
Table 5.2 The impoverished population in rural China and the rate of poverty 
(1978–2002)
Year Rural Official Impoverished The rate of The rate of 
population impoverished population poverty (%), poverty (%), 
(ten thousand population estimated by Official data World Bank 
persons) (a) (ten thousand the World Bank (c) data
persons) (b) (ten thousand 
persons) (d)
1978 79014 25000 33.1
1984 80340 12800 15.9
1985 80757 12500 15.5
1986 81141 13100 16.1
1987 81626 12200 14.9
1988 82365 9600 11.7
1989 83164 10600 12.7
1990 84142 8500 28000 10.1 33.3
1991 85280 9400 28700 11.0 33.6
1992 84799 8000 27400 9.4 32.3
1993 85166 8000 26600 9.3 31.2
1994 85549 7000 23700 8.2 27.7
1995 85947 6500 20000 7.6 23.3
1996 86439 6000 13800 6.9 16.0
1997 86637 5000 12400 5.8 14.3
1998 86868 4200 4.8




Sources: (a) Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2002; (b) “A Monitoring Report of China’s
Rural Poverty in 2000” by the research office of rural social economy of national statistics bureau,
China’s Statistical Press, 2000, p. 7; (c) “Statistical Communiqué of China’s Economy and Society”
by National Statistical Bureau, quoted from Economic Daily, March 1, 2003; (d) World Bank, 1999.
167 million. In the corresponding period, the impoverished population of the
whole world decreased by 98.3 million. China’s contribution rate to the world’s
(mainly referring to the developing area) poverty reduction is 166.9 percent. In
the 1990s, China’s impoverished population decreased by 115 million, and the
contributing rate was 122.8 percent. It is also estimated by the World Bank that
China’s impoverished population will drop to 74 million; the net decrease will
be 150 million, compared with that in 1999, which will account for 41.7 percent
of the whole world’s (mainly referring to the developing area) poverty reduc-
tion. In 1990, China’s impoverished population accounted for 29 percent of that
of the world; the number has been down to 19.2 percent in 1999, decreasing
by approximately 10 percent. It is forecast that the number will be down to 9.1
percent in 2015 (see Table 5.3).
Asia has the largest and most condensed impoverished population. Among
the five Asian countries with the most condensed impoverished populations
(China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh), according to the inter-
national poverty line, China’s current proportion of impoverished population is
the lowest. The ratio between China’s per capita GDP (PPP) and India’s per
capita GDP is 1.6:1; and India’s ratio of people whose cost of living per day
is less than $1 is 25.7 percent higher than that of China, while India’s ratio of
people whose cost of living per day is less than $2 is 32.5 percent higher than
that of China (see Table 5.4).
The preceding statistics demonstrate that China has experienced a period in
human history in which the impoverished population decreased by the largest
margin in the past two decades, and reversed the trend that the impoverished
population has been increasing in the past five decades of world history, causing
the impoverished population of the world to decrease for the first time (see
Table 5.5). That is to say, without China’s efforts at poverty reduction, or
excluding China’s impoverished population, the impoverished population of the
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Table 5.3 Number of people living on less than $1 per day, estimated by World Bank
(1990–2015) (million)
Region 1990 1999 2015
East Asia and the Pacific 486 (37.6%) 279 (23.9%) 80 (9.9%)
Excluding China 110 (8.5%) 57 (4.9%) 7 (0.9%)
Europe and middle Asia 6 (0.5%) 24 (2.1%) 7 (0.9%)
Middle East and North Africa 48 (3.7%) 57 (4.9%) 47 (5.8%)
Latin America and Caribbean region 5 (0.4%) 6 (0.5%) 8 (1.0%)
South Asia 506 (39.2%) 488 (41.7%) 264 (32.6%)
Sub-Sahara Africa 241 (18.7%) 315 (26.9%) 404 (49.9%)
Total 1292 (100.0%) 1169 (100.0%) 809 (100.0%)
Excluding China 917 (71.0%) 945 (80.8%) 635 (90.9%)
China 375 (29.0%) 224 (19.2%) 74 (9.1%)
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Development Countries, Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2003, Table 1.9.
Note: The data in brackets are the ratio of impoverished population as a percentage of the world
total population.
world would have increased from 848 million in 1980 to 917 million in 1990,
and then to 945 million in 1999.
Why can China decrease its impoverished population by a large
margin?
The main reasons are as follows.
Continuous high economic growth is the basis of poverty reduction. The
average per capita growth rate of GDP of China was 8.1 percent in the period
1978–2002 (see Table 5.1), which is the longest-lasting period with the highest
growth rate of GDP per capita and the largest population who benefit from it.
This corresponds to doubling per capita GDP every 8.6 years, 5.4 times the
global GDP per capita growth rate in the same period (1.5 percent). According
to the estimate made by the World Bank, it took Britain 58 years to double its
per capita income (1780–1838), America 47 years (1839–1886), Japan 34 years
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Table 5.4 Percentage of the impoverished population in several Asian countries
GDP per Population below national Population’s Population’s
capita poverty line (%) expenditure expenditure 
(PPP$) below $1 per below $2 
day (%) per day (%)
Bangladesh 1,423 (1998) 42.7 35.6 29.1 (1996) 77.8 (1996)
(1991–1992) (1995–1996)
China 3,356 (1998) 6.0 (1996) 4.6 (1998) 18.5 (1998) 53.7 (1998)
India 2,101 (1998) 40.9 (1992) 35.0 (1994) 44.2 (1997) 86.2 (1997)
Indonesia 2,806 (1998) 15.7 (1996) 27.1 (1999) 7.7 (1999) 55.3 (1999)
Pakistan 1,794 (1998) 34.0 (1991) 31.0 (1996) 84.7 (1996)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001,
p. 64.
Note: Numbers in brackets are the years when the researches were carried out.
Table 5.5 Impoverished population and the poverty rate of the world (1950–1999)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1992 1999
The Impoverished 1805.6 1946.5 2200.7 2426.6 2800 2320
population (million) (a)
Population in dire 1376.2 1330.1 1304.7 1390.3 1294 1169
poverty (million) (b)
Poverty rate (%) 71.9 64.3 60.1 55.0 51.3 38.1
Dire poverty rate (%) 54.8 44.0 35.6 31.5 23.7 13.3
Source: The data for 1950–1992 are quoted from F. Bourguignom and C. Morrisso, “Inequality
among World Citizens: 1820–1992,” American Economic Review, September 2002, pp. 727–744;
the data for 1999 are quoted from World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, Table 1.9.
Notes: (a) refers to people living under $2 per day; (b) refers to people whose cost of living per
day is less than $1.
(1885–1919), South Korea 11 years (1966–1977). In China, the annual growth
rate of the rural population’s consumption level (the majority of China’s popu-
lation) is 5.6 percent; the annual growth rate of per capita net income of farmers
is 7.2 percent, corresponding to doubling their per capita income every 9.7 years
(see Table 5.1), which is the major reason leading to China’s great poverty
reduction in the rural areas. In 1978 nearly 100 percent of peasant households
had per capita net incomes below 500 Yuan. In 1985, the percentage was 77.7
percent; in 1990 it was 35 percent; and in 2001 it was only 2.5 percent. In
1985 the percentage of peasant households whose per capita net income was
less than 1000 Yuan was 97.69 percent, while in 2001 the ratio was down to
only 13.22 percent (see Table 5.6), which shows that the extremely poor and
poor households have been sharply decreased.
A great deal of rural labor force transfers to non-agricultural industries. More
and more people are employed in village and township enterprises. The number
has increased from 28.27 million in 1978 to 130.86 million in 2001, accounting
for 26.7 percent of the total rural work force, compared with the original ratio
of 9.2 percent. In addition, in 2001, 38.16 million people worked in private
rural enterprises or were self-employed, accounting for 7.7 percent of total rural
employees. The total of the above two ratios is 34.4 percent, exceeding one-
third of total rural employed population (see Figure 5.1).
Urbanization has been speeding up. China has experienced the largest popu-
lation transition in the world since the policy of reform and opening up was
carried out. This includes population transference, referring to moving from the
place where one originally lives. In China’s case, it refers to transferring one’s
household register or transforming from an agricultural population to a non-
agricultural population, directly recruiting personnel for employment from rural
areas, such as graduates of junior college, technical secondary school, demobi-
lized servicemen, professional personnel and so on. Population flow refers to
those whose living place remains the same, but the person himself (or herself)
leaves the living place and move across a given administrative region, and
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Table 5.6 Percentage of rural households grouped by per capita annual net income 
(1978–2001) (%)
Grouping by per capita 1978 1985 1990 1995 2001
net income
100 Yuan and below 33.3 1.0 0.3 0.21
100–300 Yuan 64.3 36.9 8.34 1.06 2.51
300–500 Yuan 2.4 39.8 26.41 3.77
Over 500 Yuan 22.3 64.95 94.96 97.49
Over 1000 Yuan 2.31 22.78 69.77 86.78
Sources: The data for 1978 and 1985 are quoted from Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics
of China), Zhongguo shehui tongji ziliao 1990 (China’s Social Statistics 1990), Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 1990, p. 68; the data for 1990 and 1995 are quoted from
Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongtuo tongji nianjian 2000; the data
for 2001 are quoted from Guojia tongjiju, Zhongtu tongji zhaiyao 2002, p. 99.
temporarily stays there and engages in various activities. The activity of rural
laborers going to cities for work comes under this type of population flow. In
the period 1982–2000, 206,750,000 people moved from rural to urban areas,
equal to 45.0 percent of the total urban population in the same period, and 84.6
percent of the newly increased rural population (see Table 5.7). In the same
period, 109,600,000 rural laborers moved to cities, equal to 45.8 percent of the
total town labor force and 94.3 percent of the newly increased town labor force.
From this, we can see that the scale of the moving population and labor force
is enlarging rapidly. In the 1980s, the moving population was 8,140,000 and the
moving labor force was 4,010,000, while in the 1990s, the numbers were
14,140,000 and 7,750,000 respectively. Some were the agricultural population
who transformed into the non-agricultural population, while the majority were
rural laborers who went to cities for work. The wage income has become one
of the most important sources of farmers’ income. The ratio of wage income
accounting for their total income was up to 30.4 percent in 2001, from 13.2 per-
cent in 1985 (see Figure 5.2), which shows that peasants have partly enjoyed
the benefits brought by urbanization and non-agricultural industries.
China’s export volume has increased rapidly since implementing the policy
of reform and opening up, especially since the export of labor-intensive prod-
ucts has increased very rapidly, which plays an important role in expanding
employment and poverty reduction. The export volume of 2002 was 325.6
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Figure 5.1 Percentage of employed persons in township and village enterprises, private
enterprises and self-employed individuals in rural areas (1978–2001)
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002, p. 121.








billion dollars, increasing by thirty-two times that of 1978. The proportion of
export volume accounting for GDP has increased rapidly from 4.6 percent in
1978 to 23.0 percent in 2001. In addition, China actively draws in foreign
investment and takes an active part in economic globalization, which is also a
way to achieve poverty reduction, especially since the foreign economy in
Guangdong and Zhejiang attracts large quantities of surplus agricultural labor
from different areas. The flowing labor force of Guangdong accounts for 39
percent of that of the whole country.
Human capital has evidently been improved. The level of people’s educa-
tion and health conditions have greatly improved since reform, which is useful
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Table 5.7 Population and rural–urban labor force migration (1982–2000) million
Period The increased Total Labor force Average Average 
number of migrating migration annual annual 
urban total population migration labor force 
population population migration
1982–1990 87.15 65.10 32.08 8.14 4.01
1990–1995 49.79 39.01 20.20 7.80 4.04
1996–2000 107.32 102.37 57.32 20.30 11.46
1990–2000 157.11 141.38 77.52 14.14 7.75
1982–2000 244.26 206.75 109.60 11.49 6.09
Sources: Industry and Policy Department of Ministry of Agriculture. Quoted from Caijing Magazine,
2003, 3rd/4th issue, p. 95; the data of total urban population are from Guojia tongjiju, Zhongtuo
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Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2002, p. 97.
to human capital accumulation and plays an important role in improving people’s
living standards and reducing poverty. As shown in Table 5.8, average educa-
tional years of people above 15 years old has increased to 7.11 years in 2000
from 4.64 years in 1982. The illiterate population has decreased greatly, the
ratio of which has decreased from 22.8 percent in 1982 to 6.7 percent in 
2002. The absolutely illiterate population has decreased to 84,920,000 from
231,770,000, of which the rural illiterate and semiliterate population has obvi-
ously decreased. The infant mortality rate has decreased from 37.61 percent in
1982 to 28.38 percent in 2000. The average life expectancy has increased to
71.40 years in 2000 from 67.77 years in 1981. These figures demonstrate
important progress in the areas of education and medical care, and the comple-
mentary relationship between economic and social progress.3
Anti-poverty actions have been adopted by the government. China’s govern-
ment made a political commitment to reducing poverty in the early 1980s and
reflected poverty reduction goals and plans in the national economic plans. With
the development of the economy, the central government’s willingness to aid
the poor became stronger and stronger, with the input of aid also increasing
(see Table 5.9). In order to protect the benefits to the farmers, the government
adjusted agricultural policies to increase and loosen the price of agricultural
products step by step. As a result, the purchase prices of agricultural products
have greatly increased in the 1980s and the middle of the 1990s (see Figure
5.3). In 1996, the price index of agricultural products was 5.5 times as much
as that in 1978. The average growth rate per year was 9.9 percent. In the corre-
sponding period, the retail price indices of rural industrial products were 2.9
times and 6.1 times respectively. The growth rate of farmers’ actual earnings
per year (the price index growth rate of agricultural products minus that of
industrial products) was 3.8 percent.
104 Economic and social transformation in China
Table 5.8 Basic status of China’s human capital (1982–2003)
1982 1990 1995 2000 2003
Average educational years 4.61 5.50 6.09 7.07 7.36
The percentage of illiterate 22.8 15.9 12.0 6.7 8.7
people in total population (%)
The percentage of illiterate 27.87 20.73 13.47 8.96 
and semiliterate rural people (1985) (1999)
in total population (%)
Infant mortality rate (‰) 37.61 32.89 33.03 28.38
(1981) (1996)
Average life expectancy 67.77 68.55 70.80 71.40
(years) (1981) (1996)
Sources: Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongtuo tongi zhaiyao 2004 (China
Statistical Abstract 2004), Beijing: Zhongtuo tongi chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 2004, p. 37.
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Table 5.9 National poverty relief fund and the ratio in GDP (1986–2000)
Year Subsidized Food for Government Total The Per capita 
loan work budgetary (million proportion amount in 
(million (million poor area Yuan) in GDP impoverished 
Yuan) Yuan) development (%) population 
fund grants (%)
(million Yuan)
1986 230 90 100 420 0.41 32
1990 300 60 100 460 0.25 54
1991 350 180 100 630 0.29 67
1992 410 160 100 670 0.25 83
1993 350 300 110 760 0.22 101
1994 450 400 120 970 0.21 194
1995 450 400 130 980 0.17 151
1996 550 400 130 1080 0.16 180
1997 850 400 280 1530 0.21 306
1998 1000 500 330 1830 0.23 436
1999 1500 650 430 2580 0.31 756
2000 2600 0.29 1182
Sources: Data for 1986–1997 are from Y. Jiang and H. Gao (eds), Zhongguo caizheng fupin (The
Financial Aid to the Poor by the Central Government), Beijing: Zhongguo caijing chubanshe (China
Financial and Economic Publishing House), 1998. Data for 1998–1999 are from the State Council
Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development, quoted from Guojia tongjiju (National
Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo nongcun pinkun jiance baogao 2000 (A Monitoring Report
on China’s Rural Poverty 2000), 2000, p. 53; data for 2000 are estimates by the author. 
Note: Per capita relief fund received by the impoverished people is calculated using the current








































Figure 5.3 Purchase price index of agricultural products (1985–2000) (1978 as 100)
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001, p. 282.
China has slowed down its pace of poverty reduction since
the 1990s: analysis of the reasons
The pace of poverty reduction since the 1990s
China’s per capita output and income were greatly improved in the first several
years of economic reform (1978–1985), and poverty correspondently decreased
by a large margin. According to the official poverty line, the rural impoverished
population decreased by 200 million in the period 1978–2002; half of the decrease
happened in the period 1978–1985. In this period, the impoverished population
decreased by 17.86 million per year, and the annual growth rate of per capita
GDP was 8.3 percent. The growth rate of the farmers’ per capita consumption
level and per capita income went up to 10.0 percent and 15.1 percent respec-
tively. The rural population, especially the impoverished population, has been
the main beneficiary of high economic growth in this period. However, after the
second half of the 1980s (1985–1990), although China maintains a fairly high
economic growth rate, there are still some indications that the pace of poverty
reduction in rural areas has slowed down – the annual decrease of the impov-
erished population has reduced by half; the impoverished population has only
decreased by 8 million annually; the average growth rate of farmers’ consump-
tion level per year is only 2.5 percent; and the average growth rate of farmers’
per capita net income is only 3.0 percent (see Table 5.1).
In the 1990s (referring to the period 1990–1997), the highest average growth
rate of China’s per capita GDP was 9.9 percent, higher than that of the early
period of reform (referring to the period 1978–1985). However, the rural impov-
erished population decreased annually by 5 million, less than one-third of that
in the period 1978–1985. The farmers’ growth rate of consumption was far
lower than economic growth rate (see Table 5.1). The growth rate of per capita
GDP still remained as high as 7.7 percent in the period 1997–2002, but the
average decrease of the impoverished population per year was reduced to 4.36
million. The average growth rate of farmers’ per capita net income was 3.8
percent, also lower than that (7.2 percent) in the reform period (1978–2002).
The decrease of China’s rural impoverished population in the 1990s was a
result of the decrease of the poverty line. Compared internationally, the income
poverty line prescribed by the Chinese government – per capita net income
below 300 Yuan (the fixed price in 1990) – is a low-standard poverty line,
corresponding to only 66 percent of the international standard. If we make a
vertical comparison of data, this standard tends to decrease rapidly compared
with farmers’ per capita net income, reducing to 26.3 percent in 2002 from
43.7 percent in 1990, and its ratio to per capita GDP reduced to 8.2 percent in
2002 from 18.4 percent in 1990 (see Table 5.10). Based on this standard, the
impoverished population estimated by the government is much less than China’s
real impoverished population, thus the anti-poverty achievement is overesti-
mated (see Box 5.1).
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There were still 22 million people stricken by poverty in the rural areas by
the end of 2000. The objective of providing 80 million poor people with adequate
food and clothing promised in “The Eight–Seven Anti-poverty Plan” set down
in 1994 has not been met.
In China’s urban areas, the poverty rate has gradually increased since the
1990s, especially the extreme poverty rate and dire poverty rate. According to
Khan’s estimate, the extreme poverty rate increased to 4.1 percent from 2.2
percent in the period 1988–1995; the dire poverty rate increased from its orig-
inal 1.3 percent to 2.7 percent. He estimates that the poorest population exceeded
10 million in 2001.4 According to our estimate, the urban impoverished popu-
lation has gone up to 24.03 million, which, plus the population with the lowest
income (per capita income every year lower than 2497 Yuan), will account for
5 percent of the total town population. To one’s fear, the number of laid-off
workers and unemployed people has sharply increased, and the release of
payment to employees and retirees has generally defaulted, which leads to rapid
increase of the impoverished population and results in the marginalization of
these people. This phenomenon not only causes serious economic problems,
but also imposes grim challenges for China’s society in the future.
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Table 5.10 China’s official poverty line and its relative level (1978–2002)
Year Official poverty The ratio of farmers’ The ratio of official
line (Yuan, current per capita net income to poverty line to per 
price) official poverty line (%) capita GDP (%)
1978 100 74.9 33.0
1985 205 51.6 24.0
1990 300 43.7 18.4
1991 304 42.9 16.2
1992 317 40.4 13.9
1993 350 38.0 11.9
1994 440 36.0 11.2
1995 530 33.6 10.9
1996 580 30.1 10.4
1997 600 28.7 9.9
1998 625 28.9 9.9
1999 625 28.3 9.5
2000 625 27.7 9.5
2001 630 25.4 8.8
2002 627 25.3 7.9
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2004, pp.18, 99 and 101.
Notes: China’s current rural poverty line was calculated based upon investigating 67,000 farmer
inhabitants’ income and expenditure by the Rural Research Office of National Bureau of Statistics
of China in 1986. China’s rural poverty line in 1985 was RMB 205 Yuan net income per capita
per year. The standard is adjusted year by year according to the price index since then. In 1990
the standard was RMB 300 Yuan; in 1999, RMB 625 Yuan. The standard, calculated by the fixed
price in 1990, corresponds to only 66 percent of the international poverty line.
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Box 5.1 China’s poverty line and discussion
A broad gap exists between China’s official poverty line and the inter-
national poverty line. The impoverished population in 1998 estimated
according to China’s national poverty line (per capita annual income less
than 650 Yuan) accounts for 4.6 of its total population, while the poverty-
stricken population in the same year estimated according to the inter-
national poverty line (per capita everyday living cost less that $1) accounts
for 18.5 percent of the total population, differing by about 14 percent. 
In Brazil, the impoverished population accounts for 22 percent of its 
total population according to its national poverty line, and accounts for
9.0 percent of its total population according to the international poverty
line; in Bengal, the two proportions are 35.6 percent and 29.1 percent
respectively; in Indonesia, the two proportions are 27.1 percent and 
7.7 percent respectively. This demonstrates that the national poverty 
lines of the three countries are higher or slightly lower than the inter-
national poverty line. China’s national poverty line is much lower than
the international poverty line, which leads to the underestimation of the
poverty-stricken population and the low-income population, at least 100
million less than the real number.
The following table shows China’s rural poverty-stricken population
estimated according to different schemes. Scheme A is the current national
poverty line; per capita income is 1,000 Yuan, which is the poverty line
set by scheme B; 1,500 Yuan is the poverty line set by scheme C. The
result is that if scheme C is adopted, the estimated result is closer to the
estimate made by the World Bank; if scheme B is adopted, the estimated
result is between that of the World Bank and that of the national poverty
line.
The national Poverty line/ The estimated Rural poverty- Rural poverty-
poverty line per capita rural poverty- stricken stricken 
GDP (%) stricken population/ population/
population total rural total 
(10000) population population 
(%) (%)
Scheme A: 650 Yuan 8.6 2713 3.4 2.1
Scheme B: 1,000 Yuan 13.2 10518 13.22 8.2
Scheme C: 1500 Yuan 19.9 24044 30.22 18.8
Characteristics of China’s poverty since the 1990s
Distribution of the impoverished population in urban and 
rural areas
Most of the impoverished population lives in rural areas where the degree of
poverty is much deeper than that of urban habitants. One of the major reasons
for this disparity is that there is a great gap between the per capita income of
urban habitants and that of rural habitants, which surpasses that in common
developing countries.5 In addition, poor habitants in urban areas enjoy the lowest
living insurance provided by the government, while most of the impoverished
population has no other living insurance besides their own land.
Regional distribution of the impoverished population
Since the 1990s, China’s rural poverty gradually demonstrated regional and
marginal characteristics. The poverty rate is high in the western areas of China,
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The estimating method of schemes B and C: rural impoverished popu-
lation under various poverty lines is estimated according to the proportion
that poverty households account for in total households. According to
Annals of China’s Statistics of 2002, the households with per capita income
below 1,000 Yuan account for 13.3 percent of investigated households.
The rural total population is 795,630,000 according to the new statistics
of population. The estimated population with income below 1,000 Yuan
is calculated by performing multiplication of the two numbers. The
estimated population with income below 1,500 Yuan can be obtained in
the same way.
2001 per capita Accounting for per Proportion of Total impoverished 
income (Yuan) capita GDP (%) impoverished population (10000)
population (%)
100–600 1.3–8.0 3.87 3078
600–800 8.0–10.6 3.88 3087
800–1000 10.6–13.3 5.47 4352
Subtotal 13.22 10518
1000–1200 13.3–15.9 6.3 5012
1200–1300 15.9–17.2 3.45 2745
1300–1500 17.2–19.9 7.25 5786
Total sum 30.22 24044
where the impoverished population is the most concentrated and the degree of
poverty is the deepest across the country. According to the data given by the
Rural Research Office of National Statistics Bureau in Zhongguo nongcun pinkun
jiance baogao 2001 (A Monitoring Report on China’s Rural Poverty (2001),
in the 592 national poverty counties mentioned in 1986, about two-thirds of
the total impoverished population were distributed in the eastern and middle
provinces but the impoverished population of these regions has decreased rapidly
since then. In 2000, 10 percent of the impoverished population was distributed
in the eastern regions in a fragmentary state and 28 percent was distributed in
the middle regions. The impoverished population in the western twelve provinces
and areas has increased by 590,000, mainly distributed in geographically allotted
areas, accounting for 62 percent of the total impoverished population of the
whole country (see Figure 5.4). According to the official poverty line, the poverty
rate in the west is far higher than that in the east. In 2000, the poverty rate in
middle-west provinces such as Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi,
Gansu, Yunnan, Tibet, Guizhou, Qinghai and Ningxia was higher than 10 per-
cent, while the poverty rate in the eight eastern provinces (namely Shanghai,
Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang and so on) was lower than 1 percent. Extreme poverty
has been thoroughly diminished in these regions. Per capita income of poor
farmers in the western areas is far lower than that in the east, and the rate of
poverty occurrence in the west is rather high – about 30 percent in recent years.
This rate is especially high when these regions are by natural disasters and
overall economic decline.
The multi-dimensional characteristics of poverty
In the past two decades, the strategies of poverty reduction of the Chinese gov-
ernment mainly focused on eliminating income poverty, especially in national
poverty counties. It is a reasonable choice of policy, and it is very necessary, too.
However, as we enter the new century, the problems of new types of poverty
such as human poverty and knowledge poverty are increasingly apparent, and the
combined population of these is far greater than that of income poverty. Such
types of poverty have gradually become major types of poverty. Human poverty
refers to the lack of basic human ability, such as illiteracy, malnutrition, short life
expectancy, low level of health condition of mothers and infants and the harm
caused by preventable diseases. Knowledge poverty is a new form of poverty
when humans enter the knowledge based society in the twenty-first century,
which can be defined as the problems caused by people’s lack of the abilities to
obtain information, communicate with each other, utilize and create knowledge
and information, or the lack of basic rights and chances to obtain these abilities.
These three types poverty are not independent of one another, but interrelated.
The impoverished population is not always faced with only one type of poverty,
but the problems of multi-dimensional and interdependent poverty. Figure 5.5
is a three-dimensional coordinate map weighing poverty. It can differentiate
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various types of poverty. The impoverished population faced with the three types
of interrelated poverty is inside the cube. One of the indexes weighing status of
human poverty is the human poverty index (HPI).6 China’s HPI is shown in
Figure 5.6. In addition, China’s status of knowledge poverty is reflected by the
great gap among different regions (see Figure 5.7, Table 5.11).
Factors affecting China’s poverty reduction since the 1990s
The relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction is not simple.
It is not the speed of economic growth but the quality of economic growth that
actually plays an important role. Since the 1990s, the economic development of
many developing countries, especially in east Asia, demonstrates that although
economic growth plays an important supporting role in social development, too
rapid economic growth will still produce damaging effects on the environment and
resources. Moreover, if the economic growth is not based on good environmental
systems, various marketing distortions, inefficient investments and prevailing
corruption will come into being. The public, especially the impoverished popula-
tion, will be deprived of the ability and chance to participate in marketing activi-
ties and political decision-making. Therefore, we must comprehensively survey
the complex relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction.
Although China’s economy has been increasing very rapidly since the 1990s,
the quality of its economic growth is declining and the income allocation is
unfair, which results in a decreased proportion of benefits being obtained by
the impoverished population. This is an important reason for China to slow
down its pace of poverty reduction.
Quality of economic growth has declined: rapid economic growth
has not helped to decrease poverty
China’s growth rate of per capita GDP in the 1990s has created the highest
record in history, but why is the achievement of poverty reduction so limited?






Figure 5.4 Regional distribution of China’s rural impoverished population (2000)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Zhongguo nongcun pinkun jiance baogao 2001 (A
Monitoring Report on China’s Rural Poverty 2001).







Figure 5.5 Multi-dimensional framework of poverty
Sources: UNDP, Poverty Report: Overcoming Human Poverty 2000, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
Notes: Y refers to average status of income poverty; K refers to average status of knowledge
poverty; H refers to average status of health poverty.
Figure 5.6 Human poverty index (1998)
Sources: UNDP, Poverty Report: Overcoming Human Poverty 2000, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
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Figure 5.7 Proportion of illiterates and semiliterates above 15 years (1997)
Sources: Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo renkou tongji nian-
jian 1998 (China’s Population Yearbook 1998), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics
Press), 1998, p. 39.
Table 5.11 Ranking of comprehensive knowledge developing index of different regions
(1998)
Eastern areas Central areas Western areas
High level Beijing (606.05)





Medium-high level Hainan (127.64)
(150 > It ≥ 100) Liaoning (126.69)
Zhejiang (122.71)
Medium-low level Shandong (82.05) Jilin (99.53) Shaanxi (88.05)
(100 > It ≥ 75) Hebei (75.69) Hubei (92.18) Xinjiang (65.85)?
Heilongjiang (84.63) Chongqing (63.71)
Low level (It<75) Guangxi (50.88) Hunan (69.72) Gansu (58.32)
Shanxi (64.27) Ningxia (54.70)
Henan (63.74) Sichuan (51.49)
Jiangxi (61.04) Yunnan (48.75)
Anhui (57.69) Qinghai (44.18)
Inner Mongolia (56.59) Guizhou (38.32)
Tibet (31.99)
Sources: A. Hu and Y. Xiong, “Woguo zhishi fazhan diqu chaju yanjiu: tedian, duice he chengyin”
(Analysis of Regional Disparities of China’s Knowledge Development: Characteristics, Causes and
Countermeasures), Guanli Shijie (Management World), 2000, Issue 3.
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This is mainly because the quality of economic growth has declined, and China’s
poverty stratum has not directly benefited from the high growth rate of the
gross economy, which can be shown by the following points.
The growth of per capita income and consumption lags far behind the growth
of GDP per capita. In the past two decades, a rather complex relationship has
emerged between China’s growth rate of per capita income and that of per
capita GDP (see Figure 5.8). In the period 1978–1985, the growth rate of per
capita GDP was 8.4 percent, which is calculated according to a fixed price (as
are the following rates). The growth rates of per capita consumption level and
per capita net income of rural residents were 9.7 percent and 15.1 percent
respectively, higher than the growth rate of per capita GDP, also much higher
than the growth rate of per capita consumption level of urban residents (1.3
percent), which demonstrates that the broad masses of farmers have directly
benefited from the economic growth in the early stage of reform. In the period
1985–2001, the growth rate of per capita GDP has separated from that of per
capita income: the growth rate of per capita consumption level of rural and
urban habitants and the growth rate of per capita income of rural people are










1978–85 1985–90 1990–97 1997–2001 1978–2001
GDP per capita Expenditure per capita, urban  
Expenditure per capita, rural  Income per capita, rural  
Figure 5.8 Annual growth rate of GDP and consumption level per capita, urban and
rural people (1978–2001)
Sources: Data of per capita consumption (1978–1999) are quoted from Guojia tongjiju (National
Bureau of Statistics of China), Xinzhongguo wushinian tongji ziliao huibian (Comprehensive
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
(China Statistical Press), 1999; the rest of the data are quoted from Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo
tongji nianjian 2002.
Note: Data are calculated in comparable prices.
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obviously lower than that of per capita GDP (except during the period 1997–2001
when the growth rate of per capita income of urban habitants was slightly higher
than that of per capita GDP).
The proportion of agricultural production value in GDP has greatly declined.
The ratio of agricultural labor productivity to national average labor produc-
tivity has declined. The ratio of farmers’ income per capita to GDP per capita
has declined. The proportion of farmers’ agricultural income in their total income
has continuously declined.
The proportion of agricultural production value in GDP has been decreasing
continuously. Calculated at current prices, the proportion of agriculture in GDP
was 28.4 percent in 1985 and has decreased to 18.1 percent in 2002, declining
10.3 percentage points. The proportion of the agricultural labor force in the
total labor force had been decreasing until 1995. Since then, the proportion has
stopped at about 50 percent (see Figure 5.9), which leads to the rapid decrease
of the ratio between agricultural productivity and national average productivity
after 1985. Although the ratio has slightly increased in the middle of 1990s,
the obvious trend of declining has arisen after that year. This reflects the decrease
of relative agricultural productivity. The ratio between farmers’ income per
capita and GDP has also been dropping continuously. The highest ratio was
46.5 percent in 1985, which has rapidly decreased since then, decreasing to
31.1 percent in 1994, and then fluctuating around that level after that year (see










































The proporion of agriculture in GDP 
The proportion of agricultural labor in total labor       
Figure 5.9 Status of agriculture in the national economy (1978–2002)
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002.
I: 
Figure 5.10). In terms of the sources of farmer’s per capita annual net income,
agricultural income accounted for 75 percent of total income in 1985, and the
proportion decreased to 49.9 percent in 2000, decreasing 33.5 percentage points
(see Figure 5.11). Generally speaking, agriculture is still the main income source
of farmers. This shows that the gap between per capita GDP and farmers’ per
capita net income and per capita real consumption level has obviously become
larger, which produces a large negative impact on poverty reduction. This
analysis partly explains the reasons for China’s slow pace of rural poverty
reduction after the middle of the 1980s.
The opportunities for employment in rural areas are declining. Since the 1990s,
the opportunities for employment created in urban areas are far more than those
in rural areas. In the period 1990–2001, the growth rate of urban employment
was 40.5 percent, while that in rural areas was only 2.9 percent; in the period
1978–1985, the number of people who were employed in rural areas had
increased by 21 percent (see Figure 5.12). In the period 1990–2001, rural labor
force decreased by 6.2 percent. The development of village and township enter-
prises had undergone serious setbacks. The number of people who were employed
decreased by a large margin, decreasing by 8 million just in the period from
1996 to 1998. Because large quantities of employees had been laid off and lost
their jobs, there is a limit for rural labor to enter into cities. This has produced
a very serious impact on rural poverty reduction. This will be reflected as follows:
first, the pressure of employment competition will become larger; and secondly,







































Farmers' income per capita/national GDP per capita
Agricultural productivity/national productivity  
Figure 5.10 Farmers’ income and agricultural labor productivity (1978–2002)
Sources: The proportion between farmers’ per capita income and national per capita GDP is calcu-
lated according to the data of Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002; the ratio between
agricultural productivity and national productivity is calculated according to the data of Figure 5.9.
I= 
the remitting income flowing from cities to rural areas will decline. Since many
cities set a limit on rural labor forces flowing into cities or adopt discriminatory
policies (such as the requirement of formal residential identity), the wages of
these workers will be directly influenced. In addition, the living costs of the
children of these new migrant families in cities will increase.
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Figure 5.11 Proportions of various income sources in farmers’ per capita net income 
(1985–2000)
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Figure 5.12 Status of employment since reform (1978–2001)
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002.







A great decrease in the prices of agricultural products increases the loss of
exchange volume of agricultural products. In recent years, people have not only
suffered from risks caused by natural disasters, but have also incurred the
marketing risks of “price impact” caused by four successive years of great
decreases in the prices of agricultural products. Taking the price in 1996 as 
the base, the accumulated decrease rate of the purchase price level of national
agricultural products was 25.6 percent by 2000. In the period 1997–2000, the
trade volume of national agricultural products suffered the loss of 41.1 billion
Yuan, 8100 billion Yuan, 134.4 billion Yuan and 44.8 billion Yuan respec-
tively because of the price decrease, and the accumulative total loss was 301.3
billion Yuan (see Table 5.12). This shows that the broad masses of farmers
have been the most serious victims of deflation. The price fluctuation in the
macro-economy directly influences farmers’ income.
Increasing inequality in distribution
Factors affecting the poverty occurrence rate include not only income growth,
but also income distribution. Even though the growth rate of per capita income
is lower than that of per capita GDP, if the degree of income inequality does
not deteriorate, rapid economic growth can still play a positive role in poverty
reduction. Since 1985, the degree of inequality between urban areas and rural
areas, among different regions, and even within urban areas has intensified,
which produces a great negative impact on poverty reduction.
Great gaps exist between urban residents and rural residents in terms of per
capita income, per capita consumption, revenue, transferred payment and public
services, and so on.
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Table 5.12 Volume of national agricultural products trade and the loss caused by price
decreases (1996–2000)
Year The volume of The growth rate of The price losses of 
national agricultural General Purchasing sold agricultural 
products trade (a) Price Index of Farm products 
Products (%) (b) (100 million Yuan) 
1996 7600
1997 9136 –4.5 411
1998 10123 –8.0 810
1999 11018 –12.2 1344
2000 12443 –3.6 448
1997–2000 33620 –22.6 3013
Sources: (a) Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2001, p. 145; (b). Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo
tongji nianjian 2001, p. 281.
Notes: The volume of national agricultural products trade refers to the sum of transaction value of
grain and oil, meat, poultry and eggs, aquatic products, vegetables, dried and fresh fruits. The price
losses of sold agricultural products are (a) times (b).
The gap of per capita income between urban residents and rural residents has
experienced a process of shrinking and then enlarging since the policy of reform
has been adopted. The income distribution between urban areas and rural areas
has deteriorated, which has directly resulted in the increase of the poverty rate to
a great extent. What is demonstrated in Figure 5.13 is the proportion (calculated
at current prices) between per capita disposable income and per capita con-
sumption in urban areas and that in rural areas, from which we can see that there
exists great gap between urban areas and rural areas. Calculated at current prices,
the ratio of per capita disposable income of urban households to that of rural
households is 2.57 times in 1978, falling to 1.85 times in 1985, but increasing to
2.9 times in 2001, 71 percent higher than that in 1978. If calculated at a constant
price in 1978, the ratio of per capita income in urban areas to that in rural areas
has declined to 1.53 times in 1985 and increased to 2.12 times in 2001.
The fiscal distribution system with its high inequality effects has sharpened
income inequality between the urban population and the rural population. The
per capita income of rural households is analogous to two-fifths of that of urban
households. However, in rural residents’ total income, the proportion of trans-
ferred income acquired from the country and the collective is far lower than
that of urban residents (see Table 5.13). Moreover, rural residents have to pay
tax that is far more than fiscal transferred income. By comparison, urban house-
holds can obtain various types of fiscal allowances and become beneficiaries
of net subsidies.
Great gaps exist between urban residents and rural residents in terms of
enjoying public services. The Chinese government adopts public service policies
















Per capita disposable income   Per capita consumption  
Figure 5.13 Ratio of per capita disposable income and per capita consumption
expenditure of urban residents to those of rural residents (1978–2001)
Sources: Calculated according to Guojia tongjiju, Xinzhongguo tongji huibian.
Note: Calculation in current prices.
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that are preferable to cities. The rural population accounts for two-thirds of the
total population now, but only one-seventh to one-tenth of the fiscal expendi-
ture of the government is spent directly on the rural population, which results
in rural areas lagging far behind urban areas in public services such as basic
education, fundamental medical care and family planning, and in areas of infra-
structure such as irrigation, roads and communication, and so on. The low level
of rural public services not only restricts the improvement of rural residents’
living standards, but also restricts the developing abilities and opportunities of
rural residents, which makes them easily affected by poverty.
The gap among the per capita income of farmers in different regions is
enlarging. The Impoverished population in western areas is very large and the
degree of poverty is very deep. According to the data of Zhongguo nongcun
pinkun jiance baogao (A Monitoring Report on China’s Rural Poverty) by the
Rural Research Office of National Statistical Bureau, the ratio between the per
capita income of farmers in the east, in the middle and in the west is
1.27:1.05:1.00, increasing to 1.92:1.30:1.00 in 2000. The Gini coefficient of
farmers’ per capita net income in poverty counties is 0.3274 in 2000, higher
than that in 1999. The main reason is that poverty counties in the middle and
west areas were badly hit by serious droughts, thus most counties had negative
growth of income. By comparison, the per capita net income of farmers has
increased again on the basis of the original high level in poverty counties in
the eastern provinces, such as Hainan and Fujian.
The gap in the per capita net income in rural areas among different provinces
presents a trend of enlarging. According to the research made by Zhang Ping,7
the Gini coefficient in 1988 was 0.19, increasing to 0.23 in 1995.
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Table 5.13 Income and transferred income per capita of urban households and rural
households (1985–2003)
Year Urban households Rural households 
Per capita Per capita Transfer Per capita Per capita Transfer 
total annual transfer income/ annual transfer income/ 
income income total income income income annual 
(Yuan) (Yuan) per capita (Yuan) (Yuan) income per
(%) capita (%)
1985 748.92 65.88 8.8 547.31 n.a. n.a
1990 1522.79 250.01 16.4 990.38 n.a n.a
1995 4288.09 734.83 17.1 2337.87 65.77 2.8
2000 6316.81 1211.86 19.2 3146.21 147.59 4.7
2001 6907.08 1362.39 19.7 3306.92 162.83 4.9
2003 9061.22 2112.20 23.31 3582.42 136.75 3.8
Sources: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongg tongji nianjian 2004 (China Statistical Yearbook 2004), pp. 359
and 380.
Notes: All data are in current prices.
Furthermore, in terms of income structure, the proportion of non-agricultural
income in total income of farmers in the east is much higher than that in the
middle and the west (see Figure 5.14), which shows that the farmers in the east
area were able to get more benefits from non-agricultural industries.
Inequality of income distribution within rural regions is enlarging. Income
inequality within China’s rural areas was not large before the reform. According
to the estimate of a sample investigation made by the National Statistical Bureau,
the Gini coefficient of rural residents’ income in 1978 was 0.21 to 0.22.8 The
Gini coefficient in 1978 estimated by Adelman and Sunding was 0.22.9 The
Gini coefficient in 1978 estimated by Mark Selden was about 0.28.10 The income
gap between rural residents has been shrinking in the period from 1978 to 1982.
The Gini coefficient during this period has decreased to 0.22 from 0.32, according
to the estimate by Ahmad and Wang.11
The income gap within China’s rural areas has enlarged since the middle of
the 1980s. According to the estimate made by the National Statistical Bureau,
the Gini coefficient of per capita income of rural households has increased to
0.34 in 1995 from 0.23 in 1985, and it was 0.35 in 2000. Ravallion and Chen
estimated that the Gini coefficient increased to 0.34 in 1995 from 0.3 in 1988
(see Table 5.14). Though the poverty incidence rate experienced a fluctuation
of falling, rising and falling (see Table 5.15), inequality had experienced falling,
rising, falling and rising (see Table 5.16)










































Figure 5.14 Proportion of income from non-agricultural industries of rural residents
(1986–1999)
Source: Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China, Zhongguo nongcun pinkun jiance
baogao 2001 (A Monitoring Report on China’s Rural Poverty 2001), 2001.
--
--
The fiscal distribution system with its high inequality effect not only inten-
sifies income inequality between the urban population and the rural population,
but also intensifies income inequality between poor people and non-poor people
in rural areas. In rural areas, the tax paid by the group of people with the lowest
average income accounts for the highest proportion, 3.4 times as much as that
of the group of people with the highest income (see Table 5.17).
The preceding analysis shows that high economic growth alone cannot auto-
matically solve the problems of income inequality and poverty; the fruits brought
by economic growth and the opening up policy cannot be automatically shared
by all the people. On the contrary, unequal economic growth with low quality
restricts people’s opportunity to share the fruits of growth. The distribution policy
of the government intensifies this inequality phenomenon. The fiscal expendi-
ture and public services policies of the government are seriously preferential to
cities and beneficial to urban residents. Urban residents and rural residents have
different chances to obtain education and medical care. Economic policies are
preferential to coastal areas, and are not beneficial to the development of inland
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Table 5.14 Gini indices of income inequality in China (1980–2002)
National
Rural Urban Without cost of With cost of living 
living adjustment adjustment 
1980 24.99 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1981 24.73 18.46 30.95 27.98
1982 24.40 16.27 28.53 25.91
1983 25.73 16.59 28.28 26.02
1984 26.69 17.79 29.11 26.89
1985 26.80 17.06 28.95 26.45
1986 28.48 20.66 32.41 29.20
1987 28.53 20.20 32.38 28.90
1988 29.71 21.08 33.01 29.50
1989 30.96 24.21 35.15 31.78
1990 29.87 23.42 34.85 31.55
1991 31.32 23.21 37.06 33.10
1992 32.03 24.18 39.01 34.24
1993 33.70 27.18 41.95 36.74
1994 34.00 29.22 43.31 37.60
1995 33.98 28.27 41.50 36.53
1996 32.98 28.52 39.75 35.05
1997 33.12 29.35 39.78 35.00
1998 33.07 29.94 40.33 35.37
1999 33.91 29.71 41.61 36.37
2000 35.75 31.86 43.82 38.49
2001 36.48 32.32 44.73 39.45
2002 n.a. 32.65 n.a. n.a.
Source: M. Ravallion and Sh. Chen, China’s (Uneven) Progress Against Poverty, July 2004.
Available at www.worldbank.org.cn/chinese/content/poverty-04.pdf (accessed June 17, 2005).
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Table 5.15 National urban and rural poverty incidence rate and poverty population 
(1980–2002)
Year Poverty incidence rate (%) Poverty population (10,000) 
Rural Urban National Rural Urban National
1980 75.70 62.0 51455 61197
1981 64.67 6.01 52.84
1982 47.78 2.16 38.14
1983 38.38 4.56 30.42
1984 30.39 1.27 24.11
1985 22.67 1.08 17.55 18308 18577
1986 23.50 3.23 18.53
1987 21.91 1.62 16.77
1988 23.15 2.07 17.71
1989 29.17 7.05 23.37
1990 29.18 2.58 22.15 774 25325
1991 29.72 1.66 22.16 25149 517 25666
1992 28.18 1.33 20.75 23952 361 24313
1993 27.40 1.01 20.01 23384 331 23715
1994 23.32 1.19 17.01 19981 405 20386
1995 20.43 0.85 14.74 17559 294 17853
1996 13.82 0.61 9.79 11759 223 11982
1997 13.33 0.70 9.30 11221 276 11497
1998 11.58 1.16 8.10 9629 477 10106
1999 11.40 0.57 7.63 9352 245 9597
2000 12.96 0.63 8.49 10476 284 10760
2001 12.49 0.50 7.97 9937 235 10171
2002 0.54
Source: M. Ravallion and Sh. Chen, China’s (Uneven) Progress Against Poverty, July 2004.
Notes: Rural poverty line is 850 Yuan per person per year in 2002; urban poverty line is 1200
Yuan per person per year. National poverty incidence rate is a weighted means of rural and urban
poverty incidence rates.
Table 5.16 Income inequality and income growth rate (1981–2001)
Period Inequality Gini index Mean household income 
Change (annualized (annualized log difference %/year)
log difference
%/year) National Rural Urban
1981–1985 Falling –1.12 8.87 14.0 5.6
1986–1994 Rising 2.81 3.10 1.7 5.3
1995–1998 Falling –0.81 5.35 7.8 4.3
1999–2001 Rising 2.71 4.47 3.1 7.4
Source: Ravallion and Chen, China’s (Uneven) Progress against Poverty.
areas. Tax policies are preferential to the rich, which intensifies the income gap.
Only if economic growth with high quality is maintained, can investment dis-
tortion be avoided, and full exploitation and utilization of human capital 
be realized. Only then can all of society benefit from economic growth so as to
prevent poverty.
New strategies of poverty reduction (2002–2015)
The United Nations and the World Bank have publicly promised that the impov-
erished population of the whole world is to decrease by half by 2015. China’s
success or failure in poverty reduction is directly related to the realization of
the world’s objective. To sum it up, although China has made huge achieve-
ments in poverty reduction, the economic growth since the middle of the 1980s
has not led to corresponding poverty reduction; the pace of poverty reduction
has slowed down and some new types of poverty have arisen. Moreover, China’s
official national poverty line is relatively low, far lower than the international
poverty line prescribed by the World Bank, the ratio of which to per capita
GDP has continuously declined. This means that the gap between this part of
the impoverished population and the social collective is enlarging – their rela-
tive situation is deteriorating. Recently, China’s new Premier Wen Jiabao
mentioned at a press conference that China’s poverty line is at a low level and
he classified the issue of employment and poverty as one of the top three tough
tasks. However, after the “87 anti-poverty plan” ended in 2000, the central
government has not put forward new plans on poverty reduction. The Sixteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) points out that for
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Table 5.17 Tax proportion of farmers by different income groups (1999)
Income of Average income Income Tax/fee ratio Tax/fee ratio 
group (Yuan ) (Yuan) (a) Components (b) (c) (d)
< 800 522.40 86.52 17.53 11.51
800–1600 1204.91 82.22 10.35 6.75
1600–2400 1970.35 72.98 6.71 4.12
2400–3200 2766.30 60.18 5.22 2.90
3200–4000 3570.66 46.41 4.27 2.18
4000–6000 4804.11 41.83 3.42 1.44
6000–8000 6868.57 30.51 3.89 1.16
8000–12000 9532.26 22.32 2.91 0.32
> 12000 23594.92 6.89 5.14 0.30
Sources: Y. Lin and T. Ren et al., “Issue of Chinese Farmers’ Tax Burden,” China Center for
Economic Research, Peking University, June 2002
Notes:
(a) Average income indicates that of different groups’ net income per capita;
(b) Income components are the proportions of agriculture income in net income per capita;
(c) Tax/fee ratio indicates the proportion of national tax and local charges in average income;
(d) Tax/fee ratio indicates the ratio of local charges to average income.
the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the most important goal of our
country is to concentrate on building a well-off society with a higher all-round
standard to the benefit of well over one billion people and further to develop
the economy, improve democracy, advance science and education, enrich culture,
foster social harmony and upgrade the standard of living for the people. Poverty
is the opposite of being well-off. Therefore, poverty reduction should be a
priority in the comprehensive construction of a well-off society.
By the year 2020, the total population of China will probably reach 1.44
billion, the gross economic value will quadruple the one of 2000, the finance
income will increase enormously, China’s overall national strength and inter-
national competitiveness will increase markedly, the income of residents will
improve markedly, the people will lead a more affluent life, and the country
and society will be more capable of further reduction of the impoverished popu-
lation in cities and rural areas, and the elimination of varied phenomena of
poverty. China’s development objective of building a well-off society in an all-
round way conforms to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). According
to UNDP’s statistics the chief development index of China by the year 2001
has reached or approached the main targets of the Millennium Development
Goals (see Table 5.18). If China continues its high speed of economic devel-
opment, maintains stability of its society and promotes social development, not
only will the goal of building a well-off society in an all-round way come true
by 2015, but the Millennium Development Goals will gain great benefits from
China’s efforts at the same time.
China’s five targets of anti-poverty in the future are: further increase average
income of poor peasants by 60–65 percent by the year 2010, eradicate the
impoverished population under the national poverty line, make great strides to
eradicate the impoverished population under the international poverty line, at
least reduce by two-thirds; ensure poor peasants’ normal meals and basic food
needs; create more opportunities for employment for the impoverished popula-
tion, break barriers of systems against labor flow; enhance investment of human
capital for the poor population, offer basic public services, provide conditions
for learning, absorbing and applying knowledge, extend development scopes,
promote the development ability of poor people radically; realize the objective
of environment protection and infrastructural construction. For further back-
ground, see Table 5.19.
To this end, a new anti-poverty plan for the longer term (2003–2015) should
be set down. Aiming at current problems, the anti-poverty strategic direction
should be adjusted to: re-confirm the national poverty standard close to the
international poverty line; identify the three types of poverty (income poverty,
human poverty and knowledge poverty); pay great attention to increasing the
chances of the vulnerable to participate in social activities and constructing the
system of benefits; design an effective comprehensive anti-poverty strategic
framework so as to keep anti-poverty policies in accordance with appropriate
macroeconomic policies and regional developing policies. The suggestions in
detail are as follows.
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Table 5.18 To achieve millennium development goals (1990–2015)
1990 2001 2015
Poverty GDP per capita China 1603 4020
(PPP US $) 2001 East Asia and the Pacific 2346 4233
Famine Undernourished people China 16 9 8
(%) East Asia and the Pacific 16 10
Education Net primary enrolment China 97 93 100
ratio (%) East Asia and the Pacific 96 93
Gender Ratio of boys to girls in China 81 98 100
equality primary and secondary East Asia and the Pacific 84 89
education (%)
Health Under-five mortality China 49 39 16
rate(per 1,000 live East Asia and the Pacific 58 43
births)
Water Population with China 71 75
sustainable access to an East Asia and the Pacific 71 76 86
improved water source
(%)
Sanitation Population with access to China 29 38 65
improved sanitation (%) East Asia and the Pacific 35 46
Human Human development China 0.624 0.721 0.85
develop- Index value East Asia and the Pacific 0.722
ment
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2003 (Chinese edition), Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng
jingji chubanshe (China Financial and Economic Publishing House), 2003.
Table 5.19 Policy evolution of employment and transference of rural labor force 
(1984–2003)
Year The institution The publicized Main contents of the document
publicizing the document
document
1984 The Central Document No. 1 Allowing farmers to raise funds 
Committee of the independently and provide house-
Communist Party hold register for themselves to 
of China do manual works in towns and 
cities
1993 The Third Plenary The Resolution about Encouraging and steering surplus 
Session of the Some Issues of rural labor force to orderly flow 
Fourteenth Central Establishing into non-agricultural industries in 
Committee of the Socialistic different regions step by step
Chinese Communist Marketing 
Party Economic System
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Table 5.19 continued
Year The institution The publicized Main contents of the document
publicizing the document
document
1994 Labor Department Interim Regulations Adopting management of 
of Rural Labor employment card or certificate
Force Flowing 
across Provinces
1995 The General Office Suggestions about To adopt the system of unified 
of Central Strengthening employment card of flowing 
Committee Management of population and card of temporarily 
Flowing Population residence
2001 The National Specific Programming To reform the employment system 
Planning of Pivot Development dividing up urban and rural areas 
Committee of Urbanization in except in very few especially large 
The Tenth Five-Year cities, to eliminate those restrictive 
Plan employment policies aiming at 
farmers and population from other 
places
2001 The Ministry of Suggestions about Perpetual township household 
Public Security Promoting register can be conducted for 
Management migrant workers and their direct 
System of relatives who live with them as 
Household Register long as they have legal and fixed 
in Small Cities and habitation, stable jobs and sources 
Towns of living 
2002 The Central Document No. 2 Migrant farmers should be treated 
Committee of the fairly, guided rationally, managed 
Communist Party perfectly and served excellently. 
of China Unreasonable restrictions on 
farmers entering cities and illegal 
charges should be cleaned up
2003 The General Office Document No. 1 Farmers should be treated fairly 
of the State Council The Notice of and the guidance, service and 
Performing Good management to them should be 
Jobs of Employment strengthened. Migrant workers’ 
Management and legal rights and benefits should be 
Services to Farmers protected and they should be 
Who Enter Cities and involved in insurance of industrial 
Do Manual Work injuries. The right to accept 
compulsory education of migrant 
workers’ children should be 
guaranteed.
Source: B. Ren, “The Breakthrough of Policies towards Farmer Workers”, Finance and Economy,
2003, issue 3/4, pp. 95–97.
First, to adjust the national poverty line, to re-define the rural impoverished
population, and to establish anti-poverty strategic steps according to the new
poverty line. Box 1 lists the three schemes for estimating the rural impoverished
population. Scheme A is the current national poverty line; scheme B sets the
poverty line at per capita income of 1,000 Yuan; scheme C sets the line at per
capita income of 1,500 Yuan. When scheme B is adopted, the estimated rural
impoverished population is 100 million, of between the estimation of the World
Bank and the national poverty line; when scheme C is adopted, the estimated rural
impoverished population is 240 million, very close to the estimate made by the
World Bank. We suggest that scheme B be adopted, and then transit from scheme
B to scheme C gradually. According to scheme B, the current rural impoverished
population of China is about 100 million. Effective measures should be taken to
decrease this part of the impoverished population in ten years, by the year of 2015.
Scheme C is to be taken into consideration by 2015 and then new plans should
be carried out to reduce poverty in the framework of scheme C.
Secondly, to practice macroeconomic policies and regional development poli-
cies which benefit poverty reduction. The anti-poverty experience of East Asia
and China in the early 1980s shows that if policies which can effectively promote
macroeconomic growth can combine with poverty reduction policies aimed at
benefiting the poor, the number of the impoverished population will be greatly
decreased and the burden on the impoverished population will be lightened.
This includes the following:
1) Various macroeconomic policies aimed at increasing domestic demands
should be connected to poverty reduction. Policies of increasing domestic
demands should especially benefit peasants and the rural impoverished popu-
lation first, which can reduce the gap between urban and rural areas, alleviate
the living pressures of the impoverished population, promote the adjustment of
the rural structure and increase the ability of peasants to develop themselves
so as to ease poverty. It is suggested that policies of increasing domestic demands
should adopt direct adjustment to provide basic facilities to the rural impover-
ished population and realize the objective of the “seven provisions,” namely
water provision (gap water, clean drinking-water, the necessary water supply
for living and producing), electricity and electric net provision, post provision,
road provision (country roads or simply roads), cable provision (broadcasting
and TV), telephone provision (telephones, especially public telephones), and
network provision (Internet, especially public Internet in county and village);
to help farmers accelerate adjusting the agricultural structure and provide support
in terms of technology, funds, information, qualified personnel and policies to
adjust the agricultural structure; to help farmers develop a commodity base of
agricultural products with high quality and encourage them to develop the export
of green food with high added-value; to encourage large-scale agricultural enter-
prises to establish contractual relationships with poor farmer families and provide
technical guidance and planting information to them; to help farmers and
communities to establish markets for agricultural products and a transporting
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and selling system; to encourage and support farmers to store, process, trans-
port and sell agricultural products; to increase employment opportunities for
farmers and promote regional labor force flow or migration; to increase the
input of rural basic education and basic public health.
2) To practice fiscal policies that are helpful in benefiting the impoverished
population and increase the inputting proportion of the anti-poverty fund. New
resources of revenue can be adopted by means of increasing individual income
tax, imposing inheritance tax, and imposing social security tax, which can also
increase the progressive degree of revenue. This will be used in poor-aid funds,
bringing the proportion of poor-aid funds in GDP to 1.5 percent from the current
0.27 percent. The government will not give allowances to enterprises that suffer
from loss and business (including state-owned food supplies enterprises) any-
more. Instead, the government will directly give allowances to the poor. Poor-aid
funds should be used to assist poverty-stricken villages or poor farmer fami-
lies instead of poverty-stricken areas, the proportion of which is no less than
60 percent. The proportion of investment in the impoverished population’s
human capital should be increased by a large margin; it should increase to more
than 20 percent from the current 2–3 percent.
3) To practice monetary policies that are helpful to benefit the broad masses
of the impoverished population. To maintain macroeconomic stability, the
general level of prices of agricultural products has direct bearing on farmers’
incomes. On the contrary, if the macro economy is not prosperous and the price
of agricultural products is continuously falling, the agricultural income of the
rural impoverished population will be directly influenced. The government
should help the poor to obtain loans, with discounts given by the government.
The loans should be used to directly assist poverty-stricken women or families,
providing necessary subsidies to poor farmer’s families.
4) To get adjusted to trade policies after entering into the WTO and to aid
farmer’s families in producing labor-intensive agricultural products. These
include vegetables, fruits, fresh flowers, tea, medicinal materials, forestry prod-
ucts and livestock products. The government should help farmers enhance the
quality of agricultural products and increase the proportion of increment of
agricultural products; the input of the government in agricultural RND should
be increased by a large margin; the government should also provide market
information, product information and technical services to farmers.
5) To practice regional policies that are beneficial to reducing the regional
development gap. This includes establishing normative and fair systems for fis-
cal transfer payments, realizing the objective of basically equalizing regional
average resources, enhancing the ability of poverty-stricken counties and villages
to provide fundamental public services; reducing the tax and charge burden of
poor farmer families; setting down national basic standards of public service and
expenditure; adjusting the pivotal investment of the government in poverty-
stricken areas; increasing investment in human capital; reducing disparity of
public services in different regions. The poor-aid office of the State Council
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notifies the standing committee of NPC at least once each year of the distribu-
tion scheme of investment in aiding the poor, and the progress of investment,
especially the effect index of investment such as per capita net income of poor
farmers, per capita living costs and expenditures, rate of illiterate adults, enroll-
ment rate of children, infant mortality and maternal mortality, and so on. The
office will also announce the above information and the evaluation advice given
by the standing committee of the NPC to the whole country. The National
Auditing Office will regularly audit various expenditures of the aid-fund given
by the central government, and publicize the auditing results showing irregular-
ities. Evaluating groups made up of experts from home and abroad are estab-
lished and will give their evaluation as an independent third party. Regular
monitoring reports of regional poverty will also be announced by the National
Statistical Bureau.
Thirdly, to adopt the developing strategies of taking employment as a prior-
ity to create more employment chances for poor people. First, various levels of
governments should take creating employment as one of the most important
developing objectives. Creating employment is a conscious activity. An increase
in employment will not happen automatically, so the government should take
creating employment as a prior objective, put into effect employment-oriented
strategies and actively develop labor-intensive industries. Compared with other
types of groups, the main resource of the urban or rural impoverished popula-
tion or low-income population is their labor. To be engaged in formal or infor-
mal employment is their main source of obtaining income or increasing income.
To increase their employment opportunities means to increase their opportuni-
ties of increasing income. Therefore, the gist of practicing employment-oriented
polices is to give people the opportunity to obtain employment, including tem-
porary, short-term and flexible informal employment. Secondly, the transfer of
the agricultural labor force should be actively promoted. The most outstanding
problem of development in China is that almost one-half of the labor force is
concentrated in agricultural departments and the labor productivity of agricul-
tural departments is very low. The large-scale transfer of surplus agricultural
labor forces is both the core of China’s economic development strategies and
an important measure of China’s anti-poverty strategies. Looking into the future,
with the supply of agricultural exceeding demand and China’s entry into WTO,
the ability to increase farmers’ per capita income seems likely to become smaller
and smaller. Therefore, farmers’ labor service income and non-agricultural
income should be increased and the proportion of that in farmers’ per capita net
income should also be increased. In the long term, the fundamental method for
solving China’s rural problems is to transfer farmers and reduce the number of
farmers. As a result, every region should actively encourage farmers to do manual
work in cities and towns, and should improve the related laws and policies. The
central government should take a firm stance against discriminating against the
rural labor force by governments of different regions, and should set down in
writing employment policies allowing farmer workers to compete fairly and
should encourage the orderly flow and transfer of the rural labor force.
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Fourthly, to create opportunities for democratic participation and expression
by the poor population. One of the fundamental reasons for the gap between
urban and rural areas and for rural poverty is that the broad masses of peas-
ants in China have neither their own representatives nor a system for expressing
their opinions. According to statistics, workers and farmers account for only
18.46 percent of the total delegates to the Tenth NPC. This proportion is obvi-
ously too low because the rural population accounts for 64 percent of the total
national population. If the most fundamental and major group of peasants are
neglected in terms of representative structure, the immediate interests of peas-
ants cannot be protected. As a result, the reform of the selection system of NPC
delegates should be undertaken to absorb more representatives of peasants into
the range of delegates. Furthermore, the impoverished population should take
part in the events that can influence their life through various channels, for
example, participating in the design of poverty reduction projects and performing
supervision and evaluation publicly. The government should change from exclu-
sive management and control to social governance and public management, and
encourage and support privately-run departments, social groups, non-govern-
mental organizations and international organizations to take part in China’s
cause of aiding the poor.
Finally, the ultimate way to reduce poverty is to invest in people and to
promote the abilities of the impoverished population. First, the educational
investment in the impoverished population should be increased by a large margin.
Various rural education programs should be accelerated, and nine years of
compulsory education should be taken as a major objective to be realized. A
national educational fund should be used to directly assist the impoverished
population, such as providing the tuition fees of children, the cost of books,
the living subsidy of country teachers, the input fund of constructing school-
houses and buying equipment. The government should assist poverty-stricken
areas to set up semi-lodging schools, classes of young girls, and classes of
minorities in primary school and secondary school. The project of educating
migrants should be vigorously carried out in poverty-stricken areas in the twenty-
first century. The government should provide funds to subsidize the children of
poor families who are willing to study (or after mobilization), and to achieve
nine years of compulsory education or even twelve years of education, enabling
them to permanently emigrate from poverty-stricken areas, giving them the same
high-quality education as children in cities. The governments of major cities in
the east should provide funds to local primary schools and secondary schools
to make them accept “educational migrants” in poverty-stricken areas. Secondly,
providing basic public health services to the impoverished population, investing
in people’s health and diminishing health poverty should be important contents
of the anti-poverty policy. What the government should do is change from
helping poverty-stricken rural areas to reestablishing a cooperative medical care
system, and to establish a medical treatment assistance fund, assisting sick
people and the impoverished population, giving subsidies to clinical service
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expenditure, family planning expenditure and women’s childbearing expendi-
ture among the impoverished population, adopting assistance projects with low
cost, high income, high social benefits and wide coverage. The government
should also widely spread knowledge of public health care, meals and nutri-
tion, enhance the ability of impoverished population to build health capital and
prevent diseases, and advocate that doctors of hospitals in cites should travel
to poverty-stricken areas regularly or for a short term to provide medical services
to poor people. The government should provide funds to undergraduates and
postgraduates of medical colleges and should encourage them to go to poor
rural areas to undergo medical practice and provide medical services. Only
when the government invests in people’s health and education, reduces the
birthrate of the population and enhances the ability of the impoverished popu-
lation to support themselves, can knowledge poverty and human poverty be
alleviated and income poverty be eliminated.
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6 China’s macro-economy 
and health1
Introduction
In the usual discussions about the issue of health, people always consider the
issue separately. They seldom observe the health issue in the macro-economic
perspective. The two issues are combined and discussed in the report on Investing
in Health for Economic Development by the Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health (CMH) of the World Health Organization (WHO), with Professor
Jeffery D. Sachs as its Chairman. The theme of the report is the macro-economic
and health issue of the world, putting forward a new thinking about develop-
ment, namely, to invest in health so as to promote economic development,
which provides us with a new perspective on global economic development and
health issues.
Many analyses and suggestions in the report are very valuable to developing
countries, especially to the poorest nations. A large number of research results
related to health and development are listed in the report, and the main agendas
of the economic development in health as well. The report suggests in partic-
ular that each country establish its own committee of national macro-economy
and health, evaluate the national health areas that take precedence, broaden the
coverage of the basic health services, and reinforce cooperation with other
departments to guarantee that health development is identical to the overall
macro-economic policies. The report also discusses how to reach the goal of
reducing poverty and improving people’s health standards by peaceful methods,
by means of applying the most advanced scientific technologies and tremen-
dous wealth of the rich nations, combined with joint efforts of the whole world.
It provides important knowledge and enlightened of policies for promoting
global health and development.
China is a country that has one of the world’s fastest economic growths. The
achievement of China’s economic growth has become the focus of world atten-
tion. However, there are few discussions about the relationship between health
development and macro-economy at home. What is the relationship between
economic growth and health development in China? What characteristics does
the relationship have in different periods? In the area of health which is related
to China’s macro-economy, what are the main problems China is confronted
with currently? What objectives will future health developments achieve? How
can China promote health development through effective public policies and
then promote the whole economy? These are the issues that concern us.
Through comparisons made internationally, we have found that compared
with the indicator of income per capita, the indicators of China’s population
and health were on a relatively high level after the foundation of the People’s
Republic of China, exceeding the average level of low medium income coun-
tries and approaching the average level of high medium income countries.
However, as shown by historical records, the growth rate of China’s health
indicators has been obviously left behind by the growth rate of the indicator
of income per capita. What’s more, due to the diversity and complexity of
China’s national conditions, the fact of “one China, two systems” and “one
China, four worlds” exists, that is to say, a gap exists between urban and rural
areas and a gap also exists between different regions, which is a continuing
problem.2 Similar problems also appear in healthcare, which is reflected in the
difference in the disease model between urban inhabitants and rural inhabitants,
and the gap in health services and levels of health between regions. In addi-
tion, China is also confronted by the great challenge of new global health
problems, such as AIDS in the context of globalization. These problems have
had great impacts on China’s macro-economy and long-term economic growth.
The Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China that was
held recently puts forward the development objective of an all-round construc-
tion of a well-off society, the core of which lies in the development of people
and the improvement of people’s welfare. Health is the core element of people’s
welfare and should be an important component of the well-off society. The
health objective plays an important role in the millennium objective put forward
by the Summit Forum of the United Nations. Due to its population, which takes
up one-fifth of the world’s population, China should make important contribu-
tions to the realization of the millennium objective. If the view that “people’s
health and welfare should take precedence” is established, the government’s
public policies should work towards people’s health, macro-economic policies
should be beneficial to the improvement of people’s health level and a new
mode of governance should be realized in the health area.
Historical records of China’s economic growth and health
It is necessary here for us to analyze the relationship between China’s economic
growth and its population and health according to the historical records. Table
6.1 demonstrates the main indexes of China’s human capital in 1950, 1982 and
2000, including the average years of education for people above 15 years old,
which reflects the education level; the population’s average life expectancy and
infant mortality rate, which reflects the health level; the index of human devel-
opment, which reflects people’s quality of life and social equality. Of these data,
those for 1950 are estimated by the author; those for 1982 and 2000 are calcu-
lated according to the data of the fourth and fifth national census. Table 6.2
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calculates the average growth rate of indexes of China’s main economies and
human capital in the period from 1950 to 1980 and the period from 1980 to
2000 respectively. The data of Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 show the following.
First, the level of not only income per capita but also human capital is rather
low in the early stage of China’s industrialization and modernization. It is esti-
mated by Maddison that per capita GNP of China was US $537, according to
the price of the dollar in 1990, analogous to one-quarter of the per capita GNP
(US $2268) of the whole world, lower than the per capita GNP (US $609) of
India, and was one of the poorest countries in the world.3 In 1950, the average
years of education of people above 15 years old was only 1.0 year (according
to Maddison’s estimate, whose methods are different from the author’s, it should
be 1.6 years in 1952); the population’s average life expectancy was about 35
years; the infant mortality rate was 200‰; and the human development index
(HDI) was 0.159. This shows that China at that time was one of the countries
whose levels of human development were the lowest in the world, which is the
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Table 6.1 Main indicators of human capital in China (1950–2000)
Indicator 1950 1982 2000 
Average educational years 1.0 (a) 4.6 (d) 7.1 (d)
Average life expectancy(year) 35 (b) 67.77 (d) 71.4 (d)
Infant mortality rate (‰) 200 (b) 37.61 (d) 28.38 (d)
Human development index 0.159 (c) 0.553 (e) 0.724 (e)
Sources: 
(a) Estimated by the author in A. Hu, “Goujian zhongguo da zhanlue: ‘fumin qiangguo’ de hongda
mubiao” (Constructing China’s Grand Strategy of “Enriching the People and Strengthening the
Country”), China Studies Reports, November 12, 2002–11–12.
(b) Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Xinzhongguo wushinian tongji ziliao
huibian (Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China), Zhongguo
tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 1999. 
(c) N. Crafts, “Globalization and Growth in the Twentieth Century,” IMF Working Paper, 2000,
WP/00/4.
(d) Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2002 (China
Statistical Abstract 2002), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 2002,
p.34.
(e) UNDP, available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2002/indicator (accessed December 10, 2002).
Table 6.2 Average annual growth rate of main economic and human resource indicators
in China (1950–2000) (%)
Indicator 1950–1980 1980–2000
GDP per capita 4.0 8.3
Consuming level 3.1 7.1
Average educational years 5.1 2.3*
Average life expectancy 2.1 0.3*
Infant mortality rate –5.1 –1.6*
Human development index 4.2 1.4
Source: Same as table 6.1
basis of human capital at the starting point of China’s industrialization and
modernization. This is also the bottleneck restricting the development of human
capital and affecting China’s industrialization and modernization.
Secondly, in the period from 1950 to 1980, China’s growth rate of per capita
income was relatively low, but the growth rate of the main indices of human cap-
ital was relatively high. In this period, the average growth rate of per capita GDP
per year was 4.0 percent at constant prices; the average growth rate of the whole
nation’s consuming level per year was 3 percent; the average growth rate of years
of education of people above 15 years old was 5.1 percent; the average growth
rate of the population’s life expectancy was 2.1 percent; the average reduction
rate of infant mortality was 5.1 percent; and the average growth rate of HDI was
4.2 percent. According to Maddison’s estimate, China’s per capita GDP in 1978
was US $979, still analogous to that of one-quarter of the whole world (US
$4383), and a bit higher than that of India (US $972). By 1982, the average years
of education of people above 15 years old had been raised to 4.6 years, the
population’s life expectancy had been raised to 68 years, the infant mortality rate
had been reduced to 37.6 percent, and HDI had been raised to 0.553.4
Since the People’s Republic of China was founded, China has rapidly finished
the first health revolution under the condition of low income, namely, China
has put the emphasis on public services such as the prevention, control and
elimination of infectious diseases, and ensured the wide availability of basic
medicine and basic medical services, which enables the public health condition
to be improved greatly. At the same time, China has established a national
health care system in both urban and rural areas. The elementary service system
of health care has been put into practice in rural areas in particular. Consequently,
many basic health and health indices have improved, and even exceed the level
of economic development. Under the guidance of this strategy, people can obtain
good health without paying high medical fees, which improves the level of
health of China’s population, especially of the poor people. Compared with
other developing countries, on an equal basis of income, China’s health index
is obviously on a higher level, which reflects the fact that China’s level of
health development is higher than that of its economic development, that is to
say, the level of the material standard of life of the Chinese people is higher
than the level of China’s per capita GDP. This shows that the human capital
was greatly improved when China launched its reform and began to be open
to the outside world. To some extent, this has also laid foundation of human
capital for China’s economic takeoff.
Thirdly, the growth rate of China’s per capita income in the period from
1980 to 2000 was relatively high, but the growth rate of indices of the main
human capital were relatively low. During this period, the average growth rate
of per capita GDP was 8.3 percent at constant prices, twice as much as that
from 1950 to 1980; the average growth rate of national consuming level was
7.1 percent, 2.3 times as much as that from 1950 to 1980; the average growth
rate of the population’s years of education was 2.3 percent, less than half of
that from 1950 to 1980; the average growth rate of the population’s life
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expectancy was 0.3 percent, greatly lower than the level from 1950 to 1980;
the average rate of reduction of the infant mortality rate was 1.6 percent, greatly
lower than the level from 1950 to 1980; the average growth rate of the index
of human development was 1.4 percent, also greatly lower than the level from
1950 to 1980. By 2000 the years of education of people above 15 years old
had gone up to 7.1 years, higher than that of the average level of the whole
world (6.5); life expectancy had gone up to 71.4, coming up to the average
level of medium countries; infant mortality rate had been reduced to 28.4 per
thousand; the mortality rate of children under 5 years old was 37 per thousand,
lower than the average level of low-medium income countries, but higher than
the average level of high-medium income countries; HDI had gone up to 0.724,
which is on the level of low-medium human development countries.
In this period, either per capita GDP or the growth rate of people’s consuming
level exceeded the growth rate of human capital, much higher than that of the
health index in particular. Observed from a historical point of view, the
improving degree and speed of China’s population health index is obviously
lower than that before the reform. Although China has realized the objective
of economic growth ahead of time, namely, to quadruple the total GDP and
per capita GDP by 2000, the important social development objective that
everyone will enjoy elementary health care was not put into effect as sched-
uled. We can regard the relationship between China’s economic growth and
health from 1950 to 1980 as a “combination” type, while that from 1980 to
2000 was a “separation” type. This shows that economic growth is an important
condition for improving the population’s health, but it will not realize the objec-
tive automatically, naturally and spontaneously unless the economic development
policies that are beneficial to the poor population and the social development
policies that are beneficial to social equality can be adopted so that people can
not only share the important achievements of economic growth, but also enhance
the stored quantity of one’s own human capital and improve their level of
health. China’s development is a very complicated phenomenon and contains
many phenomena beyond people’s understanding. In terms of international
comparisons, China’s population health index is at a relatively high level,
exceeding the average level of low-medium income countries and approaching
the average level of high-medium income countries. The level of social devel-
opment is higher than that of economic development, which is especially obvious
in the period from 1950 to 1980. However, in terms of the historical records,
the growth rate of China’s population health index is not only very low, but it
also lags behind compared with the per capita income index.
Challenges to China’s health
Although the main health index of China’s population has come up to the coun-
tries of medium income in the world, China is a developing country with a
large population, vast territory and unbalanced development of different regions.
Further, the rural population takes up a dominant proportion. The basic national
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conditions make the health issue a main problem all along the course of speeding
up economic development, as seen in the following.
People are facing the “double-burden of disease”
A great disparity of disease exists between urban inhabitants and rural inhabi-
tants. With the first health revolution in the twentieth century, the transforma-
tion of the population resulted in the transformation of the disease model.5 In
this health revolution, great progress in medical techniques has been achieved,
methods of inoculation and vaccines have been invented, and antibiotics have
been widely used to cure contagious diseases. With people’s income increasing,
education spreading and nutrition improving, the contagious diseases that seri-
ously threatened people’s lives, such as malaria and plague, have been elimi-
nated. Thus, the level of people’s health has improved and life expectancy has
obviously been prolonged. But the prolonged life expectancy and major changes
in people’s lifestyles have led to the prevalence of cancers and other chronic
diseases. Some developing countries also experienced such transformations after
World War II, following developed countries. However, because the time for
transformation is short and the speed of transformation is fast, the transforma-
tion speeds of different groups of people are very different. Therefore, an incom-
plete transformation of the disease model appears, and people are faced with the
“double-burden of disease.” The case is the same with China, the obvious man-
ifestation being in the different models of disease between urban inhabitants and
rural inhabitants. Most of the contagious diseases and diseases related to too
close confinement and poor nutrition have been controlled. But new types of
contagious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and so on, more and more chronic dis-
eases such as cancer, cardiovascular system diseases, and diabetes have become
the main elements threatening people’s health. Psychological diseases have also
become a problem that we cannot neglect. In the vast rural areas, especially
those areas with poor economic conditions, due to adverse ecological circum-
stances and poor health conditions, some contagious and regional diseases have
not been fundamentally controlled. The incidence of diseases of women and chil-
dren is still very high in some regions (see Table 6.3, Table 6.4, Figure 6.1, and
Figure 6.2). These diseases will cause serious loss to human capital and most
of them can be prevented and cured through cheap and effective methods. The
appearance of the gap between health conditions in urban areas and in rural areas
is related to the rural reform of the collective economy, the disintegration of
cooperative medical treatment and the slow increase of peasants’ income growth.
The most fundamental reason is that the binary structure of China’s urban and
rural areas leads to the great disparity between urban inhabitants and rural inhab-
itants when enjoying public services, and so on. The transformation of China’s
disease model is incomplete, for the urban population and most of the rural pop-
ulation are at different stages of the transformation of the disease model, which
makes China confront the “double-burden of disease.” This is a difficult problem
and a major challenge facing China’s health system.
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Great gaps in health development among different regions
Identical to the gap in economic development, gaps in health development also
exist in different areas of China. Great differences exist if some indices of the
health levels of different groups, basic health conditions, the demand and provi-
sion of health services in different provinces (see Table 6.5). This gap is further
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Table 6.3 Health expenditure per capita in urban and rural areas (1996–2000)
Indicator 1996 2001 1996–2002 
annual growth rate (%)
Per capita health expenditure (Yuan)
Urban Residents 143.3 343.3 19.1
Rural Residents 58.26 96.61 10.6
Total expenditure on health (0.1 billion Yuan)
Urban residents 534.6 1650 25.3
Rural residents 495.7 769 9.2
Total 1030.3 2419 18.6
Percentage to GDP (%) 1.52 2.52
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2002, pp 14, 35, 93, 98.
Table 6.4 Inpatient rate by disease in survey areas (1998)
Disease Urban Component Disease Rural Component 
inpatient (%) inpatient (%)
rate (‰) rate (‰)
Cerebrovascular 4.20 8.69 Gastritis 1.73 5.57 
disease Pneumonia 1.45 4.67 
Gall-stone and 2.29 4.75 Fracture 1.23 3.95 
cholecystitis Gall-stone and 1.08 3.49 
Hypertension 1.81 3.76 cholecystitis
Fracture 1.52 3.15 Appendicitis 1.07 3.45 
Pneumonia 1.47 3.04 Cerebrovascular 0.85 2.75 
Bronchitis 1.45 3.00 disease
Diabetes 1.21 2.51 Nasopharyngitis 0.82 2.65 
Appendicitis 1.10 2.28 Bronchitis 0.81 2.61 
Gastritis 1.04 2.16 Bronchitis 0.66 2.13 
Emphysema 0.75 1.56 Quinsy 0.53 1.70 
Cardiopathy 0.73 1.52 Enteron abscess 0.52 1.68 
Nasopharyngitis 0.68 1.40 Influenza 0.50 1.62 
Diapophysis 0.68 1.40 Hurt 0.50 1.60 
disease Arthritis 0.47 1.52 
Enteron abscess 0.66 1.37 
Source: Analysis Report of the Second National Health Services Survey 1998. 
Notes: Cerebrovascular disease, coronary heart disease, and high blood pressure are the top three
diseases for inpatients in urban areas; dysentery, hepatitis, tuberculosis, and flu are the top reasons
for inpatients in rural areas; while in the poor rural areas, infection, transmission disease, and
malnutrition are the main diseases for inpatients.
demonstrated in terms of eastern, middle and western regions (see Table 6.6).
These show that on the one hand, the gap in economic development leads to
the gap in the expenditure on health care and in the coverage of health services,
which further results in the gap in people’s health conditions. On the other
hand, the poor health condition of people in some regions has become an
important element that restricts economic development and hinders such regions
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Figure 6.1 Pregnant mortality rate trend (1989–2000) (1/0.1 million)
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Figure 6.2 Trend of mortality rate for children under 5 years old (1991–2000) (‰)











from escaping the trap of poverty, and present an obstacle to reducing the gaps
in economic development between different regions. Moreover, the govern-
ment’s ability to strengthen regional transferred payments and support the
backward areas is not enough. The government is unable to redistribute the
limited public health expenditure throughout the country, which does not accord
with the principle of fairness. The principle of fairness requires that different
groups of people can equally enjoy basic health services, that is to say, regard-
less of one’s economic condition, nationality and living area, health resources
should be distributed according to his or her needs, not on one’s ability to pay,
so that the primary function of health resources to serve the people can be
brought into play.
New problem: the impact of global threats of AIDS on China
In recent years, the prevalence of AIDS has become very severe, presenting a
tendency towards rapid increase. According to The Report of Global AIDS in
2002 announced by WHO and UN’s Programming Office of AIDS on November
26, 2002, there is a danger that China will have a sharp increase in the number
of AIDS patients. Currently there are about 1 million AIDS patients in China.
The report warns that if China does not take some effective measures, the
number of people infected with HIV will increase to 10 million by 2010, that
is to say, the number will have increased nine times during that period of time.
Based on what the Rand Company of America has estimated, the number of
AIDS patients in 2002 is 0.6 million to 1.3 million, and if it increases at the
rate of 20 percent to 30 percent, the number will be 11 million to 80 million
by 2015. AIDS and contagious diseases will have a negative impact on China’s
sustained economic growth.
In researching how serious a disease is, there is an index based on whether
or not it attacks the young and strong people of the labor force. It is currently
reported that 93.9 percent of the people who have been infected by HIV are
15–49 years old, in other words within the rich manpower resource that is one
of the greatest advantages of our nation for developing the economy. The Rand
Company has estimated that the percentage of the negative impact on China’s
economic growth rate produced by various contagious diseases in the future
will be between 1.8 percent to 2.25 percent.6
Various health problems affecting China’s macro-economy and
long-term economic growth
The factual foundation of health and development and the channels for diseases
to affect economic development can be found in the CMH report. As far as
China is concerned, we think that the success of the first health revolution, the
control of basic contagious diseases and the improvement in nutrition have
greatly improved the whole nation’s physique and health condition, which is
one of the factors for the development of China’s strong economy since the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1980s. Some scholars have estimated that the average life expectancy of China’s
population has increased to 69 from 35 during the period from 1950 to 1982,
thanks to the economic value that 2473 billion Yuan has created, about 77.3
billion Yuan per year, corresponding to 22 percent of GNP.7 However, in the
current situation, some problems appearing in the health area have affected the
development of the macro-economy, including in the rural areas where
preventable diseases have caused losses to human capital. The gap in health
development between areas harms the ability of poverty-stricken areas to get
rid of poverty and limits any reduction in the gap of economic development
between areas. Various contagious diseases, such as AIDS, are likely to produce
gigantic burdens, and to affect the regular operation of trade and investment.
The economic costs of various diseases can be calculated by the direct treat-
ment cost, the opportunity cost caused by the absence of working and studying,
and the indirect cost of serving the patient. The method of calculating the
Disabled Adjusted Life Year (put forward by WHO) can also be adopted to
measure the losses. For example, the method of calculating the economic costs
caused by DALY has been used to measure the economic burden caused by
diseases in the CMH report. Here, the vision of the health GDP accounting
system is advanced as another method by estimating the losses caused by
diseases, and as a revision to the GNP account. The traditional account of GNP
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Table 6.6 Care service availability index by region (1999)
Health care service Eastern area Central area Western area
availability Index
High level Beijing (0.06)
Shanghai (0.12)
Tianjin (0.22)
High middle level Hebei (0.27) Jilin (0.36) Qinghai (0.37)
(0.50>CSAI ≥ 0.25) Liaoning (0.27) Heilongjiang (0.38) Xinjiang (0.39)
Fujian (0.47) Shaanxi (0.43) Inner Mongolia (0.43)
Jiangsu (0.47) Ningxia (0.46)
Yunnan (0.46)
Low middle level Shandong (0.50) Jiangxi (0.50) Guangxi (0.50)
(0.75>CSAI ≥ 0.50) Guangdong (0.50) Henna (0.51) Gansu (0.52)
Hainan (0.56) Hubei (0.52) Shanxi (0.53)
Hunan (0.53) Sichuan (0.60)
Anhui (0.54) Guizhou (0.72)
Low level Zhejiang (0.76) Xizang (0.91)
(CSAI≥0.75)
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002 (Chinese edition), Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng
jingji chubanshe (China Financial and Economic Publishing House), 2002.
Notes: CSAI is calculated by number of hospital beds per 1000 people, number of doctors per
1000 people, number of nurses per 1000 people, proportion of population with access to hospital
service, which can reflect the level of health care service in a region.
is calculated additively, such as the sum total of production, namely, to add up
the production value of the first, the second and the third industry; the sum
total of expenditure, namely, to add up investment, consuming and net export,
and so on; the sum total of elements, namely, to add up salary and rent, and
so on. In fact this method has a very obvious defect – the loss of national
welfare is not taken into consideration, especially the human capital loss and
economic cost caused by illness and deformity. Therefore, the World Bank has
put forward a system of green national accounts to measure national wealth,
namely, the real rate of national savings is calculated by the result of various
losses of natural assets subtracted from the national net welfare.8 Can we now
imagine a health GDP accounting system? Namely, the human capital loss and
economic cost caused by illness and deformity are subtracted from the nominal
GDP. Regardless of the calculation method, the purpose is to make people
realize that diseases, deformity and death cause losses to the national welfare,
while the maximization of the national welfare and the minimization of various
losses is the purpose of development.
China’s health development objectives in the next 
twenty years
What is China’s development objective for health in the next twenty years? It
is to enable more than 1 billion people to lead a healthier and longer life with
more benefits and higher quality. The specific objectives are as follows:
First, the objective of access to health services: to ensure that everybody enjoys
elementary health care, and then to unceasingly improve the quality of basic
public health services. In all areas, especially in the economically backward rural
areas, people need to actively promote the popularization of elementary health
care so as to make elementary measures of health care available to everyone.
The lowest standard that everyone should enjoy health care was formulated in
2000 by the Ministry of Health, improving the standard of health expenditure
by the government, the standard of health service institutions, the standard of
the coverage of medical insurance, the standard of basic health care services
such as access to safe water and lavatories, prevention and immunity, and basic
health indices of people (see Table 6.7). Parts of areas that don’t reach the tar-
gets should further improve these standards. Based on realizing universal cov-
erage of basic health services, the quality and standard of service should be
continuously improved to fulfill the target of using the minimum input to real-
ize the maximum output, namely, to realize the unification of the principle of
fairness and the principle of efficiency. “Efficiency” refers to whether or not one
can achieve the same health effect with minimum health resources, or whether
or not one can produce greater health effects with the same resource. Health ser-
vices of high efficiency are helpful in reducing input and saving health resources.
This requires pursuing research in selected areas of epidemiology, establishing
an outcome-oriented health system, and adopting measures for maximum cost
benefit aimed at different problems.9
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Secondly, the specific objective of population and health: to realize the
promise made by the UN’s Millennium Declaration on population and health.
The Millennium Summit Forum of the United Nations adopted the UN’s
Millennium Declaration and decided on objectives aimed at combining the
efforts of all nations to eliminate the basic poverty of human beings in educa-
tion and health, and to realize the progress of human development. The quantified
and controllable objectives include: in 2020, infant mortality is to decrease by
half of that in 2000; in 2015, mortality of pregnant women is to decrease by
15 percent (in China, 65 women in parturition died out of 100,000 women in
the period 1990–1998); by 2015, the general method of contraception that is
safe and efficient will have been acquired (in China, the rate of acquiring safe
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Table 6.7 Minimum requirements for the “Everybody enjoys health services in 2000”
project (by county)
Elementary health indicators Minimum requirements
Poor Not Rich Richer 
poor
1 Take basic medical care as county or town 100 100 100 100
government’s goal and economic growth 
programming (%)
2 Proportion of county or town government’s 8 8 8 8
fund to each’s expenditure (%)
3 Popularization rate of health education (%) 50 65 80 90
(ratio of accessed people to total population)
4 A Coverage rate of village medical rooms in 90 95 100 100
administrating village (%)
B Proportion of village medical room ranked A 
to all (%) 30 50 70 90
5 Coverage rate of collect-money medical care (%) 50 50 60 60
6 Popularization rate of “safe and clean water” (%) 
(ratio of accessed people to total population) 60 70 80 90
7 Coverage rate of “clean lavatory” (%) 35 45 70 80
8 Up-to-grade rate of food (%) 80 80 85 85
9 Reducing rate of infant mortality every five 
years (%) 20 15 8 5
10 Reducing rate of pregnant women mortality every 
five years (%) 30 25 20 15
11 Inoculation of one of children’s “four bacteria” (%) 85 85 90 95
12 Reducing rate of morbidity of legally reported 
infectious diseases every five years (%) 15 15 10 10
Source: Weishengbu, Weisheng tongji zhaiyao 2001.
contraception was 85 percent in the period 1990–1998, while the world rate
was 45 percent); by 2005, the number of people who want to limit giving birth
to children but don’t want to use birth control will decrease by half; by 2015,
the percentage of women who can enjoy good care from skilled doctors and
nurses in various child-bearing situations will increase to 90 percent; and the
impoverished population will decrease by two-thirds. The millennium devel-
opment objective is a significant political promise to the development of human
beings made by political leaders of each nation in the world. China as a country
with the largest population in the world plays a very important role in realizing
the millennium development objective. The improvement of the health indices
of China’s population will make great contributions to world health.
Thirdly, controlling the dissemination of AIDS has become an extremely
urgent task to deal with. Timely control measures should be taken to prevent
the rapid increase of infection. According to China’s Medium-Long-Term Plan
to Prevent and Control AIDS printed and distributed by the State Council, the
number of adults of our nation who have been infected with the AIDS virus is
to be controlled at a low level globally (less than 1,500,000) by 2010. Therefore,
education and dissemination of knowledge about how to prevent and treat AIDS
and venereal disease should be spread extensively among the people. By 2010,
the percentage of people who know how to prevent AIDS and venereal disease
in relatively big cities will be higher than 95 percent; in medium and small
cities higher than 85 percent; in county towns higher than 70 percent; in rural
areas higher than 60 percent. The rate of treating AIDS patients and the coverage
of antiretroviral maintenance regimens for HIV infection should be higher than
80 percent.
Fourthly, to promote health education, to realize sports practice among the
whole nation and to establish a medical health care system of high efficiency, flex-
ibility and availability. The report of the Sixteenth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China put forward the objective of forming a good system of
modern national education, a system of technology and cultural innovation and a
system of national sports practice and medical care. Knowledge about health and
healthy modes of behavior have become important factors affecting people’s
health. For this reason, health education and dissemination should be popularized,
a specialized curriculum about health knowledge should be given and propagation
of health should be strengthened in such media as radio, television and news-
papers. In our opinion, the core of the system of medical treatment lies in meet-
ing people’s needs for health care. Its characteristics should be high efficiency,
flexibility and availability to patients. The report of committee members mentions
that to strengthen basic intervention is not so difficult in terms of technology. Most
of the services can be provided by health centers, small-scale organizations of
medical treatment (or small health centers) or the extended service of these organ-
izations, which will be called a “close-to-client system.” Such measures can cover
the whole nation. In addition, various full-time or part-time organizations, both
profit-seeking and non-profit-seeking, should be developed at various levels to
satisfy people’s needs for medical treatment and health care.
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Establishing the well-off society in an all-round way 
is to invest in people’s health
The report of the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China
put it forward clearly that the main task of China’s development in the nexty
twenty years is to establish a well-off society at a higher level that can be bene-
ficial to more than 1 billion Chinese people. This is the development objective of
modernization oriented towards people. The purpose of this development strat-
egy is to satisfy people’s day-to-day increasing needs, both material and imma-
terial. Economic growth is the means of development, the improvement of
people’s welfare is the purpose and foothold of development, while the good
health of vigorous people and prolonged life expectancy are important aspects of
welfare. To establish a well-off society in an all-round way is to invest in people
in an all-round way, in which the yield from investment in 1.3 billion people’s
health is far greater than the loss caused by unsafe health conditions. Thus it is
the most profitable investment of the government, which is also most beneficial
to improve fairness. The government’s function is to make full use of the limited
health resources, to improve greatly the availability of the basic public health ser-
vices in underdeveloped areas and among people of low income, to narrow the
health gap between the rich and the poor and then to improve the health level of
the whole nation. As a result, the following should be accomplished.
First, governments at different levels should increase input into the public
health services. In 2000, the expenditure for health in China accounted for 
5.3 percent of GDP, just higher than 5 percent, the lowest limit of WHO,10 of
which the public health expenditure from the government’s budget and the
society amounts to only 39.4 percent of the total health expenditure, while this
percentage in high income countries is 71 percent.11 The expenditure on health
institutions makes up only 1.71 percent of the nation’s financial expenditure
and 9.94 percent of the expenditure on educational, scientific and cultural insti-
tutions (see Table 6.8). Health expenditure for the public sector should be
invested in key public objectives (such as the control of epidemic diseases),
and should ensure that enough resources are used in the impoverished popula-
tion’s health service. If the public expenditure is not enough, the development
of the basic public health service will be limited. As a result, the objective of
covering the whole population and improving fairness is unlikely to be real-
ized. Therefore, governments in various levels should increase the percentage
of health expenditure in their budgetary expenditure and GDP, and make the
input into basic public health greater. The CMH report has argued that as for
the health budget for countries of low and middle income, it is feasible that
their GNP will increase by an average of 1 percent by 2007 and by 2 percent
by 2015 based on the current level.
Secondly, the inputting direction of health expenditure is to be altered; the
health resource is to be distributed effectively, and the availability of the basic
public health service is to be increased. The input of health expenditure should
be directed toward the rural areas and organizations at the grass-roots level, but
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not cities and big hospitals, so as to emphatically support the health organiza-
tions of the countryside and villages. The inputting direction of resources is to
be directed toward activities aimed at solving the basic health problems of most
people and preventing diseases. The quantity of the resources needed is to be
based on the need for medical treatment service and making the most of the
limited resources of poor areas. The investment in public health and subsidies
to poor patients are not only fair but also highly efficient, because the social
benefit of health investment in the poor is higher than the personal benefit, for
it can decrease the infant mortality rate of the whole society and prolong the
population life expectancy of the society. In contrast, the personal benefit of
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Table 6.8 China’s health expenditure (1991–2000)
Unit 1991 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total health expenditure 0.1 888.6 2257.8 3384.9 3776.5 4178.6 4764.0
billion 
Yuan
Budgetary health 0.1 202.3 383.1 522.1 587.2 640.9 709.5 
expenditure billion 
by government Yuan
For public health service 0.1 151.9 270.8 362.3 410.5 449.7 498.5 
billion 
Yuan
For public health 0.1 50.4 112.3 159.8 176.7 191.3 211.0 
insurance billion 
Yuan
Social health expenditure 0.1 341.1 739.7 937.7 1006.0 1064.6 1167.7 
billion 
Yuan
Private health expenditure 0.1 345.2 1135.0 1925.1 2183.3 2473.1 2886.7 
billion 
Yuan
Components of total 
health expenditure % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Budgetary health % 22.8 17.0 16.4 15.6 15.3 14.9 
expenditure by 
government
Social health expenditure % 38.4 32.7 27.7 26.6 25.5 24.5 
Private health expenditure % 38.8 50.3 56.9 57.8 59.2 60.6 
Percentages of GDP % 4.11 3.86 4.55 4.82 5.10 5.3 
Health expenditure per Yuan 76.7 186.4 273.8 302.6 331.9 376.4 
capita
Source: Weishengbu, Weisheng tongji zhaiyao 2001. 
Notes: Data in value terms are calculated at current prices.
the health subsidy to the rich is higher than the social benefit (our current
problem is that more subsidy is given to people of higher income, whether
publicly or privately). The efficient policy of distributing health resources should
reach the double-goal of enhancing efficiency and improving fairness at the
same time.
Thirdly, a new model of governing, good governance,12 is to be realized in
the health area, which consists of three aspects. First, the function of the govern-
ment and market in the area of health care should be redetermined. For example,
some basic public health services such as prevention and immunity, maternal
and children’s health care and access to safe drinking water, belong to the
typical public products, which should be provided by the government. On the
one hand, it is helpful to solve the problem of market failure; on the other hand,
disadvantaged people can be protected to promote social fairness. Personal
medical treatment and health care belong to the private area, which should be
provided by the market, that is, the function of the government should be
changed from “vacancy” into “presence” and in the private area of health care
the function should be changed from “offside” into “onside.” Secondly, the
macro-economic policy of the government should be beneficial to health devel-
opment and the improvement of people’s standard of health. For example, the
policy of enhancing domestic needs should combine with improving basic public
health and improving the system of medical treatment service. Foreign trade
policy should help to acquire global knowledge and introduce advanced tech-
niques. When carrying out the anti-poverty strategy, the improvement of the
poor population’s standard of health should be taken as the core objective.
Finally, the model of separation of state power is to be put into practice in
health development, that is to say, the local governments apply the public finan-
cial resources independently to supply the local public health service, to establish
and supervise the health system of medical treatment and to undertake the
concrete responsibility of local health development. The central government is
mainly responsible for the financial transferred payments and for the provision
of nationwide public goods, policies, laws and regulations. All in all, the govern-
ment should bring health development into the development strategy of the
macro-economy, realize the reasonable positioning of its function in the health
area, and realize the transformation of the governing model to “good gover-
nance” from “bad governance.”
Fourthly, we should win over and draw on international aid actively and
effectively. We should actively and effectively raise and use domestic funds to
develop health care. Further, we should actively strive for and draw on inter-
national aid. The committee’s suggestion is that countries of low and medium
income should ensure that the health system has sufficient funds to operate effi-
ciently and should work to solve important health problems by means of surplus
domestic funds, political leadership, transparency and establishing a system in
which communities can have a hand in and be responsible for each of the levels
below. That is to say, conditions should be created to strive for international
aid; reform of the public health department should be carried out to enable its
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budget and purchasing systems to operate normally, and supervision and a
system of responsibility should be strengthened. Furthermore, the construction
of non-governmental social ability should be promoted and the function of
NGOs in using international aid to carry out the aid-the-poor program should
be brought into play. In short, “powerful political leadership and the promise
of public departments, private departments and non-government communities
are needed,” and then we can obtain health development resources and apply
them to the sectors of greatest need so as to speed up realizing the health
development objective of our nation and the international society.
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7 Health insecurity
The biggest challenge to human
security in China1
In 2004 the Center for Health Statistics and Information of the Ministry of
Health officially published “An Analysis Report on the Third National Health
Services Survey.”2 This is a very good and authoritative investigation report on
the national conditions of the health of the population. I think that the third
national health services survey has a clear aim and the survey is well designed
and the method of the survey is scientific; the analysis of the survey is of high
quality; the major findings are convincing. It provides background for research
of great reference value for getting to know and analyze the national condi-
tions of the health of the population and for mapping out the health development
strategy and policies in cities and the countryside. At the same time, it provides
extremely important information for realizing the population health objectives
of the UN’s “Millennium Development Goals.” What merits special mention is
that the survey report has given the major findings of the previous two health
service surveys conducted in 1993 and 1998, which enables us to see the changes
and characteristics in the health conditions and health service demand in cities
and the countryside over the past ten years and enables us to give an objective
evaluation of the past health reform and the effects and problems of public
health policies.
But what is the most important and most valuable information about the
national conditions of the population’s health that the survey report provides?
We need to make full use of the rich materials provided by the report and its
major achievements to give a more detailed analysis and exploration of the rela-
tions between health and development and put forward our proposals as to how
to realize the grand goal of building a well-off society in every way while
constructing a healthy society. I think the most important and most valuable
achievements of the report is that it has revealed the most glaring problem of
“health insecurity” of the population in China, which involves the major liveli-
hood of all the 360 million households and 1.3 billion people in the country.
Five major characteristics of health insecurity in China
Health is an eternal subject of people’s conversations. Health and vitality is one
of the values pursued by man since his appearance. To ensure the health of the
people is one of the core objectives for building a well-off society in an all-
round way in the next twenty years, that is, to enable billions of people to live
a healthier, longer and happier life of high quality.3
Being healthy, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), is more
than not being sick. It is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being. The world health survey covers several areas: mobility, self-service
ability, pain and discomfort, recognition, vision, sleeping and energy, emotion,
a healthy body and mental state, and conditions concerning daily life, work,
spirit and emotion.4
By health insecurity, we mean that health risk factors cannot be brought under
control or that people have been deprived of the basic health rights, such as being
unable to enjoy an elementary health service, medical insurance, or having no
basic health conditions and having a living environment detrimental to health,
being unable to foster a healthy life-style or lacking basic health care knowledge
(see Figure 7.1). Health insecurity has become one of the biggest challenges to
human security in China. So health security is one of the most important tasks
for building a well-off society with health service available to all.
Health insecurity of the Chinese people mainly assumes the following
characteristics.
First, health insecurity is multidimensional. This refers to the fact that people



















Figure 7.1 Composition chart of health insecurity
in an environment without hygienic conditions and they may be unable to enjoy
elementary medical service. Different groups of people suffer different types
of health security.
Second, health insecurity is universal and all-round, existing in different habi-
tats and regions, among people of different income levels, careers and age
groups. In terms of regional distribution, health insecurity exists in all regions,
not only in rural, but also in urban areas; not only in low-income areas but also
in middle-income and high-income areas. In terms of distribution among
different groups of people, health insecurity involves all types of population,
but especially old people, women and children.
Third, health insecurity covers a large population. As China is a populous
country, even if there is a fraction of health insecurity, the absolute figure is
considerable.
Fourth, health insecurity exists not only among insecurity-prone people but
also causes all kinds of economic costs, including both direct economic costs
such as in-patient fees and out-patient medical fees and indirect costs such as
losses caused by absence from work due to ill-health. The economic costs in
2003 accounted for about 7 percent of the GDP, including economic costs and
mental losses.
Fifth, population health and economic development have formed a “devel-
opment paradox.” Over the past ten years, China’s economy has maintained a
high-speed growth and the per capita income level has risen greatly. Calculation
according to a constant price shows that China’s per capita GDP grew by about
1.15 times in 1993–2003 and the urban per capita disposable income grew by
1.01 times and the rural per capita income also grew by 58.7 percent.5 But the
incidence of diseases and the number of patients also increased and the patients
who fail to see doctors or receive treatment also increased in proportion and
size. All these have testified to what Premier Wen Jiabao said, that in general,
there is the problem of “one leg is long and the other is short” in both economic
and social development.6 The problem is especially outstanding in the area of
health. Although in general China has attained a level of well-off living, China
remains the world’s largest developing disease economy and society.
Manifestations of health insecurity
On the basis of the third national health service survey report, we have summed
up health insecurity as follows.
1. The disease incidence in urban and rural areas is as high as 5 billion
person/times, nearly half of which were not referred to a doctor
The disease incidence rose by 16.5 percent from 4.3 billion person/times in
1993 to 5 billion person/time by 2003,7 increasing by 700 million person/times.
The average disease incidence time per person per year rose from 3.63 times
in 1993 to 3.86 times in 2003 (see Table 7.1). Among the patients, 21.8 percent
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thought their disease serious, 51.3 percent though it OK, 24.1 percent deemed
it serious and 2.8 percent deemed it not good.
The number of patients who did not refer to doctors in 2003 reached 2.35
billion, about 47 percent of the total number of patients. They refused to go to
hospital or see the doctor. The number of patients who did not receive any
treatment reached 630 million/times, 12.6 percent of the total number of patients.
The proportion of people who failed to receive treatment was 10 percent in
cities and 14 percent in the rural areas. Among them, 38 percent did not receive
any treatment due to economic difficulty and 70 percent of them did not stay
in hospital for treatment due to economic difficulty. In the low-income group
in urban areas, about 41 percent of the patients who should have been in-patient
did not receive in-patient treatment. Even in the high-income group, about 
17.2 percent of the patients who should have been in-patient did not receive
in-patient treatment. All the preceding proportions were higher than those in
1998.
The number of the population ill with chronic diseases is large, about 160
million, 13 percent of the total population. The statistical data only include
those cases that have been definitely diagnosed by doctors8 and do not include
those not definitely diagnosed by doctors.
2. More than 80 percent or one billion of the urban and rural
people are not covered by medical insurance
The number of people who have not been covered by medical insurance over
the past ten years rose from 900 million to one billion or from 67.8 percent to
80.7 percent. The number in cities rose from 96.53 million to 300 million. In
the rural areas, people who have not been covered by medical insurance dropped
from 800 million to 400 million, as the rural population dropped in the period
while the proportion of people who are covered by medical insurance rose from
94 percent to 97 percent (see Table 7.2).
Statistical data from the State Statistical Bureau shows that the 1998 basic
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Table 7.1 Changes in sickness and treatment (1993–2003)
1993 1998 2003 
Disease incidence (person/time, 100 million) 42.9 47.9 50
Total population (100 million) 11.85 12.48 12.92
Average disease incidence time per year per person 3.62 3.84 3.86
Undiagnosed cases (person/time, 100million) 23.5
Untreated cases (person/time, 100 million) 6.3
Number of chronic disease cases (person/time, 100 million) 1.6
Sources: Statistics and Information Center of the Ministry of Public Health, Disanci guojia weisheng
fuwu diaocha fenxi baogao (Analytical Report on the Third National Public Health Service Survey),
Beiji ng: Zhongguo xiehe yide daxue chubanshe (Peking Union Medical College Press), 2004; Guojia
tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo tongji zhaoyao 2004 (China Statistical
Abstract 2004), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 2004, p. 38.
medical insurance coverage was 18.78 million and the figure rose to 110 million
by 2003, about 20.85 percent of the total urban population (523.76 million) or
8.4 percent of the total national population (1292.27 million). Meanwhile, the
number of people who have not taken out medical insurance policies rose from
397.3 million to 414.74 million, with the proportion dropping from 95.5 percent
to 79.2 percent (see Table 7.3). Even according to these data, the number of
urban people who have not taken out insurance policies was 110 million more
than the data obtained by the survey. The survey indicates that 300 million to
400 million urban people are still not covered by social medical insurance, let
alone the 800 million rural people.
3. Problems of being in poor health among women and children
and people in poor areas are very serious
Although much headway has been made in China’s maternal and child care,
still there is a serious problem of being unhealthy. First of all, the percentage
of pregnant women with pre-natal examinations rose from 70 percent in 1993
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Table 7.2 Urban and rural population not covered by medical insurance (1993–2003)
1993 1998 2003 
Urban
Without social medical insurance (%) 29.1 50.2 57.0
Without social medical insurance (10 thousand) 9653 20887 29854
Rural
Without social medical insurance (%) 94.2 95.37 96.9
Without social medical insurance (10 thousand) 80394 79303 74469
Nation
Without social medical insurance (%) 67.8 80.3 80.7
Without social medical insurance (10 thousand) 90047 100190 104323
Source: Rao Keqin, Disanci guojia weisheng fuwu diaocha zhuyao jieguo (Major Findings of the 
Third National Public Health Service Survey); Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji zhaoyao 2004, p. 38. 
Table 7.3 Urban population not participating in primary medical insurance (1998–2003)
1998 2000 2003
Total population (10 thousand) 41608 45906 52376
Participating in primary medical insurance (10 thousand) 1878 3787 10902
Not participating in primary medical insurance (10 thousand) 39730 42119 41474
Proportion participating in primary medical insurance (%) 4.5 8.2 20.8
Proportion not participating in primary medical insurance (%) 95.5 91.8 79.2
Disposable income per person, urban (Yuan) 5425 6280 8472
Medical expenditure per person, urban (Yuan) 205 318 476
Proportion of medical expenditure in disposable income (%) 4.7 6.4 7.3
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2004 (China Statistical Abstract 2004), pp. 99,
103, and 187.
to 88 percent in 2003 in the whole country, with that in the rural areas rising
from 60 percent to 86 percent. But there are still 15 percent of rural pregnant
and lying-in women who did not receive pre-natal examinations, with the number
estimated at 1.05 million. Rural hospital birth delivery remains a problem. The
percentage of the urban hospital birth delivery rate has reached 93 percent, but
that in the rural areas is only 62 percent, with the number estimated at 2.86
million.
Secondly, the health conditions of the newborn have been greatly improved.
The proportion of underweight children is 3.1 percent in cities and 3.8 per-
cent in rural areas, all lower than the 16.8 percent in the world and the 9 
percent in lower-middle-income countries and 8 percent in upper-middle-income
countries. The weight of the newborn in rural areas is very close to that in
cities. The situation is good with the planned immunization inoculation of one-
year olds already reaching or exceeding the level of middle-income countries
in the world. But the percentage of children under 5 with planned immu-
nization cards is still very small in rural areas, only about 56 percent, with the
number of children without planned immunization cards estimated at about 
2 million.
Thirdly, the poor areas are low not only in per capita income but also in
public health service level, indicating prominent income poverty and health
poverty. The survey shows that in poor areas, such as the fourth category rural
areas, one-third of the rural population had per capita annual income of only
1183 Yuan in 2003 or only 743 Yuan in real terms, short of the national average
of rural per capita income (922 Yuan) ten years ago.
About 60 percent of children do not have regular physical checkups and
nearly half of pregnant and lying-in women do not have pre- and post-natal
physical checkups. Ninety percent of pregnant women give birth at home. The
percentage of households without safe drinking water has reached 5.3 percent
and the percentage of households using unhygienic toilets has reached 91.3
percent. Besides, there is a big gap between urban and rural areas in 1990 in
terms of the death rate of the newborn, the death rate of infants and children,
the death rate of children under 5 and the death rate of pregnant and lying-in
women. The life expectancy at birth in cities has caught up with that of devel-
oped countries, being 73 years, but the underdeveloped rural areas still belong
to the type of less-developed countries.
4. The size of all kinds of health insecurities is large
First of all, China has the largest smoking population in the world. It is both
the largest tobacco consuming country and the country with the most victims
of tobacco hazards. Smoking has become one of the biggest “killers” threat-
ening the health of the people. In the mid-1990s, there was one smoker in every
three adults and the total smoking population in the world reached 11 billion.9
The national health service survey shows that 47.3 percent of men in China
smoke. Although the percentage dropped significantly compared with that ten
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years ago (61.2 percent), it is still higher than the world’s average level. The
number of men smokers in China was 270 million in 1993, but it was 250
million in 2003, making up about 22.7 percent of the world total. Nationwide,
smokers accounts for 26 percent of the total adult population and the total
number of smokers in the country as a whole is 260 million, about 23.6 percent
of the total world population. The tobacco consumption level in China is the
highest in the world, with the annual amount of cigarettes consumed reaching
5,800 per person, averaging 15.9 per person per day. The WHO statistics that
cover 58 countries show that there are only two countries whose per capita
annual cigarette consumption has topped 5,000 (the other is Iraq). The 260
million smokers consume 1,500 billion cigarettes a year. China’s 2003 ciga-
rette production was 35.81 million packets.10 Although the tobacco industry is
one of the major revenue sources in China, it is one of the main destroyers of
human health. According to the 2002 World Bank report, smoking may cause
heart troubles and other blood vessel troubles, lung cancer and cancers of other
organs. As the tobacco-induced fatal diseases significantly lag behind the devel-
opment of smoking, developing countries will face serious consequences of
smoking for a dozen years to come.
Secondly, China is also a big alcoholic drinks consumer, with the annual
direct consumption reaching about 1,000 tons. About 8.2 percent or about 82
million of the people aged 15 and above are regular drinkers.11 The per capita
consumption of alcoholic drinks in 2003 was 9.39 kg in cities and 7.67 kg in
the countryside. The average annual alcoholic drink consumption was 492 tons
in cities and 589 tons in rural areas, totaling 1,081 tons.12 Like tobacco, brew-
eries are major sources of revenue of the country, but excessive drinking has
also become one of the main destroyers of human health.
Furthermore, there are still more than 200 million to 300 million people who
do not have access to safe drinking water. The current survey data show that
as much as 14 percent of the people in the country do not have access to safe
drinking water, about 180 million, mostly in the countryside. According to a
survey conducted by the Ministry of Water Resources,13 of the drinking water
in rural areas, only 66 percent have met the prescribed standards and the rest,
34 percent, fail to meet such standards. About 300 million people in the rural
areas still drink unsafe water and 191 million people drink water containing
harmful elements. In the vast rural areas of China, about fifty diseases occur
or are spread due to drinking of unsafe water. Drinking water insecurity is the
principal reason for water pollution, water-associated endemic diseases and snail
fever. At present about 63 million rural people drink water with fluorine content
far higher than the prescribed standards and about 38 million people drink bitter
water, mostly in the coastal areas of north and east China. There are 110 counties
in seven provinces where snail fever has not been brought under control and
about 60 million people live in the disease-infested areas (see Table 7.4).
There are still hundreds of millions of people who lack human health
knowledge. Only 47.2 percent of the people try to get health knowledge, with
67.5 percent in cities and 39.5 percent in the rural areas. This means that 
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650 million people in the country do not try to get health knowledge. About
25.8 percent of the people who do not know or misunderstand how AIDS is
transmitted, with that in the rural areas accounting for 33.9 percent. That means
330 million people in the country do not have a correct understanding of how
AIDS is transmitted.
Also, there are about 60 million handicapped people, 8.36 million more than
in 1987. All kinds of handicapped people have increased to varying degrees
(see Table 7.5).
Lastly, the number of people suffering from health insecurity is considerable
(see Table 7.6), involving, directly or indirectly, hundreds of millions of fami-
lies and a billion people and its impact is bigger than any other factors. In this
sense, China is not only a country with the biggest population, but also a country
with the biggest number of disease cases. Health insecurity has become the
biggest threat.
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Table 7.4 Population without access to safe drinking water (2003)
Number (100 million)
Population without access to safe drinking water (a) 1.8
Population without access to safe drinking water (b) Over 3
Of which, people drinking water with harmful elements 
above prescribed standards (b) 1.91
People drinking high-fluorine water (b) Over 6300
People drinking bitter water (b) 3800
People living in snail fever infested areas (b) 6000
Sources:
(a) Authors’ calculation based on the findings of the Third National Public Health Service Survey
(Disanci guojia weisheng fuwu diaocha);
(b) Authors’ calculation according to the survey by Ministry of Water Resources, Xinhua News
Agency, Chengdu, November 28, 2004.
Table 7.5 Handicapped population in China (1987–2003) (10 thousand)
1987 2003
Total number of handicapped people 5164 6000
Hearing and speech handicapped people 1770 2057
Mentally retarded people 1017 1182
Limbs disabled people 755 877
Vision lost people 755 877
Mentally ill people 194 226
Multiple disabled and other types of disabled persons 673 782
Source: China Disabled Persons’ Federation, available on official website: http://www.cdpf.org.cn/
shiye/sj–000a.htm (accessed December 10, 2004).
Estimate of economic costs of health insecurity
Health insecurity has become a prominent social problem, bringing to the society
not only sufferings but also huge economic costs. The health service survey
provides the data for estimating the economic costs caused directly or indirectly
by the poor health of the people. The calculation results are alarming. In 2003
alone, the economic costs came to 800 billion Yuan, about 7 percent of the
year’s GDP.
The economic costs caused by disease include both direct and indirect losses.
The direct economic costs refer to the sum total of direct expenses or cost of
the losses caused by disease, including annual treatment fees, out-patient fees,
in-patient fees, health care and treatment, medicine expenses and nutritional,
travel and transportation costs of patients receiving medical services; the indi-
rect economic costs caused by disease refer to losses caused to society and
family wealth by absence from work (labor) due to sickness and premature
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Table 7.6 Size of groups with health insecurity (2003)
Urban Rural Nation
Number of people with chronic diseases 167
Number of cases failing to see doctors 2350
Number of cases untreated 630
Number of people not covered by social medical insurance 300 740 1040
Pregnant and lying-in women who fail to receive pre-natal 1.05
checkups 
Number of lying-in women not delivering in hospital 2.86
Number of children without planned immunization cards 1.99
Smoking population 260
Number of regular alcoholic drinkers 82.00
Number of people failing to try to get health knowledge 650
Number of people without correct knowledge about how 330
AIDS is transmitted 
Population without safe drinking water 180–300
Iron-deficient anaemia and vitamin and mineral deficient 250
population (a)
Legally reported cases of communicable diseases (b) 2.48
Number of rural households without standard toilets (c) 122.11
Population without regular physical exercises (d) 800
Disabled population (e) 60.00
Sources: Rao Keqin, Major Findings of the Third National Public Health Service Survey; Guojia
tongjiju, Zhongguo tongi zhaiyao 2004, p. 38; 
(a) Xinhua News Agency, September 4, 2004; 
(b) Guojia tongjiju, China Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 868; 
(c) Ministry of Public Health, June 9, 2004 (See MPH website); 
(d) 2001 National Physical Education Survey: the number of people ages 7–70 who do physical
exercises regularly reached 369 million, those who do not do physical exercises regularly reached
about 800 million;
(e) China Disabled Persons’ Federation website.
death. The measurement is the number of days absent from work converted
into money by a given economic standard, such as losses in RMB.
First of all, we try to calculate the direct economic costs caused by disease
based on the data provided by the survey. We divide the direct losses into out-
patient fees and in-patient fees. Given that each person makes 0.134 hospital
visits every two weeks, the total expenses per visit (including medical and other
fees) is 127 Yuan. Based on this figure, the amount of fees that occur due to
hospital visits is 435.6 billion Yuan a year, amounting to 3.7 percent of the
GDP. Given that the number of hospitalization is 0.036 times per person per
year, the total cost per time (including medical and other fees) is 3,904 Yuan,
and the total annual expense is 181.5 billion Yuan, 1.6 percent of the GDP.
The total direct economic cost due to disease is 617.1 billion Yuan, 5.3 percent
of the GDP. This does not include fees that occur from self-treatment without
seeing doctors.
Then, let’s try to calculate indirect economic costs from disease. Based on
the data from the survey, given that every person rests 0.194 days every two
weeks and the total employment is 744 million in the country, the loss in the
two weeks is 144 million workdays and the annual loss would be 3.753 billion
workdays. Suppose each person is hospitalized 0.036 times per year, the total
number of days each time of hospitalization (including waiting days and days
in hospital) is 14.1 days. Calculating according to the total employment of 744
million and a five-day week, the loss would be 270 million workdays, and the
total annual loss would be 4.023 billion workdays. The average labor produc-
tivity in 2003 was 15,700 Yuan. Suppose every person works for 300 days a
year, the per capita output per workday is 52 Yuan, the losses due to absence
from work for sickness would be 209.2 billion Yuan, 1.8 percent of the GDP.
Finally, let’s calculate the total losses from disease, that is, direct and indi-
rect losses. Our preliminary estimate is that the economic cost of disease in
2003 totaled 826.3 billion Yuan, 7.1 percent of the year’s GDP.
We may also adopt a second method for calculation, that is, calculating the
total cost of medical and health services in cities and the countryside from the
total medical and health care spending per person. The total for 2003 was 338.3
billion Yuan, 2.8 percent of the GDP (see Table 7.7). Such spending reflects
family investment in health and medical and health care due to unhealthiness
or disease. We have found that this kind of spending in the total consumption
spending is increasing.
All these show that China is not only a society with the largest health inse-
cure population but also a developmental disease economy with huge losses
caused by health insecurity.14
Review and evaluation of health development and 
reform objectives
First, let us review and evaluate the health development objectives of the govern-
ment. In December 1990, the seventh plenary session of the Thirteenth Party
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Central Committee adopted the “Proposals of the CPC Central Committee on
Formulating the Ten-Year Program for Social Development and the ‘Eighth
Five-Year Plan’.” The document proposes that by 2000 the people’s living stan-
dards would gradually reach the well-off level. The well-off level at the time
refers to further improving the quality of life on the basis of adequate food and
clothing, that is, both urban and rural people will have enough to spend on
clothing, food, housing, articles used daily and travel. Only Article 48 mentions
the development of health care to improve the health levels of the people.15
But this program fails to put forward any development objectives and targets
in public health.
“China’s Outlined Children’s Development Program for the 1990s” formu-
lated in 1991 put forward health development objectives and some quantified
targets. These targets have been met (see Box 7.1). The outlined program
mentioned raising the use and availability of hygienic toilets for 2001. In 
1995, the target was revised as raising the proportion of sanitary toilets to 40
percent. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Health, 110 million
households had built such toilets, with the popularization rate reaching 415 
percent.16
Five years later, the fifth plenary session of the Fourteenth CPC Central
Committee adopted in September 1995 the “Proposals of the CPC Central
Committee for Formulating the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic
and Social Development and the Objectives for Years Running up to 2010.”
The proposals urged active efforts to develop health services in order to realize
the objective of enabling everyone to enjoy primary health care services.17 But
this plan failed to spell out specific objectives and targets. In 1995, the State
Council approved the “Outlined Program for China’s Women’s Development
(1995–2000),” which puts forward objectives and quantified targets for the health
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Table 7.7 Estimated economic costs of disease (2003)
Absolute Percentage 
figure (billion) of GDP
Estimates based on the data obtained by the survey:
Direct losses 617.1 5.3
Of which, Aout-patient fees 435.6 3.7
in-patient fees 181.5 1.6
Indirect losses 209.2 1.8
Total 826.3 7.1
Calculated based on data of per capita medical and 
health care spending in urban and rural areas:
Medical expenditure of urban residents 249.3 2.1
Medical expenditure of rural residents 89.0 0.7
Total 338.3 2.8
Source: Ministry of Health, Disanci guojia weisheng fuwu diaocha zhuyao jieguo; Guojia tongjiju,
Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2004, p. 16.
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Box 7.1 Objectives for health development of women
and children and their implementation
Objectives of children’s health development set out in the “Outlined
Program for the Development of Children in the 1990s”:
1 Cut by one-third 1990’s death rate of infants and children under 5.
2 Halve the death rate of pregnant and lying-in women by 1990.
3 Halve the incidence of medium and serious malnutrition of children
under 5 by 1990.
4 Population benefiting from the water improvement project in water
short rural areas to reach 95 percent by 2000.
5 Universally raise the practice of rendering sewage water and garbage
harmless and sanitary toilets.
Objectives on women’s health set out in the “Outlined Program for
Women’s Development of China (1995–2000):”:
1 Bring the health care coverage of pregnant and lying-in women and
their health education to 85 percent.
2 Bring the new birth delivering method in rural areas to 95 percent.
3 Raise the percentage of hospitalized birth of rural women so as to
halve the death rate of pregnant and lying-in women on the basis of
1990.
4 Bring the immunization inoculation against tetanus and other diseases
of child-bearing women and expectant mothers to 85 percent and
eliminate tetanus of the newborn.
Implementation results
By 2000, the country opened 3,180 maternal and child care organizations,
built a three-tier medical care network at the county, township and village
levels. The death rate of infants and children under 5 was lowered from
50.2‰ and 61‰, respectively, at the beginning of the 1990s to 32.2‰
and 39.7‰ by 2000 and the death rate of pregnant women and lying-in
women was lowered from 1989’s 94.7/100,000 to 53.0/100,000 by 2000.
Children receiving planned immunization of four kinds of vaccines
reached over 90%; polio was eliminated; the percentage of underweight
children under 5 was reduced from 1990’s 21 percent to 10 percent by
2000; iodine was universally added to table salt.
development of women. Most of its targets have been realized (see Box 7.1).
In March 1996, the fourth session of the Eighth National People’s Congress
adopted the “Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development.” The plan set the goal of enabling 90 percent of the people to
benefit from rural water improvement projects by 2000 and the percentage of
rural families enjoying tap water would reach 80 percent. According to the data
provided by the Ministry of Public Health, the percentage of people benefiting
from rural water improvement projects had reached 93 percent by the end of
2000 and 50 percent of rural families had had tap water to use.18 Obviously
the goal for the use of tap water was far from being realized.
The minimum standards (with county as unit) for “Health Service for all by
2000” are specified in the “health and anti-epidemic policies, laws and stan-
dards” but many of the targets have failed to be met within the prescribed time
limit.
Five years later, the “Outlined Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic
and Social Development” approved by the fourth session of the Ninth National
People’s Congress in March 2001 set the health development goals as follows:
Continue to improve the urban medical service level and rural medical service
facilities and further raise the health level of the people. Build a sound rural
elementary health service system, with emphasis put on strengthening the health
service infrastructure and developing cooperative medical services according to
actual local conditions so as to resolve the problem of rural areas lacking basic
medical services.19 The Tenth Five-Year Plan set clear objectives for all areas
including income, education and housing but excluding health services. The
Western China Development Program for the Tenth Five-Year Plan period put
forward objectives for the death rate of rural pregnant and lying-in women and
the newborn, but the objectives were not quantified. We have also seen the
twelve key special programs for the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, but health
development is excluded, without any clear objectives. Naturally, it is hard to
have resolute actions in this regard.
The Sixteenth CPC National Congress in 2002 mentioned the improvement
of the health of all the people and stressed the improvement of rural medical
and health services and the improvement of the medical care level in urban and
rural areas.
Now, let us give a review and evaluation of the objectives set by the govern-
ment with regard to reform of the social medical insurance system. Providing
institutional arrangements for social medical insurance is one of the major areas
for government intervention.20 This is also one of the important objectives for
reform of the economic system. But the objectives have not been realized.
Article 27 of the Decisions on Problems Concerning the Establishment of a
Socialist Market Economic System adopted at the third plenary session of the
Fourteenth CPC Central Committee in 1993 provided for the establishment of
a social medical insurance system for urban workers, with work units and indi-
viduals sharing the medical cost and urged places with poor conditions to
develop and improve rural cooperative medical services.
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Article 35 of the Proposals of the CPC Central Committee for Formulating
the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and
Objectives for Years Running up to 2010 adopted at the fifth plenary session
of the Fourteenth CPC Central Committee in 1995 provided that during the
Ninth Five-Year Plan period, the country should accelerate the reform of the
old-age, unemployment and medical insurance system so as to initially give
shape to a social security system that integrates social insurance with social
relief, social well-being, job arrangements for families of soldiers and social
mutual assistance, with individual accounts.21
By the end of 1997, more than 3.6 million workers and retired people of
state-owned enterprises were covered by a medical insurance system, accounting
for 2.5 percent of the total number of workers in the country. This, plus the
workers and retired people covered by social pools for major diseases, meant
that the coverage of the medical insurance system reached 11.3 percent. In 
some cities, reform of the medical insurance system was carried out only in
government organs and publicly financed institutions, and the workers and many
enterprises, especially those in the collective, private and foreign-funded sectors,
did not participate in the reform at all. So, the State Council issued the deci-
sion on the establishment of basic medical insurance in urban areas in December
1998, deciding to introduce the social insurance medical service system financed
by social pools and individual accounts (employer units contribute about 6
percent of the total payroll and workers contribute 25 percent of their wage
income).22
The medical insurance system is the most elementary in China and it needs
full commitments by political leaders. Over the past ten years, political leaders
have made a series of political commitments, but the coverage of social medical
insurance has become lower and lower and the population who are not covered
by social medical insurance has become larger and larger. Human health inse-
curity has become more and more outstanding.
This shows that relative to economic development objectives, health devel-
opment objectives are but “soft targets” that can be either fulfilled or unfulfilled;
relative to material and capital input, health investment is but a “soft invest-
ment” that can be more or less; relative to other institutional reforms, the social
medical insurance system reform is but a “soft reform” that can be either
advanced or postponed.
Conclusions: act to cope with major challenges to human
health insecurity
The biggest development opportunity facing China in the twenty-first century
is economic globalization and the biggest challenge facing China is human inse-
curity. Human insecurity will become a major challenge to China in its long-term
development and social stability in the twenty-first century. Human insecurity
mainly comes from all kinds of conflicts in the process of economic global-
ization and economic transition. If we say human development is to increase
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choices and improve quality, human security refers to people’s free and safe
realization of their choices.
In the twenty-first century, China is still facing all kinds of grave human
insecurity and development challenges to human development. They are:
employment insecurity, income insecurity, old-age insecurity, health insecurity,
cultural insecurity, social insecurity and environment insecurity.23
China has a large population but little cultivated land. The food problem for
the 1.3 billion people has always been a major development task for the Chinese
government over the past half century. One of the major achievements of reform
and development is the success in basically solving the inadequate food problem.
In 1998, China’s total grain output reached a record 510 million tons. But one
of the most outstanding development problems, namely, human health insecu-
rity, has been neglected by the people, especially governments at all levels.
The third national health services survey has clearly demonstrated that the
biggest challenge facing the Chinese people is health insecurity. How to solve
this problem for its 1.3 billion people – this is one of the major tasks of devel-
opment for the Party and the government. During the SARS crisis, Party General
Secretary Hu Jintao, for the first time, put the people’s health in the first place.
This is a major political commitment. Now it is necessary to adopt effective
measures to fulfill the commitment.
The progress of China in improving human health will not only benefit the
1.3 billion Chinese people but will also help realize the Millennium Development
Goals of the international community. Of the eight UN Millennium Development
Goals, three are in the area of health. Of the eighteen sub-objectives, seven are
in the area of health. Of the forty-six targets, seventeen are in the area of health.
So public health and the health of the people are the most important objectives
for the Millennium Development Goals. This is a full demonstration of the
human-based approach to development and a fundamental purpose of human
development.
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8 Developing human resources
to cope with an aging society1
Introduction
An aging society refers the process by which the proportion of the aged popu-
lation to the total population has constantly increased. When the proportion of
people aged 60 and older reaches over 10 percent of the total population or
when the proportion of people aged 65 and older reaches 7 percent of the total
population, the country or the region is considered an aging society. Globally,
population aging reflects changes in the age structure. It is an inevitable result
of the transition from a high birth rate and high death rate to a low birthrate
and low death rate. But countries vary in the speed and scale of population
aging and the concomitant economic conditions. Aging in developed countries
is a concomitant of urbanization and industrialization and it therefore assumes
an incremental process. When the population aged 65 and above reaches 7 per-
cent, per capita GDP usually reaches 10,000 US dollars and the pressure on
the economy is not big. However, in China, the demographic transition was
late and fast and the scale of the population is large and the corresponding
industrialization and urbanization are still in the process of development with
low per capita income.2 The impact of population aging is, therefore, a problem
that cannot be ignored.
The proportion of China’s aging population will experience an accelerated
spiraling, high speed growth, deceleration and steadying off process after enter-
ing the twenty-first century. At the same time, the proportion of the working-
age population will drop and the old age population that needs support will rise.
Such changes in the population structure will have a profound impact on the
economy. It will lead to a series of changes in economic variables such as labor,
savings, investment and consumption and will influence the long-term develop-
ment of the economy. It will bring about heavy burdens on society and pose a
challenge to the social security system. How should China cope with the rapid
arrival of the massive aging society? How can China solve the problem of pro-
viding for the aged while maintaining sustainable development? It is generally
believed that it is necessary to accelerate the pace of setting up and improving
the old age security system, such as raising funds for the aged in different ways
and solving the debt problems of the basic old age insurance fund, improving
the management of old age security funds and improving the returns to the funds.
There are other scholars who propose setting up a security system with multi-
ple pillars including the state, communities and families. All of these are good
ways to solve the old age support problem. But for China, the old age support
system will take a long time to improve. In the face of the tremendous pressure
of an aging population and its impact on economic development, these meas-
ures are, to a large extent, to take up challenges in a passive way. This chapter
considers that the human resource represented by education is an important fac-
tor affecting the old age support capability of an individual. In the next few
years, the level of human capital in the total population will be low after enter-
ing the aging population stage and that part of the population with the lowest
level of human capital will have the most difficulty in their old age. On the other
hand, taking the society as a whole, human resources are an important source
for promoting future economic growth and will provide enough resources for
supporting the elderly. On this basis, this chapter puts forward a new line of
thought for coping with the aging society, that is, to make great efforts to develop
human resources and make it a “reserve mechanism” and “adaptation mecha-
nism” to cope with the challenges of the aging society and promote sustainable
economic growth and economic structural transition.
The trend and challenges of China’s aging (1980–2050)
The development of population aging is closely associated with the drop in the
death rate, the rise in life expectancy at birth, and the drop in the fertility rate
and birth rate. China’s death rate began to drop at the beginning of the founding
of the People’s Republic of China. In the 1970s, both the fertility rate and the
birth rate began to drop, resulting in a gradual change in the population struc-
ture. According to such indicators as the proportion of people aged 65 and over,
the proportion of working-age population aged 15–64 and the old-age depen-
dency ratio (the ratio of the number of people aged 65 and over to the number
of working-age population aged 15–64), the process of China’s population aging
may be divided into four stages (see Figure 8.1, Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3).The
data before 2000 comes from China’s population statistics and the other come
from prediction data made by the United Nations in its “Prospects of World
Population 2000” using the middle fertility and death rate scheme.
The first stage covers 1980–2000. In the 1980s, the proportion of people
aged 65 and over made up 5 percent of the total population.3 By 2000, the
proportion reached 7 percent, thus entering the aging society. So this stage may
be called the preparatory stage for population aging. The proportion of working-
age population during this period rose rapidly, indicating that the supporting
burden of the whole population dropped and it is a period in which a popula-
tion “dividend” began to show itself while the supporting ratio rose slowly.
The second stage covers the period 2000–2015, which is the acceleration
stage of population aging. According to the prediction by the United Nations,
the proportion of the population aged 65 and over during this period will rise
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Proportion of population aged 65 and above      
Average annual growth of proportion of population aged 65 and above
Figure 8.1 Predicted proportion of population aged 65 and above and its growth rate 
(1980–2050)

















































Proportion of people aged 15–64
Average annual growth rate of the proportion of people aged 15–64
Demographical divided
Figure 8.2 Predicted proportion of population aged 15–64 and its growth rate 
(1980–2050)






' .. : : : ... 












·- ~-·· ~ 
.··· 




V .•.... ··r 
! 
from 6.9 percent to 9.3 percent. In the 2000–2010 period, the proportion of this
part of the population will increase at an annual rate of about 1.6 to 1.7 percent
and up to 2.8 percent in the 2010–2015 period, with the speed of population
aging assuming an upward trend. During this period, the proportion of the
working-age population in the total population will rise first and then fall, but
there will not be much change in general. Changes in the old age support ratio
will be similar to changes in the old age population. It will rise slowly in
2000–2010, but it will begin to pick up speed after 2010.
The third stage covers 2015–2040, which will be a high speed growth period.
The proportion of the population aged 65 and older will rise from 9.3 percent
to 21.4 percent, and peak from 2015–2020 and from 2030–2035, with an 
annual growth around 4 percent. The proportion of working-age population will
drop quickly, by nearly 10 percentage points from 71 percent in 2015 down to
62 percent by 2040. The old age support ratio will rise to 0.35 by 2040, that
is, 2.85 working-age persons supporting one old age person. The burden of
supporting the aged in the whole country will rise significantly. The main reason
for this trend is that the baby boomers in the mid-twentieth century would enter
old age. But the result of the intensified family planning efforts toward the end
of the 1970s would begin to show up, with the working-age population reduced,
thus intensifying population aging.
The fourth stage covers 2040–2050, which will be a period of deceleration.
During this period, the annual growth in the proportion of old age population















































Old age support ratio
Average annual growth rate of old age support ratio
Figure 8.3 Predicted old age dependency and its growth rate (1980–2050)
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would drop to about 0.6 percent. Still, the number of people aged 65 and over
would continue to rise to 331 million by 2050, whose proportion would reach
22.7 percent. The working-age population would continue to drop, but at a
slower pace. The speed of the rise in the proportion of old age support ratio
or old age dependency ratio would also slow down, to reach 0.37 by 2050 with
2.7 working-age persons supporting one old age person.
Unlike many developed countries, China has rapidly completed its demo-
graphic transition, making it “grow old before being rich.” It can be seen in
Figure 8.4 that even if calculated by the PPP method, China’s per capita GDP
is much lower than that of Japan and America when they had the same degree
of aging. In the following couple of decades, aging will exert great challenges
upon China. First, social security burdens will become heavier and the pres-
sure on the central finance will increase. Statistics shows that in the 23 years
from 1980 to 2003, the pension of retirees increased by more than 60 times
from 5.04 billion Yuan to 414.9 billion Yuan.4 The proportion in the GDP has
gone up continuously. During the same period, the ratio of on-the-job workers
to retirees assumed a downward trend, dropping from 10.1:1 in 1982 to 3.2:1
by 2001 (see Figure 8.5). China currently still continues using the same retire-
ment from work which is age 60 for male, 50 for female and 55 for female

































China Japan United States
China, 2025
(13.4%)
Figure 8.4 Per capita GDP vs population aged 65+: China, Japan and the United States
(1950–2000)
Sources: Nicholas Eberstadt, “China’s ‘Triple Bind’: Demography, Economics and Health in an
Aging Low-income Society,” presented at CSIS/CASS Conference on Preparing for China’s Aging
Challenge, Beijing, China, April 19–20, 2004. Data of per capita GDP are quoted from A. Maddison,
The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Development Centre Studies, OECD: Paris, 2001,
Tables C1–c and C3–c. Data of population are quoted from United Nations Population Division,
World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, available at http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed
June10, 2005).
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cadres. This retirement age is among the lowest in the world.5 Furthermore, as
life expectancy increases, the time for the retirees to draw money from social
plans will become longer, which will definitely put more pressure on social
security. Now the remaining life length after retirement is eighteen years for
Chinese people, close to that of the OECD countries. If we keep the retirement
age constant, the remaining life length will exceed that of the OECD countries
in 2020.6 Secondly, aging will influence labor force resources and in turn influ-
ence the impetus and pattern of economic growth. The impact of aging on the
labor force can be viewed from two aspects. One is that the number of working-
age population will be reduced, making it difficult for the economic growth
pattern relying on the number of laborers to be maintained. However, this will
not be a problem for China for quite a long time. The other and more important
aspect is the change of age structure of the working-age population. The ratio
of people aged from 15 to 44 to people aged 45 to 49 was 81.1:18.9 in 1990
and will be 65.5:34.5 in 2020, and 62.8:37.2 in 2050.7 Due to the difference
in physical force, mental energy and so on among different ages of laborers,
the change of age structure may have some negative impacts on the economy.
From an international perspective, the decrease of working-age population and
change of age structure will increase the cost of labor and reduce the compar-
ative advantage of China in its abundant low cost labor, which will depress the
long term economic growth potential.

































































Retiree pension/GDP On-the-job workers/retirees
Figure 8.5 Percentage of pensions of retirees in GDP and ratio of on-the-job workers to
retirees (1980–2003)
Sources: Percentage of pensions of retirees in GDP comes from Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau
of Statistics), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2004 (China Statistical Yearbook 2004), Beijing: China
Statistics Press, 2004. Data for the ratio of on-the-job workers to retirees come from Guojia tongjiju
(National Bureau of Statistics), Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2004 (China Labor Statistical
Yearbook 2004), Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2004.
Note: All calculations are at the year’s current prices.
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Human capital and old age support
China’s current social security system is still not perfect, with a low percentage
of participation in endowment insurance (the number of workers joining in the
basic old age insurance policies is about 40 percent of the total on-the-job
workers) and the pension payment is at a low level. For the people who have
not participated in the old age insurance and whose pension payment is low,
their old age security is mainly determined by the income level and work age
on the job. Empirical study on China shows that human capital denoted by
educational level is an important factor determining income. Return rates of
different educational levels are different. The higher the educational level, the
higher the return rate. The differences in the returns of different educational
levels are still increasing during the process of economic development (see
Figure 8.6). This shows that human capital leads to the enlargement of income
gaps. The situation for people with low human capital levels will get worse.
In addition, the income changes are also different during the lifetime of people
with different levels of human capital. P. Cipollone studied changes in income
with the change in age for people with different levels of education8 (see Figure
8.7). From the figure, we can see that for people with higher levels of educa-
tion, the income level would rise higher and the time for income to drop would
also come late. That is to say, the life-long income of people with fairly high
levels of human capital would be much higher than those with a lower level
of human capital and their work and income are not limited to their age. So
the level of human capital has a significant impact on the life-long income and
the income in the old age stage, especially for those without old age insurance
or with a low pension, whose level of human capital would be an important
factor in determining the security of their life during old age. People with a
low level of human capital will become the “disadvantaged group” in old age.
Figure 8.8 shows the average schooling years by age of urban and rural popu-
lations in 2000. As is known to all, there is a big gap in the total level of
education between China and developed countries.9 The older the age group,
the lower their educational level. In 2000, the average years of education received
by old people aged 65 and above were only four years. The old age popula-
tion section on the left side of the figure would gradually enter the old age
stage. The people in the 45–55 age group who would enter the old age stage
by 2020 would have eight years of education on average, similar to the junior
secondary level. Future population aging will not only be large in number but
also fast in growth. It is an aged population with a low total level of human
capital. They will hardly be able to support themselves and that will add to the
already heavy burdens on society.
Here, it is necessary to point out the challenges of aging faced by a special
group. This group is deeply ingrained with different stages of development in
the history of New China. They were born during the baby boom period of the
1950s soon after the founding of New China. At the time, the national economy
was restored and developed and society was secure and people lived in peace.
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Comparison between higher and elementary education
Comparison between technical education after middle school and elementary education
Comparison between senior middle and elementary schools
Comparison between junior middle and elementary schools
Figure 8.6 Return rate of education (1988–1999)
Sources: A. Park, Y. Zhao et al., “The Growth of Wage Inequality in Urban China, 1988 to 1999,”
Publishing on the Internet, Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Available at http://poverty2.foru-
mone.com/library/view/13933 (accessed February, 2004).
Note: In China, primary school is six years, junior secondary school is three years; senior secondary







Figure 8.7 Income curve of age by level of education
Sources: P. Cipollone, “Education and Income,” International Encyclopedia on Education
Economics, Beijing: Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe (China Higher Education Publishing
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During the first five-year plan period, the first baby boom period appeared (see
Figure 8.9). During the period of the 1960s and 1970s when they entered school
age, the so-called “Great Cultural Revolution” took place, interrupting the school
life of most of the students. This group of people suffered a tremendous oppor-
tunity cost during the revolution, which can be called a “human capital shortage”
(see Figure 8.10). The middle and late period of the 1990s felt the consequences
of a lay-off or “unemployment” tide brought about by the reform of state-owned
enterprises. As they were older in age and their educational level was not high,
they had to bear the brunt of the adverse tide. The proportion of layoffs and
unemployment is the highest among this group of people. They have in fact
become the direct bearers of the cost of economic transition. Survey data show
that the “cultural revolution co-efficient” of all age groups (the ratio of the
years of education in the Cultural Revolution to full education years) is strongly
associated with the layoffs in this age group. This age group is the worst affected
(see Figure 8.11). This age group will enter the old age stage around 2015,
forming an “old age peak,” which will create tremendous pressure on social
security and family support. For social security, the payment by the original
work units and re-employment service centers will be very big.10 Many enter-
prises have to pay pensions to laid-off workers according to the minimum
standards and some enterprises asked the workers to pay or delay the payments.
That means that laid-off workers will receive the minimum old age pension 
in the future. There are also problems in family support with this group of
people. This group of people entered the child-bearing age in the 1970s when
the state tightened the enforcement of family planning and their fertility rate
dropped drastically. Many of them have only one child. This will lead to old



































Figure 8.8 Distribution of average level of education by age in urban and rural areas in
2000
Source: Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics), Statistical Data of Fifth National Population
Census conducted in 2000.
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age support problems. This typical disadvantaged group should receive special
attention.
In a word, China is facing a tremendous impact and special challenges by
population aging to the future economy and society and it is, therefore, neces-
sary to change the method of relying on the amount of labor to stimulate
economic growth and relying on old age insurance to solve the old age problem
and to seek new countermeasures.










































































Figure 8.9 China’s birth rate (1949–1997)
































































Per capita human capital reserve (year)
Per capita human capital reserve growth
Figure 8.10 Trend of changes in per capita human capital (1949–2000)
Source: Master’s dissertation by Ch. Li, “Zhongguo ge diqu renli ziben yu jingji fazhan chaju
yanjiu” (Research on Human Capital and Regional Disparities of Economic Development in China),
School of Public Policy & Management, Tsinghua University, 2001.
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Develop human resources: reserve mechanisms and
adaptation mechanisms for coping with an aging society
Human resources usually refer to the sum total of knowledge, experience, skills
and other intelligent abilities possessed by the population. Relative to the
resource of labor, human resources place more stress on the quality of labor.
Relative to simple physical labor, human resources place more stress on compli-
cated mental activities. Studies of economic growth theories show that human
resources may be regarded as a kind of capital, namely, human capital, which
can improve labor productivity. It is an important source of economic growth.
We argue that developing human resources should be a strategy of fundamental
importance in taking up the challenges of the future aging population and stim-
ulating long-term economic development.
First, developing human resources is a very effective “reserve mechanism”
for coping with the future aging society. As mentioned earlier, the increase in
the aged population means the rise of the social support coefficient and heavier
social security burdens. In order to take up these challenges, society needs to
boost production capacity and produce enough surplus to satisfy the consump-
tion demand of the aging population. To intensify human capital investment now
will store up human capital for future society and boost the production capac-
ity for scores of years to come; it would inevitably become a powerful motive
for economic growth. In fact, such means will exactly replace the decrease in
labor by increasing human capital. This is an inevitable trend of economic devel-
opment. Empirical study of China shows that China’s economic growth pattern
is undergoing a major shift from a type that relies on the quantity of labor to a















Figure 8.11 Proportion of laid-off workers in different age groups and their education
experiences during the Cultural Revolution
Source: F. Cai (ed.), Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao 2002 (China Population and Labor
Report 2002), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe (Social Sciences Literature
Publishing House), 2002.
type that relies on quality of labor. In the estimate of the sources of economic
growth (1978–1995 and 1995–2001), the contribution of the number of the
employed to economic growth dropped while that of human capital rose (see
Table 8.1). From 1995 to 2001, the contribution by the number of the employed
was already lower than human capital. At present, the growth in the number of
laborers has dropped significantly and it will continue to drop in the next twenty
years. In contrast, human capital has still maintained high growth and will become
a major contributor to economic growth. So, developing human resources will
be a fundamental guarantee for future sustainable economic growth and will
stimulate economic structural changes. It will be an important means for cop-
ing with the pressure brought about by an aging population, especially after
2015, when the working-age population will begin to drop rapidly. The next
decade will be a fleeting opportunity for developing human resources and we
must get a firm grasp of it.
Secondly, developing human resources is an “adaptation mechanism” for
coping with an aging society. This requires analysis of the characteristics of
human resources. Labor usually covers physical resources and mental resources,
with the former as the main component. These two kinds of resources vary
with work experience and the passing of time. Physical resources usually reach
their highest point between the ages of 30 to 40 before going downward with
the extension of labor time and age. That is to say, the depreciation rate for
physical resources is very high over the time. When entering the old age stage,
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Table 8.1 Estimate of the sources of economic growth (1978–2003) 
1978–1995 (%) 1995–2001 (%)
Population 1.4 0.9
GDP 9.8 8.2
Per capita GDP 8.4 7.3
Employment 2.6 1.2
Labor productivity 7.2 7.0
Capital stock 9.3 11.8
Human capital 2.2 2.8
Capital productivity 0.5 –3.6
Capital stock per labor 6.7 10.6
TFP (a) 4.64 (47.3) 2.28 (27.8)
TFP (b) 3.95 (40.3) 1.30 (15.9)
TFP (c) 3.26 (33.3) 0.32 (3.9)
Sources: J. Zheng and A. Hu, Zhongguo gaige shiqi shengji shengchanlu zengzhang bianhua de
shizheng fenxi (1979–2001) (An Empirical Study of Productivity Changes among Provinces during
China’s Reform Period), Working paper No. 1, Center for China Study, Tsinghua University, 2004.
Note: In calculating TFP, (a) the weight of capital input is taken as 0.4, that of labor input is taken
as 0.3, that of human capital input is taken as 0.3; (b) the weight of capital input is taken as 0.5,
that of labor input is taken as 0.25, that of human capital input is taken as 0.25; (c) the weight of
capital input is taken as 0.6, that of labor input is taken as 0.2, that of human capital input is taken
as 0.2. TFP in brackets is the contribution to GDP growth.
physical decline is fast. But the mental resources reach their peak much later
than physical resources. With the accumulation of experience, a laborer will
become more skillful and good at solving problems. That is to say, mental
resources have a relatively low “depreciation rate.” In other words, people
mainly relying on mental resources for a living could still maintain a very high
productivity even in old age; their income will be much higher than those mainly
relying on physical resources for a living and it is very late when their income
begins to drop. They have a longer time for obtaining income and will be more
capable of coping with economic pressures in old age. So, developing human
resources has extended the effective working time and increased the life-long
income and raised their capabilities of self-support. In terms of society as a
whole, it means lowering the speed of “depreciation” of labor as a whole and
better utilization of the production capacity of the old age group, thus reducing
the pressure on society for supporting the aged. In this sense, developing human
resources is an “adaptation mechanism” for easing the pressure of an aging
population. This will promote and establish a new way of working and living
compatible with an aging society and will also be a long-term measure for
taking up the challenges of population aging.
In a word, to cope with an aging society by developing human resources is
an important long-term strategy. For China, it will become even more urgent
to develop human resources. As previously mentioned, the situation of popu-
lation aging and its pressures on economic and social development in the next
ten years will be stern because those people suffering most from lay-offs and
unemployment now are those who are about to enter retirement and the old age
stage around 2015. If we can develop the human resources among these people
and enable them to get some income through re-employment, delaying their
age for getting pensions, it would be useful for lightening the burdens of the
current and future social pension funds. So, developing human resources is to
develop the human resources of the entire nation and the human resources of
both the future working-age population and the current on-the-job labor: to
develop human resources among both young workers and the middle- and old-
age groups. For the present, it is necessary to give particular attention to human
development among the laid-off workers and the unemployed. If we miss the
current ten-year opportunity for developing human resources, the pressure of
population aging will delay the progress of China’s future economic and social
development.
Life-long education and a learning system for human
resources development
To meet the development trend of future population aging and develop human
resources of the entire population, the key lies in the establishment of a life-
long education and a human resources learning development system. This system
should cover all the people and carry out education and training in different
Resources to cope with an aging society 179
contents and forms according to the different characteristics of the population.
Human resources is a concept that includes knowledge, skills, experience, and
many other elements. The development of human resources should, therefore,
be multi-angled and multi-leveled with the purpose of improving labor produc-
tivity and making people better live according to the requirements of their jobs
rather than blindly pursue schooling and the breadth and depth of knowledge
and skills. That is to say, people must be taught according to their aptitude.
Apart from raising the stock of human resources according to social needs,
developing human resources also includes the allocation and effective utiliza-
tion of human resources. For the future laborers who are still studying at school,
the emphasis of human resources development should be put on raising their
knowledge and skills. School education should also serve the requirements of
economic development and train people who are needed for economic devel-
opment and should develop personnel reserves for future development. For the
current laborers who are unemployed or laid off, the emphasis of human
resources development should be put on raising human resources reserves while
making a better allocation and use of human resources so as to enable them to
meet the demand of an aging society and reduce the pressures on individuals
and society.
In this system, the government is not necessarily the direct provider of educa-
tional products. It must play a role as promoter and pusher. For this purpose,
the government must be well aware of the basic facilities and services neces-
sary for education and training, giving full scope to the market mechanism to
prevent market failure. For public goods with significant external costs and
values and non-competitiveness, such as basic education, the government should
play a role in providing the basic facilities and services. For competitive facil-
ities and services (such as specialized training, professional quality training and
so on), the government should open the market to non-governmental depart-
ments and private sectors and even to foreign investors in order to broaden the
allocation of resources through market competition. The government may
provide policy guidance to encourage citizens, non-governmental sectors and
foreign organizations to participate, thus better ensuring supply of the services
and more effectively satisfying the demand of citizens for skills and knowledge
and more effectively developing human resources.
On this basis, we hold that the life-long education and learning system for
human resources development to cope with population aging should cover the
following areas.
First, to strengthen the basic education for young people by intensifying the
basic functions and obligations of the government in compulsory education. By
the end of the twentieth century, China had achieved nine-year compulsory
education and eliminated illiteracy among young and middle-aged people. The
length of education received per capita had reached eight years, well above the
world average level. But no fundamental change has taken place in the situa-
tion in rural areas. At present, there are 431 counties that have not established
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nine-year compulsory education. Even places where compulsory education is
widespread, the level is still very low and the foundation is feeble. In many
places, students often drop out due to poverty. Teachers do not receive their
wages in time, school houses have long been in disrepair and there are short-
ages in public expenses. In the life-long education system, compulsory education
is a typical public good. “Every one enjoys compulsory education” – this is
one of the most important functions of the government for providing public
services. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Compulsory Education
(1986) provides that “the state exempts tuition for students receiving compul-
sory education.” So, it is necessary to introduce nine-year free compulsory
education throughout the whole country and ban indiscriminate fee collection
from students and their families. According to data provided by the Ministry
of Education, at present the number of people receiving compulsory education
in rural areas has reached 160 million and the main areas for spreading the
nine-year compulsory education are rural areas and among rural people. The
State Council has already decided to bring the rate of nine-year compulsory
education up to more than 85 percent by 2007 in the economically less-devel-
oped western part of the country and bring the illiteracy rate among young and
middle-aged people down to below 5 percent. According to the current national
strength, China is entirely capable of providing aid to school-age children for
compulsory education. Great efforts should be made to develop high schools
(including regular senior secondary education, secondary vocational education,
senior secondary professional school education and technical school education).
In cities, the enrollment rate of graduates from junior secondary schools should
be raised from about 60 percent at present to more than 75 percent by 2010,
and should make senior secondary school education widespread by 2015. Rural
areas should be encouraged to extend senior secondary education, bringing the
enrollment rate of junior secondary graduates to 65 percent by 2010 and over
75 percent by 2015 and basically realize the objectives of senior secondary
education in another five years. If we can achieve twelve-year education, the
average educational level of people aged 10 and above would be raised from
the current seven years to ten years and it would be raised from nine years to
over twelve years in cities. The population burden would be likely to turn into
human resources and increase potential productivity in the future.
Secondly, to establish and improve the continued education system for middle-
aged and young laborers (especially laborers of low quality, laid-off workers
and the unemployed). The continuing education system should be centered on
job training, including basic training for new workers before taking up their
posts, advanced training for existing workers and training for those who shift
their posts. The main purpose is to raise their professional levels and labor
productivity. The continuing education system should also provide well-targeted
job training for laborers who are temporarily out of jobs. For instance, people
aged 40 and above who lack specialized skills should get training in home
administration and services to enable them to turn their age disadvantages into
Resources to cope with an aging society 181
advantages, thus putting human resources to their best use. The emphasis in
human resources development among laid-off workers and the unemployed
should be put on rational shift of posts by providing effective information, espe-
cially to those who specialize in certain skills and who are out of jobs due to
economic restructuring. They should be encouraged to move in order to find
proper posts by giving them some training. For laid-off workers and the unem-
ployed, especially those who are about to enter the old age stage, human
resources development would be especially pressing and will bring about gains
in economic restructuring. For those who still have difficulty in taking up jobs,
especially the typical old age groups, the government should provide them with
basic living allowances and pension insurance through constructing a social
safety net.
Thirdly, to carry out education and training among old age people to make
full use of old age human resources. We have already mentioned that raising
the level of human resources will extend the time for people to maintain their
work efficiency. So, with the arrival of the aging society, old people will become
major sources of human resources. It is necessary to pay attention to the devel-
opment of human resources among old people and develop these resources by
providing them with training and education. This part of human resources should
be put to full use. First, it is necessary to extend the retirement age. The current
retirement age was based on the life expectancy at the beginning of the founding
of New China. But now, the mean life expectancy has risen from 49 in 1950
to about 71 at present. With the increase in life expectancy, the time used for
work is comparatively shorter than with the previous generation of people, while
the time for receiving pensions has been prolonged. This increases the pressure
of supporting the aged population and wastes the human resources of the elderly
who are still active (especially those who have a high level of knowledge and
skills). We recommend that the current retirement age for women should be
raised to 53 and 55 and those whose retirement age is set at 55 should be
extended to 60 and 63; the retirement age for men should be extended to 63.
This will greatly ease the pressure on old age pension funds. Using the data of
the fifth population census and related data, we calculate that if the retirement
age for both men and women is extended to 63, it would reduce the expendi-
ture of basic old age pension funds annually by 80 billion Yuan, amounting to
one-third of the total expenditure for a whole year. This shows that the exten-
sion of the retirement age would greatly ease the pressure on the social security
system. However, the impact of this measure on employment is still to be calcu-
lated. Because of the differences in knowledge and experience of people of
different age groups, the direct competition between the aged and young people
for jobs is not very serious. It is necessary to strengthen guidance while intro-
ducing these measures in order to avoid adverse effects on employment. Further,
it is necessary to change the age discriminatory standards for employing people.
Support should be given to old people who have the experience, will and ability
to seek re-employment. Old people should be organized to engage in community
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service, to give training and to offer policy and legal advice. For those engaged
in science and technology and management, and technical people who are needed
in their jobs, a policy of extending their appointment should be introduced. At
the same time, it is necessary to establish a personnel market for old people so
that old people who demand employment may try their hands at different jobs.
In a word, developing and using old people as resources may lighten the burdens
of the old age population and raise the living quality and confidence of the
aged people. It is an inevitable option for the development of the future aging
society.
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Since the 1990s, China has entered a period of high unemployment accompa-
nied by a massive structural adjustment of employment. Large numbers of jobs
were cut in the formal sectors (urban state-owned and collective-owned units)
and traditional industries, which caused large numbers of workers to lose their
jobs or be relocated. At the same time, new formal sectors and informal sectors
including individual and private enterprises have created large numbers of
employment opportunities. China’s employment is experiencing a process of
“constructive destruction” that is characterized by the coexistence of construc-
tion and destruction, and the speed of construction is much slower than that of
destruction. The unemployment explosion has caused great shocks to China’s
economic, social and political arenas. It has become the most serious develop-
mental challenge for China in the first ten years of the new century.
There are different calculations regarding China’s unemployed population.
According to the National Statistical Bureau, there were 1.2 to 1.75 million 
urban registered unemployed, making the urban registered unemployment rate
2.9–3.1percent.2 At the same time, China’s official agency, the Ministry of Labor
and Social Security of China, admitted that there were 6 million laid-off work-
ers from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In fact, urban unemployment would
further increase to about 10 million if the laid-off workers from the collective-
owned enterprises (COEs) were added. According to the new official definition
of employed workers,3 employed workers decreased by 3.649 million in 2000
compared with that in 1999. The decrease in employment of SOEs and COEs
was 30.77 million and 16.29 million respectively. The total number of employ-
ment decrease amounted to 47.06 million in 2000.4 Clearly, the registered unem-
ployed no longer reflect the real situation of China’s unemployment due to the
massive decreased number of the employed population of SOEs and COEs.
What is the real situation of China’s unemployment? Which sector, industry,
region and social group is shocked most seriously by unemployment? What are
the characteristics of the current unemployment in China? What are the
economic, social and political effects caused by serious unemployment? This
chapter will address these questions by analyzing statistical data. The chapter
consists of seven parts. Part one introduces the analytical question. Part two
estimates the urban unemployment population during the period 1993–2000.
Part three analyzes the characteristics of China’s unemployment such as educa-
tional level, age, sector distribution and regional distribution. Part four describes
the characteristics of China’s urban unemployment insurance. Part five analyzes
the effects of unemployment using the Okun Model for the first time. Part six
analyzes the changes in China’s employment mode, including the relations
between growth of employment and economic growth, regional differences of
employment growth, development trends of formal and informal employment,
and the background of the high unemployment. Part seven concludes the chapter
and proposes policies that will help to solve the unemployment problem and
reduce the unemployment rate.
2. Estimates of China’s urban unemployment (1993–2000)
Definitions of unemployment
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), the unemployed popu-
lation includes those who have no job but have the ability to acquire employment
and are now hunting for a job. This definition of unemployment includes both
people who lose their job and those who give up work voluntarily.5 How many
urban unemployed people are there in China today? Unfortunately, we cannot
get an accurate estimate on this indicator using current statistical methods. The
unemployment statistics of Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of
China) include only registered unemployment and exclude the unemployed popu-
lation of laid-off workers (xiagang) and the rural labor force who are working
in urban areas. Therefore, the official estimate of unemployment is much lower
than real urban unemployment. In order to correct these shortcomings, the
chapter offers a new estimate of unemployment using various methods.
First, we define the major statistical definitions as follows (see Figure 9.1).
Registered unemployment refers to those who have non-agricultural residency
(hukou) of a certain age (above 16 and below 50 for male and below 45 for
female) with working ability and a desire to work and who have registered at
the local employment agency for job search.6
Surveyed unemployment refers to the difference between total economically
active population and the employed population in the sample estimation
according to residency.
Laid-off unemployment refers to the total unemployed laid-off workers who
cannot find re-employment and are out of work.
Farmer unemployment in urban areas refers to the unemployed population of
rural laborers who have the ability to work but cannot find work opportunities
in urban areas. Data of this kind of unemployment come from the investigation
of the urban economically active population on the basis of the nature of resi-
dency. The number of unemployed farmers in urban areas is estimated on the
ratio of the rural unemployed population to the total urban economically active
population.
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The real unemployment population includes the registered unemployed, unem-
ployed laid-off workers and farmers unemployed in urban areas.
On the basis of the above definitions, we estimate the real unemployment of
China through four different calibers: 1) caliber one for the surveyed unem-
ployment rate is based on the composite calculation of the unemployment rate
of the non-rural and rural residency economically active population; 2) caliber
two for the surveyed unemployment rate is the unemployment rate of the non-
rural residency economically active population; 3) caliber one for the real
unemployment rate is the composite unemployment rate of the non-rural and
rural residents in urban areas; 4) caliber two for the real unemployment rate is
the unemployment rate of the non-rural residents in urban areas.
Estimate of urban unemployment
Based on the above definition and statistical standards, we can estimate China’s
real unemployment rate using the current statistical data. The results of the esti-
mates are shown in Table 9.1, Table 9.2 and Table 9.3.
The characteristics of China’s urban unemployment population are as follows.
First, China’s urban registered unemployment increased by 5 percent annu-
ally since 1993 and amounted to 5.7 to 6 million in recent years. The registered
unemployment and the registered unemployment rate cannot reflect the real situ-
ation of China’s unemployment due to the rapid increase of real unemployment
since 1996. In 1997, the registered unemployment only amounted to about 
39 percent of the real unemployment and this ratio decreased to 35 percent in
2000.
Second, the surveyed unemployment in China increased substantially and
amounted to 11 million. In 1997, the surveyed unemployment was 7.9 million
and increased to 11.64 million in 1999 with an average annual increase rate of
10 percent and was nearly two times the registered unemployment population.
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Third, China’s urban unemployment population increased very rapidly and
amounted to 17 million and more. According to the author’s estimate, the real
unemployment figures for China were 5.4 to 6 million and 14.73 million in
1993 and 1997 respectively. This number increased to 17 million in 2000 and
was more than two times that of 1993. The annual growth rate of real unem-
ployment was 16 percent, which was not only higher than the economic growth
but also hit the historical record.
Fourth, the unemployment of laid-off workers has become the main body of
China’s unemployment. In 1993, the unemployment of laid-off workers
amounted to 1.2 to 1.8 million and increased to 8 million and 10 million in
1997 and 2000 respectively. The number of unemployed laid-off workers in
2000 was about 4.5 to 7.3 times that in 1993. The ratio of unemployed laid-
off workers to the total real unemployment population increased from 28.2–37
percent in 1995 to 59 percent in 2000.
Fifth, the scale of farmer unemployment in urban areas remains small and
stable and the unemployment rate is comparatively low. The total number of
rural workers working in urban areas remained at less than 1 million and the
unemployment rate was about 1.5 percent.7
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Table 9.1 Estimates of real urban unemployment (1993–2000)
Year Unemploy- Unemploy- Laid-off Unemploy- Real The ratio 
ment ment (10,000) ment of unemploy- of laid-off 
registered surveyed agricultural ment and real 
(10,000) (10,000) work force (10,000) unemploy-
(10,000) ment (%)
1993 420 – 120–180 NA 540–600e 22.2–30.0
1994 476 – 144–216 NA 620–692e 23.2–31.2
1995 520 790 226–338 55 800–913 28.2–37.0
1996 553 815 356–535 60 970–1148 36.7–46.6
1997 570 980 815 88 1473 55.3
1998 571 1194 877 93 1541 56.9
1999 575 1164 937 106 1618 57.9
2000 595 – 1000 100 1695 59.0
Sources: Data for 1993 to 1996: A. Hu, “Xinshiji zuida tiaozhan: zhongguo jinru gaoshiye” (The
Biggest Challenge in New Century: China Has Entered into the Stage of High Unemployment),
Chira Study Report, Issue 48, June 1999.
Data for 1997: ibid. Unemployment in rural area data: Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1998
(China Labor Statistical Yearbook 1998), 1998, p. 74.
Data for 1998 to 1999: Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2000, pp. 7, 64 and 409; Zhongguo
laodong tongji nianjian 1999, pp. 7 and 63; Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1998, p. 74.
Data for 2000: A. Hu, “China’s Employment Problems: Analysis and Solutions,” China & World
Economy, 2001, No. 1, pp. 12–18.
Notes:
1. unemployment after 1998 refers to those who are unemployed and have not obtained a job;
2. unemployment in rural after 1997 is calculated through the spot check data based on “the struc-
ture of economic activity population in urban by group” from Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian
(China Labor Statistical Yearbook);
3. unemployment surveyed in 1998 and 1999 equals urban population in economic activity minus
urban employment.
3. Characteristics of the urban unemployment population
Characteristics of laid-off unemployed workers
Education structure
Laid-off workers registered at the Reemployment Service Center show the
following characteristics: workers with junior high school education or below
form the main body of laid-off workers. In 1998 and 1999, the ratio of workers
with junior high school education or below to the total of laid-off workers was
57 percent and 54.7 percent respectively.
Age structure
Laid-off workers registered at the Re-employment Service Center show the fol-
lowing age structure: workers aged above 35 account for the main body of the
total laid-off workers. In 1999, laid-off workers aged between 35 to 46 years
old amounted to 42.7 percent of the total laid-off workers and the laid-off work-
ers above 35 years old amounted to 64.5 percent of the total laid-off workers.
Obviously, there is a difference of age between registered unemployment workers
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Table 9.2 Estimate of urban unemployment ratio (1995–2000)
Year Unemployment Unemployment surveyed Real unemployment
registered
Caliber one Caliber two Caliber one Caliber two 
(gross) (non-farmer) (gross) (non-farmer)
1995 2.9
1996 3.0
1997 3.1 4.9 6.1 7.3 7.5
1998 3.1 5.8 7.8 7.5 7.9
1999 3.1 5.5 7.4 7.6 8.2
2000 3.1 – – – 8.3
Sources: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1998 (China Labour Statistical
Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), 1998, p. 74; Guojia tongjiju,
Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1999, p. 63; Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian
2000, p. 64.
Notes:
1 Caliber one of the unemployment rates surveyed is the integrated inquisitional unemployment
rate based on the urban economically active population and the rural economically active popu-
lation according to the registered permanent residents; caliber two of the unemployment rate
surveyed is based on the urban economically active population.
2 The real unemployment rate is the integrated inquisitional unemployment rate based on the agri-
cultural population and the non-agricultural population according to registered permanent
residents. It is calculated by the following way: real unemployment / unemployment surveyed
times the unemployment rate surveyed (caliber one); caliber two of the unemployment rate is
the unemployment rate of non-agricultural population, and it is calculated by the following way:
the real unemployment minus the unemployment of peasants / the unemployment registered
times the unemployment rate registered.
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Table 9.3 The real unemployment rate and real unemployment rate by region (1999) 
(10000 persons)
Region Unemploy- Laid-off The real Registered Real 
ment (b) unemploy- unemploy- unemploy-
registered ment (d) ment rate ment rate 
(a) (%) (a) (%) (c)
Beijing 2.5 14.0 16.5 0.6 4.0
Tianjin 9.5 24.9 34.4 2.9 10.5
Hebei 16.2 30.3 46.5 2.5 7.2
Shanxi 9.5 22.3 31.8 2.1 7.0
Neimenggu 12.4 15.2 27.6 3.1 6.9
Liaoning 39.8 94.3 134.1 3.5 11.8
Jilin 21.5 44.8 66.3 3.3 10.2
Heilongjiang 24.1 71.9 96 2.5 10.0
Shanghai 17.5 31.3 48.8 3.4 9.5
Jiangsu 26.6 52.1 78.7 2.8 8.3
Zhejiang 21.2 17.1 38.3 3.5 6.3
Anhui 17.3 29.9 47.2 3.2 8.7
Fujian 7.9 12.0 19.9 2.2 5.5
Jiangxi 15.5 34.2 49.7 2.6 8.3
Shandong 36.5 45.0 81.5 3.2 7.1
Henan 22.0 43.2 65.2 2.6 7.7
Hubei 33.1 56.7 89.8 3.3 9.0
Hunan 30.7 52.6 83.3 3.9 10.6
Guangdong 27.4 30.4 57.8 2.3 4.9
Guangxi 11.6 13.4 25 3.3 7.1
Hainan 3.7 5.4 9.1 3.2 7.9
Chongqing 10.1 17.7 27.8 3.5 9.6
Sichuan 29.6 39.1 68.7 3.7 8.6
Guizhou 11.3 9.1 20.4 4.0 7.2
Yunnan 6.2 7.2 13.4 2.5 5.4
Xizang 0.1 0.1
Shanxi 10.7 24.9 35.6 2.6 8.7
Gansu 8.0 9.4 17.4 2.8 6.1
Qinghai 1.9 2.8 4.7 2.5 6.2
Ningxia 3.7 2.4 6.1 4.5 7.4
Xinjiang 10.3 8.2 18.5 3.7 6.6
Sources:
(a) Data is from Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2000 (China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2000),
p. 86.
Notes:
(b) It is estimated by author according to 40 percent of the number of urban laid-off workers;
(c) estimated by author according to the data surveyed by Guojia tongjiju (National Statistical
Bureau), Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2000, p. 64. The data by region are lacking;
(d) estimated by the author (the real unemployment rate equals the real unemployment / the unem-
ployment registered / the unemployment rate registered), among which the real unemployment
equals the unemployment registered plus laid-off staff plus the rural unemployment.
and laid-off workers registered at the Reemployment Service Center. The main
body of the registered unemployed is the workers below 35 years old and the
ratio amounts to 63.9 percent.
Laid-off workers increased rapidly
The total laid-off workers in China increased from 8.9 million in 1996 to 21.54
million in 1999 with the growth rate at 142.7 percent.
The share of the laid-off workers in various economic units increased
substantially
The share of the laid-off workers of the state-owned units (SOU) increased
from 5.2 percent in 1996 to 13.84 percent in 1999. During the same period,
the share of the collective-owned units (COU) increased from 9.7 percent to
36 percent and the share of other economic units increased from 3.3 percent to
11.63 percent.
Main sources of laid-off workers
State-owned enterprises (SOE) and state-owned loss-making enterprises
(SOLME) are the main sources of laid-off workers. In 1998, laid-off workers
from state-owned enterprises accounted for 67.8 percent of the total laid-off
workers and this ratio was 47.2 percent for loss-making enterprises. In 1999,
the share of laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises increased to 69.6
percent and the share for state-owned loss-making enterprises increased to 58.3
percent.
Sectoral characteristics of laid-off workers
The wholesale and retail trading sector, manufacturing industry, and mineral
industry are the three major sectors affected most seriously by laid-off workers.
In 1998, the share of laid-off workers amounted to 32.3 percent of the manu-
facturing sector, and the same ratio was 41.3 percent for the wholesale and
retail sector and 21.6 percent for the mineral industry. The total number of laid-
off workers in the above three sectors amounted to 17.25 million and accounted
for 80 percent of total laid-off workers in China.
Banking and insurance, education, culture, radio, television and film, gov-
ernmental agencies, party organizations, health and sports organizations as well
as social welfare organizations have very low levels of laid-off workers (see
Figure 9.2).
Laid-off workers mainly come from state-owned units and collectively-owned
units in rural areas. The share of laid-off workers amounts to 85 percent higher
or even to 100 percent in state-owned units and collectively-owned units.
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Regional characteristics of laid-off workers
The problem of laid-off workers shows different characteristics across different
regions due to great differences in the level of development and economic struc-
ture in China. The characteristics of laid-off workers of different regions in
1999 can be summarized as follows.
The real unemployment rate was very high in nearly every province and
there were five provinces with real unemployment higher than 10 percent (see
Table 9.3). These five provinces are Liaoning (11.8 percent), Hubei (10.6 per-
cent), Tianjin (10.5 percent), Jilin (10.2 percent) and Heilongjiang (10.0 percent).
At the same time, there were some provinces with a real unemployment rate
lower than 6 percent. These provinces included Beijing (4.0 percent), Guangdong
(4.9 percent), Yunnan (5.4 percent) and Fujian (5.5 percent).
There are eight provinces with more than 1 million laid-off workers and the
unemployment situation in these provinces tends to be very serious. These
provinces include Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan,
Hubei and Hunan. The total number of laid-off workers of these eight provinces
amounts to 11.51 million. There are four provinces whose share of laid-off
workers is higher than 30 percent, which include Tianjin (30.7 percent), Liaoning
(37.3 percent), Jilin (31.8 percent) and Heilongjiang (31.3 percent).
In regions with the most serious unemployment situations, the share of laid-
off workers of collective-owned units is very high, often higher than 60 percent.
The share of laid-off workers of collectively-owned units in Liaoning province
amounts to 80.47 percent. The number of this indicator was 70 percent for Jilin
and 60 percent or higher for Hunan, Shanghai and Tianjin.
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The ratio of laid-off workers from state-owned loss-making enterprises to total
local laid-off workers is higher than 50 percent for some provinces. This ratio
was 83.8 percent, 61.8 percent and 50 percent for Qinghai, Gansu and Shaanxi
respectively. The total of laid-off workers in Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Hunan
and Hubei amounts to 2.4 million and accounts for 44 percent of the total laid-
off workers of this type.
The preceding analysis shows that the problem of laid-off workers and unem-
ployment has become more and more serious in many provinces in China. The
unemployment situation in old industrial bases such as northeast China and
Hunan and Hubei provinces tended to deteriorate. Laid-off workers in these
provinces account for a large share of the total unemployment in China. In
addition, the problem of laid-off workers of loss-making enterprises has become
more acute and the laid-off workers from loss-making enterprises become the
main body of the unemployed in some provinces. The unemployment situation
in southeastern coastal regions is relatively optimistic. As China’s political and
economic center, Beijing’s unemployment situation has been effectively curbed.
The problem of unemployment of laid-off workers in western China is rela-
tively not serious. Generally speaking, the characteristics of laid-off workers
and unemployment show great differences due to significantly different regional
development models.
Unemployment insurance
China’s unemployment insurance system only covers workers in formal sectors,
with a coverage rate of no more than 50 percent. We have calculated the unem-
ployment insurance on the basis of three different standards. The first one is
the percentage of workers who have joined the unemployment insurance system
compared to the total of formal workers. From 1994 to 1999, this ratio decreased
at first and then increased to 83.7 percent in 1998. The second indicator is the
percentage of the population who have joined the unemployment insurance
system compared to the total urban employment population. This indicator also
decreased first and then increased to 46.9 percent. The third indicator is the
percentage of the population who have joined the unemployment insurance
system compared to the total employment population in China. This share was
only about 14 percent in 1999. This analysis shows that the unemployment
coverage level of China is still very low, and the employed rural population as
well as informal workers in urban areas are excluded from the unemployment
insurance system. This means that the current unemployment insurance is actu-
ally beneficial only to a very small part of the population rather than to all
members of society.
The coverage rate of illness and occupational injury insurance is very low.
The percentage of workers who have joined the illness catastrophe insurance
system (dabing tongchou) was only 1.8 percent in 1998 and increased slightly
to 8.8 percent in 1999. The percentage of workers covered by the occupational
injury insurance system was only 0.7 percent in 1993 and increased slightly to
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3.4 percent in 1999. The coverage rate of health insurance and labor injury
insurance will be much lower if the urban informal workers were included. This
shows that urban laborers still face high health insecurity (see Table 9.4).
The ratio of laid-off workers who have not acquired the basic living
allowances amounted to 48.8 percent in 1997. This ratio decreased to 6.7 percent
in 1999 due to the emergent measures adopted by the central government (see
Figure 9.3). In 1996, the average annual living allowance received by laid-off
workers was 925 Yuan and the monthly living allowance was 77 Yuan. The
monthly living allowance was 47 Yuan for collective-owned units and 128 Yuan
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Table 9.4 Coverage of medical and occupational injury insurance schemes in China 
(1993–1999)
Year Medical insurance Occupational injury insurance
Contributors Ratio to all Contributors Ratio to all 
(10,000 persons) employees (%) (10,000 persons) employee (%)
1993 268 1.8 110 0.7
1994 375 2.5 182 1.3
1995 703 4.7 261 1.8
1996 791 5.3 310 2.1
1997 1082 7.4 351 2.4
1998 1108 9.0 378 3.1
1999 1040 8.8 396 3.4
Sources: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2000, pp. 480–481; Zhongguo tongji
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Figure 9.3 Coverage of basic living allowance for laid-off workers and relief for the
registered unemployed (1995–2000)
1-
for other units. In 1999, the average annual living allowance received by each
laid-off worker was 1552 Yuan and the monthly living allowance per capita
was 129 Yuan. The monthly living allowance per capita was 150 Yuan for
state-owned units, 61 Yuan for collective-owned units and 181 Yuan for other
units. In 1996, the ratio of the average living allowances received by laid-off
workers was only about 14.9 percent of those of employed workers and this
ratio slightly increased to 18.5 percent in 1999.
The average living allowance received by laid-off workers in different regions
varies significantly in China. In 1996, the average living allowance was 65
Yuan for Heilongjiang, 70 Yuan for Jilin, 76 Yuan for Liaoning, while this
amount was much higher in political areas such as Tibet (437 Yuan) and Beijing
(337 Yuan).
The ratio of the registered unemployed population who have not received
unemployment allowance was 40.2 percent in 1996, which was around 2.22
million registered unemployed workers. This ratio increased to 52.8 percent in
1999. In 1996, the unemployment allowances received by registered unem-
ployed workers amounted to only 7 percent of the wages of the employed
population. In 1999, this ratio increased to 14.1 percent (see Table 9.5).
The preceding analysis shows that two very different social groups emerged:
the winner (employment workers with increase income and insurance) and the
loser (laid-off workers with no income and very low unemployment insurance
compensation).
The ratio of the unemployment funds financed by the government to the total
GDP is very low, though it has increased in recent years. The unemployment
funds financed by the government consist of two parts: the first part used for
the basic living allowances for laid-off workers and the second part used for
unemployment insurance funds. The total funds amounted to 11 billion Yuan
in 1996, and the former part occupied 75 percent and the latter occupied 25
percent of the total unemployment funds. In 1999, the total funds amounted to
41.5 billion Yuan and was about four times that in 1996, among which the
basic living allowances occupied 77.9 percent and the unemployment insurance
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Table 9.5 Coverage of urban unemployment insurance (1994–1999)
Year Contributors Ratio to Ratio to Ratio to 
(10,000 all employees employees gross 
persons) (%) in urban (%) employment (%)
1994 9500 64.0 51.6 14.1
1995 9500 63.7 49.8 14.0
1996 8333 56.1 42.1 12.1
1997 7961 54.3 39.4 11.4
1998 7928 64.3 38.3 11.3
1999 9852 83.7 46.9 14.0
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2000, pp. 20, 480; Zhongguo tongji
zhaiyao 2001, p. 40; Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000, p. 54.
funds accounted for 22.1 percent. The ratio of the total unemployment funds
financed by the government to the total GDP amounted to only 0.16 percent
in 1996 and 0.51 percent in 1999. The total unemployment funds financed by
the government amounted to only 1.21 percent of the total wages of the employed
workers throughout the country in 1996 and 4.2 percent in 1999 (see Table
9.6).
From the perspective of international comparison, China’s unemployment
insurance expenditure is way too low. According to the data from the UNDP,
there were about 30 million unemployed workers in industrialized countries in
1997 with an unemployment rate of 7.7 percent. Also in 1997, the long-term
unemployment rate was 28.9 percent for male workers and 25 percent for female
workers. In these countries, the unemployment insurance funds accounted for
over 1 percent of the total governmental expenditure and this ratio would be
higher than 5 percent in countries with relatively higher unemployment rates.
For example, the unemployment rate in Canada was 9.3 percent and its unem-
ployment insurance funds were 8.1 percent of the total government expenditure.
The two indicators were 10.5 percent and 6.3 percent for Ireland, 9.0 percent
and 5.8 percent for Belgium, 20.9 percent and 7.0 percent for Spain, respec-
tively (see Table 9.7).8
5. The consequences of laid-off workers and unemployment
Severe problems of laid–off workers and unemployment heavily affect the
economic development and social stability of China, which make this one of
the greatest challenges that China must face in the twenty-first century. Serious
outcomes from these problems will be felt in every aspect of the Chinese
people’s lives.
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Table 9.6 Investment in security for laid-off and unemployed (1996–1999)
Year Total Total Total Ratio Ratio Ratio 
amount of amount of between between the between 
the basic security the capital capital for the capital
alimony for unem- for unem- unemploy- for unem-
(108 Yuan) ployment ployment ment and ployment 
(108 Yuan) and the the total and GDP 
expenditure amount of (%)
of govern- wage (%)
ment (%)
1996 82.50 27.29 109.79 1.38 1.21 0.162
1997 142.37 36.33 178.7 1.94 1.90 0.240
1998 238.88 47.41 286.29 2.65 3.08 0.365
1999 323.56 91.61 415.17 3.15 4.20 0.507
Sources: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2000, pp. 5, 178, 485; Zhongguo
laodong tongji nianjian 1999, pp. 205, 522, 533; Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1998, p. 230;
Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1997, p. 213; Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2001, pp. 16, 43, 66.
Economic consequences
According to the estimate of the Okun Model, the gap between real economic
output and potential output caused by urban unemployment is increasing and
its ratio to GDP is rising. To calculate the economic cost of laid-off workers
by applying the Okun Model, we can make the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: we must replace the nation-wide comprehensive (including rural
areas) unemployment rate with a constructed real urban unemployment rate.9
Hypothesis 2: the natural unemployment rate of China is 5 percent.
Hypothesis 3: according to the estimate of the Okun Model, if the real unem-
ployment rate is higher than the natural unemployment rate by 1 percent, the eco-
nomic cost in GDP would be 2.25 percent, that is, “a” in the Model equals 2.25.
Thus, we can estimate the economic consequences of lay-offs and unem-
ployment (see Table 9.8). According to the calculations of Table 9.8, the
economic cost caused by severe lay-offs and unemployment is up to 6 percent.
We can draw the conclusion that to decrease personnel and increase effi-
ciency by lay-offs and labor redistribution (fenliu) can improve the operational
efficiency of economic units at the micro-level, but leads to greater losses at
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Table 9.7 Unemployment and unemployment insurance in industrialized countries
Unem- Gross The ratio in long Voluntary Involuntary Unem-
ployment unemploy- term (percent) (%) 1993 part-time ployment
(1,000) ment ratio (%) 1993 alms 
1997 (%) 1997 Female Male GDP (%) 
(1997) (1997) 1991
Canada 1414 9.3 10.2 14.5 0.9 5.5 8.1
Norway 93 4.1 11.1 14.0 1.2 2.2
US 6739 5.0 8.0 9.4 0.9 5.0 1.5
Japan 2300 3.5 11.8 28.8 2.2 1.9 0.7
Belgium 375 9.0 61.5 59.4 1.5 3.8 5.8
Sweden 367 8.0 26.9 31.8 2.0 6.2 0.8
Australia 791 8.5 27.5 33.1 1.6 6.9 4.0
Netherlands 422 5.6 48.5 49.9 0.6 5.6 4.5
UK 2034 7.1 27.8 44.9 0.6 3.2 1.7
France 3192 12.4 43.3 39.1 0.2 4.8 3.2
Switzerland 162 4.2 32.8 25.5 0.4
Finland 367 14.5 28.2 33.9 1.5 2.9 3.6
Germany 4308 9.8 1.5 3.0
Denmark 174 5.4 27.9 26.3 1.6 4.8 5.5
Austria 165 5.2 28.4 28.9 1.8
Italy 2805 12.5 66.2 66.5 2.6 2.3 1.0
Ireland 159 10.5 46.9 63.3 0.5 3.3 6.3
Spain 3357 20.9 60.4 49.9 0.2 1.0 7.0
Industrialized 29974 7.7 25.0 28.9
countries 
in total
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, p. 215.
the macro-level. To solve the redundant personnel problem only by lay-offs
and labor redistribution is a questionable approach. Its effects should be further
weighed.
Social consequences
The problems of lay-offs and unemployment directly affect up to one-eighth of
China’s urban inhabitants. In 2000, the number of real unemployment in China
was 16.95 million. If we estimate that each urban family has 3.3 members and
each family has one laid-off member, then about 56 million people, that is 12.2
percent of the total urban inhabitants, have been directly affected by lay-offs
and unemployment. Unemployment severely affects the social stability of China.
The legal cases of labor disputes increased substantially. The number of
accepted cases and subsequent hearings increased from 47,951 in 1996 to
120,191 in 1999, among which the number of collective labor dispute cases
increased from 3,150 to 9,043, the number of lodgment and prosecution
increased from 1,389 to 3,903 for the same period. In terms of sector struc-
ture, the labor dispute frequency in foreign, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan
invested enterprises is the highest, 45.5 cases occurred in every 10,000
workers in 1999, much higher than other economic units; in terms of appeal
subject, the proportion of individual appeal cases was 87.5 percent, and the
proportion of collective appeal cases was 7.5 percent, the proportion of
cases appealed by the employment units is 87.5 percent, so the employees
are the main victims of labor disputes.10
Political consequences
Ordinary people have extremely strong feelings of insecurity regarding social
and political stability. According to a sample survey in six large cities by the
Academy of Macroeconomic Research, SDPC Source, when ordinary people
were asked to choose the factors that affect social stability, lay-offs and unem-
ployment was the third most important factor in 1998, the second factor in 1999
Urban unemployment and social security 197
Table 9.8 The economic costs of lay-offs and unemployment (1997–2000) (%)
Year Growth rate of Real unemployment Ratio between the 
GDP rate (caliber one) economic cost and GDP
1997 8.6 7.3–7.5 5.2–5.6
1998 7.8 7.5–7.9 5.6–5.7
1999 7.1 7.6–8.2 5.9–7.2
2000 8.0 8.3 7.4
Sources: Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000
(Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2000), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubhanshe (China Statistics Press),
2000, p. 54.
and the first factor in 2000 (see Table 9.9). According to another sample survey,
the proportion of inhabitants who feel heavy pressure and severe insecurity has
been rising since 1995, from 65.4 percent in 1995 to 83.5 percent in 1999 (see
Figure 9.4). The severe problems of lay-offs and unemployment are a heavy
charge on the mental endurance of common people, and severely threaten social
order in China.
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Table 9.9 Change in the top five most important social problems concerning common
people (1998–2000)
Year First Second Third Fourth Fifth
1998 The The income The Overburden The basic level
emergence gap increment in of the organization
of corruption unemployment peasants of CCP lacks
capability of
governance
1999 Corruption The The The The basic level
of officers increasing of increasing deterioration organization
demission income gap of public of CCP lacks
and security capability of
unemployment governance
2000 The Severe Wide gap The Manufacturing 
increasing corruption between the deterioration and selling fake 
of lay-offs rich and the of public goods
and poor security
unemployment
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Figure 9.4 Ratio of ordinary people who feel a high level of pressure in life
Source: Sh. Wang, “Kaifangxing, fenpeixing chongtu he shehui baozhang: zhongguo jiaru WTO
de shehui he zhengzhi yingxiang” (Open and Distribution Conflicts and Social Security: The Social
and Political Impacts of China’s Accession to WTO), 2001. Available at http://www.xslx.com/
article1/messages02/2250.html (accessed July 10, 2005).
-
The increase in lay-offs and unemployment directly threatens the political sta-
bility of China. Collective protest rallies, such as sit-downs and demonstrations,
which occur frequently in some regions, are good examples.
Severe lay-offs and unemployment problems have put great pressure on the
government. Ever-increasing lay-offs and unemployment will affect the social
stability of China. The Chinese government has been paying more attention to
laid-off and unemployed workers and has set up certain compensation mecha-
nisms. It can be perceived that severe social problems caused by lay-offs and
unemployment have forced the Chinese government to push for reforms of the
social insurance system and to accelerate social change.
6. Change in employment patterns: from formal
employment to informal employment
Change in the relation between economic development and employment
increase: from high economic growth with high employment increase
to high economic growth with low employment increase
There are four patterns in the relation between the economic growth rate and the
employment increase rate. The first pattern is high economic growth and high
employment increase. The second pattern is high economic growth but low
employment increase or no employment increase. The third pattern is low eco-
nomic growth and low employment increase. The forth pattern is low economic
growth but high employment increase. Since 1980, the Chinese economy has
entered the takeoff period with high-speed economic growth and increased
employment opportunities. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan Period, the aver-
age annual employment increase rate reached 5.08 percent, that is, as GDP
increased by 1 percent, the employment rate increased by 0.643 percent accord-
ingly, showing the characteristics of high economic development and high
employment increase. During the Eighth Five-Year Plan Period, the average
annual employment increase rate decreased to 1.23 percent, which means, as GDP
increased by 1 percent, the employment rate increased by 0.106 percent accord-
ingly, showing the characteristics of high economic development and low employ-
ment increase. It can be seen that high economic development does not necessarily
lead to more employment opportunities. High capital investment does not always
result in a high employment increase either. From 1986 to 1995, the average
annual increase rate of investment in fixed assets rose from 16.5 percent to 36.9
percent, but the elasticity of employment to fixed assets investment decreased from
0.308 to 0.033. In conclusion, the contributory effects of economic growth or cap-
ital accumulation on employment depend on the development policies and indus-
trialized technical guidelines. From the economics point of view, if we wish to
create more employment opportunities under the presupposition of maintaining a
higher economic growth rate and capital investment rate, we must promote the
elasticity of employment. We should especially devote major efforts to develop
the tertiary industry because the elasticity of employment increase in the tertiary
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industry is the highest. As its additional values increase by 1 percent in the tertiary
industry, employment will increase by 0.722 percent. In comparison, as additional
values increase by 1 percent in the secondary industry, employment can only
increase by 0.182 percent (see Table 9.10).
Change in employment patterns: from formal employment to
informal employment
At present, China is at a critical stage of economic transformation. The read-
justment of the employment structure is the key component and aim of economic
restructuring, and accordingly a change in employment models is the main
component of the readjustment of the employment structure. Economic struc-
ture regulation and employment structure readjustment correlate and interact
with each other. Yet, China’s present transformation of employment models
falls gravely behind economic restructuring, and the direction of employment
pattern transformation is now confused, which leads to the deterioration of
employment conditions.
There are three basic directions in China’s present economic restructuring:
the “marketization” of the economic operation mechanism; the “non-national-
ization” of ownership structure; and the “open economy” under the condition
of economic globalization. The three directions form a development process
characterized by correlation, interaction and mutual promotion. Under such
conditions, how do we determine the basic direction of China’s employment
pattern transformation?
Under the macroscopic background of economic restructuring, the conditions
that China’s employment structure readjustments face are as follows. The first fac-
tor is industrial structure, that is, agriculture, the traditional mining and quarrying
industry, the manufacturing industry and the construction industry have trans-
formed quickly from enormous labor absorption to enormous labor rejection, and
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Table 9.10 Calculation of employment elasticity (1986–2000)
Item Seventh Eight Ninth
Five-Year Five-Year Five-Year 
Plan Period Plan Period Plan Period
(1986–1990) (1991–1995) (1996–2000)
Annual growth rate of GDP (%) (a) 7.9 12.0 8.3
Annual growth rate of investment in 16.5 36.9 11.2
fixed assets (%) (b)
Annual growth rate of employment (%) 5.08 1.23 0.93
(c)
The employment elasticity of economic 0.643 0.106 0.112
growth (c/a)
The employment elasticity of investment 0.308 0.033 0.083
in fixed assets (c/b)
Source: Guojia tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000, pp. 7, 9, 19, and 40.
become the main sources of lay-offs and unemployment. The second factor is the
deep contradiction in economic operation that the state-owned industries gener-
ally face a deficit. The third factor is technological progress, which causes enor-
mous cuts to traditional jobs and creates new jobs, thus steps up the structural
readjustment of employment. The fourth factor is the transformation to a market
economy; employment in state-owned economy shrinks swiftly, while the non-
state-owned economy lags behind in development, leading to a rapid increase in
unemployment. The fifth factor is capital deepening; since China undertakes 
the industrialization technical guideline of capital concentration, the effect of
investment on employment increase is therefore limited.11
Against the background of employment structural adjustment, China’s
employment model transformation is in the process of “informalization – formal-
ization – informalization.” At the very beginning of the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China, the informal economy dominated and employment
in individual and privately owned economies was the main employment pattern.
During the nationalization period, China’s economy entered into the planned
economy period. Traditionally formal sectors (such as state-owned and collec-
tive-owned units) monopolized China’s national economy and enrolled almost
all employees. During the transition period, China began to set up a market
economy system, and the employment structure started to change dramatically.
The ratio of traditionally formal sectors in the employment structure decreased
rapidly, the ratio of newly emerging formal sectors (such as joint ventures,
cooperative enterprises and foreign invested enterprises, joint stock companies)
in the employment structure increased swiftly, and informal employment began
to emerge. Employment in traditionally formal sectors is very large, and its
decrease has been rapid; yet the development of newly emerging formal and
informal sectors falls behind. Accordingly, the newly emerging economic sectors
cannot recruit labor from the traditional formal sectors, which leads to an increase
in unemployment. In the later period of economic transition, a comparatively
complete market economy system is to be set up; the readjustment of employ-
ment models enters a stable stage. During this period, the ratio of traditional
and formal sectors in employment decreases to a lower level, while newly
emerging formal sectors enter the mature stage of development and recruit large
numbers of laborers; informal sectors enter a stable development stage and
become one of the main channels for urban employment; a balance between
supply and demand in the labor market can generally be reached, as unem-
ployment decreases but is still maintained at a high level (see Figure 9.5). As
for the backgrounds and characteristics of the transformation of employment
models in different periods, please refer to Table 9.11).
We can see from Figure 9.5 and Figure 9.6 that China now is at the medium
period of transition. The economic restructuring is entering the stage of rapid
deepening, the scale of unemployment is at its peak, and the unemployment
rate will maintain a much higher level in the next few years. Speeding up
restructuring and the development of newly emerging formal sectors (especially
the rapid development of informal sectors) have a direct bearing on the future
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of unemployment in China. We estimate that the unemployment peak will last
for three to five years with a prolonged restructuring process. The number of
unemployed people will decrease, though it will remain at a comparatively high
level in the near future.
During the Ninth Five-Year Plan Period, the characteristics of the changes
in urban formal and informal employment were as follows (see Figure 9.6).
First, the ratio of formal sectors in employment decreased substantially but
still maintained a comparatively high level. The ratio of urban employees to
the total formal employment decreased from 78.1 percent in 1995 to 52.9 percent
in 2000.
Secondly, as for the formal sectors, employees in traditionally formal sectors
(state-owned and collective units) decreased substantially, 44.3 million jobs have
been cut, and its ratio to total employment decreased from 73.5 percent in 1995
to 45.1 percent in 2000. The ratio of newly emerging formal sectors in employ-
ment increased from 4.6 percent in 1995 to 9.3 percent in 2000. The ratio of
formal sectors in employment will decrease further, within which the ratio of
newly emerging formal sectors will increase.
Thirdly, the most substantial decrease of employees occurred in the three
traditional industries, that is, the mining and quarrying industry, the manufac-
turing industry and the construction industry. In nationwide urban employment,
employees in the manufacturing industry decreased by 19.43 million or by a
proportion of 35.7 percent; employees in the construction industry decreased
by 2.75 million or by a proportion of 26.1 percent; employees in the mining
and quarrying industry decreased by 2.64 million or by a proportion of 28.9
percent. In total, employees in the three industries decreased by 24.82 million,
about 79.2 percent of the overall decrease in employees.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fourthly, the ratio of informal sectors (privately owned enterprises and self-
employed businesses) in total employment increased substantially from 10.7
percent in 1995 to 16.0 percent in 2000.
Fifthly, the ratio of urban formal sectors in China’s employment is much higher
than the average level of the developing countries. However, the ratio of urban
informal sectors in China’s employment is much lower than the average level of
the developing countries,12 and lower than most of the developed countries.13
Sixthly, the employment increase in informal sectors has become the domi-
nant channel for China’s urban employment. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan
Period (1995–2000), the number of urban employees increased by 21.81 million
or by a proportion of 10.1 percent; at the same time, employees in informal
sectors increased by 13.59 million or by a proportion of 66.5 percent, which
was about 62.3 percent of the total increase in new employees. Meanwhile,
employees in formal sectors (including traditional formal sectors and newly
emerging formal sectors) decreased by 36.49 million. In conclusion, informal
employment became the most important source for the increase of new urban
jobs.
Seventhly, informal employment is the main channel of re-employment for
the unemployed and laid-off workers. The proportion of self-employment in the
re-employment of laid-off workers in 1999 was 48.7 percent, and at least 80
to 90 percent of the laid-off workers were re-employed in informal sectors.
According to the preceding analysis, urban employment in informal sectors
has great potential. In the future, it will be one of the main channels for new
increases of jobs. Finally, it is worth pointing out that institutional barriers in
the labor market (such as the social insurance system, household registration
system, and so on) severely hinder the free flow of labor between urban and
rural areas or across sectors and regions, and constitute the greatest barrier to












1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Ratio
Informal sector Emerging and formal sector 
Traditional and formal sector
Figure 9.6 Proportion of employment by sector (1950–2000)
the development of the informal employment model, and the main cause for
the unemployment rate to remain high for a comparatively long period.
7. Conclusion and suggestions
The population in China is about 21 percent of the total world population, the
labor force is about 26 percent of the total world labor force, and China’s agri-
cultural labor force is more than one-third of the world agricultural labor force.
This is one of the basic national conditions of China. To create more employ-
ment opportunities and transfer more of the agricultural labor force to non-
agricultural activities while improving productivity gradually remain the biggest
challenge for China’s economic development in the long run, and one of the
most difficult problems for human development across the world. The ratio of
employment to population has increased sharply from 36.1 percent in 1952, to
41.7 percent in 1978, to 56.6 percent in 1998.14 A substantial reason for this was
the change in the age structure as a result of the national effort at birth control.
The rise in the ratio gave a bigger once-and-for-all boost to production poten-
tial than other catch-up countries achieved.
Since China undertook reforms more than twenty years ago, its economy has
been entering a takeoff stage. During the 1980s, the growth rate of China’s
economy reached 9 percent, and employment increased at an annual average
rate of 3 percent (within which the non-agricultural employment increase rate
was as high as 6.8 percent, and the urban increase rate reached 4.7 percent);
the average unemployment rate was lower than 3 percent. Thus the aims of
high-speed economic growth, high employment increase and low unemployment
rate had been achieved.
Since the last half of the 1990s, China’s economy entered an unprecedented
period of restructuring accompanied by a high unemployment rate and low
employment. In the past five years, the average annual increase rate of nation-
wide employment was only 0.9 percent, the lowest since the establishment of
the People’s Republic of China. The destruction of traditional jobs was the largest
in scale in the world. Such traditional formal sectors as state-owned and
collective-owned units, for example, cut 47 million jobs, yet the new formal
sectors and new informal sectors, such as private-owned and individual enter-
prises, had only created 15 million new jobs, so it was typical of a “process of
creative destruction.” At present, the number of real urban unemployment is
about 17 million, which sets the highest national record since 1949, with the
real unemployment rate at about 8 percent. The ratio of long-term unemploy-
ment to overall unemployment is over 80 percent, and that of laid-off unem-
ployment is up to 60 percent. The ratio of state-owned enterprises’s lay-offs to
total laid-off unemployment is up to two-thirds, due to the fact that 60 percent
of the SOEs are making losses. The ratio of unemployment of the mining and
quarrying, manufacturing and construction industries in overall laid-off workers
is up to 80 percent. Thus, we can call it a “structural unemployment.”
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Following China’s accession to the WTO, the biggest challenge China faces
is unemployment, and the problem could get worse. On one hand, new indus-
tries (such as IT, tourism, finance and insurance, culture, education and public
health), newly emerging formal sectors (such as foreign invested sectors), and
informal sectors (privately-owned and individual enterprises) will create new
jobs. On the other hand, traditional formal sectors will cut more jobs. The race
between the two driving forces will directly affect changes in employment 
and unemployment rates, which will have three stages. In the first stage, more
existing jobs will be cut than new jobs created. Since most people work in
traditional industries and the ratio of employment in new industries is small,
there will be a rapid increase in the unemployment rate. In the second stage,
new jobs will increase in greater numbers, and laid-off workers will find new
jobs. Although the unemployment rate remains high, the surging trend will slow
down or stop. In the third stage, more new jobs will be created than job-cuts,
more and more new laborers will enter into new industries directly, a large
proportion of the unemployed will enter into the new industries gradually, and
the rate of unemployment will decrease. The process of economic growth itself
is not only an increase in production, but also a process of restructuring. In
other words, restructuring is a process of partial or even overall qualitative
change caused by economic development.
To face the challenges of large-scale restructuring following accession to the
WTO, the most important policy arrangement is to carry out an employment
priority strategy, and to create a lot of different (formal and informal) jobs;
thus economic growth will promote an increase in employment. To achieve
these goals, we need to undertake employment-concentration or labor-concen-
tration action projects, and link them with present public investment and public
engineering plans. We need to promote a positive labor market to improve 
re-employment opportunities and the employment competitiveness of the unem-
ployed. Also the following actions are recommended: to improve the free
movement of the labor force, to provide employment service information and
monitor the key indices of the labor market; to speed up the restructuring of
formal sector employment; to decrease the ratio of traditional formal employ-
ment and enlarge the scale of newly emerging formal employment; to promote
the development of informal employment; to encourage self-employment, inde-
pendent employment, household employment and community employment; to
encourage the development of small enterprises and help the transformation of
traditional industries or enterprises.
My second policy suggestion is to set up a large-scale, low-level but highly
agile unemployment insurance system; to provide effective, necessary and
fundamental protection for the temporarily unemployed, to enlarge the scope of
basic unemployment guarantees from state-owned enterprises and formal sectors
to non-state-owned enterprises and informal sectors; to modify the criteria of
unemployment insurance; and at the same time, to further broaden the medical
insurance of on-post staff (dabing tongchou) and the coverage of insurance for
occupational injury.
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10 Genuine national savings and
natural capital cost in China
(1970–2001)1
During the past twenty years, China has been one of the countries whose
economic growth rate is the fastest in the world, and whose domestic savings
rate (as a percentage of GDP) and domestic investment rate (as a percentage
of GDP) are the highest. According to the statistics of the World Bank,2 the
average GDP growth rates of the 1980s and the 1990s in China were respec-
tively 10.1 percent and 10.7 percent, ranking second among the 206 countries
and regions in the world (only second to Botswana, a naturally abundant African
country) in the 1980s, and the first in the 1990s. In 1999, the domestic savings
rate and investment rate in China were respectively 42 percent and 40 percent,
the highest in the world, 20 percent higher than the average world level at that
time. However, according to the World Bank Database, the cost of natural
capital in China is also shockingly high. To a great extent, it counteracts the
nominal domestic savings rate and investment rate, cutting down at least 20
percent of the genuine domestic savings rate in 1985, down to 4.5 percent in
1998, and reversed to 6.3 percent by 2001.3
Presently, the national economic accounts system, which is based on nominal
GDP, has severe flaws. It does not take out the cost of natural capital, and puts
the values of overexploited resources and energy, especially non-reproducible
resources, into the GDP as additional value. This will exaggerate economic
income at the expense of rapid consumption of natural resources and severe
deterioration of the environment, and will inevitably lead to great reductions in
real national welfare. Therefore, it is necessary to amend the current national
accounts system.4
Since 1995, experts from the World Bank began to redefine and measure the
world’s wealth. They proposed the green national accounts system to measure
national wealth.5 The meaning of so-called wealth is comprehensive. It includes
produced assets, natural capital and human resources, among which production
capital is traditionally measured by the national economic accounts system as
national wealth, whereas natural capital and human resources are significant
parts of national wealth in the new synthesized national economic accounts
system. Green GDP is a new type of national wealth, or a new type of income
estimation. Human resources are the most important part of real national wealth,
accounting for about 40 to 80 percent of gross national wealth. Generally
speaking, the rate of advanced countries is higher than that of countries with
abundant natural resources. Production capital is the second important factor,
accounting for 15 to 30 percent of gross national wealth. Natural resources rank
third, accounting for 2 to 40 percent, although this factor is listed in second
place in some regions in the Middle East and West Africa.
The World Bank first proposed the concept and calculation method of genuine
domestic savings, which is the real savings rate of a country, after the deple-
tion of natural resources (especially non-reproducible resources) and the cost
of environmental pollution are deducted.6 Natural resources depletion is meas-
ured by the economic rent of exploiting and procuring natural resources. Rent
is the difference between the production price (calculated by the international
price) and total production costs. These costs include the depreciation of fixed
capital and return of capital. One thing must be pointed out: the rational exploita-
tion of natural resources for necessary to promoting economic growth; however,
if the resource rent is too low, it will induce over-exploitation. If the resource
rents are not put into reinvestment (e.g. investment in human resources), but
are put into consumption, this is “irrational.” Pollution costs mostly refer to
CO2 pollution. This is calculated by the global marginal cost caused by emis-
sion of one ton of CO2, for which Fankhauser suggested 20 US dollars.
7 This
calculation does not include air, water and other pollution. According to the
calculation of the World Bank, 39 percent of the gross wealth in the Middle
East comes from natural capital, most of which is oil and natural gas. After
taking out natural resources depletion, the genuine savings rates in these coun-
tries are all negative (see Table 10.1). According to the research of Sachs and
Warner at Harvard University,8 ever since the 1970s, the economic growth rate
of countries with abundant natural resources has been much lower than that of
countries with barren natural resources. The study of the World Bank also shows
that countries relying heavily on natural resources suffer greater costs, and the
genuine domestic savings are low or even negative.
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Table 10.1 Genuine savings rate (1970–1993) (ratio as a percentage of GDP, %)
Regions and income types 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1993
Regions south of the Sahara, Africa 7.3 –3.2 (1.7) –1.7 (2.4)
Latin America and Caribbean 10.4 1.9 (1.7) 5.1 (3.4)
East Asia and the Pacific Ocean 15.1 12.6 (8.0) 19.3 (7.4)
The Middle East and North Africa –8.9 –7.7 (2.0) –7.0 (3.0)
South Asia 7.2 6.5 (5.7) 6.9 (5.7)
High income OECD countries 15.7 12.4 (3.1) 14.5 (2.4)
Low income group 9.8 3.3 (4.4) 8.2 (2.4)
Medium high income group 7.2 2.9 (3.2) 8.9 (3.5)
High income group 15.2 12.3 (3.1) 14.7 (2.4)
Sources: K. Hamilton and M. Clemens, “Genuine Savings in Developing Countries,” World Bank
Economic Review, 1999, vol. 13; World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking
Poverty, Oxford University Press, 2000.
Note: Data in the brackets are economic growth rate in the 1980s and 1990s.
The World Bank estimated various natural resource costs in many countries
since 1970.9 Here we list the data for China, USA and Japan. The conclusions
are: First, energy depletion accounts for the greater part of natural capital cost.
The natural capital cost as a percentage of GDP experienced a rising and falling
curve (see Figure 10.1). In the 1970s, with large-scale oil and coal exploitation,
the natural capital cost as a percentage of GDP rose sharply, and peaked in 1980
(close to about one-quarter of GDP). In the late 1980s, it fell to about 10 per-
cent, and further declined to a little over 5 percent in the early 1990s. During
recent years, the rate dropped rapidly to less than 1.5 percent in 1998, and
reversed to 2.8 percent in 2001. Such changes showed that the industrial restruc-
turing, especially energy consumption restructuring, during the Ninth Five-Year
Plan was one of the key reasons for the declining share of energy depletion as
a share of GDP. Energy depletion accounts for a large share of natural asset
costs, and had an influential effect on cutting down the natural capital cost rate
as a percentage of GDP during this period. However, entering into Tenth Five-
Year Plan, the economic development in China, driven by high capital input and
high energy depletion rather than technological progress and improved efficiency,
reverted back to the low-quality, high-growth path. According to the latest sta-
tistics of BP in 2004, China’s coal production accounted for 33.5 percent of the
world total (US coal production was 21.9 percent of the world total) in 2003,
and China’s coal consumption accounted for 31.0 percent of the world total (22.3
percent for the US). These two shares are much higher than the share of China’s
population and China’s GDP in the world total. Thus we can draw the conclu-
sion that China is the world’s largest dirty energy producer and consumer. The
dirty energy production and consumption has not only made the Chinese peo-
ple the gravest victims, but also affected the global environment and the safety
of mankind to a large extent.
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Figure 10.1 Energy depletion cost (1970–2000) (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.
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Second, the cost of CO2 pollution ranks second as a percentage of GDP. In
the 1970s, the cost was over 4 percent, and around 4 percent in the 1980s. In
the 1990s, the rate began to decline. The declining trend was especially obvious
during the late 1990s and reached 2.33 percent in 1998, the lowest point since
the 1970s. However, compared with other countries, this rate is still much higher
than that of the USA and Japan (see Figure 10.2). There is one more thing to
add: the calculation does not include the cost of water pollution, SO2 and other
noxious emissions pollution. If these are taken into account, the total cost of
pollution will probably be 3.5 percent. The World Bank calculated China’s cost
caused by air and water pollution using the human capital method, and the
result accounted for 3.8 to 7.8 percent of GDP.10 The decrease of the cost of
CO2 emission as a percentage of GDP during the late 1990s also helps to reduce
the rate of natural resources as a percentage of GDP. We noted that CO2 emis-
sion as a percentage of GDP presents a rising and falling curve since the middle
of the 1960s, and during the late 1990s it shows an obvious trend of falling
(see Figure 10.3). This phenomenon indicates that economic growth rate is
higher than the CO2 emission rate. The increase of their difference implies that
the intensity of pollutant emissions is decreasing. However, due to the high
growth of energy consumption during the Tenth Five-Year Plan, especially the
rapid increase in coal consumption, the CO2 emission cost in 2003 might reverse
back to the level of the mid-1990s.
Third, mineral consumption or depletion ranks third in natural capital cost.
During the past twenty years, there have been two successive exploitation deple-
tions (see Figure 10.4). The first exploitation depletion took place between the
late 1970s and the early 1980s, and the cost accounted for 1.2 percent of GDP.
The second one was between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and the cost

















































Figure 10.2 CO2 emission cost as share of GDP (1970–2000) (%)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.
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was 0.8 to 1.2 percent of GDP. Since the 1990s, this cost as a percentage of
GDP fell sharply down, to less than 0.2 percent in 2001. The mineral output
of the US is very large, but its mineral depletion cost as a percentage of GDP
is much less than China’s.
Fourth, the cost of forest depletion as a percentage of GDP is comparatively
the smallest. However, this shows a rising trend ever since the reform, growing
from less than 0.2 percent of GDP up to 0.8 percent in the middle of the 
1990s. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, this rate dropped substantial,
declining to 0.43 percent in 1998, and 0.07 percent in 2000, but increasing 
to 1.0 percent in 2001 (see Figure 10.5). There is one thing to be pointed out.
Since the reform, timber output has grown, peaking at 67,673 in 1995. After
that, the government carried out a project to protect natural forests, forbade


















































Figure 10.3 China’s unit GDP CO2 emission (1960–2000) (kg/1995 US dollar)












70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00
China United States
Figure 10.4 Mineral resources depletion as share of GDP (1970–2000) (%)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.
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deforestation, cut down the timber output target, and increased timber imports.
By 2002, timber output decreased to 44.36 million steres, which is one-third
(34.4 percent) lower than in 1995 (see Figure 10.6). If the current forest protec-
tion policy can be carried on, the forest depletion cost as a percentage of GDP
in future years will be less than 0.2 percent. During the past fifty years, the
cardinal point of China’s forestry policy was to “cut big woods.” The Ministry
of Forestry was also known as the “Ministry of Felling;” the state-owned forestry
enterprises were “felling enterprises” that destroyed the forest ecology. China
experienced a process of large-scale exploitation and rapid forest resources
depletion. Not until the late 1990s did this situation begin to reverse towards
limited felling and vigorous protection. History shows that we did not have a
deep understanding of China’s basic situation, and took a false step of “first
destroy, then protect.” According to the data provided by the World Bank,11
although the natural capital per capita of China is only a bit higher than that
of Japan, the forest resource capital per capita of Japan is 2.4 times greater
than that of China. The forest coverage rate in Japan is as high as 65 percent.
However, Japan sill keeps importing timber at a large scale, accounting for 22.4
percent of the world’s gross amount in 1998, whereas the import amount of
China accounted for only 4.7 percent. Canada, Russia and the USA are the
three largest timber export countries, accounting for 45.0 percent of the inter-
national timber export market.12 This situation indicates that China needs to
further cut down the import tariffs on timber and its processed products (e.g.
paper or paper pulp), or even to practice zero tariffs, so as to expand its power
of utilizing the international forest resources, and to protect the domestic forest
resources for the next fifty years.
Fifth, China’s cost of natural capital as a percentage of GDP is shockingly
high. It follows a rising and then falling process (see Figure 10.7). According
to this measure, we can give an objective evaluation of the economic, energy































Figure 10.5 China’s forest depletion as share of GDP (1978–2000) (%)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.
and environment protection policies and their effects at different times. During
the early 1970s, the cost accounted for 6 to 7 percent of GDP. Between the
late 1970s and 1980s, the economic cost reached its peak, as high as 30 percent
of GDP. After that, it began to drop, reaching about 15 percent in the late
1980s. Just as the author pointed out in the national situation report “Subsistence
and Development” (1989), economic development in the early days of the reform
was at the expense of natural resources and a case of ecological environment
“overdraft.” The expense is much more costly by far than the estimate made
at that time. In the 1990s, the cost began to fall. Up to 1995, it decreased 
by half to 7.80 percent. During the late 1990s, this falling trend was quite
distinct, reaching a low of 4.53 percent in 1998 (see Table 10.2). The changing
trend of natural capital cost as a percentage of GDP reflects the fact that China




































Figure 10.6 China’s timber production (1978–2002) (10 thousand steres)









































Figure 10.7 China’s natural capital cost as share of GDP (1970–2000) (%)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.





experienced a big detour during the past twenty years, which was “first destroy,
then protect; first pollute, then purify; first deplete, then retrench; first fell, then
plant.” For this, both the country and the people have paid a heavy price. The
genuine domestic savings rate is greatly discounted by the cost in natural
resources. This is reflected in the trend of genuine domestic savings rate, which
gradually rises after a sharp fall. Since, after taking out the natural capital cost,
the net domestic savings rate appears to rise after the 1990s, the two curves
tend to converge (see Figure 10.8).
To sum up, in the traditional national economic accounts system, neither the
high economic growth rate nor the high domestic savings rate could really iden-
tify the genuine national wealth and the cost of natural resources. Only the new
green GDP national economic accounts system can faithfully reflect the above
circumstances. Though there are still some defects in the assessment of the World
Bank, it provides us a clear description of the historical environment and devel-
opment track China has experienced during the past twenty years. It describes
the transformation of China’s economic growth model, its changing trend of nat-
ural capital cost as a percentage of GDP, and the international comparison. Thus,
it offers a beneficial reference for expanding the genuine national wealth, espe-
cially improving the genuine domestic savings rate. We should significantly
reduce the depletion of non-reproducible energy, mineral resources and forest
reserves. And we should also transfer from the highly “autarkic” traditional
resources security strategy of using domestic scarce resources to the new global
resources security strategy, that is, making full use of both kinds of resources,
especially the global strategic resources, such as oil, natural gas, timbers and
wood products. This is because China’s three main types of resource reserves
respectively account for 2.36 percent, 0.94 percent and 3 percent of the world’s











































Figure 10.8 Genuine domestic savings and net domestic savings rate (1970–2000) 
(as percentage share of GDP)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.
gross reserves.13 By boosting both import and export growth, especially the export
of labor-intensive and technologically intensive products, we can increase the
efficient use of international resources for import and procurement. We should
open up energy and timber import markets, practice zero tariffs, eradicate tariff
barriers, eliminate the distortions of the domestic price system and market, and
establish an energy reserve system for the country and its enterprises. We should
significantly cut down coal consumption, eliminate the subsidy for coal pro-
duction and transportation, firmly close small-scaled thermal power stations,
encourage using clean energy and reproducible energy, and stop environmental
pollution. We should also carry out environmentally friendly industrial strate-
gies and economic development strategies, increase environmental capital, and
improve the environmental quality of people’s lives. This means increasing all
the people’s natural capital, and significantly improving the national investment
in human resources, which include education, sanitation and health, family plan-
ning and procreation health, and investment in R&D and so on. This also implies
improving everyone’s developing ability, and increasing everyone’s real wealth.
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Table 10.2 Natural capital and genuine domestic savings rate in China (1980–2001) (ratio
as a percentage of GDP, %)
1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2001
Gross domestic investment 35.19 37.77 34.74 40.83 38.28 34.16
Domestic savings 35.19 33.48 37.95 43.13 42.63 40.9
Net domestic savings 29.32 27.69 31.73 35.18 34.5 30.9
Energy depletion 22.53 13.66 10.28 4.19 1.48 2.8
Mineral depletion 0.96 0.48 0.84 0.58 0.29 0.2
Net forest depletion 0.21 0.70 0.62 0.53 0.43 0.1
CO2 damage 2.34 3.48 3.69 2.50 2.33 2.2
Natural capital cost 26.03 19.83 15.43 7.80 4.53 6.3
Education expenditure 2.27 2.21 2.18 1.98 2.00 2.00
Genuine domestic savings 4.86 11.87 18.47 29.38 31.98 26.6
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002; World Development Indicators
CD-ROM 2003.
11 Corruption: an enormous
black hole
Public exposure of the economic
costs of corruption1
Corruption has become a major enemy of economic development and social
stability in China, and has caused prodigious economic costs for the country and
its people. The estimate of economic costs resulting from corruption is very diffi-
cult. Corruption is often called a “black hole,” which is an invisible abyss. It is
necessary to know, during the transformation period of the Chinese economy,
which areas and departments are the most corrupt, why they are easily corrupted,
how to determine the key areas for preventing corruption, and in what areas the
anti-corruption measures can effectively reduce economic costs. To answer these
questions, we have to make a preliminary estimate of the economic costs of
corruption, however crude and inaccurate it might be. According to my calcu-
lation of four major types of corruption during the economic transformation
period in China (i.e. corruption in rent-seeking, the underground economy,
evasion of taxes, and government investments and public expenditure) in
September 2000, during the late 1990s, just these four major types of corrup-
tion each year have on average resulted in economic costs of about 13.3 to 16.9
percent of GDP.2
People were shocked by the figures. Some thought I had overestimated the
coverage of corruption and exaggerated its economic cost.3 This is quite normal
for academic debate. To thoroughly probe the types and economic costs of
corruption, we still need to collect more detailed materials, make full use of the
data of more authoritative institutions, and continue to unveil the disguises of
corruption, to deeply explore the black hole of corruption, and to publicize the
results so as to make an important contribution to anti-corruption.
Recently, some departments of the Chinese government successively publi-
cized events to penalize corruption and economic costs, which I summed up as
ten types of systematic economic costs caused by corruption. They add up to
economic costs of enormous sums, which are caused by government depart-
ments or public institutions who abuse their power for their own interests. This
kind of economic cost amounts to, on average, 14.5 to 14.9 percent of GDP
each year between 1999 to 2001.
1. Economic cost caused by official corruption, bribery and defalcation.
According to the material submitted by Xiao Yang, dean of the Supreme People’s
Court of China, to the third session of the Ninth National People’s Congress,
the directly recovered economic cost amounted to 2.24 billion RMB, through
punishing smuggling, obtaining foreign exchanges by fraud, financial swindling,
and cheating on invoices for value-added tax. The directly recovered economic
cost by punishing crimes like corruption, bribery and defalcation reached 1.5
billion RMB.4 Both of these added up to 3.74 billion RMB, accounting for 0.04
percent of GDP in 2000. We found that, compared with the gross economic
cost resulting from all types of corruption, those caused by official corruption,
briberies and defalcations are only “a mite on an elephant.”
2. Tax evasion by smuggling at customs. In 1998, customs uncovered 7,328
smuggling crimes, whose values amounted to 13.7 billion RMB.5 In 1999,
uncovered smuggling crimes were worth about 80 billion RMB, and customs
tax increased by 71 billion RMB in 1999.6 The two respectively accounted for
0.17 percent and 0.97 percent of GDP in 1998 and 1999. The world’s biggest
smuggling case, that of the Yuan Hua group, involved 53 billion RMB and
dodged taxes of 30 billion RMB,7 equivalent to 53 percent of customs tax and
0.34 percent of GDP in 1999. Taking 1995 as the base, in 1999, the import
volume increased by 4.3 percent and the customs tax volume increased by 92.7
percent. Excluding the factor of the import volume increase, the net income of
customs tax would increase by 55 percent, which would be about 16 billion
RMB, accounting for 0.20 percent of GDP in 1999. Excluding the factor of
import volume increase, the net income of customs tax would increase by 52.4
percent, about 15.3 billion RMB, accounting for 0.17 percent of GDP in 2000.
3. Economic cost caused by corruption of industry monopolies. According to
data provided by the State Development Planning Commission of China, the
telecoms industry has illegally charged users 2.17 billion RMB since 1998, and
the power industry 2.74 billion RMB,8 for a total up to 4.91 billion RMB,
accounting for 0.06 percent of GDP in 1999. According to data of the National
Power Corporation, in 2001, 365 counties in China charged the same electricity
price for cities and counties. It relieved peasants of 35 billion RMB.9 However,
these 365 counties account for only 13 percent of 2,861 counties in China.
According to my estimate, this unfair charge is equivalent to 7.5 percent of the
consumption level of countryside dwellers and equivalent to 0.37 percent of
GDP in that year. According to data provided by the Style Rectification Office
of the State Council and Ministry of Health, in 2001, measures to rectify the
unhealthy tendency in the purchase and sale of medicaments relieved patients
of 10.1 billion RMB, which is estimated at about 2.8 percent of the average
consuming level of citizens in the country, accounting for 0.11 percent of GDP
in that year. The State Development Planning Commission and commodity price
offices in provinces reduced high prices for medicaments by a total of 8.1 billion
RMB. Nineteen-thousand cases of illegal purchase and sales of medicaments
were penalized, involving 1.08 billion RMB.10 According to data provided by
the State Development Planning Commission, 236,000 cases of price breaches
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were penalized in the country from January to November in 2001, involving
prices and charges in the countryside, education, prices of medicaments and
medical treatments, charges by administrative offices and facilities, and price
cheating and price discrimination. The economic punishment totaled 3.15 billion
RMB.11 These illegal charges took advantage of industry monopolies and were
forcefully levied on all users and consumers.
4. Economic cost of tax evasion. The national tax department penalized 9.37
billion RMB for breaching tax law, accounting for 0.105 percent of GDP in
that year. Eighteen central departments did not submit correct income, which
was 1.7 billion RMB, and twenty departments detained financial capital of 5.6
billion RMB.12 This does not include defaulted tax of state-owned enterprises
or unsubmitted charges and fees in or outside of the budget.
5. Economic costs in public facilities and public expenditure. According to an
audit of 120,000 state-owned enterprises and government offices by the National
Audit Office, in 1998, unreported, embezzled or dissipated capital was about
100 billion RMB, accounting for 1.27 percent of GDP in that year. The key
departments were finance, food supplies and monopoly industries.13 In 2000,
over 76 billion RMB of illegal capital was uncovered through audit,14 accounting
for 0.85 percent of GDP in that year. From January to November in 2001, 
over 160 billion RMB of illegal capital was uncovered through audit in the
country,15 accounting for 1.67 percent of GDP in that year. And one-third of
these were big cases, involving large quantities of money. Through audit, twenty-
two cases were disclosed and handed over to judicial organs, involving 59.5
billion RMB and sixty-one persons. On average, each case involved 2.7 billion
RMB, 975 million RMB for each person in the case. Through a financial audit
on eight state-owned key enterprises, 34.8 billion RMB in illegal money was
uncovered, averaging 3.45 billion RMB for each enterprise. The financial audit
of China Bank disclosed 2.7 billion RMB, excluding the other three state-owned
key banks. Altogether 4.3 billion RMB of national debt was found to be em-
bezzled or defaulted. In the education system, primary and middle schools were
found to arbitrarily charge, exact and collect money for 3.9 billion RMB.
Through audits of twenty-one national quarantine offices, 3.4 billion RMB of
illegal capital was uncovered, averaging 162 million RMB for each office.
Among this, 0.9 billion was for staff overpayment, averaging 42.86 million
RMB for each office. A total of 10.5 billion RMB of embezzled financial capital
has been returned; 10.6 billion RMB of tax and penalties has been turned in;
and 2.2 billion RMB of defaulted national debt has been correctly returned to
its proper position.16 In 1999, 76.8 billion RMB of loans for food and oil
purchase was found to be embezzled, and 13.8 billion RMB was found to be
falsely reported in the accounts by listing less income and more expenses than
were the case.17 Both of these two totaled 90.6 billion RMB, accounting for
1.1 percent of GDP in that year. Thirty-six departments embezzled 2.1 billion
RMB of financial capital in building and administrative expenditure.18 From
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1997 to early 1999, the country had invested 48.8 billion RMB in poor coun-
ties to support the poor: 4.343 billion RMB was embezzled, falsely listed as
expenditure, or moved into a unit-owned exchequer, accounting for 9 percent
of the poor-supporting capital. In 2001, national disciplinary inspection depart-
ments uncovered 6.527 billion RMB of illegal money, saving economic costs
of 2.286 billion RMB; 2.139 billion RMB of illegal money was returned,
avoiding economic costs of 2.834 billion RMB. A total of 8,139 cases were
put on file for investigation and prosecution. Nine thousand and seventy-two
persons were penalized by party discipline, among whom 963 were handed 
over to judicial departments, accounting for 10.6 percent of the total penalized
cases.19
6. Economic cost caused by corruption in public investment. According to an
audit of the National Audit Office, in 1999, embezzled national debt amounted
to 2.86 billion RMB. Fifty-eight key water conservancy projects embezzled 1.78
billion RMB of special capital. Falsely reported investments and wasted money
reached 3.3 billion RMB.20 All of these totaled 6.16 billion RMB, accounting
for 0.08 percent of GDP in that year.
7. Economic cost caused by capital flight. Capital flight means to transfer abroad
income earned through illegal measures, such as smuggling, trafficking in drugs,
money laundering, dodging taxes, swindling foreign exchanges, and trading
inside or outside of China. It is estimated that a total of 98.8 billion US dollars
was transferred from the country from 1997 to 1999. According to the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange, capital flight from 1997 to 1999 amounted
to 53 billion US dollars, averaging 17.7 US dollars each year, accounting for
2 percent of GDP in each year. In 1998, more than 10 billion US dollars of
foreign exchanges were swindled, accounting for 1 percent of GDP in that
year.21
8. Economic cost caused by privatization of state-owned enterprises. Up to the
end of 2000, 51 percent of the converted enterprises (32,140 in total) dodged
185.1 billion RMB of capital and interest from bank loans, accounting for 
32 percent of total capital and interest of bank loans for converted enterprises
(579.2 billion RMB in total),22 2.07 percent of GDP in that year.
9. Economic cost resulting from arbitrary charges by public institutions.
Arbitrary charges are another form of corruption. It is administrative corrup-
tion, and is typical as a department abuses its public power over a small group
of people. Since 1997, more than 40,000 items of arbitrary charges on enter-
prises (e.g. collecting money and raising funds) have been cancelled, involving
170 billion RMB, averaging 34 billion RMB each year, accounting for 0.42
percent of GDP. Since 2000, 29,227 items of arbitrary charges on township
businesses have been brought into control, involving 23.67 billion RMB, aver-
aging 810,000 RMB per item.23 By the end of June 2001, 26,798 items of
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arbitrary charges on township businesses have been cancelled, involving 22.6
billion RMB,24 averaging 840,000 RMB per item. In 2001, 14.5 billion RMB
in total of arbitrary charges were cancelled, greatly alleviating the burdens of
peasants.25 This is estimated to be equivalent to 7.25 percent of the consuming
level of countryside dwellers, averaging 18 Yuan RMB per person. According
to statistics of the State Economic and Trade Commission, up to the end of
October 2001, 27,055 instances of arbitrary charges on enterprises had been
cancelled, involving 37.55 billion RMB,26 0.37 percent of GDP in 2001.
10. Economic cost caused by financial industry. In the late 1980s, there were
only several dozen registered cases of financial swindling. However, by the late
1990s, the number had increased to over 10,000. In the 1980s, there were few
cases involving over a million RMB, but at present it is normal to see cases 
over tens of millions or even billions of RMB. During only January to October
in 2000, cases of financial swindling amounted to 8,000, involving 10 billion
RMB.27 Cases involving economic law reached 59,000, involving 70 billion
RMB, 0.9 percent of GDP in that year. Rescued money amounted to 12 billion
RMB, accounting for only 17 percent of the total amount in these cases. This
indicates that more than 80 percent of the economic cost of economic crime
(mostly involving corruption) cannot be recovered. By the end of 2000, the total
volume of financial loans reached 68,000 RMB, among which 7 percent (467 
billion RMB) were bad loans unable to be recovered, accounting for 5.35 per-
cent of GDP in that year. The economic cost of the above two types of financial
corruption accounts for 6.25 percent of GDP, ranking first in all types of
corruptions.
If the repeatedly calculated amount is excluded, according to the preceding
official statistics, during 1999–2001 the total economic cost of ten types of
corruption amounted to 14.5 to 14.9 percent of GDP (see Table 11.1). These
are only the corruption cases publicly exposed, a partial illustration of an increas-
ingly rampant corrupt situation. In reality, there are even more types of corruption
than these, and the real loss is far greater. We are far from calculating and esti-
mating the real economic cost of corruption. It is still an unknown economic
“black hole.” It is hard to reflect the real economic cost of corruption in the
current national economic account, the calculation of which is “man-made,”
and simply an “addition.” Therefore, it is just nominal GDP in a statistical
sense, far from the real “national welfare” in the real sense. For instance, when
the loss of “natural capital” is excluded, the genuine national savings rate will
be far less than the nominal one. We call the former green GDP, and the latter
nominal GDP. Based on the same method, when “the economic cost of corrup-
tion” is excluded, the genuine national savings rate, which represents national
welfare or net national welfare, will be far less than the nominal national saving
rate. We can similarly call the former “clean” GDP, and the latter nominal
GDP. It is known that the maximization of net national welfare does not equal
that of nominal GDP. As for people and their country, only the maximization
of net national welfare is really meaningful.
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Table 11.1 Economic costs of corruption (1999–2000)
Corruption type Year Economic Proportion 
cost in GDP 
(billion (%)
RMB)
1. Official corruption, bribery and defalcation 2000 3.74 0.04
2. Smuggling and corruption at customs
Values of penalized smuggling cases 1998 13.7 0.17
1999 80 0.97
Increase of net tariff 1999 16 0.20
2000 15.3 0.17
3. Corruption loss in monopolized industries 53 0.60
Illegal charges in the power industry 1998–1999 2.74
Increasing financial burdens of peasants by 2001 35 0.37
high living electricity price
Illegal charges of telecom industry 1998–1999 21.7
Increasing financial burdens of patients by 2001 10.1 0.11
overcharging for medicaments 
Illegal charging cases 2001 3.15 0.03
4. Tax and revenue evasion 2000 16.7 0.17
Capital against tax law 2000 9.37
Income in the budget but not submitted 2000 1.7
Defaulted financial capital 2000 5.6
5. Corruption loss in public expenditure 210–220 2.35–2.46
Auditing defalcation and dissipation 1998 100 1.27
Auditing illegal cases 2000 76 0.85
Auditing illegal cases 2001 160 1.67
Defalcating and cheating loans for 1999 90.6 1.1
purchasing food and oil
6. Corruption loss in public investments 1999 9 0.11
Defalcation of special capital of national debt 1999 2.86
Defalcation of capital for water conservancy 1999 6.16
7. Loss caused by capital flight 1997–1999 53 (dollars) 2
8. Corruption loss of privatization of state-
owned enterprises
Dodging capital and interest of bank loans 2000 185.1 2.07
9. Corruption loss in arbitrary charges
Arbitrary charges 1997–2001 170 0.42
Canceling illegitimate charges on township 2000 23.7 0.27
enterprises 2001 22.6 0.24
Canceling illegitimate charges on enterprises 2001 37.55 0.37
Canceling illegitimate charges on countryside 2001 14.5 0.15
10.Corruption in financial industry 2000 547 6.25
Financial swindling cases 2000 10
Economic low cases 2000 70
Bad loans unable to be recovered 2000 467 5.35
Total 1999–2001 1290–1300 14.5–14.9
Notes: The proportion of total number in GDP refers to average estimates during 1999–2000. The
total number of economic cost deducts some repetitions.
The preceding calculation indicates that the economic cost of personal corrup-
tion is only “a mite on an elephant.” The major part takes place in the corruption
of groups, industries and enterprises. It is typical systematic corruption. The
most distinct features include large quantities of money and abuse of public
power, and the economic cost often ranks highest in the world. Corruption is
not only a problem of economic cost. I call it “the largest social pollution”
because corruption cannot create any new money and abuses public power by
transfering social capital through unjust, unfair, concealed and illegal measures.
It leads to greater inequality of social distribution. Like environmental pollution,
it damages both people and the society.
It must be pointed out that, based on the calculation of purchasing power
parity (PPP), the GDP of China accounts for over 10 percent of the world total,
ranking second only after the United States. Up to the end of 2001, the GDP
of China will be approximately eight times of that of 1978 (7.9 times), and to
have created capital at that speed is one of the great wonders in human history.
However, this was achieved at great economic cost and illegal capital trans-
fers, caused by prevalent and systematic corruption (corruption cannot create
money, but only transfer money). Whether income and capital of the 1.3 billion
people or state revenue and capital, the real increase is much less than eight
times. It is not exaggerated to say that China might be the country with the
greatest economic cost of corruption in the world. Corruption has become the
largest “black hole,” devouring the fortunes of the people and the country.
The “black hole” of corruption is a kind of “product” of “leaks” in the
country’s system, or a function of its “leaks.” The more the leaks, the more
chances for corruption there will be, and the larger the black hole will be.
Meanwhile, it is clear that when the party and the government take measures
to prevent corruption, the economic cost of corruption will be reduced. Take
the cancellation of arbitrary charges as an example. During the past five years
(1997–2001), more than 170 billion RMB of economic cost was recovered. It
is quite reasonable to believe that, as long as we have the perseverance to inno-
vate and construct systems, we will be able to eliminate any leaks in the system.
Thereby, the economic cost of corruption, the black hole, will be much reduced.
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12 Second transition of the
Communist Party of China
From economic development to
institution building1
First transition: opening up an “era of economic
construction”
In 1978, the third plenum of the CPC’s Eleventh Central Committee took the
strategic policy decision to shift the central task of the Party from “taking class
struggle as the key link” to socialist modernization and economic construction.
The plenum held that the timely and summary shift of the emphasis of work
to socialist modernization and economic construction to keep up with the devel-
opment of both the internal and external situations reflected the requirements
of history and aspirations of the people and represented the fundamental inter-
ests of the people. The plenum discarded the “leftist” erroneous principle of
“taking class struggle as the key link,” which was not suited to a socialist
society, and settled the strategic shift problem that had not been resolved after
the establishment of the basic system of socialism.2
This was the first transition in the central task of the CPC. It was regarded as
a great historic shift in China. It opened up a new period of reform, development
and opening up.
Ideologically, the CPC broke away from the long-time serious bondage to
dogmatism and the personality cult and re-established the Marxist ideological
line of seeking truth from facts and maintained and developed Mao Zedong
thought. This was a period noted for the emancipation of the mind and change
in concepts.
Politically, China ended decade-long disturbances caused by the “cultural
revolution” and for the first time in history realized great order across the land,
marked by social stability and easiness in the mind of the people, gradually
established and improved socialist democracy and the legal system, and
improved the democratic process of the Party and state and also the mecha-
nism for formulating public policies and decisions, thus creating a lively political
situation. This was the best period of political enlightenment since the founding
of New China.
Economically, China experienced an unprecedented sustainable high growth
to become one of the countries with the fastest economic growth. This was a
period of economic prosperity in which development went the fastest and
people’s living standards rose the most significantly.
Internationally, for the first time, China introduced economic and social
opening-up policies and participated in economic globalization and sought
greater benefits from it. This was the most open period in China’s history.
The practice of reform and opening up over the past two decades and more
shows that the strategic policy decision taken in 1978 of shifting the central
work of the CPC to economic development was of great significance. It
conformed to the national conditions and went along with the tide of develop-
ment throughout the world. This was the first typical compulsory change in
institutions in China and also the reform of institutions from the top down and
from the bottom up. This was also an institutional reform with the biggest
participation of people in the history of human development.
The biggest merit of the transition is that it created in contemporary China
“good governance found during the period of Emperor Li Shimin of the Tang
Dynasty.” The “good governance” by Emperor Li Shimin lasted for twenty-
three years. It was one of the peak periods in the history of China’s development.
It also represented the highest level of development in the world at the time.
Now, twenty-four years have passed since China introduced the reform and
opening up policies, during which China has experienced the succession of two
generations of leadership, matching the time span of the “good governance
period.” What is different from the earlier period is that the current great order
across the land was achieved under the condition of opening up. This not only
represented the best historical period but also made the most important
contributions to the development of humanity.
Second transition necessary: to create an era of “institution
building”
In the twenty-first century, the long-term development goals are not only to
realize economic modernization, following the “three-stop strategy” laid down
by Deng Xiaoping, but also to modernize institutions, as was the conception
of reforms of the Party and state leadership system put forward by Deng
Xiaoping. The CPC needs a second strategic transition, that is, a transition from
economic development to institution building. The reasons are as follows.
First, economic development is no longer the central task of the CPC, as the
roles of the Party and government have undergone great changes, changing
from macro-economic “controllers” and “planners” to “directors” and “leaders.”
It is correct to say that the CPC and the government have always played a vital
role in pushing forward China’s economy at a high speed, promoting rapid
social evolution, maintaining social stability and persisting in opening up to the
outside world. But with the rapid development of the economy and deepening
of economic restructuring, enterprises, domestic and foreign investors, peasants
and consumers have become the main players in the economy. The replace-
ment of the planned economy by a market economy has made it possible for
the government to withdraw from the area of competition. The proportion of
the state sector in the economy is dropping and the proportion of non-state
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sectors are rising and even exceeding that of the state sector. It would be falling
far behind the changes in the economic system if the CPC and the government
continue overall control and excessive involvement in the economy. Continuing
the strategy of taking economic development as the central task would result
in excessive intervention in micro-economic activities and there would be people
who would create all kinds of economic rents and political rents, which are the
sources of daily worsening corruption.
Second, taking economic development as the central task cannot automati-
cally ensure long-term peace and stability. For longer than the past twenty years,
China has experienced sustained high-speed growth, resulting in unparalleled
economic prosperity. But economic prosperity will not necessarily or automat-
ically lead to social equality, social fairness and social stability. Chinese history
shows that more often than not, serious social crisis occurs during periods of
economic prosperity. The experience of many other developing economies also
shows that the growth of inequality and unfairness would suddenly stall, reverse
and even collapse due to social crises. At present, China has entered another
period of social instability, as evidenced by the biggest flood of lay-offs and
unemployment in the world caused by an economic restructuring on the biggest
in scale in the world, the most significant disparities between town and country
and among different regions; the fastest growth in Gini coefficiency in the
world; the most serious corruption in the world and the biggest economic cost
caused by it; and the biggest damage to the ecological environment in the world.
There are also structurally destabilizing factors in economic and social activi-
ties. Sustained economic growth has not dissolved these destabilizing factors.
On the contrary, it has reinforced them. Practice over the past two decades
shows that economic development and political stability are guaranteed when
social justice is ensured (such as in the beginning and middle periods of the
1980s); whereas economic development and political stability are threatened
when social justice is sacrificed, as in the latter half of the 1990s. We hold that
unequal social distribution is the ultimate root cause of social instability in
China. So, curtailing inequality in distribution and correcting social injustice
have not only become a problem of ethics but also a social problem that threatens
social stability and a political problem that threatens the stability of political
power of the state. Economic development is the hard truth, though social justice
is also a hard truth.3 Persistence in pursuing “common prosperity” is not only
the greatest superiority of socialism but also the basis of the legality of the
CPC and its government. Whether or not to persist in seeking “common pros-
perity” and prevent polarization is the crucial mark of success or failure in
reform. As early as ten years ago, Deng Xiaoping sounded the warning: “Things
would be quite different when indulging in polarization, as that would give rise
to national conflicts, regional conflicts and class conflicts and correspondingly
the conflicts between the center and localities, which would lead to distur-
bances.”4 In fact, China has been one of the countries in the world with the
biggest income inequality (Gini coefficient), and is more and more likely to
become an unequal society. Solutions to the contradictions cannot rely only on
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making the “cake” bigger. What is most important is to build basic systems of
the state, including an income distribution system, social security system, transfer
payments system, and people’s democratic participation system so as to ensure
the prevention of polarization institutionally.
Third, taking institution building as the central task requires the moderniza-
tion of state institutions. The modernization of a country should include at least
two major aspects: one is economic modernization, such as modernization of
agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defense; the other is
institutional modernization, that is, modernization of the basic systems of the
country, instituting “good governance,” ensuring the maximization of the state
interests and the welfare of the whole people. Institution building includes the
country’s basic systems and “infrastructure facilities.” It is highly correlated
and complementary to economic development and modernization. To realize
modernization of the system of a country is not only the most important objec-
tive of a modern country but also a typical national public good. Without
modernization of state systems, there would be no way of realizing economic
modernization. Over the past half century, economic modernization has been
initiated and promoted by CPC and its government but it is still necessary for
the CPC and its government to direct and guide and motivate all kinds of main
players in economic activities, for it is only up to the CPC and the government
to consciously initiate and lead the institutional modernization of China and put
it into practice, building a modern society with a high degree of democracy
and legal system while making the people’s life well-off.
Institutional modernization is a process. It is a long historical process of insti-
tutional innovation, systems building and practice according to the national
conditions and on the basis of assimilating and borrowing the experience and
knowledge about modernized states. It is conducive to lowering the manage-
ment cost of the country, regulating the interests of different social groups,
safeguarding social order and the trading rules necessary for economic activi-
ties, carrying out the most extensive income distribution and the accessibility
and provision of public services in order to improve the human capital condi-
tions of the people of the whole country.5 Institution building is not economic
development, but the basic condition for stimulating economic growth and
sustainable development.
Fourth, institution building is a major transition in the way the CPC exer-
cises political power. Chinese society has not only experienced economic
transition, that is, from a planned economy to a market economy, but also social
transition, that is, from an agricultural society to an industrialized society and
from a rural society to an urban society. The success of these two kinds of
transition depend on voluntary transition and the success of the CPC as the
ruling Party. Since 1978, the CPC has realized the first transition, that is, from
the rule by revolutionary method to the rule by administrative means and from
a revolutionary Party to a developmental Party, a ruling party that makes
economic development its main task. The Party is capable of promoting
economic development, but lacks the capability of solving social contradictions
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and conflicts. This requires the voluntary second transition required by the
economic and social development, that is, from the rule by administrative means
to the rule by political means and from direct government (first level) rule to
indirect rule.6 The principal meaning of the political legality of the Party lies
not in the popular support and approval by the people when the ruling party
has positively satisfied the interests of the people, but in winning the under-
standing of the people, who will not rise up to overthrow its rule when it cannot
bring positive results to the people and even brings negative and passive results
to them. Do not think that making the cake bigger can ease all contradictions
or crises. With the marketization and globalization of the economy, the capa-
bilities of the government to control the national economy will become weaker
and weaker. If its legitimacy continues to be founded on economic growth, this
is no different than trusting its destiny to an outside accidental force.
The history of the CPC shows a historical process of constant innovation,
timely adjustment and voluntary reform. The CPC’s political program and polit-
ical orientation have been changing since the founding of New China. It has
by and large experienced three important periods: 1953–1957, when the basic
program of the Party was industrialization and the socialist transformation of
agriculture, handicraft industry and capitalist industry and commerce, which
created an upsurge in socialist construction. This is the first period of economic
construction. The years 1957–1978, when the CPC changed its basic program
into one of “taking class struggle as the key link,” was the period of class
struggle and the Cultural Revolution. Since 1978, when the Fifteenth National
Party Congress of the CPC reversed its basic program to economic develop-
ment, opened up the second period of economic construction.7 We hold that
entering the twenty-first century, the Party’s program and central task, marked
by the Sixteenth Party Congress, should be shifted to building modern state
systems to open up an era of institution building.
The transition of the CPC is crucial to the success of social transition, mar-
ket transition and governmental transition. The internal development model
shows that the CPC needs “self-reform, self-innovation, self-transition and self-
construction.” The external challenges indicate that the CPC needs “keen deter-
mination in making progress, constant innovation, voluntary transition and
strictness in Party building.”
The time is ripe for accelerating the building of socialist
political democracy
The basic systems of the state should include at least two major aspects: one
is the building of the socialist economic system, that is, the socialist market
economic system; the other is the building of the socialist political system, that
is, the socialist political democratic system. In reality, the CPC has started insti-
tution building and institutional innovation from the Fourteenth National Party
Congress when it set the goal of building a socialist market economic system.
Over the past ten years, China has made major progress in economic construction
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and now it needs a clear objective in reforming the political system, giving it
more strength.
Concomitant with economic reform and opening up to the outside world,
China’s reform of the political system is different from the political reform (polit-
ical democracy) of other transitional economies. China’s political reform aims
at promoting economic development. China has maintained relative political
stability and social stability for as long as a whole generation. The core of polit-
ical stability is the stability of the collective leadership. In the 1980s, China
experienced three major personnel reshuffles: Hua Guofeng in 1982, Hu Yaobang
in 1986 and Zhao Ziyang in 1989. But Deng Xiaoping played a crucial role in
maintaining stability. In the 1990s, the leadership change tended to be institu-
tionalized. But the objectives of reform of the political system are not clear, just
as Deng Xiaoping pointed out in 1980 that “there is no fundamental change in
the drawbacks of the leadership system of the Party and state. In some aspects,
the political reform has not only made no progress but regressed. Besides, corrup-
tion has become increasingly outstanding with each passing day, which has
become a serious hidden trouble and the biggest social pollution.” Compared
with economic development, political development is relatively slow. Compared
with reform of the economic system, reform of the political system has been
left far behind. Compared with opening up, the competition mechanism of the
survival of the fittest has not been established in the Party, the government and
the People’s Congress and other power organs. In a word, the current political
system has seriously hampered economic transition and the establishment of the
socialist democratic system. It has become the biggest institutional bottleneck.
To reform the Party and state systems is the core of the construction of a polit-
ical system and also a fundamental principle for China’s modernization (economic
modernization and institutional modernization). It should, therefore, become the
central task of the Party.
The political report to the Twelfth National Party Congress at the beginning
of reform put forward not only the objectives of economic construction but also
the objectives for institution building as it said that the building of a high degree
of socialist democracy is the fundamental objective and one of the fundamental
tasks of the CPC. But the latter has never been listed in the central work and
priority tasks of the CPC. Institution building has been left far behind eco-
nomic construction and development of democracy has been left far behind
economic development.
To build a socialist political democratic system should be one of the main
themes in the reform of the political system. Just as the market economy is not
the “patented good” of capitalism, neither is political democracy that of capi-
talism. Socialism can promote political democracy just as well. Deng Xiaoping
once said that without democracy, there would be no socialism or socialist
modernization. The building of the basic systems of the state is to build a
socialist political democracy and other basic systems that ensure the long-term
peace and stability of the country.
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We may say that the Fourteenth and Fifthteenth National Party Congresses
laid down the institutional framework for building a socialist market economy
and the Sixteenth National Party Congress put forward a new institutional
conception of how to build a socialist political democratic system.
We deem the time to be ripe for accelerating the pace of building such a
system. To build a high degree of socialist democracy is not a dream. This
manifests itself in the following: First, it is already more than twenty years
since China introduced economic reform. The CPC has accumulated a wealth
of experience in handling the relations between reform, development and stability
and has built fairly mature theories about it. Reform is a process of constant
practice and learning. The experience and knowledge of leaders learned in
economic reform, in particular, provide some of the most favorable conditions
for promoting and directing the reform of the political system, which may help
avert major policy decision blunders and social turmoil. Secondly, China’s
economic development has prepared good foundations for the reform of the
political system. China’s macro-economy is now in a most stable period, without
inflation, without fluctuation, which serves as a good basis and environment for
carrying out political reform. Thirdly, the historical experience and lessons of
the former Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries in political
reform have enabled state leaders and people to understand that the best option
is to maintain social stability and adopt incremental reforms. Fourthly, the reform
of the political system is a matter of major importance that we have wanted to
do for years but lacked the necessary conditions and capabilities. It directly
concerns the future of China.
What should be the objectives of building a socialist political democratic
system? Deng Xiaoping once put forward three objectives and criteria in 1980,
that is, catching up with capitalist countries economically; creating a democracy
that is higher and more practicable than that of capitalist countries; and training
more outstanding personnel than these countries.
The report to the Thirteenth National Party Congress in 1987 put forward
the near- and long-term goals for the reform of the political system. The long-
term goal is to build a socialist political system with a high degree of democracy,
a perfect legal system, efficiency and vitality. The near-term goal is to build a
leadership system useful in raising efficiency, enhancing vitality and in moti-
vating initiatives in all quarters, that is, separating the Party from the govern-
ment, further delegating powers, reforming government agencies, reforming the
personnel system, building a socialist social consultation and dialogue system,
improving a number of systems for socialist democratic politics and strength-
ening socialist legal construction. It stressed the limitation of the near-term goal.
But the pity is that the ensuing party congresses did not pursue the concrete
goals of political reform; neither did they work out a policy timetable.
We hold that, based on actual national conditions, the long-term goal for the
reform of the political system should be set at building a socialist political
democratic system and, on the basis of the goals set by the Thirteenth National
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Party Congress, we must add the goal of broad participation. At the same time,
it is necessary to set more achievable limited near-term goals, such as making
policy decisions more scientific and democratic; avoiding major policy blun-
ders; realizing horizontal and vertical restrictions in power in order to prevent
over-concentration and abuse of power; realizing the broadest possible people’s
democracy and ensuring the people’s participation in the handling and discus-
sion of state affairs and exercising democratic supervision over and assessment
of the performances of the Party and government; building transparent, open
and perfect leadership organs of the Party and state and a personnel system and
providing incentives for internal competition among different departments and
working personnel, making them capable of working both at the top and down
below.
Basic contents of institution building
The modernization of state systems in the twenty-first century is a process of
institutional transition and institutional innovation. This includes at least two
aspects: one is how to build a socialist democratic system, which is a process
of political democracy; the second is state building that is compatible with the
system of a socialist market economy and complementary to economic global-
ization. The basic purpose is to design a basic conception that ensures people’s
democracy and state building institutionally. This includes five major objectives
of institution state building and eight mechanisms of institution building and
four major political reforms for institutional changes.
The five major objectives of state building: What is state building? We hold
that state building is to prepare the institutional conditions, environment and
functions that would ensure good governance, and the ultimate goal of good
governance is to maximize state interests and the welfare of the whole people
and to ensure the representation and realization of the fundamental interests of
the people. For China, the five fundamental objectives are: state security and
territorial integrity; economic development and economic stability; social justice
and security of the people; political transparency and probity and social stability;
ecological balance and environmental protection. The five objectives are inter-
related and none can be dispensed with. The realization of one objective must
be in tandem with other objectives. The five objectives interact on one another
and complement one another. The realization of one objective is conducive to
the realization of the other.
A country is a “mechanism” which monopolizes the lawful use of coercive
powers that are exercised by the society formed by a given territory and the
residents in the territory.8 However different in ideology and political power,
all states are in essence institutional arrangements of public power.9
The basic systems of a state include the following eight mechanisms: coercive
mechanism; uptake mechanism; common understanding mechanism; regulatory
mechanism; coordination mechanism; expression mechanism; integration mech-
anism; and redistribution mechanism.
Transition of the Communist Party of China 231
Coercive mechanism
The government of a modern state must have a regular army to defend its sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity. If the armed forces of a government do not
have a monopoly power, there would be fighting among different warlords. A
modern state must have a well-trained and well-disciplined police force to main-
tain law and order. The army and police must be fully provided for by the state
finance. They are not allowed to go into businesses or collect fees. Otherwise,
the capabilities of the army to defend the country and the capacities of the police
force in maintaining law and order would be greatly weakened or even become
destabilizing factors.
Uptake capability mechanism
The financial capabilities of mobilizing and exploiting social resources so as to
provide basic public goods and public services to the society are of the basic
functions of the state.
Common understanding mechanism
The existence of a country and a political system must be based on a common
understanding of some basic values. The most important values are identifica-
tion and loyalty to the national state, which must respect and protect the rights
of the citizens. The core value reflects the common ideas and the crystalliza-
tion of the convictions of the people. What needs pointing out is that core
values are never spontaneous, but are conceived and spread consciously by the
state. Once formed, such core values can greatly reduce the cost of state manage-
ment or the cost of governance and can increase the efficiency of implementing
public policy.
Regulatory mechanism
Asymmetry of information and powers are universal in economic and social
activities. Asymmetry of information between doctors and patients is likely to
lead to a sharp rise in medical fees; asymmetry of information between forgers
and consumers would create a glut in the market of forged and shoddy goods;
asymmetry of power between the boss and his workers would lead to deterio-
ration of working conditions and the frequent occurrence of work injuries. A
state must, therefore, standardize economic behavior and social behavior.
Coordination mechanism
Government functionaries and government agencies are necessary, but they
themselves may entail many problems, such as being unable to live up to their
jobs or seeking personal gain by abusing their powers. The central government
agencies and local governments may resort to departmentalism or localism. A
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modern state must, therefore, establish a standard public service system and an
honest government system to ensure quality and probity of their personnel and
must set up all kinds of rules and regulations to ensure that all departments
and governments at all levels exercise administrative powers according to law
and safeguard the unification of the state machine.
Expression mechanism
With the rise in educational levels and the increase in information flow, people
have enhanced their desire and power to participate in politics. In face of the
demand for popular participation, the government must establish institutional-
ized channels of expression. Otherwise, such demand is likely to be expressed
by ways other than institutionalized and peaceful means.
Integration mechanism
The aspirations and opinions expressed by the people are often many and various.
In order to reflect the voices of the people in public policies, it is necessary to
integrate the popular views through political parties and other mechanisms (trade
unions, Chinese Political Consultative Conference and people’s congresses).
Redistribution mechanism
Under market economy conditions, due to various reasons (such as handicaps,
seriously illness, work injuries, unemployment and old age), there might be
wide variation in economic life and uncertainties in social life. In order to
reduce the sense of insecurity and narrow the inequality caused by primary
distribution, the state must, through laws and administrative means, draw on
economic resources from the national income and redistribute the results of the
primary distribution based on the idea that all citizens, irrespective of residence,
profession, gender, educational level and age, so that all members of the society
share the results of economic development and social progress.
The preceding eight mechanisms show that China is still facing the tasks of
institution building or reconstruction of the state systems. This will not only be
favorable for settling all kinds of social crises but will also lay a solid institu-
tional foundation for introducing democratic politics. We shall provide a series
of systematic study reports on the necessity and feasibilities for the institutional
building in the eight aspects.10 We shall publish other reports in the next few
months.
Four political reforms
The establishment of the basic state systems and the reform of the political sys-
tem are highly complementary to each other. To establish a socialist democratic
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political system requires political reforms in four major areas, namely, reform
of the CPC, reform of the people’s congresses, reform of the government and
reform of the justice system. The reforms in the four major areas interact upon
and reinforce each other.
Reform the CPC
The CPC is facing a series of challenges that are unparallel in history, very
grave and mutually associated.11 First of all, the Party is seriously divided in
diversified interests, giving rise to many people with vested interests and vested
interest groups. This is a period in which an unhealthy tendency within the
Party is rife and corruption is the most serious for the past eighty years. The
Party is facing a period of grave danger, of accelerated degeneration. The root
cause is the lack of de facto democratic and open supervision and a strict control
mechanism and system. Secondly, this is a historical period in which the rela-
tions between the Party and the people and between the government and the
people are the most strained, which seriously corrodes and weakens the foun-
dation for the Party to exercise its political power and the legitimacy of the
government. The Party and its organizations have seriously estranged them-
selves from the people as the interests of the people are not fully reflected in
the resolutions and policy decisions of the Party. On the contrary, such reso-
lutions and policy decisions have been strongly influenced by groups of vested
interests. When the immediate interests of the people are harmed, they cannot
obtain effective protection or timely compensation. On the contrary, the groups
of vested interests and monopolistic groups are protected or occupy dominant
positions. Lastly, the Communist Party of China has long been facing tremen-
dous external pressure in exercising its political power. We must be fully aware
of the fact that the essence of economic globalization is the globalization of
capitalism or the economic, political and cultural globalization of capitalism.
The Western countries headed by the United States have always had economic
and military “hard hegemonism” as well as information and ideological “soft
hegemonism.” The basic pattern of the world is no longer “the east wind prevails
over the west wind” but “the west wind prevails over the east wind.” So long
as the CPC is in power and so long as China persists in its socialist road, we
shall be in a “passive position of being attacked” and in a relatively isolated
position.
The most important strategy for coping with the real challenges from both
inside and outside is to take the initiative to reform itself.
The objectives of the reform of the CPC should be: establish a true democratic
ruling Party that represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming major-
ity of the people. China’s reform first of all requires the reform of the CPC, and
the reform of the CPC must be based on the democratic principle so as to become
a truly democratic ruling Party. The democratic system of the Party can ensure
that the Party represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority
of the people and governs the Party according to its constitution.
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The CPC is a ruling Party. The establishment of a democratic system in
China depends on the establishment of an inner Party democratic system. From
the day of the birth of the CPC, it was clearly determined that it should build
an inner Party democratic system. It is, therefore, a political party with a
democratic tradition. But over the history of more than eighty years, Party
leaders violated the inner Party democracy on many occasions, for which the
Party paid the political price. The Party constitution has clearly provided that
the democratic nature and democratic system of the Party is the basic system
that ensures that the Party represents the maximum interests of the people in
wielding political power, and prevents the degeneration of the Party’s organs,
dictatorial actions of Party leaders and corruption of Party officials. But the
reality is far from what is provided in the constitution, or the words and actions
do not match. The core of the principle of managing the Party strictly is to
abide by the constitution. Even the revision of the Party constitution should be
done according to the procedures clearly provided in the constitution.12
First, according to the democratic principle clearly provided in the Party
constitution, the National Congress of the Party and the Central Committee of
the CPC must have clear new democratic decision-making procedures so as to
ensure the formation of the most authoritative and concessionary political prin-
ciples and policies, to ensure that Party representatives fully discuss and debate
problems of major importance without interference from the outside (as in
closed-door discussions) so as to provide opportunities to express all kinds of
opinions (such as conference bulletins and internal information exchanges, which
are good information sharing channels), to ensure that representatives and CPC
central committee members freely speak their minds without fear of punish-
ment or personal attacks against people who express different points of view.
There must be a strict ban on political persecution of any description.
Second, Article 16 of the Party constitution provides: “In taking decisions,
Party organizations must implement the principle of the minority being subor-
dinate to the majority.” The term “Party organizations” should include the CPC
Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and
the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
Party resolutions should be adopted or vetoed by secret ballot and by over-
whelming majority of the CPC Central Committee members and Party member
representatives. If necessary, the results of voting should be made open within
the Party. The different opinions of the minority should be given full review.
If disputes arise on major issues and the number of people on both sides is
very close, except in emergency situations, decisions should be taken according
to the views of the majority of the representatives, or decisions should be post-
poned to allow more investigations and study and exchange of views for
discussion at the next meeting as provided in Article 16 of the Party constitu-
tion. What needs to be clarified is that resolutions that are not voted for but
get the approval of the majority should not be made Party resolutions. If such
a resolution is the proposal of some leaders, it may be reserved or left for
discussion next time, but it cannot be regarded as the resolution of the Party.
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Third, it is necessary to intensify the two-way democratic supervision system
from top to bottom and from bottom to top. In the past, stress was laid in the
inner Party supervision of local Party organizations by the Central Committee
and this is very necessary. However, we should also stress the inner Party super-
vision from bottom to top according to relevant provisions of the Party
constitution. This includes the democratic supervision by the Political Bureau
of the CPC Central Committee over its standing committee, the democratic
supervision of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee by the CPC
Central Committee and the democratic supervision of the CPC Central
Committee by the National Congress. Apart from the functions and powers of
the National Congress as provided for by the Party constitution (six in all), it
is necessary to clearly define the functions and powers of the plenary session
of the CPC Central Committee, which should include hearing and reviewing
and voting on reports by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
or its standing committee; hearing, examining and voting on the report by the
Central Discipline Inspection Commission, hearing, examining and voting on
the report by the Organizational Department of the CPC Central Committee;
discussing and deciding on matters of major importance concerning the Party;
co-opting or re-electing members to the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
Committee and members of the CPC Central Committee, and co-opting or re-
electing members to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. The plenary
session of the CPC Central Committee should make normal changes and adjust-
ments to personnel according to the provisions of retirement age, needs of work
and requirements for exchange of cadres. During the plenary session of the
CPC Central Committee, CPC Central Committee members and alternate
members and observers should give objective comments and positive sugges-
tions with regard to the reports by the CPC Political Bureau, the Central
Discipline Inspection Commission and the CPC Organizational Department. In
order to maintain the principle of “correctly carrying out criticism and self-crit-
icism in the political life of the Party” as provided for by the General Principles
of the Party constitution, it is necessary to formulate procedures and imple-
mentation rules for carrying out criticism and self-criticism in the Political
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, the National Congress of the CPC and
the CPC Central Committee to make them institutionalized and regular and, if
necessary, they should be published inside the Party (Party Congresses at all
levels and all Party committees should follow the above-mentioned practices).
Fourth, it is necessary to provide institutionally the terms of offices and
retirement age for Party leaders. The core of the reform of the Party is the
normalization and institutionalization of the leadership change so as to ensure
relative stability of the leading groups and at the same time realize the insti-
tutionalization of the succession procedures for Party leadership and ensure the
continuity of the Party’s line and principles. First of all, it is necessary to clarify
the functions, powers and term of office of the Party General Secretary and the
procedures for election when the post is vacated. As the CPC is a ruling Party,
the term of office of Party General Secretary should be the same as the President
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of the People’s Republic of China as provided for in the state constitution and
the extension of the terms should not exceed two terms. Apart from the provi-
sions of Article 21 of the party constitution that “the General Secretary is
responsible for calling meetings of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
Committee and its standing committee and presides over the work of the secre-
tariat of the CPC Central Committee,” it should also provide for the specific
functions and powers of the General Secretary so as to make him a leader with
limited rather than unlimited powers. It should also provide for the procedures
to follow when the post of the General Secretary is vacant. Secondly, there
must also be a limit on the terms of office for members of the Political Bureau
of the CPC Central Committee and members of the Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. The terms of office should not
be too long, so as to enhance the liquidity of the leading body, which is
conducive to maintaining the innovative power and vitality of the collective
leadership of the Party. Thirdly, the retirement age for central leaders should
be clearly defined. In 1982, the CPC Central Committee clearly stipulated the
retirement age for provincial and ministerial level officials (including deputies).
Now it is necessary for the central leadership to clearly define the retirement
age so that it would become normal for leaders to retire at the prescribed age
and ensure the institutionalization and stability of leadership change.
Fifth, it is necessary to prevent any leader from exercising individual auto-
cracy and to ban any form of personality cult. The CPC is a unified entity that
has been organized according to the principle of democratic centralism and it
exercises a high degree of centralism on the basis of a high degree of democracy.
Article 16 of the Party constitution provides: “Any Party member, irrespective
of official ranking, cannot make decisions on issues of major importance” and
“it is not allowed to exercise individual autocracy and put individuals above
Party organizations.” Article 10 of the Party constitution provides: “The Party
bans any form of personality cult and it is imperative to ensure that the activ-
ities of Party leaders are subject to supervision by the Party and people and 
at the same time safeguard the prestige of leaders that represent the interests
of the Party and people.” It is, therefore, necessary to incorporate into the Party
constitution the following provisions made at the second plenary session of the
Seventh CPC Central Committee: “Celebration of the birthdays of Party leaders
is forbidden. Naming places, streets and enterprises after Party leaders is like-
wise forbidden. We must keep to our style of plain living and hard work and
put a stop to flattery and exaggerated praises.”13 It should also be added that
Party leaders are not allowed to write inscriptions in their personal names and
the signatures of Party leaders on public buildings and public places should be
treated properly. There should also be clear stipulations about the rules governing
foreign visits and internal inspections by Party leaders. The TV coverage
(national news program) of Party leaders should be strictly defined, with neces-
sary restrictions. Except for major events or major political problems, there
should be no report or they should be reported briefly.
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Sixth, it is necessary to stick to the principle that “party leadership is chiefly
political, ideological and organizational leadership” as stipulated in the General
Program of the Party Constitution, to redefine the relationship between Party
and administration and introduce political rule and let the Party withdraw from
administrative areas to intensify the management functions of the government,
and to encourage social participation and introduce a new type of “social gover-
nance.” At the central level, it is good for the Party general secretary to
concurrently take up the post of the president of the state; at the local levels,
local Party secretaries take up the post as chairman of the local people’s congress
at the same level. This is conducive to the Party exercising leadership and super-
vision over the government. The Party does not participate in the handling of
specific administrative affairs but represents the people in exercising political
power and supervising the government through the constitution and law and
other means and through the institutional arrangement of the People’s Congress.
For instance, Article 92 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China
provides: The State Council is responsible, and reports on its work, to the
National People’s Congress or, when the National People’s Congress is not in
session, to its Standing Committee.
Reform of the National People’s Congress (NPC)
The second task of China’s political reform is to change the system of the NPC
standing committee to make the “rubber stamp,” “political home for the aged”
a people’s democratic policy decision-making system that is true to its name.
First of all, there is serious discrimination against the rural population in the
distribution of the number of people’s deputies. There is one rural people’s
deputy for every 960,000 rural people while there is one people’s deputy for
every 260,000 urban people, four times that of the rural areas. This has not
only violated what is stipulated in Article 33 of the constitution, that is, “all
citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equals before the law,” but also
violates Article 34 of the constitution, that is, “All citizens of the People’s
Republic of China who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and
stand for election, regardless of nationality, race, sex, occupation, family back-
ground, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence, except
persons deprived of political rights according to law.” In addition, it has created
differences in the number of people’s deputies per one million people, with
areas with a high proportion of urban population, such as Tianjin, Beijing and
Shanghai, having more people’s deputies per one million people, and rural areas
where the proportion of one million people is less, such as Henan, Hebei and
ten other provinces (see Table 12.1) having fewer deputies. The unequal distri-
bution of political resources with regard to the number of people’s deputies has
a direct bearing on the unequal distribution of economic resources. We have
found that the per capita transfer payments in various areas are closely associated
with the number of people’s deputies per one million people.
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Secondly, the current National People’s Congress lacks broad representation
as it has become more and more elite both politically and intellectually and
less and less connected to the common people and the workers and peasants.
The changes in the makeup of the people’s deputies of all National People’s
Congresses show that the proportion of communists in the Ninth NPC was 
as high as 71.3 percent versus only 54.48 percent in the First NPC; the pro-
portion of cadres and intellectuals and their combination rose to 33.2 percent,
Transition of the Communist Party of China 239
Table 12.1 Number of people’s deputies per one million persons in various areas (2000)
Total population Number of deputies %
(10000) per million persons, 
Ninth NPC
National 126583 2979 2.35
Beijing 1382 59 4.27
Tianjin 1001 45 4.5
Hebei 6744 120 1.78
Shanxi 3297 68 2.06
Inner Mongolia 2376 57 2.4
Liaoning 4238 116 2.74
Jilin 2728 72 2.64
Heilongjiang 3689 105 2.85
Shanghai 1674 67 4
Jiangsu 7438 151 2.03
Zhejiang 4677 89 1.9
Anhui 5986 112 1.87
Fujian 3471 64 1.84
Jiangxi 4140 79 1.91
Shandong 9079 185 2.04
Henan 9256 163 1.76
Hubei 6028 126 2.09
Hunan 6440 119 1.85
Guangdong 8642 166 1.92
Guangxi 4489 90 2
Hainan 787 18 2.29
Chongqing 3090 58 1.88
Sichuan 8329 151 1.81
Guizhou 3525 66 1.87
Yunnan 4288 88 2.5
Tibet 262 20 7.63
Shaanxi 3605 67 1.86
Gansu 2562 46 1.8
Qinghai 518 19 3.67
Ningxia 562 18 3.2
Xinjiang 1925 59 3.06
Army 250 268 107.2
Source: Numbers of People’s Deputies is from http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/item/lianghui/zlhb/
rd_9.htm. Population of various areas is from National Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook
2001, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2001.
21.1 percent and 54.3 percent from 13.38 percent, 14.96 percent and 28.34
percent in the Fifth NPC; the proportion of workers and peasants and their
combination dropped from 26.71 percent, 20.59 percent and 47.3 percent to
10.8 percent, 8.0 percent and 18.8 percent (see Table 12.2).
Thirdly, the current standing committee of the NPC is more and more like
a “political home for the aged” for senior Party and government officials. Article
65 of the constitution provides that “The Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress is composed of the following: The Chairman; The Vice-
Chairmen; The Secretary-General; and Members. Minority nationalities are
entitled to appropriate representation on the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress. The National People’s Congress elects, and has the power
to recall, all those on its Standing Committee. No one on the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress shall hold any post in any of the adminis-
trative, judicial or procuratorial organs of the state.” However, most of the
members, chairmen, vice-chairmen and the Secretary General of the NPC
Standing Committee and the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the sub-commit-
tees had served in state administrative agencies, judicial organs and procuratorial
organs and most of them are above the retirement age as provided by the CPC
Central Committee in 1982. Such non-institutional arrangements (not nominated
and elected by people’s deputies) lack proper representation (especially of the
peasants who make up two-thirds of the national population) and at the same
time have weakened the abilities of the NPC to supervise the government.
As the basic political and democratic institution of the People’s Republic of
China and also the foundation for a transparent political system, the National
People’s Congress bears the fundamental tasks of representing the people and
fully exercising its democratic power to supervise the government, to restrict
the government and to help realize good social governance and to fight serious
corruption within the government.
Reform of the NPC and its standing committee must occur within the system
provided by the basic principles of the Constitution of the People’s Republic
of China. The objective of reform is to genuinely establish people’s democratic
policy decision-making mechanisms, not in name only, so as to give effect to
the established provisions for supervision and restriction of the government by
the NPC, and to win the trust of the people in implementing, protecting and
defending the constitution. The NPC must become the true representative of
the people instead of a “club for political and intellectual elites” or the retreat
for senior Party and government officials after retirement.
It is, therefore, necessary to distribute the number of people’s deputies equally.
According to the provisions of Article 33 of the constitution, “All persons
holding the nationality of the People’s Republic of China are citizens of the
People’s Republic of China. All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are
equal before the law. Every citizen enjoys the rights and at the same time must
perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law.” Further, the
rural population should receive “national treatment” and all discriminatory provi-
sions against the rural people should be scrapped and there should be introduced,































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































instead, urban–rural unified, equal, open and democratic elections. According
to the provisions of Article 34 of the constitution, “All citizens of the People’s
Republic of China who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and
stand for election, regardless of nationality, race, sex, occupation, family back-
ground, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence, except
persons deprived of political rights according to law,” and, further, peasant-
workers in urban areas, whether temporary or resident, should all have the equal
right to vote and stand for election.
Second, the national people’s deputies should have broad representation and
it is necessary to increase the proportion of people from all walks of life. The
preamble of the constitution clearly says: “In building socialism it is impera-
tive to rely on the workers, peasants and intellectuals and unite with all the
forces that can be united.” And Article 2 provides: “All power in the People’s
Republic of China belongs to the people.” In order to reflect the basic princi-
ples of the constitution, more workers, peasants and other laboring people should
serve as people’s deputies to the National People’s Congress and there should
be fewer CPC members, reducing it to 54.48 percent as in the first NPC. There
should be control of the deputies from non-communist parties (the proportion
of deputies from these parties has reached 15.5 percent while the total popu-
lation of these parties makes up less than 1 percent). Their proportion should
be controlled at a percentage only slightly higher than the proportion of their
population. There should be fewer deputies from cadres and intellectuals. The
proportion of people’s deputies from the army should be cut sharply (their
proportion is one per 10,000 people), with the number of deputies achieved by
these cuts to be distributed among other population groups.
Third, according to the provisions of Article 65 of the constitution, “No one
on the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress shall hold any
post in any of the administrative, judicial or procuratorial organs of the state,”
and members of the NPC standing committee shall not be those who hold
administrative, investigative or procuratorial posts after retirement. Article 56
provides that “the National People’s Congress elects and has the right to remove
members of the NPC standing committee” and specifies how to elect and how
to remove NPC standing committee members. NPC standing committee members
should be elected directly by the people’s deputies and the proportions of the
number of nominees should be expanded. NPC standing committee members
should be full-time rather than half-time. During their tenure, they should be
independent of their original units and should enjoy the allowances and bene-
fits provided by the state. Their term of office should not be more than two
years and they should make open commitments to the state and the people.
Fourth, Article 73 of the constitution provides: “Deputies to the National
People’s Congress during its sessions, and all those on its Standing Committee
during its meetings, have the right to address questions, in accordance with pro-
cedures prescribed by law, to the State Council or the ministries and commis-
sions under the State Council, which must answer the questions in a responsible
manner.” The provisions need to be specified. For instance, the NPC Standing
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Committee or its sub-committees should address questions to leaders of gov-
ernment ministries and commissions no less than one time per year and should
vote on the report on the questioning. When necessary, the questioning sessions
should be open to the national people’s deputies or the public or broadcast live
by radio and TV so that the people of the whole country can have the right of
information just as NPC standing committee members. The people’s government
should put the results of their policies and programs and their implementation
under the supervision of the people.
Fifth, in order to implement the provisions (9) and (10) of Article 62 of the
constitution about the powers and functions of the NPC “to examine and approve
the plan for national economic and social development and the reports on its
implementation,” “to examine and approve the state budget and the report on
its implementation” and the provisions (5) of Article 67 about the functions
and powers of the NPC Standing Committee to “examine and approve the state
budget and the report on its implementation,” it is necessary to clarify the proce-
dures, rights, obligations, agenda and agenda of questioning for the examination
and approval of the national economic and social development plans and budget
and final account by the NPC and its Standing Committee. The key to erasing
its image as a “rubber stamp” lies in the right of examining and approving the
fiscal and investment appropriations as clearly provided for in the constitution,
including vetoing and non-approval. The members of the NPC’s financial and
economic committee and budget committee, apart from central representatives,
should have one member from each province and each province have one vote
and final decisions should be taken according to majority vote on major invest-
ment projects and investment amounts put forward by the state planning
commission. The distribution plan for transfer payments and tax collection
should be, according to the provisions of Article 62 of the Constitution, submitted
to the annual NPC session for examination and approval. The NPC has the
right to examine and approve major expenditure projects, investment estimates
for trans-provincial major projects, the expenditure budget, project schedule and
quality, project management and returns. Sub-committees of the NPC Standing
Committee have the right to examine and approve relative state projects and
report them to the NPC and, if necessary, to reveal the projects to the whole
country so as to subject major public spending and public projects to supervision
by the people.
Sixth, apart from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme
People’s Court, which must report to the NPC on their fight against corruption,
all anti-corruption organizations of the government, such as the Ministry of
Supervision, the Ministry of Justice, the Auditing Office, the Ministry of Public
Security and the Ministry of State Security, should report on the progress of
major measures against corruption in all fields of endeavor to the NPC Standing
Committee or its law sub-committee, which should designate a special group
to examine and discuss the reports. The reports to the NPC by the State Planning
Commission and the Ministry of Finance should have greater content on the
fight against corruption.
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Article 71 of the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” provides:
“The National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee may, when they
deem it necessary, appoint committees of inquiry into specific questions and
adopt relevant resolutions in the light of their reports. All organs of state, public
organizations and citizens concerned are obliged to supply the necessary informa-
tion to those committees of inquiry when they conduct investigations.” It is
necessary to make timely investigations into major corruption cases, especially
at the higher levels of government, major accidents, major economic costs and
major destabilizing events and make corresponding resolutions and timely
reports to the NPC and its Standing Committee and publish them. Citizens who
have provided related materials during investigations should be rewarded and
their personal safety should be protected.
Seventh, members of the NPC Standing Committee and people’s deputies
must declare their personal and family income sources, assets and liabilities as
they actually occur and accept open supervision and auditing. They must take
an oath and make a written guarantee to the state and the people that they will
not accept any forms of bribes and will not receive, collect, provide or actu-
ally enjoy any property and benefit from any person or organization. Otherwise,
they shall be regarded as having violated the law and their qualifications as
people’s deputies shall be terminated automatically or they shall be dismissed.
Eighth, the NPC Standing Committee and people’s deputies should have their
personal open websites to hear the views of the public and know what the
public suggests and should intensify their ties with the public so as to create a
situation of mutual action between the people’s deputies and the public and to
make people’s deputies truly mirror the will of the people as their title suggests.
Reform of the government
The objectives of the reform of the government are to enable the unlimited
government to become a limited government, to clarify the functions and powers
that are not clear enough in order to become a truly responsible government,
to enable an invisible government to become a visible government, to enable
a government that intervenes too much to become a government that provides
services and has a public finance system and simple and streamlined adminis-
trative examination and approval systems and an information provision and
disclosure system.
The state auditing organ must intensify its independent auditing and super-
vising functions. Article 91 of the constitution provides: “The State Council
establishes an auditing body to supervise through auditing the revenue and expen-
diture of all departments under the State Council and of the local governments
at different levels, and those of the state financial and monetary organizations
and of enterprises and undertakings. Under the direction of the Premier of the
State Council, the auditing body independently exercises its power to supervise
through auditing in accordance with the law, subject to no interference by any
other administrative organ or any public organization or individual.” In order to
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play its role as a watch-dog of the state finances, state assets and resources, the
auditing organ must have independence in operations and financial resources.
1 The State Auditing Office should submit an auditing report to the NPC
Standing Committee or the NPC and make public the results of auditing
and results of punishment;
2 The state should formulate detailed auditing procedures on fiscal spending
and state property management and receipts in order to effectively reduce
waste, the probability of corruption and possibilities of discovery and formu-
late regulations on punishments;
3 It is necessary to design a set of procedures for supervision over the use
and whereabouts of state property, sources of income, sales or rental of
state property in order to ensure that state property and income cannot be
appropriated at will or used for other purposes or lie idle;
4 The auditing organ should audit on behalf of the state major government
procurement and the use of money for major projects and report to the
State Council and the NPC Standing Committee and accept questioning by
people’s deputies;
5 The state shall ensure the sources of funds for the auditing office and the
funds should be appropriated directly by the budget committee of the NPC
Standing Committee;
6 The State Auditing Office should have an open website to encourage the
citizens and insiders to report irregularities and protect such citizens and
insiders;
7 The auditing office should publish its auditing manual, provide detailed
technical guidance and information, select and absorb competent and experi-
enced professional personnel. It should entrust well-reputed domestic or
foreign certified public accounting offices to undertake auditing of public
agencies and large state-owned units to make full use of the resources of
professional personnel.
Reform of the judicial system
The objective of the reform of the judicial system is to establish a relatively
independent judicial system to ensure law enforcement.
The establishment of an independent judicial system is one of the important
measures against corruption. By independence, we mean relative independence,
that is, the financial system should have an independent organization, inde-
pendent staff, independent sources of overhead expenses, and independent
enforcement of law. It is, therefore, recommended:
1 Judicial organs at all levels should be independent of administrative organs
at all levels; administrative organs at all levels must respect and ensure the
independence of judicial organs at all levels and they must not be allowed
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to interfere in the operation and routine affairs of judicial organs under any
pretext.
2 Judicial organs are independent legal organs of the state and they should
not follow the administrative grades and benefits of ordinary administra-
tive organs. Instead, they should introduce new judicial organizations and
legal personnel systems, such as a procuratorate system, judges system and
lawyers system. They should not be incorporated into the administrative
organizations. They should independently recruit or remove personnel,
openly selecting and appointing upright, capable and well-trained personnel
and qualified and experienced people to take up posts for the administra-
tion of justice. The selection and appointment of senior judicial personnel
should be done nationwide. Before accepting the appointments, people
should report to the judicial departments their personal or family income,
assets and liabilities. The state should ensure their old-age pension and
medical insurance after they retire.
3 Judicial organs at all levels should have their own independent budgets,
which shall not be listed in the government budget. The budget should be
verified, approved and appropriated by the Budget Committee of the NPC
at all levels to ensure that they have enough funds to operate indepen-
dently. They are strictly forbidden to engage in business activities or other
profit-taking activities; they are strictly forbidden to share any funds recov-
ered; judicial organs should have two lines of receipts and expenditure
within a limited period of time and report them to the NPC Standing
Committee.
It is necessary to clarify the public notice system concerning the appointment
and removal procedures and information announcements of pre-appointment.
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13 Making policy decision-making
more scientific, democratic,
systematic and specialized1
Reform and opening up have brought about not only high economic growth and
tremendous social changes, but also significant changes in the policy decision-
making mechanism. This indicates a shift from personal policy decision-making
to collective policy decision-making and a policy decision-making process with
extensive democratic participation, that is, a transition from non-transparent to
transparent policy decision-making or from autarkic to open policy decision-mak-
ing. Such changes reflect a good development trend, with society becoming more
and more progressive, politics becoming more democratic and the public becom-
ing more and more open. Thanks to major changes in economic development,
social progress and policy decision-making processes, all kinds of think tanks
have emerged. Scholars in all disciplines have actively offered their advice. So
have I over the past dozens of years.
Why does China need policy decision think-tanks and why does it need to
make policy decision-making more scientific, democratic and specialized? One
of the biggest lessons over the past fifty years after the founding of New China,
I think, is that major policy decision-making has had not only the biggest
successes but also the biggest errors. Since the founding of New China, China
has experienced three major policy blunders.2 The first is the persistence in
taking class struggle as the key link and frequent political movements until the
Great Cultural Revolution, which delayed the progress of China’s moderniza-
tion. The second is the eagerness for success in the guiding thinking for economic
development, which resulted in a number of big rises and big falls, causing
serious imbalances of major proportions, forcing major economic adjustments.
The third is the blunder in population policy and improper economic policy,
which led to blind growth of the population in the 1950s and 1960s. That caused
a heavy burden on social and economic development, which will take at least
half a century to overcome. Were it not for these big blunders, China’s economic
development would have been much smoother and more successful.
The “Great Leap Forward” movement and the “Great Cultural Revolution”
made China’s economy sustain tremendous losses. American China expert R.
Terrill held that the turmoil of the Great Leap Forward made China lose eight
years in its new Long March toward modernization.3 Terrill simulated the two
kinds of GDP growth curves under conditions with and without the Great Leap
Forward to estimate the losses caused by the Great Leap Forward. If calculated
by the logarithm according to the 1987 price, the GDP grew at an average
annual rate of 4.1 percent from 1952 to 1965 and grew at an average annual
rate of 8.6 percent from 1952 to 1957. The losses brought about by the Great
Leap Forward are mainly manifested in the difference between the real growth
curve after 1957 and the simulated curve (without Great Leap Forward). The
result is: the simulated curve for 1959–1960 was lower than the actual curve,
reflecting the fact that the simulated value is lower than the actual value in the
economic growth in 1958, 1959 and 1960, which is the result of abnormal
expansion. After 1961, the actual curve is much lower than the simulated curve,
with that for 1965 being 40 percent lower than the simulated curve. This shows
that the losses brought about by the Great Leap Forward, even during the later
rehabilitation period, are still lower than the GDP loss of 40 percent in the situ-
ation without the Great Leap Forward. According to Y. Kwan and G. Chow,
if there had not been the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution,
China’s economic growth after 1958 would have been quite different from what
has actually happened and the results would have been 2.7 times the real value
of the supposed output per labor for 1993.4
Reviewing the three major blunders, Bo Yibo said: “1958’s Great Leap
Forward was a response to 1957’s Party rectification movement and the anti-
rightist movement and the ensuing ‘anti-rightist conservationism’ and the Great
Leap Forward itself was the result of following closely the political storms in
taking economic policy decision-making.” The first round of the Great Leap
Forward made the national economy nearly “exhausted.” Yet, it was decided
to continue the great leap forward in 1960 in total disregard of the tremendous
difficulties. The continued Great Leap Forward met with grave setbacks, showing
clearly the undesirable results of following the political storm in taking policy
decisions for developing the economy. He held that an effective way for real-
izing democratic centralism is to institutionalize the democratic system and put
it into the legal code.5
Mao Zedong played a central role in the three major blunders. Both successes
and failures were attributed to him. This was the Mao Zedong era, during which
all major policy decisions were taken by himself. There were big successes and
also big failures. This is characteristic of the one-man policy decision-making
mechanism. In fact, there were also differences of views at the time, but these
views were suppressed and criticized. In the mid-1950s, non-Party economist
Ma Yinchu advocated for family planning to control population growth. Deng
Xiaoping put forward similar views and Zhou Enlai affirmed their views. But
Ma Yinchu fell victim to severe criticism and Deng Xiaoping’s views were not
adopted either. Peng Dehuai opposed the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s,
but he met with a cruel political struggle.6 In 1967, during the peak of the Great
Cultural Revolution, Tan Zhenlin and other veterans showed their disagreement
with the launch of the Great Cultural Revolution, but for this, they were labeled
as the “counter-current of February.” In 1975, Deng Xiaoping was suspended7
for his opposition to the idea that the Great Cultural Revolution was 70 percent
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a success and 30 percent a failure. This was an era of one-man policy deci-
sion-making. Such policy blunders could hardly be avoided, but neither could
they be corrected.
Up to the Deng Xiaoping era, the policy decision-making mechanism began
to be shifted toward a collective model. Here Deng Xiaoping displayed a posi-
tive and crucial role. His work experience as a central leader and his political
persecutions during the Cultural Revolution made him more deeply aware than
other leaders that the root cause of blunders was not a problem of personal
responsibility, but a problem of major defect in the policy decision-making
system. He once said: “The mistakes we have made in the past are certainly
associated with the thinking and style of work on the part of a certain leader,
but what is more important is that there are problems with the organizational
system and work rules. If the system is good, it may prevent bad persons from
running roughshod; if the system is not good, it makes a good person unable
to do good things and even go to the opposite.” “It is not that I am not account-
able for these blunders. It is the leadership system and organizational system
that are of fundamental importance and concern the situation of the whole
country and concern stability and long-term effects. Such a system concerns
whether the Party and the country would change their colors and it merits the
full attention of the whole Party.”8 At the national soft science work confer-
ence on July 31, 1986, the then vice-premier Wan Li was the first to call for
more democratic and more scientific policy decision-making. He stressed that
leaders must respect the rights of the people to fully air their views and must
not be afraid of differences of views or even opposing views and only in the
highly free academic atmosphere was it possible to have all good ideas come
out.9 The Thirteenth National Party Congress in 1987 clearly put forward the
long-term goal of the reform of the political system, that is, to establish an effi-
cient and vigorous socialist political system with a high degree of democracy
and a perfect legal system. China should not copy the “checks and balances”
system of the West or rotating rules by multiple parties, but it should continue
its People’s Congress system and the multiparty cooperation and political consul-
tation system under the leadership of the Party following the principle of
democratic centralism. China should establish a social consultation and dialogue
system and open wider the activities of leading organs and let the people know
about major situations and have major problems discussed among the people.
During their period, apart from the core role of Deng Xiaoping, the collective
leadership played an increasingly important role. This was also a period during
which major policy decisions were quite successful and even if there were
errors, they were corrected in a timely fashion, demonstrating the flexibility and
adaptability of policy decisions. The policy decision-making mechanism devel-
oped from “one-man decision-making” to “collective decision-making.” So, this
period may be regarded as “an era for collective policy decision-making.”
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the central authorities have become more
and more attentive to views from experts of all disciplines. The central lead-
ership time and again stressed the importance of respecting science, respecting
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knowledge and respecting experts,” and always heard views from both Chinese
and foreign experts in major policy decision-making. This helped to reduce
errors and to correct errors in a timely fashion. This period may be regarded
as “an era of policy decision-making through consultation.”
To make policy decisions more scientific and democratic is a process of insti-
tutionalization, standardization and proceduralization. In 1992, the Fourteenth
Party Congress stated that to make policy decision-making more scientific and
democratic was an important feature of democratic centralism and an important
task of building a socialist democratic politics. Leading organs and leading offi-
cials must learn to listen to the views of the people and fully recognize the roles
of experts in all disciplines and consulting organization so as to accelerate the
pace of building a democratic and more scientific policy decision-making system.
In 1997, the Fifteenth Party Congress again reiterated the idea of making social-
ist democracy systematic and codified so that such a system and legal system
would not change with the changes in leaders or with changes in the attention
of leaders. In 2002, the Sixteenth Party Congress made it more clear how to pro-
mote scientific and democratic policy decision-making, calling on policy deci-
sion-making bodies at all levels to improve the rules and procedures for making
major policy decisions and to establish a system for hearing the opinions of the
people. It also introduced the announcement and information systems concern-
ing matters of major importance that are closely associated with the interests 
of the people, improved the expert consultation system, introduced the policy
decision feasibility study system and responsibility system so as to prevent arbi-
trariness in policy decision-making. All these demonstrate that the realization of
more democratic and scientific policy decision-making depends on institution
building and enforcement so as to ensure, institutionally, that policy decision-
making is not arbitrary, thus preventing policy blunders.
I have also gained through my study and experience an understanding as to
how to make policy decision-making more democratic and more scientific. In
my work China, Toward the 21st Century which was published by the China
Environmental Sciences Press in 1991, I advanced the view that the more we
know about national conditions, the less error we shall make in making policy
decisions; the deeper we have mastered the laws governing development, the
fewer setbacks we shall meet.
In 1998, I presented the view that one of the most important aspects of political
reform was to change the political policy decision-making, including making it
more scientific, democratic and specialized, as well as maintaining the continu-
ity and stability of public policies. This is because from the angle of economics,
both macro-economic and micro-economic policies all face one basic problem in
terms of either the employment of the market mechanism or decisions taken by
the government, namely, the incompleteness of information and uncertainties of
risks. Incomplete information may lead to market failure or government failure
or policy failure. The purpose of making policy decision-making more scientific,
democratic and specialist is to solve the problem of incompleteness of informa-
tion in the process. National conditions are very complicated and all kinds of
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contradictions are very sharp. The population is large and there are big dispari-
ties between different regions. To these we must add rapidly changing external
situations for which we have no foresight nor any panacea. What is needed is an
institutional guarantee for the scientific, democratic and specialist nature of pol-
icy decisions and for the continuity and stability of public policies. This includes
high-level think-tanks or advisory committees, which should undertake in-depth
studies of some major issues of strategic importance and policy-making, improv-
ing the government policy analysis organizations and effectively absorbing out-
standing personnel. We must establish policy review organizations and networks
to collect data and make a comprehensive national conditions analysis and carry
out investigations and assessments of the major policies, provide all kinds of
important knowledge and information, encourage internal and open debates on
public policies concerning the interest of all quarters, and increase the trans-
parency of the reports by the news media in the discussion of public policies.10
Although this is not the best target model for China’s political reform, it is the
most suitable model, which may form the self-development and evolutionary logic
of China’s political reform.
Later on, we went on to put forward the idea of formulating a “State Security
Law” and establishing a State Security Commission. The State Security
Commission should be led directly by the state president and made up of leaders
of departments of foreign affairs, national defense, security, public security,
central bank, finance, foreign trade, planning, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
The commission should be put in charge of the short-, medium- and long-term
security strategies, programs of action and plans for execution and should handle
major breaking events concerning state security and should coordinate the
programs of action of all departments.11 We also proposed setting up an economic
advisory committee for the premier to study major economic issues and put
forward major policy conceptions and issued an annual white paper on economic
and social development.
One of the outstanding features of the new government has been to carry
out reform and improve the policy decision-making mechanism and make great
efforts to make policy decision-making more scientific and democratic. In March
2003, the revised “Rule of Procedures of the State Council” stressed the import-
ance of scientific and democratic policy decision-making and of persisting in
conducting administrative affairs according to law and strengthening democratic
oversight. The document clearly provides that before the State Council takes
any major policy decisions, it must hear the views of and suggestions by
democratic parties, people’s organizations and experts and scholars and give
full scope to democracy. It has let people speak out and absorb what is good
so as to prevent errors in policy decisions and make them more scientific and
extensively accepted and better implemented.
In fact, the practice started with Premier Zhu Rongji. In February 1998, I
wrote the first national conditions report “Create More Jobs for the People:
China’s Unemployment Problem and Employment Strategy.” Zhu Rongji and
Wu Bangguo, who were then vice-premiers, wrote an important note to the
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report. After that, we went on to provide several national conditions reports
and related materials to the State Council led by Zhu Rongji. We wrote national
conditions reports in order to “get a clear picture of the national conditions,
show concern for the people’s livelihood, offer our opinions and influence the
national policies.” Our reports concentrated on problems concerning the people’s
livelihood, covering such issues as laid-off workers, social security, the income
of peasants, the poverty in areas inhabited by minority people, ecology and
environmental protection and social equality. These reports have caught the
attention of State Council leaders, who made a number of notes. I, myself,
attended two expert forums called by Premier Zhu Rongji, where I put forward
my policy recommendations. I was deeply impressed with the fact that at the
forums, Premier Zhu Rongji encouraged experts to air their views and even
debates.
After Wen Jiabao took office as the premier, I attended two expert forums
presided over by Wen. Premier Wen Jiabao made several notes to our national
conditions reports. I also attended two forums on clean government presided
over by Wu Guanzheng, member of the CPC Central Committee and secretary
of the Central Disciplinary Commission, at which I stated my suggestions
concerning the building of a clean government system.
On April 13, 2003, I wrote an article “Cope with Global SARS Crisis Actively
in an All-Round Manner.” The second day, I submitted the report to the CPC
Central Committee and the State Council. This was the first report on how to
deal with the SARS crisis delivered to the CPC Central Committee and the
State Council. I put forward a nine-point proposal, which was adopted. By the
end of June, I wrote and compiled 32 SARS study reports, providing the policy
decision-makers with information, knowledge and recommendations for making
policy decisions.
The national conditions reports collected in this book mainly focus on the
major challenges to China’s development after the Party’s Sixteenth National
Congress, how to respond effectively and take up challenges, how to deal with
the serious losses caused by the SARS crisis and what lessons can be drawn
from it. The core is how to understand the new approach to development, how
to realize the transition from the first generation of development strategy to the
second generation of development strategy. It should be said that the third
plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress for the first time established the new
“people first” approach to development, with new strategies for unified devel-
opment in five major aspects. The significance is no less important than the
decisions taken at the third plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee
twenty-five years ago. It has lent a new line of thought and established a new
mechanism for realizing the grand goal and historic mission of building a well-
off society that will benefit more than one billion people.
The major contribution that a scholar can make is to offer his knowledge to
the state and the people. In 2000, I and Zou Ping jointly wrote the article
“Society and Development: Study of the Regional Disparities in Social
Development in China” (Zhejiang People’s Publishing House). The article gives
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a detailed account of the new “people first” approach to development. In the
same year, I and Zou Ping recommended to the State Planning Commission
that “people first” should be the guiding thought for mapping out the Tenth
Five-Year Plan and Long-Term Development Program. The study laid an
academic foundation for coordinated development of the economy and society.
During the SARS crisis, on June 17, 2003 I attended the expert forum called
by Premier Wen Jiabao on how to strengthen public health so that it would
develop alongside social development. I stated my views, which left a deep
impression. On July 21, I published my article “On the People-First Approach
to Development” in the Liberation Daily in Shanghai. What is gratifying is that
not long afterwards, the view I presented was written into the decisions adopted
at the third plenum of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee. Such a situation
would have been impossible were it not for the major changes in the policy
decision-making process.
What is most important for a scholar is to have the courage to pursue his
studies relentlessly for the interests of the state and the people. On June 12,
2002 I wrote the article “The Party’s Sixteenth National Congress and Trends
in the Future of China,” in which I give full stress to the awareness that from
now on, China has entered a new stage of political development marked by
institutionalization, standardization and proceduralization of changes of Party
committee members and state leaders. One of the important hallmarks is retire-
ment at a prescribed age, not half-retirement or transfer of posts. This has been
thoroughly institutionalized. Another important hallmark is that the members
of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and members of the CPC
Central Committee secretariat are younger, reaching the average age formerly
obtaining at the Thirteenth Party Congress. The issue used to be very sensitive
and it used to be very risky to raise the issue before the Sixteenth Party Congress.
Courage is needed to put forward bold views. But it was for the sake of the
fundamental interests of the Party and state that I stated my views. This book
collects the article “The Sixteenth Party Congress and Replacement of Old
Officials with the New,” which gives an objective assessment of how the Party
realized the goal. It has in fact gone beyond my expectations. I am not sure
that our recommendations have played a positive role, but the fact that I dared
to speak out shows that the policy decision-making process in China has under-
gone encouraging changes.
If we say that A-bombs are material, good policies and public policies are
spiritual A-bombs (a famous metaphor of Mao Zedong). The key lies in how
to turn spiritual A-bombs into material A-bombs. Only when a scholar provides
knowledge that becomes public knowledge is it possible to have a social impact.
Only when research achievements have become public policies with positive
application, is it possible to influence social changes and push society forward.
It is not enough to have personal knowledge on major social and economic
issues. One must take the initiative to influence policy decision-makers so that
knowledge becomes the common understanding of not only policy-makers but
also the whole society. Only by doing this is it possible to benefit the people
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and promote social progress. I call this process knowledge innovation, spread
and contribution. Despite the fact that I teach at the Chinese Academy of
Sciences of Tsinghua University, I advocate the necessity of coming down from
the top of the pyramid and going into society. In order to become an outstanding
scholar, it is essential to lead the social tide with knowledge, to effectuate
changes in social concepts and to push social development, as history and histor-
ical assessment have shown.
At the same time, a more democratic society means everyone may have the
opportunity to offer his or her good ideas. This is determined by whether or
not you can obtain the latest knowledge in the world, whether or not you know,
assimilate and accumulate the best knowledge so far known to man and whether
or not you can localize this knowledge. This is the opportunity and challenge
brought about by reform and opening up.
Unlike the experience of the older generation of scholars such as Ma Yinchu,
our generation has had the opportunity to get involved in this reform and devel-
opment era on a scale never witnessed in human history and we may contribute
to society with our acquisition, innovation, spread and exchange of knowledge.
Research into national conditions is so tempting that I will never be able to
stop studying, thinking, researching and writing.
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